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ABSTRACT 
Title: 
The Tahrir Effect: History, Space, and Protest in the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 
By 
Atef S. Said 
Chair: George Steinmetz 
 
In this dissertation, I approach Cairo’s famed Tahrir Square as both a political space and a lens 
for understanding the successes and failures of the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. I identify and 
explore a seeming paradox: on the one hand, the emergence of Tahrir as the central voice of the 
revolution amplified the event, drew attention to it, and assisted in mobilization, but on the other 
hand, the centralization of the revolution in one place also delimited further mobilizations, 
marginalized certain voices and issues within Tahrir itself, and possibly prevented a more radical 
revolutionary agenda from developing. Building upon and expanding the sociological literature 
on repertoires of contention, spaces in contention and revolutions as a processes, I argue that a 
diverse but specific set of historical conditions constituted Tahrir as the center of the revolution 
and relegated mobilization efforts beyond the square to the margins. These conditions included 
the media obsession with Tahrir, the regime’s attempts to limit mobilization to Tahrir and the 
regime’s own paradoxical endorsement of Tahrir as its central counterpart. They also included 
the historical significance of Tahrir itself, which made it an idealized location for protest, the 
reliance on a sit-in as the central mode of action, and the history of coalition building in and 
around Tahrir. Together, these conditions created a conjuncture of processes that made Tahrir the 
most powerful center of gravity of the Egyptian Revolution, the pivot point around which a 
revolutionary boundary was established. I develop a spatio-historical analysis in which I link the 
square’s historical constitution as a political space to the long history of political protest in Egypt. 
I then examine how it was that Tahrir Square emerged as the central space and voice of the 
revolution, the point at which multiple repertoires of revolution converged. I study not only how 
the Tahrir sit-in became the central repertoire of the revolution, but also its relation to important 
modes of action such as labor strikes and popular committees in other urban centers in Egypt. I 
also give attention to the marginalization of certain voices and agendas within Tahrir itself. 
Through a close analysis of the interconnected forces of space, class, and social media, I show 
how the goals and demands of the revolution were distilled and, ultimately, defanged. The 
dissertation is based on extensive ethnographic work, historical research, and 106 interviews 
conducted over the course of two research trips—one from February 4, 2011, to April 16, 2011, 
which overlapped with the revolution itself, and another from July 16, 2012, to January 5, 2013.
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction: Studying Tahrir, Studying Egypt’s Revolution 
	  
Figure 1  Tahrir Square, February 10, 2011, one day before the ousting of Mubarak.   
(Picture by NBC news) 
 
Several analysts, media circles, and scholars have described 2011 as the year of global 
uprisings (Schiffrin and Kircher-Allen 2012).1 In addition to the so-called Arab Spring—named 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, for example, the 2011 page for the Global Uprisings.org website, available at: 
http://www.globaluprisings.org/2011/ (last accessed June 30, 2014); a Democracy Now! video feature, 
“Year of Global Uprisings, from the Arab Spring to Occupy Wall Street: A Special Look Back at 2011,” 
available at http://www.democracynow.org/2012/1/2/year_of_global_uprisings_from_the (last accessed 
June 30, 2014); and Jeffrey Juris and Maple Razsa, “Occupy, Anthropology, and the 2011 Global 
Uprisings,” Cultural Anthropology Online, July 27, 2012, http://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/63-occupy-
anthropology-and-the-2011-global-uprisings (last accessed June 30, 2014).  
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after the People’s Spring or Springtime of the Peoples in Europe in 1848—widespread public 
protests spread to Europe and the US, most notably through various “Occupy” movements.2 
Time magazine chose “the protestor” as the “Person of the Year” for 2011.3 In short, there was 
discussion all across the globe among academics, activists, and analysts regarding how to make 
sense of these events and their apparent spread within and beyond the Arab world. One of the 
main themes that emerged was the very idea of occupation—what it meant to “occupy” both real 
and symbolic space, and why this was effective as a form of protest. In September 2011, the 
progressive magazine Adbusters ran an editorial that described the New York-based Occupy 
Wall Street movement as “America’s Tahrir moment.”4 And even after 2011, in events like the 
Taksim Square protests in Turkey in 2013 and protests in Ukraine that started in 2013 and 
continued until the end of February 2014, a common theme began to repeat, referencing 
something called the Tahrir model, evoking memories of the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 when 
Egyptians occupied Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo from January 25 to February 11, 2011, 
until nationwide protests led to the ousting of President Hosni Mubarak, who had ruled Egypt 
since 1981.5  
References to the Tahrir model or the Tahrir moment have become widespread, yet the 
discussion has taken new turns as analysts debate what exactly are the lessons learned from this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 There are some debates regarding the name “Arab Spring” and its origins; see Joshua Keating, “Who 
First Used the Term Arab Spring?,” Passport – Foreign Policy Magazine blog, November 4, 2011, 
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/04/who_first_used_the_term_arab_spring (last accessed June 
30, 2014).  
3 http://content.time.com/time/person-of-the-year/2011/ (last accessed June 30, 2014).  
4 Paul B. Farrell, “America’s Tahrir Moment,” Adbusters, September 6, 2011, https://www.adbusters.org/ 
blogs/adbusters-blog/occupy-wall-street-will-lay-siege-us-greed.html (last accessed June 30, 2014).  
5 For various takes on the legacy and/or lessons of Tahrir, see, for example, Juan Cole, “Learning the 
Wrong Lessons from Tahrir Square,” http://www.juancole.com/2013/06/learning-assaults-protests.html 
(last accessed June 30, 2014); and Andrew Barwig, “Why New Electoral Rules Matter,” Foreign Policy, 
February 21, 2011, http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/18/why_new_electoral 
_rules_matter (last accessed June 30, 2014).  
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model, and critics question whether the model can be simply exported to new contexts 
irrespective of its original historical circumstances (Ali 2013; Cole 2013). Patrick Cockburn 
(2014), a journalist for The Independent in the UK, specializing in the Middle East, has critiqued 
protestors in the region for relying too heavily on what he calls the Tahrir formula—a mode of 
action that he suggests has become increasingly discredited:  
At this time, revolutionaries in the Arab world believed they had hit on a winning 
formula in confronting a repressive state. Peaceful protesters would take over a 
square or central space in a capital city, such as Tahrir Square in Cairo or the 
Pearl Roundabout, Bahrain, which became the symbol of resistance and the 
rallying point for demonstrators. It was also the stage where every charge by the 
police and counter-charge by protesters would be played out before the cameras. 
A simple narrative of peaceful people resisting a brutal despotic regime could be 
established. 6 
 
But is this formula as simple as Cockburn suggests? What exactly is the Tahrir model anyway? 
Implicit in most references to the model is a highly problematic suggestion that there were no 
other protests going on outside of Tahrir Square, though we know, of course, that this was hardly 
the case. The conflation of Tahrir with the events of early 2011 in Egypt is perhaps 
understandable, given the extent to which many scholars, activists, and analysts themselves have 
named the Egyptian Revolution itself after Tahrir Square (Cook 2011; Gardner 2011; A. Khalil 
2012; Mehrez 2012; Sowers and Toensing 2012; Tschirgi et al. 2013). The issue is more than 
mere semantics, however. To put it in sociological terms, why conflate a major event like a 
revolution with one specific repertoire of protest, namely, the occupation of a public space by 
protestors?7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/are-protesters-overthrowing-a-brutal-despot-or-merely-
bad-losers-at-the-polls-9131002.html (last accessed June 24, 2014). 
7 This kind of metonymic naming is not completely without precedent—see, most obviously, the student 
protests in China’s Tiananmen Square in 1989 (Calhoun 1989; Hershkovitz 1993; Mason and Clements 
2002; Zhao 2001). The two main differences between the Tiananmen experience of 1989 and Tahrir in 
2011 are: 1) the first was only a student movement, while the second was a national uprising, 2) the first 
was suppressed and did not continue, but the second presumably succeeded in ousting the country’s 
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Two main questions drive this dissertation. The first asks why this event called the 
Egyptian Revolution of 2011 has been attributed or reduced to what happened in Tahrir Square. 
The second question examines what effect this naming and focusing of attention had on events 
themselves—in short, to what extent and in what ways was the turning of the Egyptian 
Revolution into the Tahrir Revolution constitutive of what happened. The second question needs 
some elaboration. The event known as the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 entails many challenges 
for research, but for many observers, the very ousting of Mubarak on February 11, 2011 took a 
confusing form and remains a puzzle to be explained.  On that day, the Vice President, Omar 
Soliman, appointed by Mubarak himself only a few days earlier, announced that Mubarak is 
“giving up his power, and transferring the administration of the nation to the Supreme Council of 
Armed Forces.”8 On its face, the outcome was an odd one to hail as a “victory” for a revolution: 
the Army, a significant component of the state, was to “administer” the transition away from the 
very regime of which it was part and against which the revolution took place. Yet, actors both 
within and beyond Egypt celebrated the announcement. The US administration, for example, 
praised this as an “orderly transition” and most commentators in the mainstream media followed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
dictator. For an explicit discussion of the links between Tiananmen and Tahrir, see Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, 
“From Tahrir Square to Tiananmen: Why the Egyptians Succeeded in 2011 but the Chinese Failed in 
1989?," Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia 10, no. 2 (2011): 41–46. Within the Arab region, one 
might also note the Bahrain uprising of 2011, which is named after the Pearl Roundabout, but which was 
suppressed. I will discuss this uprising and the role of spatialities in the Arab Spring further in the 
conclusion of the dissertation.  
8 See the announcement here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HzwAu8f6gG8&feature=kp (last 
accessed June 30, 2014). After the announcement, Egypt witnessed many debates at least for the first few 
months. One focused on why Mubarak/SCAF used the word “administration,” instead of “ruling,” while 
others asked on what basis and with what legitimacy SCAF was ruling the country—in short, was 
SCAF’s legitimacy derived from the revolution, or from the transfer of power by Mubarak? Some 
activists suggested that the term “administration” was used in order to give the (false) impression that 
military rule would be only temporary. As for the legitimacy of SCAF rule, this continued to be debated 
until the constitutional referendum of March 19, 2011, at which point SCAF argued that that their power 
now derived from those results. See Ahdaf Soueif, “About the Army, the People and the Three Choices,” 
El-Shorouk, February 28, 2011, http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=28022011&id= 
71e8bcf0-b3dd-4cef-9086-2f7e0be890f7 (last accessed June 28, 2014).  
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suit, offering few critiques of the transfer of power.9 It soon became clear that for both the 
Egyptian Army and the country’s international allies, the main concern was managing the 
process of transition, rather than assuring the democratic nature of its content.  
I will not focus on the question of transition here, as this is not the focus of my 
dissertation and others have ably analyzed the details of the process (Azzam 2012; Brown 2013; 
Elgindy 2012; Sharp 2012). Instead, my aim is to ask how and why protestors accepted this 
outcome. To the extent that all those people had gathered in Tahrir Square and captured both the 
country’s and the world’s attention, why then did they accept this announcement as the victory 
they’d been waiting for and disperse from the square shortly thereafter? There are many complex 
reasons why Egyptian protestors trusted the army or at least appeared to do so, some of which 
were historical, and others of which were simply strategic and focused on seeking the neutrality 
of the army during the uprising (Ketchley 2014; Said 2012).  The army proposed at the time that 
they would manage the transition and make political reforms based on people’s demands.  Of 
course, this is not what happened, as the army resisted reforms and neither the protestors who 
were in Tahrir nor wider segments of the society were allowed to participate fully in the design 
of the supposed road map to democracy.10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See, for example, Karen DeYoung, “Obama Administration Aligns Itself with Protests in Egypt with 
Call for ‘Orderly Transition’,” Washington Post, January 31, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/01/30/AR2011013004401.html (last accessed June 30, 2014); Adam Hanieh, 
“Egypt's' Orderly Transition'? International Aid and the Rush to Structural Adjustment,” Jadaliyya-Ezine, 
May 29, 2011, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1711/egypts-%E2%80%98orderly-transition 
%E2%80%99-international-aid-and- (last accessed June 30, 2014); and Mark Landler, “Clinton Calls for 
‘Orderly Transition’ in Egypt,” New York Times, January 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/31/ 
world/middleeast/31diplo.html?_r=0 (last accessed June 30, 2014). 
10 Beyond just resisting reform, the military also used excessive violence in the year and half under SCAF 
rule. A few month after ousting Mubarak, Abdallah El-Senawy, a prominent Nasserist journalist close to 
military circles interviewed a high-ranking official who described SCAF’s goals during this period, 
saying: “It was one of our top priorities to stop the unrelenting revolutionary temper and movement. Such 
a movement could have led to the obliteration of the military, the economic and the security system, and 
the state apparatus,” http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=25032012&id=7011e40a- 
d983-49f6-9597-c6df582c177f (last accessed June 30, 2014).  
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Fueled by disappointment and hindsight, much commentary and analysis since that 
moment has focused on trying to explain what went wrong, how the revolution fell short, and 
whether, indeed, the events of 2011 warrant the term “revolution” at all. On March 21, 2011, 
prominent Egyptian journalist and writer Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, described what the 
protestors had essentially accomplished as follows: “After an impressive revolution to the world, 
they reached for the moon, but then settled for just ordering some kabobs.”11 Heikal was 
criticizing the voting patterns of the first constitutional referendum after the revolution, which 
revealed that many voters preferred only minor amendments to the old constitution. But why go 
to all the trouble of staging a revolution and then seek only relatively modest political reforms? 
To put it another way, how was it that Egypt witnessed a true “revolutionary situation,” yet still 
ended up with only a “poor outcome.”12 On the night of January 28, 2011, Mubarak’s regime 
was incapable of controlling the state, after what seemed to be a major defeat and the withdrawal 
of police forces. As will be discussed in Chapters Two and Three, on that day, the battle between 
protestors and the police lasted almost all the entire day, ending with the withdrawal of police 
from most police stations and streets in urban centers, including Cairo and Tahrir Square. 
Mubarak ordered the military to intervene, but the military was unwilling or prevented from 
using violence against protestors given the latter’s sheer numbers and a likely calculation that it 
was no longer in the military’s interests to side with Mubarak. The question remains, however, 
why, given the existence of a revolutionary situation, protestors in Egypt did not push for more 
than modest political reforms?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/120696 (last accessed June 30, 2014). 
12 I am using the word “outcome” here cautiously, and only for analytical purposes, as my aim is to study 
the revolution as a process, not to focus on causes and outcomes. The question of whether or not Egypt 
constituted a revolutionary situation in 2011 is discussed further in the review of literature on revolutions.  
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This dissertation examines the symbolic and actual containment of the Egyptian 
Revolution to Tahrir Square, asking both how and why this happened, and with what effects. In 
short, I use Tahrir Square as a lens through which to understand the seeming successes and 
failures of the events that took place in Egypt from January 25, 2011 to February 11, 2011.13 
This focus on Tahrir is very useful both empirically and analytically. Empirically, several 
scholars have suggested, rightly, that Tahrir was an extremely important—if not the most 
important—site of the revolution. They have variously described Tahrir during the time of the 
revolution as a “liberated zone,” a “quasi-utopian community,” a “revolutionary space,” a ”self-
ruled community,” and a place that embodied a “time out of time” (Amar 2013a; Bamyeh 2011; 
El-Ghobashy 2011a; Gunning and Baron 2013; Holmes 2012; Sabea 2013). Authors have 
offered different takes on Tahrir, but the common denominator of their analyses is that the 
dynamics of Tahrir are read as metonymic of the dynamics of the revolution at large.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 To my knowledge, there has been no comprehensive study that investigates the role of Tahrir in relation 
to the Egyptian revolution. One exception to this is the book Why Occupy a Square? by Jeroen Gunning 
and Ilan Zvi Baron (2013). Gunning and Baron spend one chapter discussing how Tahrir was an 
important revolutionary space in the revolution. I provide a similar discussion, but I go further to argue 
that Tahrir became constructed as the main revolutionary space of the revolution. In addition to this, this 
research differs from that of Gunning and Baron in two ways. First, I study the spatial history of Tahrir in 
relation to the larger mobilization political history in Egypt. Second, I also investigate the negative 
impacts of the centrality of Tahrir in relation to the revolution, something Gunning and Baron do not 
explore. 
 
Another notable exception is an important article by Nasser Rabbat, a professor of Architecture at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Rabbat focuses on the built environment of Tahrir and its complex 
political and cultural meaning (2011). He discusses the meaning and history of important pieces of 
architecture in Tahrir, but also how the built environment of Tahrir contributed to protestors’ use of and 
interaction with it as a space and symbol of their revolution. I discuss this in different parts of this 
dissertation. But while Rabbat gives some attention to history, it is not his primary focus; whereas my aim 
is to elaborate the different ways in which the history of Tahrir has been relevant to contention there in 
the present. Also, my focus is not on the architectural history of Tahrir; rather, my aim is to situate Tahrir 
in the history of contention in Egypt. 
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The focus on Tahrir is also analytically useful to understand the revolution. If we agree 
that Tahrir became the center of action (for better or worse), then Tahrir also  provides us with an 
amplified view of the larger revolution. If we ask an average person in the US and or Europe 
what they know about the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, other than ousting Mubarak, they will 
talk about the image of Tahrir Square. And the irony is that this view exists not only in the US 
and Europe, but within Egypt as well. Hence, this very amplification and this very fact of 
reducing the revolution to its main site and its main strategy of occupation provide us with both 
useful analytical problems and insights about the larger event of the revolution.  
As I will explain further in this chapter’s discussion of methods, the main timeframe of 
the dissertation is the 18 days of the revolution (January 25 to February 11) and the main site is 
Tahrir Square. One could certainly argue that by focusing my study of the revolution in this way, 
I am simply repeating the problem of reductionism. While I focus on Tahrir and the 18 days, 
however, my point is not to suggest that other sites and times were not significant; indeed, what I 
seek to highlight is precisely what was afforded and excluded or ignored as a result of the 
narrowing of the revolution to Tahrir that happened at the time and shaped events and 
understandings as they unfolded. Once we take the centering of attention and energy on Tahrir as 
a social fact requiring explanation and analysis, then it makes sense to focus our own study there, 
while also seeking to locate Tahrir within the spatial, historical, and political contexts and 
trajectories that made it so significant.   
Certainly, I argue that it is a common mistake to assume that this revolution had a clear 
beginning and end, and happened only in 18 days, disconnected from its previous history, and 
also located in a one place, disconnected from other places. This perspective is simply ahistorical, 
and as I will show in this dissertation, does not give attention to the complex isolation/connection 
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between Tahrir/Cairo and their placement in Egyptian politics and history. Also, instead of 
falling in the trap of only focusing on Tahrir, I have taken care to include important modes of 
action that took place outside Tahrir and Cairo. Specifically, in Chapter 5, I examine labor strikes 
leading up to and during the revolution, and also the formation of what were called “popular 
committees” in major urban centers to protect neighborhoods lacking any police presence. 
I include these events and spaces beyond Tahrir, however, in order to explore the effect 
that Tahrir had upon them—how it amplified and/or delimited their scope and significance. I am 
well aware of radical activists’ frustration with the fact that, in the eyes of many, the revolution 
has been reduced to Tahrir. In focusing on Tahrir myself, I seek not to endorse or reify that 
reduction, but rather to investigate it—to trace how exactly it happened and with what effects, 
positive and negative.  I similarly want to avoid overly simplistic, verging on caricatured, 
generalizations about the revolution—for example, that it was all about middle-class youth with 
social media savvy who occupied Tahrir Square until they ousted their dictator. My goal, instead, 
is to study Tahrir as an amplified space during the revolution and to situate the square and those 
who occupied it within both the mobilization history of Egypt and the country’s specific 
spatiality of contention, or what I describe as “political public space” in Chapter 2.  
I argue that the Egyptian revolution cannot be understood without analyzing the 
intersections of street politics, formal politics and social media as three arenas of continuous 
political struggle, where tensions and battles, both virtual and real, play out between the regime 
and various forms of opposition. With regard to the realm of social media in particular, I offer an 
intervention vis-à-vis simplistic accounts that would locate this newly emergent space in a 
historical and political vacuum. Instead, I contextualize the role and impact of social media in 
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relation to both the history of protests in Egypt and other spaces in which contentious politics 
operate.  
The main argument of the dissertation is that Tahrir Square and the mobilization around it 
played a significant role in the Egyptian Revolution, but this role was paradoxical. I describe this 
as the “Tahrir Effect.” This effect refers to the way in which, on the one hand, the emergence of 
Tahrir as the central voice and site of the revolution served to amplify the event, draw attention 
to it, and assist in mobilization; but on the other hand, this centralization of mobilization in one 
form and in one place also distracted from other kinds of organizing, silenced other voices and 
issues, and limited further radicalization of the revolution in ways that might have demanded 
more than political reform and a post-Mubarak transition managed by the military. In the 
chapters that follow, I elaborate on the historical conditions that contributed to this Tahrir Effect, 
explore the spatial dynamics of the effect and how it shaped the specific forms of mobilization 
that developed, and weigh both its positive and negative implications for what happened both 
during the 18 days of revolution and, to some extent, after.14 
The rest of this introduction is divided into three sections. In the first section, I discuss 
two issues related to the focus of this dissertation: one addresses the idea of squares and public 
spaces in general, and the other comments on Tahrir’s position in the city of Cairo and the 
latter’s relation to the rest of the country. In the second section, I lay out the main theoretical 
framework/threads of this dissertation. And in this third section, I end with a description of my 
methods, as well as a discussion of my methodological rationale and my own positionality.  
 
I. Squares, Tahrir, and Cairo 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 It is important to emphasize, however, that my focus is not on assessing the aftermath of 2011, in 
particular more recent events in Egypt, though I do touch briefly on the contemporary situation in the 
dissertation’s conclusion.  
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The idea of public space has existed since early Greek civilization and the Roman 
Empires. Ancient Greek cities had what is called agora, this was a central place in the city that 
was open for meetings and activities of citizens. In the Roman Empire, the forum served the 
same purpose and was the center of civic life for citizens.  The shapes, meanings, and purposes 
of such open spaces have varied since ancient times through medieval until modern or so called 
postmodern times, and also varied across cultures and political systems (Chidester 1989; 
Corrigall 2011; Herzog 2006; Kleiner 2014; MacDonald 1986). Some countries do not have open 
public squares at all. Across history, gates and walls have been built to establish the separation 
and security of such spaces, which have been designated for different sorts of meetings and 
gatherings. Yet, despite all these historical and regional variations, the one thing common to all 
such public spaces is that their degree and form of openness is shaped primarily by the economic 
and political power structure in a given society in relation to space. In sum, the very making of 
public spaces entails power relations; the control of space entails both physical contestations and 
contestations over the meanings of places. Squares and public space are sites of contestation in 
relation to the social control of space and the very meaning or limitations of openness. Such 
spaces are also relevant to protest as, indeed, crowds need a place to gather. As such, then there 
may be nothing new per se in the story of Tahrir, but this does not detract from the fact that we 
still need to study the specificity of each case spatially, politically, and historically in order to 
address the following questions: How do specific governments deal with public space? How and 
why do protestors choose one place over others for protest? Also, why are protests in some 
spaces tolerable in the eyes of a ruling regime, while gatherings in other spaces are more 
troubling?  
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For example, on March 23, 2013, French anti-riot police clashed with 300,000 protestors 
demonstrating against gay marriage on the Champs-Élysées.15 But a few years earlier, in 2009, 
French farmers were not prevented from blocking the same avenue when they burned bales of 
hay and demanded government help with the radical fall of grain prices.16 There is no simple 
answer to the contrast here, but in discussions with friends and colleagues who are immersed in 
French politics, I learned that the meanings of places of protest vary from one political faction to 
another.17 For example, Place de la République and Place de la Nation in Paris as well as Place 
de la Bastille have been traditional places of protest for the left. The right, on the other hand, 
typically holds rallies at the Place de la Concorde, the Champ de Mars, or the Trocadéro. And the 
far right usually has rallies by the statue of Joan of Arc near the Louvre (on the Rue de Rivoli). 
Of course, these rules aren’t absolute, but there are definite tendencies and longstanding 
traditions that have been followed to this day. On May 1, 2012, for example, Sarkozy held his 
election rally in Trocadéro, while Hollande held his victory party on May 6, 2012 at the Place de 
la Bastille.  
Similar patterns can be discerned in Egypt. During the uprising of 2011, after the ousting 
of Mubarak, pro-Mubarak supporters protested in Al-Mohandeeseen, in front of Moustafa 
Mahmoud Mosque. Then under the rule of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), pro-
SCAF supporters rallied in and around Abbassyya Square and El Manasa/The Unknown Soldier 
Memorial in Nasr city in Cairo, while pro-democracy protestors reserved Tahrir Square for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2298497/Riot-police-clash-protesters-Paris-300-000-streets-
demonstrate-gay-marriage.html (last accessed June 30, 2014).  
16 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/16/champselysees-french-farm_n_323461.html (last accessed 
June 30, 2014).  
17 I am thankful to my colleague and friend Mathieu Desan, who alerted me to these differences and 
provided me with some details.  
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themselves.18 My point here is to emphasize that the relation between space and protest is more 
complicated than one simple story (Sewell 2001; Tilly 2000). Factors such as capital, power 
relations, democracy, authoritarianism, and the history of meanings make each story of space and 
protest unique. It is one of the aims of this dissertation to situate Tahrir Square into the 
contemporary political protest history in Egypt, as I will do in Chapter Two. I will also situate 
my analysis in what I describe as the political public space under Mubarak’s authoritarianism.  
The second note here concerns Tahrir’s position in Cairo. It is, of course, significant that 
Tahrir is located in the center of Cairo, the country’s capital. Cairo is a huge, cosmopolitan city 
with a multilayered history, full of contradictions rendered visible in the form of highly 
modernized developments alongside slums. The dynamics of the city are shaped by 
neoliberalism and extreme poverty at the same time. The public space in Cairo reflects and is 
shaped by all these dynamics, but it goes beyond this research to discuss in detail how these 
dynamics shaped the protest in Tahrir (see, for example, AlSayyed 2013; Bayat and Denis 2000; 
De Koning 2009; Fahmi 2009; Sabry 2010; Singerman and Amar 2006; Verdeil 2011). Similarly, 
it is important to acknowledge that although I focus here on Cairo and Tahrir, the events of 2011 
were by no means confined to these spaces. A complete understanding of the Egyptian 
revolution must consider also what happened in rural and Upper Egypt,19 as well as forms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 After Mubarak’s ouster, there were ongoing battles over who could occupy Tahrir and “to whom the 
square belonged,” as put by Egyptian historian Khaled Fahmy; see http://www.shorouknews.com/ 
columns/view.aspx?cdate=23092012&id=e9eeb0ef-0b77-4c9f-a04a-2d09d18d8f48 (last accessed June 30, 
2014).  
19 Upper Egypt is the term used conventionally in Egypt to refer to the countryside in southern Egypt. In 
general, the question of the south’s participation in the revolution is complicated. One of the reasons is 
the fact that many cities in the south are shaped by complex family and tribal networks, which are 
engaged in a different model of dealing with the government than protest.  That is why protests in this 
area were smaller and scattered. In many of these cities, families and leaders of tribe have arms and have 
witnessed terrorist attacks. This also holds true for the Sinai. Elections in these cities are run differently 
than in Cairo and other urban centers. For more on this, see: http://al-akhbar.com/node/182116 (last 
accessed June 30, 2014); http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=17012012&id= 
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mobilization and protest that took place in locations such as Mahala, Alexandria, Suez, and other 
cities along the Nile Delta and Suez Canal. While it has been a common assumption among 
many analysts that the revolution took place only in Cairo and urban centers, there is ample 
evidence that protests took place in the cities of Upper Egypt, especially in Assiut, Qena, Aswan, 
Sohag, El Minya, and Beni Suef. Most of these protests were scattered and not covered by the 
media. For example, a group in Egypt called the South Center of Rights engaged in a project in 
which they collected 300 videos on their YouTube channel of protests took place in these 
southern cities during the 18 days of the revolution.20  
The other issue complicating Tahrir’s relation with the rest of the country is that many of 
the protestors in the square actually came from outside of Cairo. This fact gave more power of 
representation to Tahrir, and also complicated the story about protests outside Tahrir. As I detail 
further in the methods section, I conducted research in three other major cities in Egypt, all of 
which had a strong impact on the events of the Egyptian revolution in different ways. Mahala 
witnessed what may be considered a true rehearsal of the Egyptian revolution in 2008, when its 
textile workers attempted a general strike that was suppressed with force by the authorities, 
sparking mass riots in the city. Suez also witnessed serious clashes by protestors and police 
authorities over January 25–27, including the first death of a protestor. These events galvanized 
anger and protests in Cairo. Alexandria, the most populous city after Cairo, was also key in that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
913e8ecb-a432-4395-8a63-0db43fa6c0aa (last accessed June 30, 2014); http://revsoc.me/politics/lsyd-
wlthwr/ (last accessed June 30, 2014); http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/16748/اﺍذﺫاﺍمﻡلﻝ-مﻡلﻝ-رﺭثﺙيﻱ-
؟دﺩيﻱعﻉصﺹلﻝاﺍ-ةﺓلﻝوﻭاﺍحﺡمﻡ-ةﺓيﻱلﻝوﻭأﺃ-مﻡهﻩفﻑلﻝلﻝ-ةﺓوﻭعﻉدﺩوﻭ-قﻕنﻥلﻝلﻝ (last accessed June 30, 2014); http://arabic.jadaliyya.com/pages/ 
index/16843/لﻝهﻩ-رﺭاﺍثﺙ-؟دﺩيﻱعﻉصﺹلﻝاﺍ-ةﺓلﻝوﻭاﺍحﺡمﻡ-مﻡهﻩفﻑلﻝلﻝ-ةﺓوﻭعﻉدﺩوﻭ-لﻝاﺍمﻡكﻙتﺕسﺱاﺍلﻝ-شﺵاﺍقﻕنﻥلﻝاﺍ (last accessed June 30, 2014); 
http://www.mandaraonline.com/جﺝاﺍهﻩوﻭسﺱ/عﻉوﻭرﺭشﺵمﻡ-يﻱبﺏاﺍبﺏشﺵ-قﻕيﻱثﺙوﻭتﺕلﻝ-ةﺓرﺭوﻭثﺙ-دﺩيﻱعﻉصﺹلﻝاﺍ/ (last accessed June 30, 
2014).  
20 See their YouTube channel and the project at: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCe4blkcf 
IFJFzR2t6ihJJzg (last accessed June 30, 2014).  
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it was the home of Khaled Said, the young Egyptian blogger whose torture and death served as 
the primary catalyst for the revolution. In each of these cities, a public square was a significant 
site of protest (Arbaeen Square in Suez, el-Shone in Mahala, and Ibrahim’s Square and mosque 
in Alexandria), yet in none of these locales did protestors successfully stage a full sit-in. The 
only attempt happened in Alexandria, but it lasted only two days and was not even in Ibrahim’s 
Square, but rather Masr Station Square (in front of the railway central station in Alexandria). 
In my interview with Mahienour El-Massry21 (December 19, 2012), an activist who 
played an important role in many mobilization efforts before and during the uprising, she 
explained why a sit-in didn’t develop in Alexandria: 
There were many reasons activists thought it does not make sense to stage a sit-in 
in Alexandria. The first of these is that we do not have the same government 
concentrated complexes like Tahrir. So if we stage a sit-in, then there will be no 
disruption of the state. The second reason is the geography of Alex. We have 
some big squares, but rallies were more important in Alexandria. It is a coastal 
city, and streets are long next to the Cornish, and rallies are more effective, as to 
make the revolution reach wider populations. Also at the time of the revolution 
Alexandria was away colder than Cairo. We will be simply staying in the streets 
and soaking wet from the rain. Also, despite how big Alex is, it is still a small city. 
There is no real need for a sit-in. you can protest all day and simply go home in 
15-20 min, unlike Cairo, where it is perhaps more convenient to stay in one place 
versus commuting in a horrible traffic. 
 
In the same interview, however, she also described the one failed attempt to stage a sit-in 
nonetheless.  She stated: 
Despite what I told you, some activists decided to stage a sit-in on February 1st. 
and they chose Masr Station Square.  And we said: we are here in a sit-in in 
solidarity with Tahrir.  And we intentionally decided upon this place not 
Ibrahim’s square, because the latter was a place of a mosque too. And we thought 
this place is more neutral and to avoid any religious connotation. The majority 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 All names in this dissertation are real names. Most of my informants were well-known bloggers and 
activists and all of them preferred to be quoted with their real names.  The interviews happened in 2011 
and 2012. Most of the informants obviously, and also I, would not have predicted the extensive degree of 
repression that is happening in Egypt now. I definitely plan to ask them again whether they want to keep 
their names as such in future versions of this manuscript, in light of the new political circumstances in 
Egypt. 
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were activists and artists from Alexandria. And some of the MB members were 
coordinating with us. And there were many debates with them on organization. 
But the total of people were 300. And actually we stayed one night. And it was 
without tents, despite the cold. But what happened is that on the second day, 
February 2. While in Cairo what is called the camel battle took place, thugs and 
ruling party militia and police came to attack us in the same time. Then this was 
simply ended in the second day. And we continued to do rallies and other things 
until February 11.  
 
Of course, one of the reasons why Cairo was so significant and why protests there were 
so much more successful relates to sheer numbers. Cairo is not only the political capital of Egypt, 
but it is also the most populous city. While the population of Egypt has reached 91 million, that 
of Cairo is estimated to be 9 million. This means that 10% of Egypt’s population is in the 
capital.22 Consequently, a mass protest in Cairo can have huge effects. In an unpublished paper, 
Ellis Goldberg (2013) proposes that whether or not the capital of a specific country is a “primate” 
city is crucial and played an important role in the Arab uprisings. Goldberg writes:  
That the capital is a primate city matters because it allows the possibility of 
rapidly assembled immense protests that paralyze the administrative and political 
life of a country.  Generally speaking the primate city is the largest city in a 
country and frequently contains between 10% and 25% of a country’s population. 
(2013: 3)   
 
Mark Traugott (1995b) has also discussed the role of capital cities in revolutions. He argues that 
capital cities in many cases reflect the centralization of government and politics, as well as the 
patterns of development and demographics within the nation. As I will discuss further in Chapter 
Three, the population of Cairo and the concentration of government buildings and centers of 
power in Tahrir Square played an important role in the revolution, as did the so-called “million 
person rallies” that garnered so much domestic and international attention. Tahrir is home to 
about ten government ministries, and in close proximity to both the cabinet headquarters and the 
parliament headquarters. Occupying Tahrir, in short, means effectively “occupying” and shutting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 This is according to Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) on 2012; 
see http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/51634.aspx (last accessed June 30, 2014).  
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down the government (see Figure 2). The ease with which we can identify this strategy now, 
however, should not be read as suggesting that such occupation was in any way easy or 
automatic. Indeed, one goal of this research is to highlight the risk and contingency of this 
process.  
  
 
 
	  
Figure 2  Tahrir Square, in relation to some important buildings in downtown Cairo. Visual 
designed by Stephen Farrell, Scott Nelson, Sergio Peçanha, Graham Roberts, Liam Stack, Alan 
McLean, and Archie Tse of the New York Times. Source: 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/02/03/world/middleeast/20110203-tahrir-square-
protest-diagram.html?hp#panel/5 (last accessed June 30, 2014). 
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II. Theoretical Framework 
 
 The literature on revolutions and social movements is immense. Jack Goldstone famously 
offered a classification of four generations of the scholarship on revolutions (2001). The first 
generation refers to the old natural history approach to study revolutions. This was very narrow 
and perceived revolutions in relation to modernization and stages. The second generation is the 
structural approaches to revolutions. This was very useful in understanding causes of revolutions, 
and limited these to structural reasons, but it gave no attention to processes. The third generation 
was still structuralist, but entailed comparisons. Classes, states and generally regimes were the 
basis of these comparisons. The fourth generation tried to give more attention to processes, 
agency and ideology in revolution, to overcome limitations of the previous generations, 
especially in understanding developing world’s revolutions.  
 The state-centered approach is useful to study the Egyptian regime crisis and the role of 
the military in the Egyptian revolution.23 I will not ignore the role of the military tout court. But I 
will touch upon it briefly due to its relevance of the analysis, especially with respect to the role 
of the military on the ground during the revolution, and how this is played out in relation with 
protestors. I address this issue in Chapter Four. The political economy/structuralist approach is 
useful to explain how neo-liberalism changed the regime structure in Egypt and also lead 
significant sectors in society, especially the unemployed and educated youth, to amass in critical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Regarding the advantages and limitation of state-centered approaches to revolutions, see Goodwin 
(1997). And for analyses focusing on the role of the military during the uprising, see Barany (2011) and 
Nepstad (2011).  	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numbers in Tahrir and elsewhere in Egypt.24 I do use some shadow comparisons throughout this 
dissertation, but my main concern is not to establish macro-causal arguments per se. 
The two dominant perspectives on social movement mobilization—namely, resource 
mobilization and framing—accord little attention given to space. The resource mobilization 
perspective, for example, would approach the Egyptian Revolution by focusing on the 
mobilization processes that led up to it, how resources were sustained over the eighteen days of 
protest, or how specific political or activist groups contributed to the sit-in in Tahrir Square. At 
best, this perspective might even look at the space of Tahrir as a mobilization resource itself, but 
it would not look specifically at the space of Tahrir as a meaningful factor in the protest.25  
Scholars working from the framing perspective, on the other hand, might ask how initial 
mobilizers for the revolution called for protests, while avoiding any divisive language.26 They 
might also examine how Tahrir became iconized after the revolution, eventually becoming a 
shorthand way for protesters to refer to the revolution itself. But what a framing perspective does 
not explain is why protesters headed to Tahrir in the first place, a question I raise in Chapter Two, 
and how protesters appropriated the previous history of Tahrir during the revolution.  
This dissertation is concerned mainly with the Egyptian revolution as a process. Neither 
the causes nor origins of the revolution, nor its results are the main focus here. These issues are 
discussed, to be sure, but only insofar as they contribute to an understanding of the revolutionary 
process. The same goes with the state and classes. I study the dynamics of state and classes as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  For analyses of the Egyptian Revolution from a political economy perspective, see Armbrust (2011); 
Joya (2011); Malik (2013); and Soliman (2011, 2012a).	  
25	  For examples of resource mobilization scholarship, see Jenkins (1983), McCarthy and Wolfson (1996), 
McCarthy and Zald (1977), and Zald and McCarthy (1979).	  
26 I touch upon the question of slogans and unifying language in Chapter Five, but I study this mainly 
with regard to the relation between mobilization in Tahrir and the actions took place outside Tahrir in 
mind. For examples of scholarship on the framing perspective, see Smith  (2002), Snow and Benford 
(1992; 2000), Oliver and Johnston (2000), William and Ranter (1996a), and Zald (1996). 
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manifested during the protests before and during the revolution. While studying protest and 
mobilization, spatially, I argue that we cannot study protest repertoires without also studying 
their relation to the Egyptian regime. My main concern here is to understand and explain how the 
revolution developed as a specific set of meanings and mobilizations centered in Tahrir Square 
and focused primarily on an agenda of limited political reform.  
Scholars of social movements recently started to express concerns that the scholarship in 
this field has became increasingly movements-centered or at least it does not give enough 
attention to the political context where movements works, (see for example Andrew Walder 
2009).  In the context of the Middle East, scholars also warned that scholarships about states and 
oppositions or movements tend to separate studying movements from states or only focus on 
what is described as a “polity centered analysis.” The latter refers to formal and institutional 
politics (Vairel 2011: 27).  The outcome is that no enough attention is given to studying political 
and social movements in their interactions with one another. And as Zhao (2010) proposes, we 
cannot study movements in authoritarian contexts using the same paradigms used to study the 
relatively open contexts without some skepticism. 
I take these warnings to heart. And I study the history of protest in Egypt before the 
revolution especially in the decade that preceded the revolution in relation to the Egyptian 
regime. I show that mobilization, the battle over space and repertoires of protest were shaped by 
the interactions and the tensions between the Egyptian authoritarian regime and movements in 
this period. In this dissertation, as the rest of the analysis shows, I emphasize the need to study 
authoritarianism on the ground; on the level of competing over spaces. I study the battle between 
protestors and movements over inches in streets. And I show how the famous Tahrir-sit in 
worked, where protestors were navigating their physical survival and mobilization at the same 
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time, in the context of the constant regime threats. The question of physical survival in 
mobilization is understudied in the literature of social movements.   
Due to this specific focus of the dissertation, in this section, I lay out only the main 
theoretical threads that run throughout the dissertation—threads that are also taken up and further 
elaborated in the appropriate chapters. Three primary bodies of literature inform the theoretical 
framework of this project: literature on repertoires of contention, literature on space in 
contentious politics, and literature on revolutions as a process. I will discuss these in order.  
 
Repertoires of Contention 
Charles Tilly (1986, 1995, 2006) coined the term “repertoires of contention” and 
developed a theoretical framework for studying them based on his extensive historical research 
of protest methods and rebellions in England and France. Repertories are specific techniques of 
protest. Tilly borrowed the idea of repertories from theater and suggested that participants in 
collective action tend to select their actions from those performances with which they are most 
familiar. Tilly argued that the modularity of repertoires shifted dramatically after the emergence 
of the nation-state  
For the purposes of this dissertation, the most important features of repertoires of 
contention is that they are: 1) context-specific, 2) shaped by the very regimes that they deployed 
against, and 3) temporally laden, bridging both the past and present. Let me discuss these in turn. 
First, despite the fact that many protest repertoires are now common and known across the globe, 
such as blocking roads, marching with banners, and signing petitions, Tilly’s theorization 
grounds specific repertoires in specific contexts. People rally with banners across the globe, but 
in each site, they use different approaches and methods. This distinction is crucial in this 
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dissertation. As I will show in Chapter 3, the formation of a culture of survival and strategies to 
aid protestors staging a sit-in already had a decade-long history. This was extremely important in 
helping the Tahrir sit-in to survive, particularly at critical moments and in the face of constant 
attacks by the police and ruling party supporters. Sit-ins existed and do exist in different places, 
they did not emerge only or without precedent in Tahrir and Egypt; rather, how a sit-in is 
organized and conducted reflects the history and dynamics of the space where the sit-in is staged.    
Second, repertoires of protest are shaped by the very regimes against which they are 
practiced. According to Tilly, the repertoire-regime relation can generally be classified in three 
ways: as prescribed, tolerated, or forbidden (Tilly 2006: 75). But as much as regimes shape and 
affect repertoires, protestors in terms of their claims and efforts to negotiate the degree of 
government tolerance or lack thereof make their own repertoires. This relation of influence and 
agency is important in my analysis. As I will show in Chapter 2, for example, in the decade 
before the revolution, Egyptian activists learned to innovate in various ways as they dealt with 
the very limited space for protests under Mubarak’s authoritarian regime.  They developed 
unique repertoires, such as simply standing on the stairs of professional syndicates and chanting 
to the streets, or organizing “stand-ins,” in which a small rally of sometimes a few hundred 
people would be cordoned off by a few thousand soldiers and anti-riot police. These repertoires 
reflected the battle with the regime over space. 
Third, repertoires are temporally laden because they are, by definition, practices chosen 
from memory and/or based on the familiarity or experiences of protestors.  Repertoires are like 
scripts, but this does not mean that they are rigid or that protestors apply them blindly. Indeed, as 
Tilly himself noted, protestors do change them (Tilly 2008 xi-xii). This aspect is important 
because, as I will argue in Chapter 3, one of the keys to the sit-in’s success in Tahrir was the fact 
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that protestors employed a combination of organization and spontaneity. Experienced organizers 
were helpful in setting up the camp in the beginning, drawing on their experiences from previous 
sit-ins, but they and other, less experienced protestors were also quite innovative and skilled at 
adapting on the fly in ways that contributed to the durability and efficiency of the camp. 
Temporality also was important insofar as the very idea of occupying the whole of Tahrir Square 
had deeply symbolic and historical resonance in the political protest history of Egypt.  As such 
my study of repertoires is both historical and relational. For example, in Chapter Two, I argue 
that we need to study repertoires in relation to one another. I show how the sit-in became the 
center of revolutionary actions and how this impacted other repertoires of action in other 
locations.  I explore, in short, how the sit-in—for better or worse—was to the Egyptian 
Revolution what barricades were to the French Revolution: dominant, effective, iconic, but also 
far from foolproof or preordained.  
Space and Contentious Politics 
I will move now to the literature on space and contentious politics, which also informs 
this dissertation. I build upon this literature and show that there was no one single meaning or 
way that Tahrir Square was spatially relevant to in the revolution. In Chapter 3, I show how the 
size of the square was crucial, especially when it came to the so-called million person rallies. 
Also in Chapter 3, I discuss how Tahrir constituted the endpoint for the many rallies coming 
from different directions and from different parts of Cairo. I examine, too, how the geography of 
Tahrir was significant in the battles with police. Regarding the conflicts on January 28, 2011, in 
particular, Ahmed Helmy, an Islamist and a human rights attorney, told me:  
The police’s plan A was to prevent protestors from reaching the square, and then 
plan B is to seize the square if some or many were able to reach it. But what 
happened is that due to the huge number of protestors, police was exhausted and 
defeated in many battles in many roads to Tahrir.  Police simply was fighting with 
	  24	  
	  
protestors in different battles in the same time most notably in Ramses St., Qasr 
al-Ainy St., and Qasr El-Nile Bridge. It was protestors who surprised the police 
and surprised themselves indeed, to reach Tahrir from different entrances coming 
from many routes, at the same time, all in the afternoon of January 28.27 
 
Both the protestors’ sheer numbers and the multiple points of access to Tahrir Square enabled 
protestors to surprise the police and even themselves, enabling them for the first time in Egyptian 
history to occupy and hold the entire square for a period that lasted for about two weeks.28  But it 
was not only the geographical feasibility and built-in environment of Tahrir Square that mattered 
for the revolution; I show also how the history and contested meanings of the space mattered. I 
show how the square’s significance in protest history impacted the mobilization for and during 
the revolution, and I also show how protestors themselves created and tweaked music and 
cultural materials to developed their own take on the meanings of Tahrir for further mobilization.  
In Chapter 5, I also expand on Tilly’s notions of contained and transgressive contention (2000: 
138) and synthesize this with a specific observation by Pierre Bourdieu (1999: 57) about the 
relevance of studying historical possibility, in order to argue that Tahrir created what I term a 
“revolutionary boundary,” delimiting who and what “counted” as part of the revolution.29   
To study the space of Tahrir in relation to the larger revolution raises a question about the 
role of space in general in relation to social movements and revolutions. The literature on space 
in relation to both phenomena is still emerging.  Some analyses focus on issues of space after 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Interview, November 2, 2012 
28 As I describe in Chapter 2, there were two earlier incidents in 1972 and 2003, in which protestors held 
only partial parts of the square and for periods of less than 24 hours.  
29 I am referring here to a specific idea Bourdieu made in his famous piece about the genesis of the state 
field (1999). In that text, Bourdieu emphasized how it is crucial for a proper historical analysis of the rise 
of the state as an idea/field is to reconstruct its genesis, and situate this within other conflicts and 
confrontations took place at the time. In other words, he suggested that there is a need to study the 
historical process that enabled the modern state to emerge from the field of “discarded possibilities 
(Bourdieu 1999: 57) available at the time. I elaborate further on this idea in Chapter 5 and how I found it 
useful to my analysis.  
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revolutions and focus accordingly on contests over memory and monuments.30 In the literature 
on social movements, we may recall that streets mattered in the protest movements in Seattle in 
1999 against the World Trade Organization (Smith 2001). And perhaps most famously, the 
Lincoln Memorial has been crucial in the civil rights movement and its legacy (Sandage 1993). 
These are just a few examples of scholars examining the significance of place in a movement.  
Kimmel  (1990) talks about the significance of space in relation to a revolution, but limits 
this only to the position of the state in its regional and global context. He states: 
Spatial and temporal issues frame the occurrence of revolution, and they must 
construct our analysis of revolution. By “spatial” I mean the levels of analysis of 
social structures that exist within, between and among societies located within a 
global context. By “temporal” I mean locating the revolutionary society, as well 
as the phenomenon of revolution itself, within historical time. (Kimmel 1990: 
218). 
  
Here, Kimmel limits the discussion on space to the global positioning of a given revolutionary 
society and its relation to regional context. Recently, David Harvey also emphasized, among 
other things, the role of specific urban features in relation to protest:  
It is also clear that certain urban environmental characteristics are more conducive 
to rebellious protests than others—such as the centrality of squares like Tahrir, 
Tiananmen, and Syntagma, the more easily barricaded streets of Paris compared 
to London or Los Angeles, or El Alto’s position commanding the main supply 
routes into La Paz. (2012: 117) 
 
In this passage, Harvey focuses on whether urban features are advantageous or not to protest. 
Harvey’s point here is similar to what Dingxin Zhao describes as the “ecology-based 
mobilization” in the case of the Tiananmen movement  (Zhao 2001: 239–66).  
 Sewell’s classical text about the invention of revolution in the Bastille (1996) is also 
worth looking at here. Sewell’s theory of historical events is mostly about action, temporality, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30See, for example, Leith (1991) on battles over monuments and buildings to commemorate the French 
Revolution.  
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and the transformation power of the event, not spatiality. Sewell famously defines a historical 
event as: “(1) a ramified sequence of occurrences that (2) is recognized as notable by 
contemporaries, and that (3) results in a durable transformation of structures” (1996: 844).31 
Sewell also invokes a note about Tilly’s notion of repertoire, acknowledging: “It is also true that 
in many respects the taking of the Bastille marked no great rupture with what Charles Tilly calls 
the “repertoire of contention” of the eighteenth-century urban dwellers” (Sewell 1996: 851). 
Although the focus of Sewell’s essay is not explicitly on space, one can see space in the text in 
two ways. The first is that the Bastille itself was a repository of significant symbolic power. This 
fact contributed to constituting the transformative power of the main event, the revolution itself. 
The second, which may be a stretch, is to see space in general as part of the social and cultural 
structure or the larger conditions in which the event is taking place, and which the event itself 
serves to re-articulate (Sewell 1996: 861–62). These are only implicit assumptions in the text, 
however, as the main objective of the text is temporality and eventfulness, not spatiality. I would 
argue, nonetheless, that Sewell’s notion of eventfulness is not aspatial.32  
 One notable exception to the virtual lack of explicit attention to spatiality in revolutions is 
Lynn Hunt’s work on the French Revolution (2004). Throughout her analysis, Hunt gives 
valuable attention to space. She shows, for example, how political space was opened in 1789 
through the competition between “the crown and the nobility, and between the nobles and the 
Third Estate” (Hunt 2004: 223). Most importantly, she addresses the material spatiality of the 
revolution, its spread and its concentration in some areas compared to others. Hunt states: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31But see George Steinmetz’ discussion (2008) of the pros and cons of Sewell’s definition of events, 
particularly in Sewell’s Logics of History (2005).  
32 I focus primarily here on Sewell’s text on the Bastille and historical event, but it should be noted that 
Sewell does address the issue of spatiality more in Logics of History (2005), which I hope to incorporate 
more in future revisions of this dissertation.   
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 Divisions within the new political class had a spatial as well as temporal 
dimension. In 1789 people almost everywhere in France were enthusiastic about 
the prospect of constitutional renewal. As the potential for conflict became clearer 
and more threatening, some places began to demonstrate their reluctance and even 
resistance to the revolutionary process. By the middle of 1798 the west was in 
open rebellion, and several cities along the coast and along the major rivers (most 
notably Lyon) had announced their secession from the revolutionary movement.  
Spatially as well as temporally, there were multiple lines of division. In many 
regions, the Revolution in a sense withdrew to the towns and cities. Within the big 
cities, the radicals often based themselves in a certain neighborhoods. Within the 
country as a whole, the revolutionary movement found most determined support 
near the frontiers and in the left-wing regions of the center and southwest. Along 
both the dimensions of time and space, the process of radicalization was 
structurally similar: as the revolution became more radical it also became more 
peripheral. Yet, at the same time, the rhetoric and symbols of the Revolution 
retained and even enhanced their universalistic, nationalistic and rationalistic 
qualities. (2004: 217) 
This dissertation is inspired by Hunt’s work; but while her focus is more on class and space and 
politics, my focus is on modes of action and protest that took place in relation to space.33 
Both Roger Gould’s work (1995) on protest in Paris leading to the Paris Commune and 
Charles Tilly’s The Vendée (1964) are also notable here. First, an analogy about the emergence 
of the identity of “people of Paris” and the “Tahrir Protestors” or “the Tahrir Youth” is obvious.  
There are, however, other similarities. First, there is the fact that the Tahrir sit-in and Paris 
Commune took place in capital cities, and that the two modes of action were the center of action 
at the time, in terms of drawing attention and becoming the target site for protest and organizing. 
The main difference between the two is that, unlike the case of the Paris Commune, many 
important actions also took place outside Tahrir—actions that were potentially radical and had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The work of Mabel Berezin (1997) on fascism in interwar Italy and how the state and different political 
groups negotiated public space and defined the very meaning of fascism in that space is also relevant here.  
Berezin was not talking about a revolution, yet her work examines rituals and specific kinds of continuous 
politics that are not antagonistic to the regime, such as parades. Berezin’s work is important because it 
also examines the regime and the public. To use Tilly’s terminology, the reconfigurations of public space 
here in relation to the regime resemble something akin to a prescribed repertoire (Tilly 2006: 75). But my 
aim in this research is to study a case where the practice of repertoire is more in tension and dialectical 
relation with the regime, rather than simply being prescribed. 
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the potential to change the course of events. Tahrir’s relationship to mobilization can also be 
seen as similar to that related to the Vendée, but while the latter was the center of counter-
revolution, Tahrir became/or was constructed as the center of revolution.34 
Regarding my own approach to space and spatiality in this dissertation, I would like to 
clarify two things. The first is that my main concern in this dissertation is not limited to spatiality. 
Yes, I want to study Tahrir Square in the revolution, but as my research shows, things shifted 
over time in Tahrir and in the revolution in general, meaning that any analysis must necessarily 
be spatio-temporal or spatio-historical. Second, as discussed above, the spatiality of Tahrir and 
its relation to the revolution constitutes both the empirical focus of the dissertation, but also the 
analytical lens I use to understand how the revolution came to have certain meanings and 
outcomes. Given the way in which Tahrir was both constituted by and constitutive of the events 
that took place within it, space appears as both part of the explanans and explanadum of the 
dissertation.   
Revolutions as processes 
 As mentioned earlier, this dissertation is concerned mainly with the Egyptian revolution 
as a process, specifically building upon the work of Charles Tilly and Jack Goldstone. Before 
discussing I mean by revolution as a process, it is useful first to clarify what is meant by a 
“revolutionary situation.”  I raised the question earlier of how it was that Egypt witnessed a true 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  The Contentious French (1986) by Charles Tilly is very relevant here as well. In Chapters Two and 
Three, I study the history of protest repertoires in Egypt. Even though The Contentious French is a study 
of the longue durée, it is inspiring here. Another relevant study is Charles Kurzman’s study of the history 
of mobilization that preceeded the Iranian revolution in 1979, with his focus on the mobilization on the 
city of Qum in the few years before the revolution (see Kurzman 2003). 
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“revolutionary situation,” yet still ended up with only a “poor outcome.” Charles Tilly (1993: 10) 
defines a revolutionary situation as a moment that has three elements:  
1) appearance of contenders, or coalitions of contenders, advancing exclusive 
competing claims to control of the state, or some segments of it, 
2) commitment to those claims by a significant segment of the citizenry, and 3) 
incapacity or unwillingness of rulers to suppress the alternative coalition and/or 
commitment to its claims.   
  
In another piece, Tilly added that a revolutionary situation requires that one of the new emerging 
centers of power commands “a significant coercive force.” He states: 
Revolutions are not social movements, although sometimes the two overlap and 
stimulate each other. A full revolution combines two elements: a revolutionary 
situation and a revolutionary outcome. In a revolutionary situation, at least two 
centers of power emerge, each of them commanding significant coercive force 
and each of them claiming exclusive control over the state. In a revolutionary 
outcome, a transfer of power over the state occurs such that a largely new group 
of people begins to rule. Revolutionary situation and social movements overlap 
when movement-based mobilization goes so far as to split the regime into at least 
two armed factions, each claiming the unique right to rule. That happened widely, 
for example during Europe’s revolutionary mobilizations of 1848. (Tilly 2008: 
126–27). 
 
 Jack Goldstone (2009) has similarly argued for a disaggregated understanding of the 
revolutions, proposing twelve components of the revolutionary process. He emphasizes, “These 
twelve stages are not intended to demarcate a universal or inevitable consequence. Rather, they 
are components of revolutionary processes that usually occur in various revolutions” (Goldstone 
2009: 19). How these components actually manifest in terms of combination, character, severity, 
and intensity constitutes every revolution’s unique “revolutionary trajectory” per Goldstone 
(2009: 20). He further coins the term “revolutionary suite” to highlight the significance of three 
factors: 1) elite defection and the formation of opposition, 2) polarization and coalition building, 
and 3) mass mobilization.  
Both Tilly and Goldstone describe acute regime crises and the development of mass 
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mobilization that challenges the regime. Where Goldstone puts more emphasis on  elite defection 
and coalition building, Tilly stipulates that contenders must seize control of the state and 
command “significant coercive force.” Looking generally at these criteria, Egypt would seem to 
have had a revolutionary situation, but the question remains whether it had a revolutionary 
outcome. The case of the Egyptian revolution is problematic when applying Tilly’s seemingly 
narrow definition of revolutionary situation. The reason for this is that Egyptian revolutionaries 
did not seek to control the state, and while they did command “some” coercive force in the form 
of popular neighborhood committees (discussed in detail in Chapter 5), they did not publicly 
claim this power, but shared it instead with that of the military. Likewise, Egyptian 
revolutionaries in Tahrir and elsewhere did use violence in some instances, but primarily in order 
to defend themselves. The Egyptian revolution may also fall short of Goldstone’s formula in 
terms of the presence of elite defection. If we interpret elite defection narrowly as people 
working within the regime, then Egypt did not witness this. Others might argue that the 
military’s decision to distance itself from Mubarak was a major defection that weakened the 
regime and created its severe crisis. Also, Goldstone defines elite broadly to include many 
members of the upper class such as politicians, intellectuals and professionals, not just state 
officials and military leaders.35  Thus, combining elements of both Tilly and Goldstone’s 
formulations, I would suggest that Egypt did, indeed, constitute a revolutionary situation that 
presented the following: 1) presence of an acute regime crisis, with some elite defection and also 
the regime’s inability or unwillingness to control the state or suppress the opposition; 2) 
formation of an opposition with strong coalitions that challenged state power; and 3) presence of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Bourdieu’s notion of field of power is also useful here, and is broader than the state field, to use his 
terminology. But the purpose of this discussion is simply to try to synthesize a definition about 
revolutionary situation.  And my larger goal in this dissertation is to investigate modes of actions in 
Tahrir and outside Tahrir in relation to one another.  
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mass mobilization that supported the revolutionary forces (the opposition).  
  As Goldstone (1998) and the authors of Dynamics of Contention (McAdam, Tarrow, and 
Tilly 2001) famously argue, there are many overlaps between collective action, social 
movements, and revolutions. And whether we agree or not “Successful revolutions share some 
characteristics with social movements, rebellions, failed revolutions and cycles of protest”(Tilly 
2001: 195; see also Goldstone 1998). This perspective is very useful for me as one of my goals 
with this dissertation is to make connections between the mobilization history that took place 
before the revolution and the revolution itself.  In some sense, what I am doing here can be 
described as a “mode of action” approach to studying revolution that uses Tahrir as a central 
analytical lens, but also locates that lens in time and space. Empirically, I seek to study the 
Egyptian revolution through a focus on Tahrir’s sit-in, while situating it in the broader 
mobilization politics of Cairo and Egypt during the revolution. Theoretically, through a case 
study of the modes of action that took place in or around Tahrir, I also explore how much a mode 
of action analysis can tell us about a revolution.36 In this dissertation, in studying the revolution 
as a process, I also deliberately argue against any rigid boundary between social movements that 
existed in Egypt before the revolution and the revolution itself.  I will move now to the final 
section in this introduction: methods and methodology. 
 
III. Methods and Methodology  
This section is divided into three parts. The first describes my methods; the second, elaborates 
the rationale behind these methods; and the third, discusses my own positionality vis-à-vis this 
research.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Or to use Bayat’s formulation (2013: 48) of revolution as a movement vs. revolution as a change, my 
dissertation asks this question: what can the Egyptian revolution as a movement tell us about the limited 
vision or protestors’ perspective about revolution as a change.  
	  32	  
	  
Description of Methods 
This dissertation is based on two phases of ethnographic and historical research in Egypt. 
I conducted the first stage of research between February 4 and April 16, 2011. The second stage 
of my research took place between mid-July 2012 and ended after the first week of January 2013. 
In both two phases, I combined the following three methods: ethnography/participant 
observation, interviews, and documentary/historical research. I conducted a total of 103 
interviews with 106 subjects.37 I discuss each of these methods below, followed by a note 
regarding the differences between the first and second phases of research.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 There was one interview in which I interviewed three subjects, and two people whom I was able to 
interview twice—once in the first phase of research and another time in the second.  
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Ethnography: 
During both phases of research, I participated in many events, including walking in 
rallies, gathering in Tahrir, talking to people, attending events such as the formation of new 
parties and new trade unions, and attending many press conferences related to the revolution. 
These activities were in various locations in Cairo, not only Tahrir.  Ethnography was especially 
important in the first phase of my research, as I was in Tahrir every day from February 4, 2011, 
to February 11,  which saw the ousting of Mubarak. My ethnographic work continued beyond 
Tahrir after that date, until I ended the first phase of research and left Egypt on April 16, 2011. 
During the time in Tahrir, my presence and participation there enabled me to talk to people in 
tents and behind the stages. I talked to artists, doctors, and journalists. I talked to seasoned 
activists and people who had never participated in a protest before but were drawn to see what 
was going on in Tahrir.  I sometimes saw the aftermath of violent events. I myself witnessed 
police and pro-Mubarak thugs attacking the square, and I saw many injured people in Tahrir.  I 
experienced the process of going in and out of checkpoints around and outside of Tahrir. Being 
in Cairo during that time, I was also able to participate in one of the popular committees at night 
as well (discussed further in Chapters 4 and 5). I participated in many unplanned conversations, 
as well as organized meetings. Some friends asked me to help with translations or editing or 
contributing to magazines distributed around Tahrir after ousting Mubarak. One of the 
magazines I contributed to was called “The Voice of the Revolution.” In the second phase, I also 
participated in many rallies and attended many events protesting against SCAF and against the 
elected president at the time, Mohamed Morsi, though these latter activities are less relevant to 
this research.  
	  34	  
	  
For the most part, I did not plan what I was going to do on any given day, but rather, I 
sought to adapt my research to the unfolding of events—events that were often profoundly 
overwhelming. Seeing a million people protesting and seeing military tanks in the streets of 
Cairo were experiences I had never had before and could hardly have planned around. Some 
days, I went directly to Tahrir; other days,  I met friends first and we went there together. In 
some instances, I planned to participate in specific rallies when I heard in advance about their 
route, and if it was not too far from where I was staying. Other times, I simply found myself 
participating in a rally almost before I realized what was happening. On February 6, 2011, for 
example, I was visiting friends at an NGO that was helping to collect aid for the protestors in 
Tahrir. After the meeting, but while I was still downtown, I saw a rally of lawyers heading from 
the Egyptian Bar Association headquarters to Abdeen Square, which also houses the presidential 
palace. I spontaneously decided to join the rally, as many of my lawyer friends were also 
participating.  
In these rapidly changing and often unpredictable circumstances, it was difficult to keep 
up with writing ethnographic notes every day. Another complicating factor was the security 
situation. During the time I was able to participate in events, from February 4 to February 11, 
efforts to intimidate and attack protestors was still intense. I made an effort to walk away from 
all events empty-handed and to keep my minimal notes at home.38  I wrote only scattered notes 
when it was possible, but I knew after the ousting of Mubarak that I would need to do interviews 
as well in order to gather a more complete picture of Tahrir and the revolution.  
Interviews: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 During this time, pro-government media targeted Tahrir and protestors in Tahrir, and labeled them as 
infiltrators and also emphasized that many foreigners were in Tahrir. Mubarak’s thugs arrested many 
journalists, especially foreigners,, especially in the first week before my arrival. I had to ensure that my 
wallet contained only an Egyptian ID and Egyptian money; I hid all my American IDs, such as my 
student ID or my driver’s license, as well as any American money in a secured place in my parents’ home. 
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I conducted 103 interviews with 106 subjects over the course of the two phases. I did not 
have a comprehensive plan regarding the number, selection, or content of interview given the 
fluidity of the situation.39  My only main criteria were that: 1) I would recruit interviewees using 
snowball sampling, but also that 2) that I would try to include a diverse group of people in terms 
of gender, political experience, class. In the first phase, I did not interview anyone over 50, but in 
the second phase, I realized this mistake and made an explicit effort to include people who were 
50 or above, as I needed some experienced informants to tell me more about history.40 In the first 
phase, the interviews were semi-structured. I asked my informants questions about their 
participation in activism or protests both before and during the revolution, as well as questions 
about how they saw the demography of Tahrir and the protests, and questions about the 
revolution in general, among many other questions. Examples of some of the questions I asked 
are:  
• Did you participate in any protests before the January 25, 2011 revolution? If so, 
which ones/where?  
• Describe to me what you did generally in the days from January 25 to February 
11, 2011? 
• Most analysts and media circles have portrayed the revolution as mainly initiated 
and led by middle class Egyptian youth (particularly those who have smart phones 
and are savvy in social media). Do you think this portrayal is accurate? Why or 
why not? 
• Did you participate in the sit-in in Tahrir Square from January 25 to Feb 11, 2011? 
(This section in the questions may be skipped if the subject did not participate, 
and she/he can answer only relevant questions) 
• If yes, describe to me your participation during this time? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 I conducted all the interviews in the second phase by myself without assistance. But in the first phase, I 
conducted some interviews with assistance from others. Due to the fluidity of the situation and the tight 
schedule, for example, I sometimes interviewed one person, while one of my assistants interviewed 
another subject nearby. And in some cases, my assistants did the entire interview by themselves based on 
instructions and guidance from me.  
40 Because the first phase of research was done in a rush, dictated by the speed of the events themselves, I 
did not have time to obtain an IRB before leaving for Egypt. I told my informants about this issue and 
they simply did not care. I did, however, obtain IRB approval for my second phase of research (IRB 
HUM00053086).  
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• Describe the sit-in in terms of the organization of space? 
• Describe the sit-in in terms of social life and daily/nightly activities, etc.? 
• From your observations and experience in the sit-in, how was the diversity of 
opinions managed in Tahrir? 41 
In the case of participants in protests outside of Cairo, I asked them the same questions about the 
types of actions in which they were involved in their cities. And I asked them questions about 
why or why not they or their friends, if any, left their cities to join the protest in Tahrir.  
 Most of the interviews in the first phase took place in downtown in cafés or in the 
political offices of organizations. Several young activists and researchers helped me and were 
provided with an honorarium. Others volunteered to help without any honorarium. Given the 
concentration of people in downtown Cairo, and the assistance of many people, I was sometimes 
able to conduct 3–4 interviews in a row in one day. In this phase, all interviews were on a 
snowball basis, whereby I interviewed some people, and then they introduced me to others and 
so forth. I also asked friends to introduce me to people to interview or asked the activists and 
researchers who assisted me to introduce me to people they knew in Tahrir. Out of the 56 
persons interviewed in the first phase, I knew about 7 personally from my previous activist life in 
Egypt before 2004, and the rest I did not know. 
 After the first round of interviews, as certain gaps began to emerge, I shifted away from 
snowball sampling and tried to target specific groups. For example, I made an effort to interview 
some of the founders of the blogging movement. I also made an effort to talk to people 
connected to the “We Are All Khaled Said” Facebook page, and I was fortunate enough to 
interview one of its two administrators. I sought out some of the founders of Kefayya, and the 
National Association for Change. I also made an effort to talk to key activists in Alexandria, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See Appendix 1 of the dissertation for a complete list of interview questions.  
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Suez, and Mahala—cities whose significance I discussed briefly above.  The following table 
summarizes the demography of my informants in the two phases.  
Table 1 Demographics of Interviewees 
Phase 1 (February 4 – April 16, 2011), N = 56 
Gender  Class42  Place  Age  Previous 
political 
experience  
Participated 
in Tahrir? 
22 women 
 
34 men 
16 WC  
 
40	  MC	  	  
53 Cairo  
 
2 Alexandria 
 
1 Banha  
33 (age 20–30) 
 
16 (age 31–40) 
 
5 (age 41–50) 
 
2 (age 51–60) 
 
0 (age 61–70) 
 
40 had prior 
protest 
experience  
 
16 had not 
protested 
before the 
revolution   
 
48 yes  
 
8 no  
 
Phase 2 (mid-July 2012 – early January 2013), N = 50  
23 women 
 
27 men 
10 WC  
  
40 MC 
29 Cairo  
 
4 Giza  
 
6 Alexandria 
 
6 Mahala  
 
5 Suez  
11 (age 20–30) 
 
28 (age 31–40) 
 
7 (age 41–50) 
 
3 (age 51–60) 
 
1 (age 61–70) 
 
32 had prior 
protest 
experience  
 
18 had not 
protested 
before the 
revolution  
33 yes  
 
17 no   
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Self-identified class of interviewee; WC is working class, MC is middle class.  
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Documentary/Historical Research:43 
I conducted documentary and historical research during both phases of the research. This 
included examining both primary and secondary sources about the revolution, Tahrir Square, and 
the broader protest history of Egypt. Primary sources included leaflets and statements issued by 
various groups, such as foundational or key statements by Kefayya and the National Association 
for Change, as well as various leaflets distributed in Tahrir during the 18 days. I also consulted 
some of the diaries of activists from earlier periods who wrote about their political history before 
the revolution and also diaries published from 2011–2013 about the 2011 uprising. As for 
secondary sources, this included researching newspaper and other media coverage of the protests, 
with particular focus on the 18 days of the revolution, though I also looked at coverage of key 
protests before 2011 and after, where relevant. Specifically, I looked at important newspapers in 
Egypt, some of which are pro-government such as Al-Ahram, and some of which are independent 
such as mostly El-Shorouk Newspaper and Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper. These three were the 
main focus of my research. In these papers, I searched for key words such as Tahrir and protests, 
class in the revolution, life in the square, rallies of the revolution and so forth. In addition to 
taking pictures in Tahrir and some protests and events, I also contacted artists and photographers 
who were known to have participated in previous protests, and some of them kindly talked to me 
and shared important pictures of previous protests.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 I am using here Robert Cooley Angell’s differentiation between documentation and archival work, not 
only because this project is mostly concerned with a contemporary issue, but also given that the main 
difference between documentary work and archival work is that the first is based mainly on reading 
primary printed or online sources, while the latter is based mainly with old historical materials and 
records. See Angell, Robert Cooley, “What does History offer Sociology,” notes for a seminar discussion 
(n.d.; ca. 1962), in Robert Cooley Angell papers, Bentley Historical Library (Ann Arbor), Box 2, folder 
“Outlines of Talks,” cited in George Steinmetz, “Issues and Agendas The Relations between Sociology 
and History in the United States: The Current State of Affairs," Journal of Historical Sociology 20, no. 
1/2 (2007). 
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Note on the two phases of research 
It is important to provide some context for the two phases of research. Each phase had its 
own unique context, each of which had various advantages and limitations. The first phase was 
primarily exploratory, though also the most ethnographically rich, while the second phase was 
much more organized and, in some respects, more crucial. As noted above, the chaos and 
unpredictability of the first phase during the revolution made research both extremely memorable, 
but also stressful and erratic.  The nature of this period also shaped my interviews. I was able to 
conduct 56 interviews, but many of these were conducting in a hurry and under what felt like 
conditions of extreme urgency. At the end of February 2011, I realized that the end of my trip 
was approaching and I had not yet conducted a single interview, as I had been so busy actually 
participating in events and attending various meetings. Consequently, when interviews finally 
began, they felt quite rushed. I realized that many of the interviews lacked depth and/or that there 
were many gaps. Since I did not do any purposive selection, I realized that most of my 
informants in this stage were youth, many of whom had only recently begun to engage with 
politics. I also realized that talking to people outside of Cairo was going to be important and I 
began to add this to my list of things to ensure for the return trip.   
 Similarly, while the ethnography was rich and the interviews were hectic, the archival 
work was also limited during my first phase of research. During my time in Tahrir itself, I was 
able to collect some original copies of the various newspapers and leaflets that were being 
distributed there, which was very crucial. But I was not able to do any rigorous archival work. 
The event was unfolding and also my sense of where the research was going was developing 
over time. In a word, my documentary work in this phase was not systemic enough. Priority was 
given instead to ethnography and witnessing and participating in events themselves.  
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 I treated my second trip as my main research trip. I was more prepared, I obtained an IRB 
before leaving Ann Arbor, and the trip lasted for almost 6 months.  After listening to most of my 
transcripts and looking at my notes, it was clear to me that on this trip, 1) I had to visits some 
important cities outside Cairo that were relevant during the revolution; 2) I needed to interview 
more experienced activists and bloggers, particularly those who participated in important 
mobilizing efforts before the revolution; and 3) I needed to look for people who played key 
organizing roles in Tahrir to help me develop a fuller picture of what was going on in the square. 
By mid-2012, I had also noted that some activists had begun to talk critically about Tahrir—a 
stark contrast to the generally reverent and utopian tone that inflected most discussions in 2011, 
so for the second phase of research I was more attuned to issues that would eventually become 
the focus of Chapter 5, the margins and silences of Tahrir. Because the trip was longer, and 
events were less intense (protests were still talking place against the new president and police 
brutality, but everything was still less intense than before), my interviews and archival research 
were much more organized and rigorous. I planned trips in advance to Suez, Mahala, and 
Alexandria, with the assistance of key organizers and some friends in Cairo. I was still 
conducting ethnography, but this research was less relevant to the focus of the dissertation. One 
might say that in the first phase, my ethnography was mostly first-hand ethnography, whereas in 
the second phase, it was mostly historical ethnography.  I discuss this further in the following 
section.    
 
Methodology/Rationale 
During my interviews, one of my informants said the following: “You know, every inch 
in Tahrir has a story and it is impossible for you to know or claim to be able to know all these 
stories”  (Interview, November 2, 2012). This comment was in one of the earliest interviews in 
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the second round of research in 2012. The same informant told me that, “to claim that you know 
enough about Tahrir, you need the work of hundreds and hundreds of researchers who go around 
and collect stories of people who were there. Of course, this should be combined with many first-
hand testimonies written by participants themselves.”44 I reflect on these comments often, as they 
remind of two important things. The first is that, despite my best efforts as an ethnographer, I 
simply cannot do justice to all the stories of Tahrir. I thought about this quote while doing my 
research in Egypt, as well as when I began organizing and analyzing the data back in the United 
States. I  remembered, too, many other quotes from informants and participants in the revolution.  
Some told me stories about where they slept at night in Tahrir, or where they lost loved ones. 
Some told me about fighting with the security forces, while others recalled the first moment they 
entered Tahrir after it was “liberated” by protestors. Some of these stories are discussed in the 
dissertation, but others are not. And while some stories were related to the sit-in itself and the 
actions related to it, many other stories were connected to past actions that happened in the 
square or to protestors themselves. This was the second lesson for me: my ethnography had to be 
historical, which I will explain in a second. But  in general these comments forced me to 
acknowledge that my job in this research is only to collect as much data as possible, then to 
construct one large story about Tahrir and the revolution. My story is only one among other 
stories.  
Below, I discuss how this research was driven by three methodological approaches. The 
primary of which is historical ethnography. And the second one is historical sociology, and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The informant was an attorney and not a researcher, but it was interesting to me that he talked about 
research in this way.   
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third is auto-ethnography. As part of the discussion I will show how mixing ethnography, 
documentary work and interviews was necessary in this research.45  
 
 Historical ethnography  
 As any typical cultural and social anthropologist would say, a good ethnography should 
include some historical background. But historical ethnography requires more than briefly 
providing some background, it requires that we take seriously the meaning and import of history 
and temporality for ethnographic work (Balandier 1974; Comaroff 1984; Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1992; de Dampierre 1957; Goodson and Ball 1984; Kirch and Sahlins 1994; Michelet  
[1831] 2013; Middleton 2003; Zeitlyn 2012). 46 For example, in Ethnography and the Historical 
Imagination, Jean and John Comaroff write against “traditional anthropology” that relies on and 
reinforces the colonial dichotomies and  models of knowledge that exist about Africa. They 
argue that the binary itself between anthropology and history is superficial and critique not only 
rigid disciplinarity, but also casual notions that the two fields should “draw on” one another. 
They state: 
To assert that anthropology should be “more” historical, or history “more” 
anthropologist, may be well-intentioned, but …. the assertion remains vacuous 
without further theoretical specification. [in our view] there ought to be no 
“relationship” between history and anthropology, since there should be no 
division to begin with. A theory of society which is not also a theory of history, or 
vice versa, is hardly a theory at all. (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 13) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 In this research, I used three kinds of ethnographic approaches, namely 1) first-hand ethnography as 
participant observer, 2) historical ethnography, and 3) auto-ethnography.  
46 As indicated by this list of works cited, historical ethnography has a long tradition, arguably dating 
back to  the works of Eric de Dampierre and then Georges Balandier in France or even earlier by the work 
of Michelet on “resurrectionist history.” I cite Jean and John Comaroff’s work as an example only. 
Tracing the genealogy and the history of the practice of historical ethnography goes beyond this 
dissertation.  
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Of course, similar discussions have gone on in sociology, history, and other disciplines, and the 
idea of historical ethnography is not strange to historical sociologists. 47 Charles Tilly (2007) 
suggests “retrospective ethnography” as one of the key forms of historical sociology, describing 
it as work that involves “empathetic reconstruction of alien times and people and uses current 
understandings of social processes to show how those instances fit into a known range of 
variations” (2007: 327). Simply put, retrospective ethnography means to “reconstruct actors’ 
dispositions from the historical record” (Tilly 2007: 326). 
Without a single consensus definition of historical ethnography, and at the risk of 
simplification, my interpretation of historical ethnography is to study people and records 
simultaneously and in relation to each other. For me, historical ethnography means doing  
rigorous societal contextualization of records and archives, and also situating people, their 
actions, and understandings “thickly” within the records of their period. In terms of methodology, 
this means either combining ethnographic methods with archival work or combining both with 
other relevant historiographical materials such as oral history and art.  
Historical ethnography was crucial for this research because my aim was to study the 
Tahrir sit-in as the culmination of a long history of protest in Cairo and in Tahrir. A rigorous 
historical contextualization of why protestors wanted to form a sit-in in Tahrir in the first place 
required that I study the sit-in in the context of previous relevant repertoires in Egypt, as well as 
in the context of the battle for and about political space between the government and opposition 
groups in the decade prior to the revolution. Many of the stories about previous sit-ins in Cairo 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See, for example, Philip Abrams’ argument (1988) that there should be no binary between sociology 
and history at all; Sewell’s discussion that historians and sociologists have much to learn from each other 
(Sewell 2005: 1-21); George Steinmetz’s contention (2005) that any division between historical sociology 
and history is “disastrous.” Finally, let us recall that C. Wright Mills suggested that all sociological 
analyses should be situated in their historical circumstances in his famous piece, The Sociological 
Imagination ([1959] 2000). 
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and in Tahrir do not exist in documents, but are scattered instead in people’s diaries and in 
journalistic accounts. When I conducted my interviews in 2012, most of my questions were 
about informants’ memories and testimonies about the revolution in 2011. Similarly, accounts of 
the various political coalitions prior to 2011 are not properly documented in Egypt due to the 
authoritarian conditions under Mubarak rule, where it was difficult to have any proper 
documentation for security reasons. Interviews about the past were crucial to fill in this history 
for me. Any proper understanding of the coalitions that emerged in Tahrir would be inadequate if 
not situated in the history of political coalitions in Egypt. In sum, using a historical ethnographic 
approach meant that I needed to combine ethnographic work, documentary/historical work, and 
interviews as complementing one another.  In many ways, all of these different methods combine 
to constitute what we might call a historical sociology of the Egyptian state, and specifically the 
relationship between that state/regime and the various repertoires developed in relation to it.48  
Auto-ethnography: 
 There were many instances in this research when I found it necessary to do auto-
ethnography. Auto-ethnography is a specific methodological approach in anthropology whereby 
the researcher systematically analyzes her or his experience or biography and situates it in the 
larger cultural and political context in order to understand the latter (Bochner and Ellis 2006; 
Chang 2008; Denzin 2006; Ellis and Bochner 2000; Ellis, Adams, and Bochner 2011; Hayano 
1979; Reed-Danahay 1997). As some proponents of auto-ethnography suggest, the method is a 
combination of autobiography and ethnography, and it is both a process and a product (Ellis, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Studies of the state are particularly popular among historical sociologists; see, for example, Abrams 
(1988); Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985). Here, my focus is more on the specifically 
authoritarian nature of Mubarak’s regime and the implications of this for the forms of protest that regime 
engendered, but I hope to further flesh out a comprehensive historical sociology of the Egyptian state in 
the book manuscript.  
  
	  45	  
	  
Adams, and Bochner 2011). Unlike traditional positivist anthropology, auto-ethnography is 
based on the assumption that the subject of the researcher is strongly present and should be 
acknowledged and examined. Not only that, but if an analysis of the researcher’s experience is 
relevant to the research, why not study it as well.  In simple terms, in auto-ethnography, 
researchers are self-reflexive and constantly study themselves in addition to their subject matter, 
especially when they are part of the context they are studying. And this is not about the 
researcher’s emotions, but rather about locating their experience and biography within the 
relevant social and cultural context.  
 Because I was fortunate enough to be present for and participate in many of the crucial 
events of the revolution, I decided that it would be enrich the research to draw on my own 
insights and experience of those events. For example, given my prior experiences in the field as a 
pro-democracy activist and human rights attorney in Egypt, it was impossible for this personal 
history not to shape my own experience and observations about how anti-riot police in Tahrir 
developed strategies against protestors, as well as how the latter developed their own strategies 
in response. Also, before conducting this research, and in the period from 2000 to 2004,  I was 
working in a human rights NGO which was hosting many anti-war and pro-democracy groups 
and coalitions, for whom it was difficult to meet elsewhere. My own experience about the place 
and these meetings were crucial part of the story of place and space and coalitions work under 
Mubarak. I was fortunate to be in these important places and experience these important 
experiences. I thought it would be a big fault to simply suppress these insights.49  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 I acknowledge that auto-ethnography may be a less accepted method for traditional anthropologists and 
sociologists who do qualitative research. Some of the critiques of it include that it simply involves 
studying the self, not communities or societies. Others contend that it blurs the line between social science 
and humanities. I am aware of these critiques. My use of auto-ethnography in this research was limited, 
but I felt that the nature of this research and my location within it required some explicit thought and 
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Positionality 
Scholarship, especially in sociology, anthropology and feminist studies, has addressed the 
significance of the positionality of the researcher while doing research. The overarching 
assumption within this body of literature is that there is no such thing as objectivity and every 
researcher approaches their research with their own set of biases, experiences, and identities. 
This scholarship has thoroughly explored how the social position of the researcher in regards to 
race, class, gender, sexuality, and/or nation shapes the kinds of questions the researcher asks and 
the knowledge the researcher produces. While acknowledging that every researcher comes with a 
“position,” one strand within these methodological discussions explores the differences between 
researchers who are “outsider” vs. “insiders” in relation to the communities they study (Abu-
Lughod 2006; England 1994; Huisman 2008; Jacobs-Huey 2002; Sultana 2007). Such analyses 
illustrate that there is no simple binary between “the outsider” and “the insider” and that insiders 
are also, to some extent, outsiders, while outsiders often become insiders in one way or another. 
This is why many scholars have critiqued the concept of the “native researcher,.” as it reduces 
people conducting research in their own communities to a one-to-one relationship with their 
research subjects. Anthropologist Kath Weston (2000: 142) replaces the “insider-outsider” 
binary or the idea of native vs. non-native researcher with the idea of the “hybrid researcher,” 
which I think more accurately captures the multiple kinds of relationships and power 
relationships between any researcher and their research subjects. 
The main conclusion from these discussions suggests that researchers should emphasize 
their positionality and state clearly their relation to the study she or he is conducting, and the 
implications of this for the research. Feminist scholars have especially called for self-reflexivity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
theorization. The advantages of drawing on my own experiences, I argue, outweigh the benefit of simply 
attempting to deny or ignore them.  
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about this rather than claiming a false objectivity.  Reflexivity and admitting that all knowledge 
is situated will make the research findings stronger rather than simply claiming a surface 
objectivity, which does not exist. Many critical qualitative sociologists and anthropologists alike 
emphasized how self-reflexivity and positionality are a must, especially in contexts where 
questions of power are relevant to the research  (Bourdieu 2003; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; 
Salzman 2002; Wacquant 2004). These authors do not reject objectivity, but they argue against 
mendacious objectivity, and they argue for a need to objectivize the researcher’s own position. 50 
It is useful here to clarify how my positionality shaped this research since, like all 
researchers, my positionality indeed shaped every stage of my research and writing. I will 
highlight only three features of my positionality in relation to this research. First, my 
positionality was multi-layered. Specifically, I identify at least five interwoven layers that shaped 
my positionality: 1) as an outsider coming from the US (at the time of the research, I had 
recently been naturalized as a US citizen); 2) as an insider returning to a familiar context  (I grew 
up and lived in Egypt until 2004 and still maintain my Egyptian citizenship); 3) as a scholar 
coming to conduct research in pursuit of a degree at a US institution; 4) as a former human rights 
and leftist pro-democracy activist in Egypt who still maintains connections with activists and 
activist networks there; and 5) as simultaneously a participant in and an observer of the 
revolution.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 In an important piece, Bourdieu (2003) differentiates between three kinds of reflexivities. The first is 
scientific reflexivity, where the researcher takes into account her or his social experience and applies 
sociological critique to her or his reflexivity (2003: 288). The second is narcissistic reflexivity, which . 
This refers to the reflexivity of postmodern anthropology, where some researchers—as a reaction to 
positivism—have become interested in simple “verging on exhibitionism” (2003: 281). And finally, 
egological reflexivity, which refers to a case where the “social scientist increases scientificity and uses 
objectivist tools of social science for the sake of the private person of the researcher and the field of 
research and the members of this field while objectifying and increase despositions of the subjects she or 
he studies” (2003: 281).   
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These aspects of my positionality shaped my research, but they also shifted over time, 
with different dimensions becoming more or less relevant in different instances and as 
circumstances changed. Sometimes aspects of my positionality was a burden, other times, 
aspects of it were very helpful. Specifically, my positionality vis-à-vis other activists in Egypt 
gave me great access to many “insider” points of view. But at the same time, these connections 
made my experience of being there and writing about it later emotionally intense. It was difficult 
to feign any level of detachment from either the events themselves or my informants. As I write 
this, for example, two of my informants are serving jail sentences. Both are icons of the 
revolutionary youth movement and are people I know personally and whose families and close 
communities or loved ones I have known for over a decade.51  
In the first round of research, I felt my positionality was a burden preventing me from 
being fully engaged with the events. Only later did I realize that my anxiety and feeling of being 
overwhelmed was shared by many of the people I interviewed, as well as other friends and 
activists due to the enormous intensity of the event. I was not alone in this. I was perhaps 
particularly prone to anxiety because I was coming from the US. At the time, the regime was 
spreading rumors about foreign spies and/or agents paying the protesters to destabilize the nation. 
Of course, I was concerned that people might not fully trust me because I am now a US citizen 
and no longer live in Egypt.52 
As noted above, my positionality and being known to many activists over the years 
assisted me in accessing offices and political organizations meetings easily. Of course, many of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Indeed, at different stages of this writing, several of my informants have been in jail. 
52 Not many people in the activist scene even knew that I had become a naturalized US citizen, but I still 
worried given the context of distrust regarding foreigners, and my own internal sense of responsibility 
and positionality. I should note that my immigration and naturalization processes were not easy either, not 
least because they took place after September 11, 2001. I  cannot say with certainty that my history as an 
activist in Egypt caused the various delays and harassments in these processes, but I do know for certain 
that my research has been always been shaped by my positionality and political choices.  
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these offices were also opened to journalists, but I was given access as a friend or as one of the 
group. It was also easy for me to find young researchers and activists to assist me in conducting 
interviews or recruiting people for interviews. At the same time, however, my positionality also 
became a problem. Precisely because I knew many activists and leading bloggers personally, I 
was reluctant to impose on their time or seem like I was seeking to exploit our relationship. I 
understood on a very deep level how  intense and tragic some of the events were, and I could not 
bear to disrespect anyone enduring these horrors by asking them to take time away from their 
struggle in order to sit down with me for an interview. Also, some of them were being 
interviewed all the time, especially by western researchers, and there was already a growing 
discourse among Egyptian revolutionaries that was critical of the ways western researchers were 
entering and exiting Egypt simply to collect people’s stories, only to disappear from the scene 
and publish their work elsewhere.53 I was deeply conscious of this dynamic and sometimes found 
it difficult to request interviews for fear of being perceived as a selfish researcher.  
On my second trip, I was more relaxed about what I had early seen as the burden of 
positionality. The trip was longer and I was more prepared. I also had time to reflect on the 
emotional intensity of the first round and realized it was not unique to me and my research 
project. After a few months into conducting archival work, I started to schedule interviews. 
Because I have many contacts, and I was more specific in doing more targeted interviews, things 
were a bit easier. But this time there was the added complication of doing research in outside 
Cairo in Suez, Mahala, and Alexandria. But a friend of mine, who worked previously as a 
reporter for Al-Jazeera during the revolution gave me many contacts in one of the cities where 
she was the main correspondent. A young blogger also shared with me his entire address book. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Sociologist Mona Abaza (2011) wrote about this phenomenon and described it as “academic tourists 
sight-seeing the Arab Spring”; see also El-Mahdi (2011).  
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Instances in which a leading activist would call other people for me to arrange an interview was 
not uncommon; this happened at least three or four times. My whole trips in the three cities 
outside Cairo occurred with help of activists. In this period, positionality was not a burden at all, 
but allowed for easy accessibility. It is this positionality that enabled me to meet and interview 
some key people, such as the founders of the Youth Coalition of the Revolution (YCR), one of 
the administrators of “We are All Khaled Said” Facebook Page, some of the founders of Kefayya 
and the National Association for Change, some of the workers who were crucial organizers in the 
Mahala Strikes in  2007 and the attempt of 2008, and some of the founders of the blogging 
movements in 2005 and beyond.  
The coding of information and data analysis and writing have also been very difficult 
given the massive changes that have taken place since 2011 in Egypt and which continue to twist, 
turn, and unfold unpredictably today. My sense of attachment to some of the subjects targeted 
after the revolution led me to feel a constant sense of responsibility to keep the research up to 
date in light of these changes and to avoid leaving out new crises and attacks on the activists. Yet, 
because the main purpose of the research was for my dissertation, I was forced to detach myself 
from this role of a witness documenting every development, and to focus instead on writing a 
dissertation that begins and ends within a specific historical time period.  
 
 The rest of this dissertation is divided into four substantive chapters followed by a 
conclusion. In Chapter 2, I examine the history and significance of Tahrir Square in Egypt and 
situate this in the history of political protest, as well as the larger political public space under 
Mubarak’s authoritarianism. In Chapter 3, I contextualize the Tahrir sit-in in relation to the other 
repertoires of protest taking place in Cairo, and examine how survival and mobilization were 
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effected through an innovative blend of organization and spontaneity. In Chapter 4, I address the 
questions of how and why the revolution became focused on a reformist agenda, and how and 
why Tahrir, in particular, became the main political voice of the revolution.  And in Chapter 5, I 
turn to the other side of the picture and investigate how the unity and centrality of Tahrir 
delimited and led to the marginalization of other issues, voices, and revolutionary possibilities.  
Finally, in the conclusion, I summarize my arguments, discuss some of the events that have 
followed since 2011, and reflect on the difficulty of writing about a phenomenon, the contours 
and implications of which people are still living and dying to define.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 Historicizing Tahrir: Protest and Political Public Space before the Revolution  
 
Introduction 
In 2011, while conducting fieldwork in Egypt during the events known as the Egyptian 
Revolution, I interviewed numerous participants and asked them all the same question: why did 
you go to Tahrir Square? Almost all of them explained that they already thought of Tahrir as a 
place where important protests were staged, so when the protests began in January 2011, they 
just knew to head there. In short, Tahrir was simply understood as where the revolution would 
take place, where the protestors knew the action would be. Their answers speak to the existence 
of something that precedes the mobilization to a revolution, something that challenges dominant 
frameworks in social movement scholarship that underplay the role and significance of space and 
time. In this chapter, I discuss the historical significance of Tahrir as a space for mobilization and 
protest prior to the 2011 revolution, noting how and why Tahrir held a special attraction for 
protesters, and how images and meanings of the square were re-appropriated by protesters during 
the revolution. But in order to properly understand the history of Tahrir Square and its 
significance to the revolution, it is important to situate it within the broader context of political 
public space under the authoritarian state. We need first to understand how the boundaries and 
practices constituting political public space came to be contested in Egypt.  
My goals in this chapter are, thus, twofold. First, I want to highlight the significance of 
what I describe as public political space for understanding contentions in Egypt, especially under 
the authoritarian regime of Hosni Mubarak. As I will argue, public political space was a crucial 
site of struggle between the undemocratic regime and the opposition. While the opposition aimed 
to expand and, when necessary, reconstitute this space through innovative new practices, the 
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regime sought constantly to control and limit this space. Understanding this struggle, especially 
in the last decade before the revolution, will help us to understand the political tensions at play 
leading up to the Egyptian revolution. Then, in the second part of the chapter, I will try to answer 
the question I posed in interviews: why did protestors target Tahrir Square specifically? And in 
what ways did the history of political protest in Tahrir shape mobilization and protest activities 
there?  I argue that we not only need to widen our understanding of the role of space in 
mobilization politics, but we also need to give greater attention to spaces’ historical significance. 
The mobilization for the Egyptian revolution must be connected to a history of protests in and 
around Tahrir that stretches back almost a hundred years, for my research reveals that this 
historical spatial legacy was certainly present in the memories of many protesters in 2011. This 
collectively remembered legacy played a key role in the construction of Tahrir Square as the 
main site for the revolution.  
 
I. Authoritarianism, Protest, and Political Public Space in Egypt 
The first half of this chapter is divided into four main sections. In the first, I define what I 
mean by “political public space,” contrasting it with other concepts of public space, and 
emphasizing the importance of locating it with a specific socio-historical context. In the second 
section, I begin to fill in this background context by reviewing the consolidation of Mubarak’s 
regime from the 1990s onwards, with particular attention to the changing capacity, targets, and 
tactics of Mubarak’s repressive apparatus. Third, I examine the specific rise of “street” politics in 
Egypt and the public’s growing disillusionment with formal politics. And finally, I chart the 
emergence of social media in Egypt and review the multi-layered ways in which such media 
have been employed to both expand and navigate political public space in recent years.  
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What is Political Public Space? 
The concept of space in general has garnered increased attention in the social sciences 
and humanities in the last few decades (Castells 1985, 1999; Foucault 1986; Harvey 1990, 1999; 
Lefevbvre 1991). At the end of the day, people and institutions exist and interact in spaces and 
places with both physical and symbolic dimensions. In addition to the sociology of space in 
general, a growing body of scholarship has emerged that specifically focuses on space in relation 
to contention. Prominent geographers in a special issue of the journal Mobilization, for example, 
focused on space in contentious politics and noted: “Research on social movements and 
contentious politics has generally downplayed the spatial constitution and context of its central 
concepts such as identity, grievances, political opportunities, and resources. As such, this body of 
scholarship remains by and large aspatial” (Martin and Miller 2003, 143). As the editors of the 
special issue emphasized, we ought to think of space not simply as “a container of activism, but 
also constitutive of it” (Martin and Miller 2003, 144). Notably, William Sewell Jr. and Charles 
Tilly have both tried to address the significance of space in contentious politics.  Sewell proposes 
“to provide a rudimentary theoretical vocabulary for thinking about space in contentious politics 
and to begin putting such a vocabulary to work” (2001, 52), while Tilly argues that space 
interacts with contentions in different ways, including, for example, “the geography of policing, 
safe spaces, spatial claim making, and control of places as stakes of contention” (2000, 135).  
Public spaces and spheres have attracted particular attention in the social sciences and 
humanities for various reasons, including their status as ostensibly communal, but also 
contestable spaces, and the political potentials and practices that they are theorized to foster. 
Roads, parks, beaches, squares, libraries, markets, and streets—all are considered public spaces, 
but have all members of the public always had equal access to and status within such spaces? 
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Such questions make public spaces fertile sites for sociological analysis. Jürgen Habermas 
famously explored the implications of political public space in his classic work, The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989), which outlined the emergence of a (largely white, 
male, bourgeois) public sphere in 18th- and early 19th-century Europe. As subsequent scholars 
have noted, however, Habermas’ focus on the autonomy of such a sphere from the state made 
him less attentive to the various forms of exclusion that characterized the public sphere.54 Pierre 
Bourdieu’s theorization of overlapping and internally dynamic fields can be seen as similarly 
engaged with questions of social space (1985, 1989). In Bourdieu’s work, individuals navigate 
and compete with others, armed with the volume and forms of capitals they hold in semi-
autonomous fields (e.g., social, cultural, political, economic); social space is the larger social 
structure that contains all of these fields is called social space. Bourdieu’s conceptualization of 
space, then, is much broader than what I mean to analyze here.  
In this chapter, I use a concept of “political public space” that is distinct from a general 
concept of public space. The main reason for this is that despite the great advances in scholarship 
that deals with the idea of public space in social sciences and the challenges of the concept, as 
mentioned above, most analyses have been Eurocentric, making claims to universality that do 
not stand up to scrutiny. The concept I use here emphasizes public space as a site struggle 
between the powerful elite and powerless populations, and is specific to the complexities of 
navigating politics under authoritarianism. The second reason I use the term “political public 
space” is that I am not conferring in public about politics in general (as per the Habermasian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 See, for example, Nancy Fraser (1990), who suggests that marginalized groups were not included in 
Habermas’ analysis and that the idea of “common concern” is problematic as it is primarily defined by the 
bourgeoisie class. She further suggests that we need to think of subaltern publics and/or counterpublic 
sphere(s) (Fraser 1990). 
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usage); rather, I am specifically highlighting the public expression of political dissent and 
opposition to the government. 55 As the rest of the chapter will demonstrate, Mubarak sought to 
strictly control, if not entirely eliminate such expression in Egyptian public space. Scholars who 
study Egypt have rightly noted that before the revolution, the mere presence of opposition groups, 
and perhaps any strong political voice in public space is only to be permitted by the state (Ismail 
2012; Jerzak 2013; Winegar 2012). Yet opposition was expressed and the term “political public 
space” is meant to capture the formal and informal ways in which this was done.  
I define political public space, then, as the specific domain in public space where citizens 
can practice their opposition to the government. The space does not so much operate in parallel 
with or opposition to the more narrow realm of formal politics; rather, it seeks actively to expand 
and challenge the limitations of formal politics. It may include protests in public squares, but it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 To be fair, Habermas was writing about a context without parliamentary politics, which only developed 
later. He was theorizing an entire model of rational communication, something he sees as the basis for 
deliberative democracy. European regimes at the time of his writing could have been seen as authoritarian, 
or at least there were no clear bounds to authorities. In some sense, the rise of the bourgeois public sphere 
has some similarities with what I am discussing here, when activists take politics to the streets and also 
when they discuss and or resist the limitation of formal politics in the public spaces. 
I am not using the Habermasian perspective for two reasons. I am not very familiar with the period that he 
is talking about. And it seems to me that the context I am discussing here is different. This is mainly 
because the idea of public space does exist today, and yet, activists yearn for democracy and do not find 
democracy in these spaces. Also, it seems to me that in the Egyptian case, activists are not only taking 
politics to streets, but also fighting for this with their bodies and protesting tyranny in the public space. 
This is something that I am not sure it happened in the context that Habermas is talking about. 
Also, the concept of political public space I am advocating here overlaps with what Asef Bayat (1997, 
2010) describes as “spatialities of discontent.” Bayat, one of the few sociologists who has examined the 
connections between space and social movements, has written about urban movements and revolutions in 
Egypt and Iran. He highlights the need in authoritarian contexts to look for “spatialities of discontent” or 
“[h]ow particular spatial forms shape, galvanize, and accommodate insurgent sentiments and solidarities” 
(2010, 162). Bayat does attend to the spatial history of contentions, but the strength of his analysis lies in 
showing how actual physical space shapes specific moments of mobilization. I thus see my work as 
contributing to his by providing a more historical understanding of how such spatialities of discontent 
emerge over time, sometimes becoming—as in the case of Tahrir Square—spatialities of revolution, as I 
will show in the second part of this chapter.  
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may also include public debates about the “democratic” character of elections (for it is important 
to remember that elections sometimes occur under authoritarianism too). According to this 
definition, the parameters of this space are admittedly amorphous, but we can begin to trace their 
contours by exploring questions such as: Where and how are citizens permitted to express dissent? 
In what spaces can they protest or even just talk politics and carry banners freely without being 
harassed by police? And how the rules about practicing politics, especially oppositional politics, 
are being made? Also, in what ways the openness and the usage of public space reflect the 
struggle between a given regime and the population over public space? 
A clarifying example is useful here to make a difference between public spaces in general 
and political public space. Coffee houses have been always places for public discussions in the 
Arab and the Muslim world. If we focus on the mere fact that people gather here to converse and 
express opinions, then such spaces contribute to a Habermasian notion of a public sphere/space. 
But when we look more specifically at how these coffee houses have become sites for people to 
discuss political views and ideas otherwise silenced in Egyptian politics, and to host meetings of 
activists and political dissidents, then we are talking about political public space.56  In the 
following section, I review the conditions of Mubarek’s regime that provide the necessary 
backdrop to this form of space—both how Mubarak sought to limit or disallow such space, but 
also how, ironically, his regime spurred its expansion and forms of innovation within it.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 I am not the first to use the term political public space. Other scholars have recently used it in various 
ways. Avritzer (2009), for example, has used the concept in the context of post-authoritarian regimes in 
Latin America; see also Parkinson (2013) and Barnett (2013). Avritzer’s work is especially relevant to my 
analysis here; he writes that in Latin American “social movements occupied the public space at a moment 
when there were serious restrictions on the free organization of political parties in Brazil and Argentina 
and on the forms of political competition in Mexico” (2009, 11). Avritzer, however, defines political 
space in more egalitarian terms than I, as a space that is open to larger segments of society, in comparison 
to the political society, which is open mainly for elites (2009,12). In contrast, I use the term to focus on 
voices of dissent in the public space. 
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Political Public Space under Mubarak’s Authoritarianism 
  Protest and mobilization under authoritarianism are difficult. Analyses in social 
movement studies that deal with this subject have focused mostly on the idea of political 
opportunities and regime threats (Schock 1999; Suh 2001). Despite the usefulness of the political 
opportunity and regime threat frameworks, their focus tends toward formal politics, rather than 
how such dynamics play out on the ground. Here, I argue that one of the most useful ways to 
examine how social movements both maneuver and are challenged under authoritarianism is to 
examine their operation in public space specifically. In the sections that follow, I historicize how 
social movements—specifically, pro-democracy movements—negotiated political public space 
in Egypt in the decades leading up to the revolution. First, however, it is necessary to understand 
the context of Mubarak’s authoritarianism—specifically, the lessons learned by the regime, its 
neoliberal economic agenda and its need for an increasingly repressive state apparatus, and how 
the tactics and targets of this apparatus shifted over time.  
The Egyptian state under Mubarak has been described variously as a failed state, a crony 
capitalist state, and/or a police state (Amar 2013b; Brumberg and Sallam 2012; Ismail 2011, 
2012; Jerzak 2013; Lazard and Diwan 2012; Lesch 2011; Teitelbaum 2012). Arguably, each of 
these descriptions focuses on only one element of a broader picture, and the labels are by no 
means mutually exclusive.57 The presence of an extensive state repressive apparatus, however, is 
an element common to all analyses. But perhaps the more important question is why the 
Mubarak state requires such an apparatus. Egyptian analysts have offered various explanations; I 
review two of the most compelling here. The first is that the inflation of the repressive apparatus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 For the purposes of conciseness, I use the term “police state” in what follows to emphasize the 
repressive capacities of the Mubarak regime, while acknowledging that some umbrella term that captures 
the various dimensions of the state would be ideal.  
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in Egypt is an outcome of Mubarak’s consolidation of power/dictatorship. According to Bassma 
Abdel-Aziz (2012), a writer and physician who has written about torture in Egypt, the political 
regime has lacked accountability for the last decade thanks to the fragile state of Egypt’s 
democracy. On the ground, police officers who have been practicing torture for decades have not 
been questioned or prosecuted. Abdel Aziz calls this (and her book) “the temptation of absolute 
power.” The other explanation comes from late Egyptian political economist, Samer Soliman 
(2011), who attributes the rise of the police state in Egypt to a deep crisis in the state’s economy 
that, in turn, has triggered a crisis of legitimacy for the regime. According to Soliman, the 
Egyptian state reached a point where it was no longer able to operate without increasing taxation 
and, hence, the impoverishment of the majority of the population—policies that could not be 
enacted with expanding and intensifying its coercive machinery.    
Such explanations remain relatively abstract, however, without a more concrete 
understanding of recent events in Egypt, specifically, how the Mubarak regime has responded to 
political and economic conflicts. Here, I identify three defining moments that solidified the 
police state in Egypt from the mid-1990s onwards. The first of these moments is the battle 
between the state and militant Islamists from 1990 until 1997. Fuelled by their belief that the 
state was not Islamic enough, militant Islamists launched a new campaign of attacks that aimed 
to destabilize the “infidel” state and punish it for not complying to what the militants saw as 
“true” Islam. Tourists, state officials, and Egyptian Christians were targeted. In response, the 
Egyptian state launched its own war on terror. The entire state apparatus, as well as even 
opposition groups and intellectuals were united in their opposition to terror, but the central figure 
in this battle was the state security apparatus. Resources and powers both legal and extra-legal 
were granted to the police. Special units were made and devoted to combating terror. Arbitrary 
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detention, killing, and torture became pervasive and even normalized. This moment had two 
important outcomes in relation to the state and the police. The first was the strengthening of the 
repressive apparatus. Notably, Habib Al-Adly started his career as Minister of the Interior in 
1997; the ministry’s primary objective was combating terror. Framed as such, its actions were 
elevated beyond critique, except for some pesky voices in the emerging human rights movement 
who criticized torture, military trials for civilians, and arbitrary detentions.58 The second 
outcome was that the state reached the conclusion that a security-based solution works. Some 
immediate successes led to the premature assessment that expanded state repression was 
effective in controlling militants, an assessment that no one in the state seemed to question. All 
evidence to the contrary that has accumulated since then notwithstanding, this remains the 
fundamental logic behind repressive state security as the solution to all problems to this day.  
 The second moment occurred around the same time, in conjunction with Egypt’s 
economic structural adjustment programs. Such programs officially began in 1991, but were 
applied gradually, with their tempo increasing steadily from around 1997 onwards. It bears 
emphasizing here that the police apparatus in Egypt cannot be separated or seen as operating 
independently of the interests of the privileged elite. A significant portion of high-ranking police 
officers come from the middle class and many of them joined the police to maintain the interests 
of this class; some actually entered the police academy through corruption and bribery 
(Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005; Lindsay 2011b; Nice 2006).59 Of course, there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 In a book I published in Arabic, titled “Torture in Egypt is a Judicial Reality” (2000), I analyzed 1124 
civil compensation lawsuits for torture victims covering the years 1981 to 1999. I found that out of the 
1124 cases, 1117 occurred during arbitrary detention under emergency law. It was during this period that 
political torture became de rigeur in Egypt, leading several national and international human rights 
groups to conclude that torture in Egypt was now systematic. 
59 The idea that to enter the police academy in Egypt you have to pay a bribe to some officials has been 
known, especially under Mubarak. In 2012, the Ministry of Interior officials implicitly admitted that the 
practice of offering bribe does exist, and urged the public “not to try to pay a bribe” before admission. 
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is nothing new about the police becoming an apparatus for the privileged, but with the escalation 
of structural adjustment programs, crushing the protests of peasants and workers who resisted the 
harsh laws and new so-called economic reform laws became a major task of the police. Peasants 
resisting the application of land reforms were arrested, beaten, tortured, and, in some cases, even 
killed by police. Even when peasants secured court decisions to delay the application of land 
evacuations, police ignored the decisions and evacuated the land by force. In 1997, when 
peasants/tenants were forced to leave land by force, about 100 were killed by the police, more 
than 1000 were injured, and the police also arrested about 1400 farmers. All of the arrested 
farmers were subjected to investigations before state Security Prosecutions or State Security 
Court. These bodies only apply Emergency Law (Saber 2006). In later years, as the application 
of neo-liberal policies escalated, many urban areas witnessed restructuring in which poor 
neighborhoods were razed in order to build new projects or roads, with the most famous being 
the ring road around Cairo. Many of the people who lived in these areas received no 
compensation and when they resisted, they were beaten and arrested by police. Human rights 
groups and experts studying torture in Egypt noticed the emergence of new categories of torture, 
most notably what may be described as “complementary torture”—instances in which powerless 
individuals are tortured at the request of or as a favor for a powerful, influential person, usually 
to force the former to sign certain papers or give up some rights.60  	  
 The third moment began in 2005 with the formation of the Egyptian pro-democracy 
group Kefayya (Enough), which soon sparked many similar groups opposing Mubarak’s 
extension of rule and the apparent plans for his son to succeed him. It was around this time that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Those officials announced that the practice is no longer acceptable “presumably.” See the relevant report 
in Al-Masry Alyoum Newspaper (Hussein 2012). 
60 See examples of “complementary torture” in Torture in Egypt, a blog about torture practices (Said). 
Also see the report by El Nadim Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence in Egypt, “In Mansoura 
Station Sexual Assault Is Complementary,” https://alnadeem.org/ar/node/8 (last accessed July 23, 2014).  
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the police state truly solidified in Egypt and became practically synonymous with the protection 
of Mubarak’s family and interests. As protests challenging Mubarak grew, the security apparatus 
kept pace and suppressed resistance whenever and wherever it showed itself. As this back and 
forth struggle between police and protestors continued, both sides learned important lessons and 
developed strategies for dealing with each other. From the regime’s side, new tactics included 
using plainclothes security to infiltrate protestors and using organized sexual harassment and 
assault to disperse female protestors in particular.61  
 These three moments were crucial in creating a context in which Egypt’s repressive 
apparatus became the dominant force in Egyptian politics. In addition to expanding their powers 
greatly, the police also become less accountable. The first moment witnessed the rise of the idea 
that policing is the solution to most problems. The second moment saw the crystallization of the 
idea that only through harsh policing could the state deal with marginalized groups and 
populations. And the third moment saw policing reach its ultimate, corrupt logic, whereby the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 While many reports have been documenting the role of plainclothes security in Egypt in the last decade, 
there is no proper historicization of the rise of this issue. My claim that the first appearance of this in the 
decade before the revolution was in 2000, with the rise of protest in streets. This is based on my field 
notes and participation in some of the protests in 2000. The first patterned sexual violence against female 
protestors was in 2005. This is documented by many human rights and feminist organizations in Egypt as 
well as international human rights groups.  
 
It is useful to note that the plainclothes police are actually either from the security state intelligence or 
informants and thugs hired by the police, or even soldiers in the State Central Security (Anti-Riot Police), 
but were instructed to wear civilian clothes and spread among protestors, before attacking them or 
arresting them or to help in dispersing protest by force later. See Baheyya Blog for discussion of the use 
of plainclothes police in 2005 (“Saturday, July 30, 2005” 2005). And see statement by Joe Stork of the 
Human Rights Watch (Stork 2005). Even though the phenomena is older, as I suggest and it goes back to 
2000, I think that it caught the attention of analysts only in 2005. I think this is due to the rise of Kefayya 
activists and protests. 
 
Regarding the rise of patterned sexual violence by the police against female protestors since 2005, I 
discuss this issue further in Chapter 5. See also Amar (2011), the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights 
fact sheet campaign against sexual harassment (n.d.), and Women Under Siege Project (Zaltzman 2012).  
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police became an explicit tool in the hands of Mubarak’s family, using any means necessary to 
serve its interests. What did this mean for social movements in Egypt, especially those calling for 
reform or democratic change in Egypt?  
It is telling to look at the right of citizens to participate and take part in formal politics, 
defined here as their right to join and/or form political parties, unions and NGOs. These things 
are supposedly protected by the Egyptian constitution and the law, but in practice, these rights 
were so eviscerated under Mubarak that they didn’t exist—in any meaningful sense—at all. 
Under Mubarak, Egyptians’ rights to form or join a political party, NGO, or union were severely 
restricted. In order to form a political party, for example, one had to get a license from a 
committee chaired by a member of the ruling party. Not surprisingly, the license was rarely 
granted; indeed, most of the political parties that existed before the revolution gained their 
license only after suing the government and challenging the committee’s prior refusal. Then, 
even after getting a license, political parties were not really allowed to practice politics. Often, 
their work was reduced to small gatherings of people in closed rooms, struggling simply to 
publish a newspaper criticizing the government. But the newspaper could be banned if it dared to 
criticize Mubarak himself or talk about his health or his family. Similarly, in order to form an 
NGO in Egypt under Mubarak, one needed to obtain a license. In theory, the license was 
supposed to granted by the Social Affairs Ministry, but in practice, such decisions were made by 
the police (HRW Report 2005). The law in Egypt also restricted union activities during elections 
and non-union members could be arrested if they practiced politics (Ali 2009).  Active union 
members known to be critical of the government often were confronted with many barriers to be 
able to run in trade union elections in the first place—or rather, they could run, but it was 
understood that they would never win thanks to the police and corrupt officials’ control over the 
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electoral process (Ali 2009).62 Many of these practices can be traced to Nasser’s rule, but what 
was new under Mubarak was the expanded use of police forces and the security apparatus—
compared to military intelligence and national security agencies—to manipulate domestic 
politics.   
Another telling indicator is to look at parliamentary election results and the number of 
election boycotts that occurred under Mubarak. In parliamentary elections between 1990 and 
2010, the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) entirely dominated the process and controlled 
no less than 70 percent of the seats in parliament throughout this period (BBC 2010; H. Moustafa  
1995, 2000, 2005) Furthermore, opposition political parties came to see the process as so 
meaningless and corrupt that they increasingly turned to boycotting elections altogether. It 
should be noted that boycotting elections was never simply or only about pressuring the regime 
to implement reforms; it was also about taking a public stance to expose the falseness of the 
process. In the period from 1990 to 2010, Egypt witnessed five parliamentary elections. In 1990, 
three important parties and forces boycotted the election: Al-Wafd, the Labor Party, as well as 
the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which was not a party. In 1995, 2000, and 2005 elections, 
although important parties did not boycott elections, their participation was limited, as they could 
not compete with the ruling party, as well as they did confront many challenges in the electoral 
process. In 2010 elections most political parties boycotted the election after the fraud in the first 
round of the election. The logic of the boycott was also to embarrass the regime internationally 
and to send the message to the public that there were, essentially, no elections. It is against this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Egypt has been listed in the International Labor Organization blacklist for decades before January 2011 
revolution, due to the fact that the government’s restrictions on labor union freedoms. The listing was 
lifted briefly after the revolution, but was made back into force in 2013. See the article “Egypt on the 
blacklist” in Al-AhramWeekly (El-Fiqi 2013).  
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backdrop that many Egyptians’ began to reassess the relevance of participating in formal politics, 
and to look instead for alternate political public space.   
The Rise of “Street” Politics in Egypt 
From 2000 onward, major shifts began to transform the battle between the opposition and 
the regime over political public space. “Street” politics emerged, marking not only new sites of 
protest, but also new strategies on both “sides.” I use the term “street(s)” here to refer to actual 
physical streets, but also to other public spaces of protest such as building stairwells, squares, bus 
stations, lawyers’ offices, police stations, and courtrooms. Whether staging large-scale street 
rallies or merely occupying stairwells in key government buildings, protestors used their bodies 
and their mere presence to politicize public spaces and register their opposition to the regime. 
For their part, state security forces became increasingly aggressive and violent in their attempts 
to repress and control these spaces, developing new tactics and specific targets along the way. 
And over the years, all parties involved began to recognize just how much was at stake in these 
spatialized struggles. It is important to stress, however, that the relationship between street 
politics and formal politics is complex. As noted earlier, to the extent that Egyptians began to 
seek out new political public space, their goal was not so much to sidestep or oppose formal 
political channels, but rather to challenge and expand the latter, to expose them as corrupt and 
demand that they be made more democratic.  
Street Rallies Since 2000  
The first major street rallies in Egypt since 1977 were sparked, in fact, not by domestic  
conflicts but by regional politics. On September 28, 2000, Israeli Minster of Defense Ariel 
Sharon made a visit to the Temple Mount/Aqsa Mosque, the most important religious site in old  
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Jerusalem. The visit was seen by most Palestinians in the occupied territories and other Arabs 
and Muslims in the region as deeply provocative. The Israeli army arrested some protestors and 
dispersed others using force. The visit triggered a Palestinian uprising, described as the second 
Palestinian intifada, which was met, in turn, by further violence from Israeli authorities. Before 
long, Arabs and Muslims throughout the region and in various parts of the world launched 
protests in solidarity with the Palestinians. In Egypt, the protests began spontaneously. A group 
of Egyptian activists and intellectuals formed the Egyptian Popular Committee in Solidarity with 
the Palestinian Intifada, and began collecting medical and food donations to be sent to 
Palestinians. The group also sponsored protests in the street, which were joined by other 
spontaneous protests, especially on Fridays after prayers in the mosques. This situation of 
spontaneous rallies lasted for a few months.  
 The first few protests were very surprising to the regime. Indeed, the huge numbers of 
participants were a surprise to the protestors themselves and the police. I, myself, participated in 
a few of these protests and saw tens of thousands of people gathered in the streets of downtown 
Cairo, met by similar numbers of security forces who were, ultimately, unable to prevent the 
rallies. Street protests occurred almost every day for the first few weeks of October 2000, in front 
of the journalist syndicate and the Egyptian Bar Association headquarters in downtown Cairo (at 
Ramses Street and Abdel Khaleq Tharwat Street). Police used violence and arrests, but the sheer 
number of protestors created a momentum that buoyed the rallies and encouraged others to join. 
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Figure 3  Faculty and students of the American University in Cairo in October 2000, rallying in 
Mohamed Mahmoud Street in solidarity with the Palestinian Intifada. The event was celebrated 
by opposition activists as one of the first time protestors took to the streets en mass since the 
1970s. (Photograph taken by Nadine Naber, used here with her permission). 
 
Protests spread to colleges and even to elementary, junior high, and high schools, where 
kids and teenagers started to carry small signs and chant against Sharon and in solidarity with 
Palestinians. Faculty at the American University in Cairo (AUC) formed a Faculty for Palestine 
group that met and worked with students groups to organize protests and solidarity events on 
campus. One rally organized by AUC faculty in October 2000 (see Figure 3) was seen as a 
particular success by activists and, indeed, became somewhat infamous for the arrest of Hossam 
El-Hamalawy who went on to become one of Egypt’s most famous bloggers.63  
Protests in solidarity with the intifada continued for a few months, until they finally died 
down and eventually vanished, with very few exceptions especially when there were attacks by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 It is important to note here that it is not only the AUC that was protesting. As mentioned above, 
students of different campuses and different schools, and sometimes even kids of elementary schools 
were protesting.  I gave some attention to the AUC protest here because this was crucial in the dynamics 
of protest in Tahrir. This is because the AUC campus is literally in Tahrir. 
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Israeli occupation forces on Palestinians either in Gaza or the West Bank (see Figure 4). This 
could be explained by the continuation of police assaults on protestors as well as protestors 
themselves were exhausted, and the movement started to lack momentum.   
 
	  
Figure 4  Protestors in Al-Azhar Street, marching from Al-Azhar Mosque after the Friday prayer 
to different areas in downtown Cairo. Protestors were rallying against the attacks by Israeli 
occupation forces on Palestinian Jenin Camp in the West Bank. Picture taken by Nadine Naber in 
April 2002 and used here with her permission. 
 
Large-scale street rallies were not seen again until March 2003 when, again, external 
events prompted widespread public reaction—this time, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Activists 
in Egypt announced their plan to gather in protest in Tahrir Square. Once again, AUC students 
were key participants as the university’s main campus is literally in Tahrir Square. Indeed, AUC 
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students were the first to arrive to the square and though their numbers were not large (a few 
hundred), the police were reluctant to disperse or attack the protestors because so many AUC 
students are from upper class and elite Egyptian families, or are the children of high ranking 
military or police officers or government officials. This fact created just enough leverage in 
terms of time. While police hesitated, thousands of protestors from mosques and elsewhere 
joined the rally and the anti-war protests of March 20–21, 2003 soon grew to become the largest 
sit-in the history of Egypt prior to the 2011 revolution.  
The 2003 protests in particular will be discussed in further detail in the second half of this 
chapter, given their location in Tahrir Square specifically. For now, what I want to highlight are 
the various lessons learned by both protestors and police as a result of this re-emergence of street 
rallies in the early 2000s. Though sparked initially by Egyptians seeking to show support for the 
Palestinian intifada, the protests in 2000 were met, nonetheless, with violence on the part of the 
Egyptian police. According to many activists with whom I spoke, the 2000 protests and the 
police response to them served as a turning point, after which they became increasingly critical 
of the Mubarak regime and determined to organized against it. Many found themselves asking, 
“We were simply protesting in solidarity with the Palestinians, why is the regime attacking us 
with such force?” Between 2000 and 2003, and then after the March 2003 sit-in, street rallies did 
not disappear entirely; rather, protestors began to adapt their strategies. Youth activists, in 
particular, learned the value of extremely sudden, spontaneous rallies in popular neighborhoods. 
As one youth activist explained to me in 2010, by which time such tactics had become common, 
“the main reason for police to attack rallies is that they knew the time and the location of the 
protest. Hence, we decided to surprise them.” Using this method, small groups of activists gather 
in neighborhoods that are central, but often suffering from terrible social and economic 
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conditions. The protestors suddenly start to chant and sing, confident that the public will join, 
given the local conditions. The rallies generally last only an hour or an hour and a half at most 
before the police show up, but by then, the protestors have already achieved their more modest 
purpose: to carve out, even if only temporarily, new political public space.  
For their part, police also began to adjust their tactics. From 2000 onward, it became 
common to use plainclothes officers and informants to infiltrate and spread chaos among 
protestors, spy on activists, and even assist in dispersing rallies by force. The police also learned 
that it is best to stop rallies at their source before they can gather momentum. In many cases, the 
sources were mosques and thus these were increasingly targeted by police, who would occupy 
the space or prevent worshippers from leaving after the prayer as a group. Police were also quick 
to recognize the threat posed by student activism and they began to work closely with AUC 
security to prevent a repeat of 2003 Tahrir Square sit-in. Some AUC students received threats 
from the police and warnings from their parents that such protests would not be allowed again. 
Many foreign students at the AUC were even threatened with deportation if they participated in 
future protests.64  Perhaps the most pernicious new repressive strategies, however, were those the 
police developed targeting female protestors in particular.  
“The Street Is For Us” 
In 2005, the Mubarak regime decided to make some constitutional amendments and put 
them to a referendum. The changes to the constitution, on the one hand, opened the door to 
multi-candidate presidential elections for the first time in Egyptian history. But at the same time, 
the changes also established extremely difficult stipulations that candidates, both within and 
outside of the party system, had to meet. Ultimately, the changes were designed to pave the road 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 This is based on my field notes.  
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for Mubarak’s son to run in the future and also to give Mubarak himself one more chance to run 
for a fifth term. Recognizing this, pro-democracy activists gathered in Cairo on May 25, 2005, 
particularly in front of the Egyptian Higher Courts Complex (Dar Al-Qadaa Al-Alyy), and in 
front of both the Press Syndicate and Egyptian Bar Association headquarters. In response to this 
protest, the police used for the first time in a very expanded way, organized sexual harassment 
and rape against female protesters. Many female protestors were taken and dragged in the street 
by policemen and plainclothes police. Some were kidnapped and left out in the desert after being 
sexually assaulted. As many activists told me, “targeting women reflected many things: sexist 
and patriarchal assumptions that women should not be in public space to protest, targeting them 
to shame them in front of the public and also targeting them based on a police assumption that 
they are ‘weaker,’ and need solidarity and help.”  From the police point of view, an attack on 
women protestors was an effective tactic for two main reasons. The first of these is that it would 
discourage women from protesting in public again in the future. And second, it would also 
render men easier targets for violence, as they would be busy “protecting” women or the number 
of protestors overall would simply be lower thus making men easier to isolate and attack.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, some of the leaders in the Kefayya movement decided to stop 
protesting in the streets for a while due to the risks involved. Resisting this specific attack on 
women, however, and also resisting the Kefayya leaders’ decision, many Egyptian feminists and 
activists launched a new campaign and movement named “The Street Is For Us.”65 On June 1, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 The name was taken from a song in an important political movie produced in 1972 and directed by 
Youssef Chahine. “Al-asfour” or “The Sparrow” focuses on a family dominated by a patriarch. The 
family members end up being fragmented and subjected to violence and abuse. The story was presented 
as symbolic of the Egyptian people under Nasser, captured like a “sparrow in a cage.” The song “The 
street is for us” refers to the legitimacy and power of the people in the streets specifically and in politics 
in general.  
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2005, the group organized a protest on the outside entrance stairs of the Egyptian Press Syndicate 
headquarters in downtown Cairo, carrying banners with the slogan, “We will not be scared.” The 
police force were standing outside cordoning the syndicate. Since then, the idea about protesting 
on the syndicate’s entrance or stairs, while being sized by the police became a pattern in the few 
years until the revolution. The movement lasted for a while, organizing a few more small 
protests and releasing documents about the right of women and pro-democracy movements in 
Egypt to have a political public space. Many female activists who participated in the revolution 
told me that the police attacks on May 25, 2005 and then the subsequent “The Street Is For Us” 
campaign in June changed their lives. Indeed, since May 25, 2005, feminist and progressive 
activists in Egypt have continued to organize an annual conference or protest every year to 
commemorate the attacks and remember the movement. As even the name of this group revealed, 
the “streets” had become a potential political symbol and site for both police and protestors, but 
as I will discuss next, the actual spaces in which “street” protests took place began to shift, as did 
the specific repertoires of protest.  
Sit-ins, Stand-Ins, and Strikes: Fighting for Even the Smallest Spaces  
 Particularly in the years after 2005, a new pattern began to emerge. In the face of intense 
police repression and the development of specifically gendered tactics, large-scale street rallies 
subsided once again and protest took on smaller, more diffuse forms. Petition campaigns were 
launched around various issues, and boycotts were organized—not only against elections, but 
also big corporations such as cell-phone companies, to protest the bad service or the exaggerated 
bills or constant increase in the bills. In some cases, people simply refused to pay things like 
electricity bills, in order to protest bad service and the constant lack of power in various areas of 
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Egypt, especially in urban centers. In other cases, individual government officials were sued for 
corruption, or to try and force a release of information about a detainee. But the most visible 
forms of protest—albeit less visible than large-scale street rallies—were those that involved 
crowds of people using their bodies and their mere presence to politicize public space. I’m 
talking here about the numerous small sit-ins, stand-ins, and vigils that characterized the years 
directly preceding the revolution, revealing the ongoing battle over space between the authorities 
and the protestors.  
Here, I build on Tilly (2006) who argues that we need to look at repertories not in 
abstract terms but in relation to the regimes in which they operate. Just as political regimes vary, 
so too do the repertoires of protest opposing them. In the case of Egypt in the years prior to the 
revolution, protest strategies adjusted in ways that reflected both the increasing authoritarianism 
of Mubarak, and the highly contested boundaries of political public space. As large street rallies 
declined, lower-profile tactics such as “sit-ins” and “stand-ins” became more common, targeting 
not only streets and outdoor spaces like squares, but also the indoor and outdoor premises of key 
buildings often concentrated in downtown urban centers. The most common targets were court 
buildings, police stations, and particularly the headquarters of the Press Syndicate and Lawyers 
Syndicate in downtown Cairo.66 The range of spaces was captured in a 2010 study conducted by 
Essem Syam that mapped the main places of protest in the decade before the revolution, 
especially between 2005 and 2010 (see Table 2).  
  Protestors would gather in front of, around, or even inside the stairwells of buildings, 
knowingly drawing the police, but also hoping that their efforts would encourage the public to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 While these efforts were focused in urban areas, it should be noted that spatial battles played out in 
rural areas also. Rural villagers, for example, attempted to block roads in particular, protesting the fact 
that many Egyptian villages still lack tunnels or bridges to cross highways, resulting in many road-related 
deaths every year. 
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join or the media to cover the event. Protest signs were specifically crafted to speak to the public, 
featuring slogans such as “we are here for you and us,” “our people, listen to us, we are standing 
here for you and us.” Other signs even addressed police themselves, targeting the lower ranks of  
Table 2 New Spaces of political protest in Egypt prior to the revolution.  Adapted from Essam Syam (2010) 
Places of Protest Examples 
In front of court buildings • the Supreme Court complex (Dar al-Qadaa Al-Aaly) in 
downtown Cairo 
• the Supreme Administrative Court in Dokki 
• inside Lawyers’ Rooms in the courts 
In work places • bus and subway stations 
• schools and colleges 
• headquarters of education districts 
• hospitals 
• main railway station in Cairo 
In front of government 
buildings 
• government Cabinet headquarters in Cairo 
• Parliament buildings in Cairo 
• specific Ministry buildings 
• police stations 
• governorate headquarters 
• local government buildings 
In front of trade unions and 
syndicates 
• Egyptian Federation of Trade Unions headquarters 
• various professional syndicates’ headquarters (e.g., Doctors, 
Engineers, Lawyers, Press) –all near Tahrir Square in 
downtown Cairo 
In streets and public spaces 
in general 
Various streets, highways, and squares, especially Tahrir Square 
in Cairo 
 
the anti-riot police by telling them “you are poor or marginalized and oppressed like us, and one 
day you will join us,” or “do not do violence or shoot at your people.” 
One of the most important of these protests was a stand-in in front of the Ministry of 
Interior in June 2010, in response to the killing of the young activist Khaled Said (an event 
discussed in further detail later in the chapter). The initial protest drew no more than a hundred 
protestors, yet was surrounded and cordoned off by thousands of soldiers and anti-riot police. 
Pictures of this protest later became iconic for many activists after the revolution, who looked at 
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the image and often commented something along the lines of: “Remember, we were always as 
small as this” (see Figure 5). The meaning is that even a big revolution has to start small. 
	  
Figure 5  Protest against police brutality and the killing of blogger Khaled Said in June 2010, in 
front of the Ministry of Interior in Cairo. (Photograph taken Moureed Barghothi, used here with 
his permission) 
The other forms of protest that emerged prominently during this period were strikes and 
labor sit-ins. Between 2006 and 2008, there was a particularly steep increase in labor protests in 
Egypt. In an article co-written by Joel Beinin and Egyptian blogger Hossam El-Hamalawy about 
this period (Beinin and El-Hamalawy 2007) they stated: 
The longest and strongest wave of worker protest since the end of World War II is rolling  
through Egypt. In March, the liberal daily al-Masri al-Yawm estimated that no fewer than 
222 sit-in strikes, work stoppages, hunger strikes and demonstrations had occurred during 
2006. In the first five months of 2007, the paper has reported a new labor action nearly 
every day. The citizen group Egyptian Workers and Trade Union Watch documented 56 
incidents during the month of April, and another 15 during the first week of May alone. 
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In 2006, there were 200 strikes and in 2007, 850 strikes and sit-ins.67 Many of the labor sit-ins 
were against closing factors and neo-liberal policies, and most of them targeted the Egyptian 
Federation of Trade Unions (EFTU) headquarters in downtown Cairo, near Tahrir Square. In 
May 2010, hundreds of workers occupied the EFTU headquarters protesting the closing of  
factories. In many ways, workers during the period were the most prominent practitioners of the 
sit-in strategy. One of the important events was in December 2007, when a group of state 
employees, tax collectors, decided to stage a sit-in at the headquarters of the ministerial cabinet. 
Around 3,000 men and women participated in the sit-in, which lasted for eleven days, effecting a 
90 percent drop in tax collection. Protestors even managed to occupy the space in front of 
Parliament, though not the building itself. Ultimately, the sit-in was successful because it was 
backed by a parallel strike of 55,000 real estate tax officers throughout the country and 
culminated in the launching of a free union. The formation of the union was celebrated by all the 
opposition in Egypt, being the first independent trade union outside state control in contemporary 
Egypt.68  
Before moving to the U.S., I participated in many such sit-ins and stand-ins, and around 
75 percent of the activists I interviewed told me that they also participated in these kinds of 
protests. Based on my field observations and these interviews, I note that these protest methods 
shared the following three features. First, the protests tended to be small and short. Protestors 
focused on occupying very limited spaces—often a court entrance, the stairs of a syndicate, or a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 For more details about the history of the Egyptian working-class struggle see the booklet of Said and 
Bassiouni’s Banners of Strikes in the Egyptian Sky (Bassiouny and Said 2008). 
 
68 I am not discussing in details the question of labor strikes here, as a repertoire. But my aim was to 
provide show the larger context of the rise of the labor movement at the time. Also, in this context, the 
labor movement relied heavily on the sit-in as a repertoire and this practice was very common near the 
cabinet and also in downtown Cairo especially in the EFTU headquarters. 
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very small space in the middle or a narrow corner of a square, for a short period of time—usually 
one to two hours, on average. Multiple squares saw such sit/stand-ins: Tahrir Square, most 
importantly, but also Sayyeda Zeinab, Shoubra Circle (Dawaran), Talaat Harb Square, and 
Mataryya Square. The small size of the protests often served as a self-fulfilling prophecy; as one 
protestor put it, “This is like a vicious circle. Public do not participate in the first place because 
the small place and small crowd does not guarantee protection.”  In short, the limited space often 
had an anti-mobilizing effect. In a 2006 piece, titled “The anatomy of a downtown demo,” leftist 
writer Hani Shukrallah described these protests as “invitation-only” demonstration (Shukrallah 
2006) and noted the way police sought to control (and literally compress) protestors’ space:  
At last, I felt, I had uncovered the full subtleties of the police counter-demonstration 
strategy. It was brilliant in its simplicity. Huge contingents of anti-riot police laid a tight 
siege to the demonstrators, who, squeezed into a small corner of the "square, were 
surrounded by wider circles made up of hundreds of civilian-clad and uniformed 
policemen. The encirclement was nearly 10 tight circles deep. 
 
Despite such tactics of police intimidating, often paired with violence, such protests continued 
nonetheless.  
Part of this resilience can be linked to the second feature of the protests: their 
concentration in urban centers, most specifically, in Cairo and in or near Tahrir Square. The 
focus here was hardly surprising: in general, the area near Tahrir has more governmental 
buildings and centers of power than anywhere else in Egypt. But by targeting such central 
locations, protestors held out hope that some of their sit-ins and stand-ins might transform into 
rallies that could move around downtown and/or expand to fill the square. Importantly, such 
central locations also provided protestors with multiple spaces to stop and rest, and also multiple 
routes they could use to disperse and escape police if necessary. Finally, many human rights 
NGOs have offices downtown. Hence, protestors could seek legal aid or assistance when the 
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police became abusive. Many of these offices, like the headquarters of the syndicates, became 
central places for protestors to meet, plan logistics, and seek medical aid.  
The third feature shared by these protests strategies is the fact that, regardless of how 
small or peaceful they were, they consistently provoked an intense and aggressive police 
response. The police intentionally cordoned protestors into limited spaces, once this was 
accomplished, they also started to crush and squeeze them in an effort to break the protest as 
soon as possible. In the simple terms, this was a battle over even the smallest amount of political 
public space and the state came to the battle prepared to use violence.  In the same piece cited 
above, Shukrallah, described how police not only tried to limit protests to only well-known 
activists (thus enforcing a strange form of elitism), but also tried to control literally who could 
enter the protest space and who could leave it:  
The “invitation only” police strategy works this way. As you approach the tiny spot in 
which the early arrivals have been squeezed already, dozens of police officers will rush 
you along - and away from the site of the demonstration. When you insist on veering 
toward the demonstration in any case, you are told in no uncertain terms that it is 
“prohibited to go there.” But I want to go there, I say, pointing to the spot where portraits 
of Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nassrallah, nervously joined by red and Lebanese flags, 
could be seen over the helmeted heads of encircling anti-riot police. A ranking officer 
then gives you a penetrating look, presumably assessing whether you belong to the 
“ordinary masses” (and thus have no business there) or to the self-styled “political elite,” 
which does. Evidently, I passed the test. My trump card, which happens to be my ID, 
outdatedly identifying me as the editor of Al-Ahram Weekly, remains snug in the wallet 
in my back-pocket. This process is repeated several times, and finally you come up 
against the wall of anti-riot police encirclement. Again, you are to seek, and be given, 
permission to wade through.69 
I have participated in many protests and recognize the pattern Shukrallah explains. And though I 
agree with his description, I would also argue that things began to change after 2006, in the years 
leading up to the revolution. Increasingly, protestors began to gain confidence and some started 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Shukrallah’s example refers to the case of a small protest in downtown Cairo in solidarity with Lebanon 
during the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006. But the pattern he is discussing was common to most 
protestors in Cairo, such as the anti-Mubarak protests.  
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to challenge and even break down cordons. Some protestors, especially in the year before the 
revolution, started to intentionally stand outside of the cordon and talk to the public. Thus, as 
discussed above the usage of specific protest repertoires reflected the battle over space in Egypt 
between the regime and the opposition. The most notable of these is the rise of repertoires such 
as stand-ins and sit-ins which took place in very limited space. But even when the opposition 
movements was challenged in the street, they tried find alternative or parallel venue for their 
grievance next to the street. I will discuss this in the next sub-section, about how social media 
became this alternative and or parallel political public space to the street. 
	  
Figure 6  Protest in front of the Press Syndicate in January 27, 2011, during the 18 days of the 
revolution, one day before excessive battles took place between the police and protestors and 
ended with protestors liberating Tahrir and formed a sit-in in Tahrir. (Photo by Asmaa Waguih of 
Reuters, used here with permission). 
 
Social Media and Its Impact on Political Public Space  
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The role of social media in the Egyptian revolution has garnered much scholarly attention 
(Bhuiyan 2011; Choudhary et al. 2012; Eltantawy and Wiest 2011;  Khondker 2011; Tufekci and 
Wilson 2012; Zhuo 2011), yet I would argue that much of this literature has two flaws: first, 
analysis is too often ahistorical, failing to examine the longer history of social media in Egypt; 
and second, not enough attention has been given the dynamic relationship between online and 
offline forms of activism.70 In this section, I historicize this relationship by tracing the interaction 
between social media and street protests over time. I argue that whenever street protests took 
place, social media served more of a supportive, backseat role; but in the absence of physical 
protests, social media emerged as an alternate space in which political protest could be staged. In 
other words, I show that the rise of social media activism in Egypt is a story about political 
public space.71 
Social media in general has a very strong presence in the lives of Egyptian youth. In the 
years before the revolution, for example, many talk shows and mainstream media outlets in 
Egypt discussed this relationship (Eickelman and Anderson 2003; Ghannam 2011; Malin 2010). 
According to a report about Facebook usage in 2010, Egypt has the largest Facebook community 
in the Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA). Of North Africa’s 7.7 million Facebook 
users, Egypt accounts for 3.4 million users (or 44% of all North Africa users) (Malin 2011b). 
Egypt also has the largest number of users of Facebook’s Arabic interface (2.2 million Facebook 
Arabic users in Egypt, versus 1.8 million in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), and 30 percent of 
Egypt’s 17 million Internet users are Facebook subscribers: up from 20% in May 2010 (Malin 
2011a).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 To my knowledge, only few scholars have given attention to the role of social media before the 
revolution (Ghannam 2011; Hirschkind 2011; Lim 2012). 
71 I build here on the work of Merlyna Lim who argues that we should conceive social media as both a 
tool and also a space and that the relationship between social media and protest in Egypt should not be 
seen as only technological but sociopolitical (Lim 2012: 234). 
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 But as impressive as these numbers are, what’s even more significant is social media’s  
political impact. Most scholars of social media in the region, as well as bloggers in Egypt 
specifically, affirm that social media in Egypt—especially blogging, which started before even 
Facebook and Twitter—was politicized right from the very beginning in Egypt. Three main 
factors were involved. The first is that social media constitutes an alternative to official media, 
most of which is heavily censored. And the more official media was censored, the more 
Egyptians turned to social media to express their views and talk about social and political issues.  
The second reason is the general exclusion of youth perspectives from mainstream politics, 
social and political talk shows, and printed mainstream media. Youth were eager for a medium to 
express themselves, making them, not surprisingly, the most frequent and enthusiastic early 
adopters of blogging and social media. According to the same report on Facebook usage cited 
above, nearly 2 million of Egypt’s Facebook users in 2010 were under 25 years of age, 
representing 61% of its total users (Malin 2010: 8). Finally, the third factor contributing to the 
political nature of social media use in Egypt was the concomitant rise of pro-democracy protest 
movements, particularly after 2005. Prior to 2005, blogging existed and was somewhat political, 
primarily insofar as it provided a forum in which people broke taboos by discussing politics, 
religion, and sex. A key shift began in late 2004, however, as bloggers increasingly began to lend 
support to and collaborate with pro-democracy protests in Egypt, especially the Kefayya 
(Enough) Movement. Some bloggers assisted Kefayya with its website, while other bloggers 
actually started to organize themselves in support of the movement.  
Based on my own observations and participation in activism in Egypt, as well as the 
recollections of many of my informants, I identify the following seven moments or events as 
particularly crucial in shaping the relationship of social media and politics in Egypt before the 
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revolution of 2011. In each of these instances, social media served as mobilizing tool both before 
and during protest.   
The first significant instance of activists using social media was in 2003 for the protests 
against the US-led war in Iraq. Though the blogger movement had not yet developed, these 
protests marked the first expansive use of cell phone texts to mobilize people for protests. In 
addition to widely circulated e-mails at the time, most anti-war and anti-imperialist activists in 
Egypt used their phones’ Short Message Service (SMS) to send the following text: “On the same 
day the US attacks Iraq, let us gather and protest at noon in Tahrir.” Such use of texting for 
mobilizing purposes has since become a regular feature of Egyptian activism, especially given 
the high number of cell phones in Egypt.   
The second moment came in late 2004, with the formation of the Egyptian Movement for 
Change, otherwise known as “Kefayya” or “Enough.” As noted previously, Kefayya was formed 
to protest Mubarak’s plans to run for another term as president, and also to challenge the 
assumption that his son, Gamal, would succeed him. In 2005, some of the key founders of the 
blogging movement in Egypt joined Kefayya and its campaign to mobilize for democracy. These 
bloggers assisted in launching Kefayya’s website and became its web administrators. By 
matching Kefayya’s protests in the street with activities online, bloggers brought new energy and 
expertise to promoting Kefayya’s ideas and helped to build a network for the movement across 
different regions of the country.   
The third moment culminated in the March 2006 sit-in in solidarity with judges. When 
Mubarak put two prominent judges challenging election corruption on trial for ostensibly 
violating their impartiality and discussing politics, pro-democracy activists in Egypt launched 
campaigns and protests declaring their solidarity with the judges. Bloggers were pioneering 
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forces in these campaigns both online and offline. In March 2006, bloggers used their sites and 
virtual connections to organize a sit-in in Tahrir Square to support the judges. Most political 
groups and parties opposed the action at first and were reluctant to join. But once the sit-in 
started and began to attract attention from the media, more political groups joined.   
Fourth, social media was a key factor shaping the April 2008 strike at the Al-Mahala 
Textile Spanning and Weaving Company. Al-Mahala is a public sector company located in the 
Nile Delta. In the spring of 2007, workers there staged a strike that successfully led to an 
increase in their bonuses. A year later in April 2008, workers announced a new strike demanding 
a minimum wage for them (and for workers across Egypt) of no less than 1200 Egyptian Pounds 
(EGP) a month. Many activists—including Kefayya and other pro-democracy and also socialist 
activists—seized upon the Al-Mahala workers’ plan for a strike as a nationwide call for strikes 
and civil disobedience across Egypt. A group of activists launched a Facebook page to promote a 
general day of striking in Egypt. The police intervened in Al-Mahala, preventing the strike, but 
city-wide riots lasting three days broke out and one protester was killed.  Many activists describe 
the events in Al-Mahala as the true rehearsal of the 2011 revolution.  On April 6, 2008, protests 
in solidarity with Al-Mahala were staged in Cairo and a few other cities. The police arrested 
Israa Abdel Fatah, one of the administrations of the above mentioned Facebook page—a move 
that served only to draw further attention to Facebook as a medium for organization and 
mobilization. The 6 April Youth movement was formed and named after this event. While the 
group started as a support to Al-Mahala workers, it expanded its role to become one of the main 
youth groups in Egypt to call for democracy. And it was one of the main groups to assist on the 
ground in the revolution.  
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 The fifth “moment” of social media I would emphasize is not so much a single instance, 
but rather a growing trend, specifically, the use of blogger campaigns to publicize and protest 
police brutality and torture. In 2008, there were many groups and individuals working on human 
rights and trying to draw attention to police brutality and the issue of torture.  The most notable 
of these was a group called Egyptians Against Torture, formed in 2008 by group of individual 
human rights activists.  The group led a number of campaigns that sought to document cases of 
torture, raise awareness about police torture in Egypt, and file actual criminal and or civil cases 
against police torturers.  Bloggers played (and continue to play) an important role in these 
campaigns, devoting significant space on their blogs to writing about torture. One blogger, Noha 
Atef, for example, launched a special blog titled “Torture in Egypt,” which became the central 
site for collecting data, books, and reports about torture (Atef 2014). Prominent blogger Wael 
Abbas also spent much time and space writing about torture and uploading videos of torture both 
to his blog (Abbas 2014) and to YouTube.72 Other bloggers even invented new forums for 
discussing the issue: blogger Hossam El-Hamalway, for example, created Piggipedia, a site using 
the photo sharing program Flickr to post pictures of police officers accused of torture and other 
forms of brutality.73 These efforts not only raised awareness and helped to mobilize people 
within Egypt around these issues, they also drew considerable international attention.  
When Mohamed ElBaradei, the former Director General of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), returned to Egypt in February 2010 and announced his willingness to 
run for the presidency, it had a hugely energizing effect on pro-democracy groups. After 
Mubarak amended the constitution in 2005 and extended his power for another term (moving the 
new end-date to 2011), many Egyptian activists became depressed and discouraged. While the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 See Abbas’s blog (Abbas 2014) and his YouTube Channel (Abbas 2006). 
73 For more on Piggipedia, including screen shots of the site, see “Piggipedia: Egypt’s Human Flesh 
Search?,”  https://storify.com/ajstream/egypt-story-state-security-officials (accessed July 3, 2014).  
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constitutional amendment allowed multi-candidate elections for president in theory, in practice, 
the amendment actually instituted stipulations that made things more difficult for opposition 
candidates.  It was a gloomy time for pro-democracy organizing, thus when ElBaradei returned 
and was very vocal in criticizing Mubarak, many Egyptian youth started Facebook groups and 
Twitter accounts calling for his presidency. Bloggers devoted their pages to writing about 
ElBaradei’s return and a special campaign was created offline to collect a million endorsements 
by Egyptians for ElBaradei’s bid.  As one leading blogger who was also an administrator of 
ElBaradei’s Facebook page put it: ElBaradei’s return and campaign was like a stone thrown into 
previously stagnant water.74  
The seventh and final moment of social media mobilization that I wish to highlight is the 
June 2010 creation of the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page. On June 6, 2010, a young 
blogger and activist named Khaled Said was tortured to death because he posted a leaked video 
about police corruption in Egypt. Soon after Said’s death, blogger Wael Ghoneim created a 
Facebook page not only to commemorate Said, but also to draw attention to the circumstances of 
his death and mobilize others against police brutality. Abdel Rahman Mansour, another activist, 
assisted Ghoneim.75 Despite being anonymous, the two were targeted by the police, but they 
managed to remain unknown until after the revolution. As I will elaborate later, the page’s 
members reached about half a million in the day before the revolution and the page itself became 
the central site for mobilizing the protests that eventually culminated in the revolution.   
In each of the moments/events I identify above, social media activism was intertwined 
with organizing in the streets in almost all of the cases. In short, social media emerged during the 
decade prior to 2011 as a key medium through which political activists of many different kinds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 There were a few Facebook pages calling for ElBaradei as president. I am quoting here Abdel Rahman 
Youssef, one of the administrators of ElBaradie’s page and campaign before the revolution.  
75 Mansour is also one of my informants in this research.  
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could connect, share information and resources, and mobilize for offline activities.  In this way, 
social media was a major tool in expanding political public space under Mubarak’s authoritarian 
rule. As noted above, activists and bloggers in Egypt quickly seized upon social media as both a 
means and a place to break taboos related to discussing sex, religion, and politics. Given the 
difficulty of censoring social media, contrasted with the strict censorship of most mainstream 
media, the blogosphere and later Facebook and Twitter further developed into spaces in which 
alternate voices and ideas could be expressed, even when activism was repressed in the streets 
and in official political spaces.  Many people who cared about democracy did not trust political 
parties, most of which were seen as co-opted at the time; also, not all those who were in favor of 
democracy actually went so far as to join the emerging movements. With social media, people 
suddenly had a new space in which to discuss ideas and a new, lower-investment way to get 
involved in politics.  This was especially important in the years from 2008 to 2011, given the 
almost complete absence of serious and organized venues of free political discussion at the time.   
 
II. Space, History and Mobilization in Tahrir Square 
 
In this half of the chapter, I shift to a more specific focus on the political public space of 
Tahrir Square. In what follows, I use the square as a lens through which we can examine broader 
questions about the significance of space for social movements, but I also seek to highlight the 
historical and spatial specificity of Tahrir itself.  On the one hand, my analysis is driven by the 
fact that Tahrir become iconized as the revolution by February 2011; but at the same time, I want 
to show the much longer historical trajectory that both led people to Tahrir and led Tahrir to have 
so much meaning for the people.  
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Earlier in this chapter, I discussed examples of how social movements theorists have 
dealt with the question of space in relation to contention. Nonetheless, analyses of space and 
social movements still tend to deal with space as a set of geographical conditions that become 
relevant only once a specific movement arises, relatively disconnected from history.  At the risk 
of simplification, I argue that this literature conceives space in relation to social movements in 
the following ways :1) space as simply the built-in environment that helps to enable or disable 
the movement; 2) space as shaping the scale of the movement; 3) space as a network that reflect 
and or embodies the movement; and 4) space as an idea or set of symbols that provides the 
meaningful context and vernacular of the movement.  This scholarship has made important 
contributions, particularly the conception of space not as a concrete/physical container of 
activism, but as “structures of relationships and networks, and the context of repertoires of 
contention” (Martin and Miller 2003: 144; Sewell 2001; Tilly 2000). But despite these advances, 
the general trend in this literature is to examine space in relation to movements synchronically.  
With the exception of the works of Sewell and Tilly, less attention has been given to the 
historical making and usage of space in relation to social movements. In rest of this chapter, I use 
the following observation by Sewell as a point of departure: “While insurgent movements make 
sure of the preexisting meanings of places, they can also—either intentionally or 
unintentionally—transform the significance of protest locations” (Sewell 2001: 65). I would like 
to apply and test this observation to the case of Tahrir and the Egyptian revolution. My aim is to 
expand our understanding of space historically. As I will show in this chapter, spaces have 
histories that exist prior to social movements, and the influence of those histories are not 
confined to the past.  
Tahrir Square: Background 
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Located in the heart of downtown Cairo, Tahrir Square is about 11.5 acres of open space, 
in which one can see layers of architecture representing different eras of Cairo’s unique history. 
It was designed to emulate Charles de Gaulle Square in Paris and was constructed in 1865 under 
Khedive Ismail (Taher 2012), after whom it was originally named Ismailyya Square. Having 
lived in Paris during the remaking of that city by Baron Haussman, Ismail’s vision was to 
modernize Cairo and create a “Paris on the Nile.” What began as an area of sand and swamp has 
since become the most vibrant and famous public space in Cairo. Near the heart of the square is 
Qasr El-Nile Bridge. Historically, the area near the bridge was occupied by British barracks until 
1947. Under King Farouk, a huge all-in-one administrative building known as Mogamma in 
Arabic (or “the complex”) was built in 1951. The name Tahrir Square, meaning “Liberation 
Square” in Arabic, was first used informally in Egyptian mass protests against British rule in 
1919. The name was made official under Nasser when Egypt became independent and changed 
from a constitutional monarchy into a republic (Farag 1999). The area around Tahrir Square 
includes other important buildings such as the Egyptian National Museum, the Nile Hotel, the 
Kasr El Dobara Evangelical Church, the original downtown campus of the American University 
in Cairo, and buildings housing the headquarters of the Arab League and Mubarak’s National 
Democratic Party (NDP, formed under Sadat), respectively. The NDP headquarters were burned 
down during the  2011 revolution. Between the Nile Hotel and the Kasr El Dobara Church is the 
Omar Makram Mosque. Named after one of Egypt’s revolutionaries during the French 
occupation of Egypt (1798–1801), the mosque was used as one of the field hospitals during the 
violent clashes of 2011. Also near the square are key government buildings including the 
Egyptian Parliament, the Shura Council, the headquarters of the Cabinet, as well as the Ministry 
of Interior. 
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 The layers of architectural history in Tahrir square are rich with symbolism about the 
history of Egypt itself, but the focus of this chapter is the broader meaning of the square in 
relation to the history of mobilization politics in Egypt, up to and including the 2011 
revolution.76  Even the name of the square took on special meaning during the revolution, as I 
discuss later in this chapter.   
	  
Figure 7  The middle of Tahrir Square, where the most tents were concentrated during the 
revolution. (Picture taken by the author) 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 On the architectural  layers of Tahrir and downtown Cairo as a mirror of Egyptian history, see 
ElShahed (2007, 2011), Rabbat (2011), Ahmed and Kamel (1996) and Nassar (2011). 
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Tahrir Square as Site of Egypt’s Protest History 
To locate Tahrir Square in the history of political protest in Egypt, I have constructed a 
table listing all the major political protests that have taken place in Egypt in the twentieth century, 
(see Table in Appendix 2). I used the following criteria, combined: 1) political protests, meaning 
protests that targeted the government and/or raised demands/grievances against the ruling regime; 
2) protests by Egyptian masses, meaning protests not limited to any one specific class, sect, or 
religious group, and 3) protests that exceeded 2000–3000 protesters. I excluded protests of 
smaller numbers for practical reasons, as they are difficult to document and because protests 
involving 2000 or 3000 people more clearly suggest a decent level of mobilization and 
participation. Using the above criteria, 15 major political protests have taken place in 
contemporary Egypt since 1919. All of these protests took place, wholly or in part, in or near 
Tahrir Square. Of course, each case has its own distinctive historical and political context and 
mobilization circumstances. For example, the mass revolt in 1919 against British occupation was 
a nationwide protest that took place all over Egypt, and was not limited to Tahrir Square. Also, 
some of these events may have overlapping grievances. By putting them in one table, I do not 
mean to diminish their historical specificity; my goal is only to highlight the significance of 
Tahrir in each case.   
It is important to note that despite this long history of protests, actual occupation of the 
square has only been realized three times: once in January 1972, once in March 2003, and once 
with a smaller sit-in in March 2006. By occupation, I mean when protesters have established a 
sit-in and maintained control of the square for a substantial period of time, varying from just 
under 24 hours, as was the case in January 1972 and March 2003, to roughly 18 days, as 
happened during the January 2011 Revolution. 
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The historical significance of Tahrir Square took three forms in relation to mobilization 
for the 2011 revolution. The first is as known target: Tahrir Square has long been the best-known 
target for political protests since before the Egyptian revolution. The second is as source of 
strategies: the history of political protests in Tahrir provided participants in 2011 with some 
tactical lessons, namely how to stage an occupation. The third is as site of meaning: Tahrir 
Square itself, given its historic and symbolic significance, provided inspiration during the 
revolution. Protesters in the Egyptian revolution appropriated this history and also produced a 
narrative about the liberation of the square.  
I- Tahrir: Where the Action Takes Place 
Many of the 2011 protesters remembered Tahrir as the meeting point of other protests. As 
noted above, they explained spontaneously heading for Tahrir by saying that the space was (and 
is) already established and understood as a gathering point for protesters. Some remembered that 
Tahrir was the site of an important anti-war protest in 2003 (against the Anglo-American war on 
Iraq), while others remembered protests organized by Kefayya (a pro-democracy coalition 
formed in 2005). Writing in his dairy about the student protests in Egypt in 1972, Kamal Khalil, 
a student leader at the time and still a leftist organizer and a leading activist of the last decade, 
stated: 
Against the regime detaining some of the students leaders, students who have been in a  
week long sit-in in Cairo University and Ain Chams University, have moved their sit-ins  
to Tahrir Square. Sadat’s regime after detaining some of the leaders, also cordoned  
campuses with heavy security and armored vehicles to prevent students from entering  
campuses. Students response was quick, to rally and go to Tahrir. Tahrir became their  
new sit-in. (2013: 76) 
 
The idea of Tahrir as a space of protest stretches back even earlier than 1972. The fact that the 
barracks for British troops were located near Tahrir during the colonial period made Tahrir a 
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target of protests since 1919. Leaders of student movements in Egypt in the 1940s also recalled 
protests against the British occupation in 1946, led by the National Committee of Workers and 
Students. The committee called for a general strike against British occupation and proclaimed 
February 21, 1946, the day of the evacuation of British troops. A massive demonstration of 
students marched from Giza to the center of Cairo. When the demonstrators reached Ismailia 
Square (Tahrir), they were confronted by the British garrison and began to burn the barracks and 
fences. British army vehicles moved towards them and a barrage of machine-gun fire opened on 
the protest. Twenty-three demonstrators were killed and some 120 injured (Farag 1999). The day 
was later chosen to mark an international student’s day.  
Contemporary activists recall Tahrir as the space of more recent protests in the last 
decade—protests that have highlighted, in fact, that protesting in Tahrir is not an easy thing. It is 
always a battle to control the space, especially under an authoritarian regime and heavy police 
state. Yet, for many of the activists with whom I spoke, Tahrir had become an important, if 
unattainable (or, perhaps, because unattainable) meeting point for demonstrations. The idea of 
controlling Tahrir took on special meaning for protestors precisely because the space was rarely 
under their control. All this is then supplemented by the fact that Tahrir has a number of physical 
features that make it a convenient and strategic target. These include the massive width of the 
space; its location in downtown Cairo; its proximity to numerous cafes, where activists and 
intellectuals can meet and write statements; and the central pedestal, which provides a 
convenient and symbolic platform for protest leaders.77 It is Tahrir’s central location, then, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 The pedestal at the center of Tahrir Square has a storied history. Originally, it is said that it was meant 
to be the base of a statue of Khedive Ismail that was never installed. After the 1952 coup d'état that made 
Egypt a republic and eventually led to the presidency of Gamal Abdul Nasser, there was talk of installing 
a statue of Nasser on the pedestal. Then Nasser’s successor, President Sadat, removed the pedestal and 
built a fountain in its place.  
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both literal and historical space that leads some analysts to say: “Whatever happens in Tahrir 
immediately becomes a national concern” (Farag 1999).  
 
II- Tahrir: A History of Sit-ins 
As noted above, actual occupation of Tahrir has taken place only three times in the 
history of political protests in contemporary Egypt. For many of the protesters I interviewed,  
these incidents hold an important place in their memory, even if they only heard about them 
second-hand. It should be noted here that Egyptian activists mostly use the word “sit-in” (in 
Arabic ieetsam,  مﻡﺎﺼﺘﻋاﺍ), rather than  the word “occupation.”  Though the latter is used 
internationally to describe this mode of action (perhaps due to the rise of the Occupy movement), 
in Arabic “occupation” is associated more with the history of colonialism. In this chapter, I use 
the words “occupation” and “sit-in” interchangeably in order to avoid confusion and because 
“occupation” is the term most often used by the media and in scholarship about Tahrir.  
The first known historical occupation of Tahrir was a student-led sit-in in 1972. In 
January of that year, students rallied, calling for democracy and a more equitable, less corrupt 
economic system, and protesting Sadat’s repression of opposition. The students also echoed 
existing critiques of Sadat for failing to regain the Sinai Peninsula after 1967. The larger protests 
were triggered when Sadat’s regime arrested 1500 students engaged in a campus sit-in on 
January 24, 1972 at Cairo University. The previous week had seen many sit-ins at various 
universities, organized by student unions and groups. In response to the arrests, about twenty 
thousand students from Cairo and Ain Chams Universities (both in Cairo) rallied in Tahrir 
Square. The students occupied the square all day, despite police efforts to dispel them by force. 
One activist recounted the sit-in experience:  
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They (students) started gathering around the campus, and the spontaneous cry was “to  
Tahrir,” this being the closest thing we have to the center of Cairo. The pedestal was  
probably an obvious choice, being the closest thing to the center of Tahrir. It was also, as  
I recall, surrounded by a sort of circular garden. It therefore offered an obvious focal  
point to gather round. It also provided a sort of platform, which was used for speeches, 
 and for Sheikh Imam and Ahmed Fouad Negm to sing their revolutionary songs  
(quoted in Farag 1999). 
 
Throughout the day, more students and other groups soon joined the students in solidarity, 
supporting their demands for the release of their colleagues. At midnight on January 25, police 
came and evacuated the square by force (A. Abdalla 2009). 
This occupation became a significant symbol in Egyptian intellectual and cultural history..  
A key factor was the writing of poet Amal Donqol, who penned the famous poem “Oghneyet El-
Kaaka El-Hagareya” (The Song of the Brick Cake) in reference to pedestal in the center of the 
square. The poem describes the protesters’ chants and determination against the tyranny of Sadat; 
it enjoys a powerful place in Egyptian memory and was cited by participants in later events. 
 Regarding the March 2003 occupation of Tahrir Square, journalist Amira Howeidy 
wrote: “It took 31 years and an American-led war on Iraq for the rare occurrence—of people 
occupying Tahrir Square—to be reenacted” (Howeidy 2003). In anticipation of the Anglo-
American war, Egyptian anti-globalization groups and leftist activists circulated e-mails calling 
for protests on the first day of the war. Diaa Rashwan, a journalist and political analyst,  wrote: 
“It's not a ‘war.’ This is the first kind of occupation the Arabs have experienced since the 19th 
century. Its magnitude shouldn't be underestimated” (quoted in Howeidy 2003). On Thursday, 
March 20, 2003, thousands of protesters rallied in downtown Cairo, near Tahrir. At noon, a small 
group of activists assembled in the square. Anti-riot police attempted to cordon off the protests, 
but more protesters showed up unexpectedly and in large numbers via the surrounding streets. 
They carried signs and chanted “Down with Powellian democracy,” “We won't be ruled by 
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imperialism,”  and “Down Bush, down Blair, down Aznar!” (Howeidy 2003). Police arrested 
about 1500 protesters, including the activists who had called for the protests, as well as ordinary 
citizens. After the arrests and blockading of the streets, protesters left, but even larger protests 
took place the next day, Friday, March 21.  
On that day, more than 20,000 protesters gathered—a number that seemed to surprise 
both police and activists. As Howeidy put it, “the capital’s most famous and strategic square was 
occupied by people from all age groups and walks of life: activists; politicians; students; children; 
passers-by; families; housewives; professors; beggars; journalists; and downtown Cairo residents” 
(2003). One activist told me, “this was one of the few 10 hours where we had a bigger number, 
and it felt as if there was no police cordon outside.”  The occupation of the square lasted all day; 
at night, the police came to evacuate the square by force. Despite the fact that the number of 
protesters was actually largest on March 21, activists launched a movement named after the 
March 20th sit-in. Activists started to link anti-imperialism with the question of democracy in 
Egypt and the dream of liberating the square again was rekindled. This fueled another, smaller 
attempt to occupy the square in March 2006, when protesters staged a small sit-in in solidarity 
with pro-democracy judges who were prosecuted under Mubarak.  
In 2011, this history of sit-ins in Tahrir provided protestors with not only the idea of 
occupying the square, but also concrete strategies for doing so. People gravitated to the square 
spontaneously, but once there, the massive crowds and space needed to be managed.  
Experienced activists who had participated in previous sit-ins knew that focusing on issues of 
survival, such as food, water, and sleeping equipment would be crucial. Other activists knew that 
communication would be key and brought large speakers and set-up stages throughout the space. 
Most of these ideas emerged from previous protests. Egyptian bloggers, in particular, who had 
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led the small 2006 sit-in were key players in 2011 who drew on their past experiences and used 
social media to mobilize protestors in 2011.78  For example, Amr Ezzat, one of the founders of 
the blogging movement in Egypt in the decade before the revolution, told me that “for many 
bloggers the experience in the sit-in during the revolution reminded them of their own sit-in in 
Tahrir in 2006.” Seham Shawadda, a labor organizer and journalist, became the key person for 
organizing survival issues, mainly food, for the Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution. She 
explained how she ended up with this role:  
I did not want to do this role in the beginning. But I could not say no. They chose me  
because I was used to do this role in previous protests. In the last few years before the 
revolution, I was one who is organizing donations, mainly food and blankets, for workers  
in sit-ins,  many of these were in downtown and near Tahrir. I became very experienced  
with types of food that was good in storage. A huge sit-in like the one in Tahrir needs lots  
 of organizations with logistics, food and blankets are of the most important things of  
 these logistics. In Tahrir, many of us knew what we were supposed to do on these issues.  
 
Protestors’ shared memories of their own and others’ experiences during previous protests thus 
informed both the very idea of occupying the square, and the specific strategies and people 
employed to do it. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78  As I mentioned in the introduction, I conducted research in three other major cities in Egypt, all of 
which had a strong impact on the events of the Egyptian revolution in different ways. Mahala witnessed 
what may be considered a true rehearsal of the Egyptian revolution in 2008, when its textile workers 
attempted a general strike that was suppressed with force by the authorities, sparking mass riot in the city. 
Suez also witnessed serious clashes by protestors and police authorities over January 25-27, including the 
first death of a protestor. These events galvanized anger and protests in Cairo. Alexandria, the most 
populous city after Cairo, was also key in that it was the home of Khaled Said, the young Egyptian 
blogger whose torture and death served as the primary catalyst for the revolution. In each of these cities, a 
public square was a significant site of protest (Arbaeen Square in Suez, el-Shone in Mahala, and 
Ibrahim’s Square and mosque in Alexandria), yet in none of these locales did protestors successfully stage 
a full sit-in.  There was only a failed attempt in Alexandria, which I discussed in the introduction.  
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III-Tahrir Means Liberation 
Because many of my interviewees had memories of unsuccessful attempts to occupy the 
square, their narratives of occupying Tahrir in 2011 involved a distinct sense of pride that this 
was the longest period they had held the square, and that this represented a new form of 
liberation. In this sense, Tahrir was not only an important geopolitical site for protesters, but also 
a historic site over which they had been struggling for decades. One of the most important 
components in protesters’ narratives was the idea that Tahrir should finally live up to its name 
(liberation). Their hope was that the liberation of Tahrir would lead to the liberation of Egypt 
from dictatorship. Implicit in activists’ narratives was an understanding of Tahrir as not only 
liberated during the sit-in of 2011 itself, but also as a symbol of liberation both historically and 
for the future. Ahmed Bahaa Eddin Shaaban, one of the leaders of the student movement in 1972, 
became the general coordinator of the National Association for Change, a coalition of different 
Figure 8  Protesters assembled in Tahrir Square on March 20, 2003, for what later 
became a sit-in that lasted for one day. (Photo by Randa Shaath, used here with her 
permission). 
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political groups that came together to mobilize for democracy under Mubarak. Shaaban himself 
comes from a leftist background and is about 63 years old.  He has spent most of his life 
involved in political activism against both Sadat and Mubarak. When I interviewed him, he told 
me how the revolution was in many ways a culmination of all the political activism in his life: “I 
learned from this revolution and I found in it the reward for all of our sacrifices in our political 
career since the student movement in 1972. In Tahrir we were liberating ourselves.”  
 Previous protests and occupations of Tahrir were an important source of inspiration, and 
also provided a reference against which to measure contemporary efforts. In an interview, 
Nermine Nezar, an independent activist, stated: 
In all my life, I have been reading the poem about the “brick cake,” and I have been 
hearing stories about the students protest and their occupation of Tahrir. And I have older 
friends and family members who participated on this. I thought that this was the highest 
point in the political protest history in Egypt. But when the 18 days in Tahrir came, I felt 
like we are making new and a stronger history. I was proud of my generation. It was like 
a dream. 
And while the history of protests in Tahrir made it the most well-known target for protesters who 
wanted to join the sit-in spontaneously, other activists explicitly used this history and the image 
of Tahrir to recruit more protesters. The idea of borrowing meanings from the past to encourage 
more newcomers to join the protests was an important aspect of the first eighteen days of the 
revolution.  
One of the best examples was the use of important political songs from Egypt’s history. 
Protesters sang old national songs, particularly those advocating resistance against occupation 
and/or liberating lands. One of the most significant songs appropriated and redeployed in Tahrir 
in 2011 was a song written by poet Ahmed Fou’ad Negm and composed and sung by Sheikh 
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Emam.79 The song, named “The valiant is valiant and the coward is coward,” was written in 
1969 in the context of the six-year war between Egypt and Israel, when the idea of continuing 
resistance/war until liberating the occupied Sinai figured prominently in the political debates and 
protest at the time. Protesters in the 2011 revolution appropriated the 1969 song to refer to Tahrir 
and sang it to those who entered the square. The message was clear: Tahrir is for those who are 
valiant. The song’s words emphasize the significance of resistance and that only brave people 
will go to the field (square):  
We will raise the strife 
Above all storms 
We will be proceeding all nights 
And bring the morning 
We will defeat defeatism 
If you want to redress all the lost, 
Go to the field 
The valiant is valiant  
And the coward is coward 
 
Since 2011, the song has also become popular among protesters trying to re-occupy Tahrir. On 
April 13, 2012, for example, in one of the so-called “million person rallies” to protect the 
aspirations of the revolution, tens of thousands of protesters were recorded singing the song at 
the same time.80  
Memories of more recent protests were also present in the minds of many protesters. 
Activists talked particularly about efforts in the early 2000’s. Speaking about his experience in 
2003, Mohamed Sanad, a young leftist activist, recounted: 
This was my first participation in a demonstration ever. I was in Cairo University, where 
the students’ rally started. I knew that the target was Tahrir. I joined the protesters. In 
Tahrir, I saw Kamal Khalil leading chants against Mubarak. The atmosphere was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 The works of both Negm and Emam are significant Egyptian political protest history. The two artists 
were present in 1972, and visited student protesters in the square. They have been heroes of resistance 
movements throughout the 1970s and beyond, including the 2011 revolution. Their songs were banned in 
Egypt throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. 
80 This video can be viewed on YouTube (The valiant is valiant and the coward is coward 2012).  
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impressive for me. I saw young people, men and women, chanting and signing old songs 
of Sheiekh Emam. At night, protesters lighted many candles. For somebody who never 
experienced or saw any protests outside the university, this was very memorable and 
impressive experience.  I remembered this during the revolution. It was almost the same 
environment.  
This sense of participating in something with longer historical roots and meanings was cited by 
numerous protestors. Whether recalling songs and narratives passed down through generations, 
or drawing on their own personal memories, participants in the 2011 revolution consistently 
framed the meaning of contemporary events in their historical context.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I tried to study the history of protests in Egypt in two ways. The first way 
was to locate the problem of Tahrir in the larger context of political public space under 
authoritarianism and also to understand why protestors were always in urban centers and located 
in downtown Cairo. In the second part of the chapter,  I examined how the history of Tahrir as a 
space of mobilization shaped the 2011 revolution and its meaning for participants. Of course, 
mobilization and political protests before the revolution are connected to the latter in many ways, 
not only through the space of Tahrir. But this chapter shows that the power of the square as a 
historical idea and inspiration played a constitutive role in the revolution itself.  Recent 
scholarship has brought more attention to the meaning and effects of spaces in which significant 
events take place. But as Tahrir and, hopefully, this chapter reveal, even before or in between 
moments when events take place, spaces carry meanings that are constructed over time, 
redeployed and reconfigured in the present, and carried forward as inspiration for the future.   
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CHAPTER 3 
Repertoires of Revolution: Tahrir as Convergence of Multiple Modes of Action  
 
I first entered Tahrir Square on February 4, 2011. The events that would eventually 
become known as the Egyptian Revolution began nine days earlier on January 25, when 
protestors first began their sit-in in the square. Just two days before my arrival in Tahrir, on 
February 2, a huge crackdown took place in which pro-Mubarak supporters, protected by the 
police, attacked the protesters with sticks, rocks, Molotov cocktails, even live ammunition. 
Despite this siege, the sit-in survived. It was a tumultuous and violent time, but when I entered 
Tahrir Square on February 4, I was still shocked to see what was going on. To be sure, there was 
evidence of recent violence. Pro-Mubarak supporters continued to clash with pro-democracy 
protestors. Some people were still fighting, but others were simply gathered together. Huge 
debates were going on everywhere. There were two big stages with huge speakers in the square. 
Impromptu field hospitals had been established and volunteers were treating people with injuries. 
Protestors erected barricades to protect the square from intruders. In the midst of what could all 
too easily be seen by outside observers as chaos, there was evidence of extraordinary 
organization. How had this been achieved? Who built those stages and how did they get sound 
equipment into the square in the context of the recent siege? When and how were the field 
hospitals set up? Who was coordinating issues like food, water, and hygiene for these huge 
numbers of people—numbers that, during the days, were reportedly reaching a million? Over the 
next week, I moved in and out of Tahrir Square, talking to people both inside and on the outside, 
looking in. By February 11, 2011, the day Mubarak was ousted from power, Tahrir had become 
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firmly established in the media and in the minds of Egyptians as the site of the revolution. In this 
chapter, I examine how this was possible.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, there is an important history of protests in Egypt 
and much of this history has centered around Tahrir Square. Yet, there was nothing inevitable 
about Tahrir’s emergence as the center of the Egyptian Revolution, nor was there anything that 
guaranteed that the sit-in there would simply survive past the first day, let alone grow to become 
so successful. Thus, the central question of this chapter is: how did the Tahrir Square sit-in 
become the main mode of action of the revolution? And secondarily, how despite an almost 
continuous state of siege and attacks by security forces and regime supporters, did the protests in 
Tahir not just endure, but grow, continuing to mobilize people while also dealing with the 
monumental task of survival for so many people in such a space.  
I draw in this chapter on Tilly’s (1986, 2006) concept of repertoires of contention in order 
to understand the various modes of action that converged in and around Tahrir Square. 
Borrowing from the realm of theater and performance, Tilly argues that participants in collective 
action tend to select their actions from those performances with which they are most familiar. 
Using a wide range of historical examples, Tilly proposes that in specific periods, specific 
techniques of protest or repertoires become prevalent, shaping the ways in which people engage 
with political regimes. Importantly, Tilly also stresses the adaptive, creative ways in which 
people employ the repertoires specific to their historical and geographical context. Sidney 
Tarrow (2011) later elaborated on Tilly’s concept by theorizing about the modularity of 
repertoires, or how they are diffused through various media and processes over time and space. 
Modular repertoires, according to Tarrow are “diffused through print, association, and state 
building that national social movements developed” (2011: 7).  
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Building upon and expanding Tilly’s arguments, I want to highlight specific features of 
the repertoires that constituted the Egyptian revolution, how and why they came together at 
Tahrir, and how they interacted with one another. Specifically, I examine how the actions and 
events that unfolded in and around Tahrir were: 1) characterized by a complex interplay of 
organization and spontaneity; 2) centrally concerned with issues of both basic survival and 
political mobilization; 3) constituted through multiple repertoires of contention, in which the sit-
in was central, but also supplemented in various ways by other actions such as barricades, rallies, 
and targeted attacks on government buildings; and 4) given added symbolic and practical 
efficacy through social media and what I refer to as the virtual making of Tahrir. My arguments 
here are constructed, in large part, in response to problematic characterizations of the Egyptian 
revolution that would paint it, alternately, as purely spontaneous, entirely reducible to a social 
media phenomenon, confined completely to the sit-in at Tahrir, and/or remarkable only as a 
political accomplishment and not also (and just as importantly) as a stunning practical 
achievement. In what follows, I hope to show why every one of these depictions is a 
simplification, and to offer instead a more nuanced understanding of what it means to talk about 
repertoires, leadership, organization, strategies and survival in a revolution. But first, it is 
important to outline a basic description of the sit-in in Tahrir, and the shifts that occurred there 
between January 25 and February 11, 2011.  
The Tahrir Sit-in  
Although the idea of occupying Tahrir Square until Mubarak left was present in the 
minds of many protesters from the first day onward, there was little actual equipment such as 
tents or other supplies that would facilitate occupation at first. As protesters clashed with the 
police, some slept on the ground, while others went home and returned the next day to continue 
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protesting.  On the evening of January 25, 2011, the day named by many as the start of the 
revolution, protesters decided to occupy Tahrir, but police eventually evacuated them by force. 
The square was a site of continuous protest and confrontations until the afternoon of January 28, 
2011, when protesters succeeded in finally establishing a mass sit-in that the police were unable 
to clear. In many ways, then, one could argue that Tahrir’s occupation was not fully developed 
until at least January 28, 2011, thus throwing into question the accuracy of the oft-cited reference 
to the “18 days of the revolution. ” Nonetheless, from January 28 to February 2, despite the 
continuation of violent clashes, more and more people came to sleep at night in the square, 
bringing blankets, tents, and food. Others who could not sleep there brought whatever they could 
to support the sit-in. Conditions were difficult, as the military, which was present in the streets 
from January 28 onward and until February 2, 2011, was not allowing food, medicine, or 
blankets into the square. There may seem to be a contradiction here: while the square was under 
regime siege, at least during this period, protestors were still able to bring things in—indeed, as I 
will show later, protestors never stopped their efforts to bring materials in.  
On February 2, a large group of pro-Mubarak supporters, alongside plainclothes 
policemen, came to evacuate the square by force in what became known as the “camel battle,” as 
some people arrived with horses and camels. Though some protestors were killed in the ensuing 
violence that took the form of twenty hours of continuous clashes, ultimately, the protesters 
succeeded in holding Tahrir and protecting the sit-in.  Most of the clashes occurred without any 
interference from the military, which remained neutral. After the battle, protesters decided to 
establish their own security system of groups of guards at all entrances of the square. A looser 
version of this had already been established prior to February 2, but not at all the entrances, and 
without any formal organization. After February 2, all the entrances had a checkpoint and every 
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single visitor had to be inspected before entering. As more and more people joined and brought 
supplies, the sit-in grew in strength and became more established after that date until February 11, 
when Mubarak was ousted.  
I asked many protesters to estimate the number of people sleeping in the square at night.  
They all had different estimates, but many confirmed that until February 2, the number ranged 
from around 5,000 to 10,000 protesters, climbing to between 10,000 to 20,000 throughout the 
rest of period, and that in the last days before ousting Mubarak, the numbers may have reached 
as high as 200,000 people actually sleeping in Tahrir at night. Media descriptions of million-
person rallies organized by protesters were referring to numbers during the day, when the 
numbers for the mass rallies in the streets peaked. The highest density of people actually sleeping 
in tents was in the center of the square, though they dispersed further over time. I did not 
document the exact number of tents, as this was difficult due to the sheer number of protesters 
and how events unfolded while I was there from February 4, 2011, onward, but I would estimate 
there were several hundred. These tents were of different types, ranging from ready-made tents 
designed for hiking and camping, to handmade tents fashioned from pieces of cloth and sticks 
(see Figure 9). Other protesters simply slept on the ground with sheets, plastic mats, or 
cardboards beneath them, with or without blankets. The scene was an incredibly dynamic one, 
with the appearance of the square shifting every day as tents moved and people joined and left 
over time.  
 Here I would like to highlight two points. First, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, 
Egyptian protestors mostly used the word “sit-in” rather than the word “occupation.” After the 
first 18 days of the revolution, protesters continued to rally in Tahrir and there were many sit-ins 
that took place there. Activists referred to these sit-ins by different names, naming them after the 
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dates they occurred—as was the case for the March 2003 sit-in, or after the purpose of the sit-in, 
such as the Shafeeq sit-in, in reference to activists’ protests against the Prime Minster appointed 
by Mubarak. The first famous 18-day sit-in of the revolution is still known as the January sit-in 
or the main sit-in, because it started the whole 2011 revolution. And I use the words “occupation” 
and “sit-in” interchangeably, to avoid confusion as mentioned earlier. Second, as much as the 
occupation of Tahrir was planned by some activists, it was for other protestors simply a 
spontaneous development in which they found themselves with so many others in the biggest 
square in Cairo. During that 18-day period, authorities tried many times to evacuate the square 
by force or through other methods. But the more protesters succeeding in maintaining the space 
for themselves through hard battles, the more they became committed to holding it and keeping 
the occupation going. Protesters invented a famous chant on January 30, 2011, in which they said, 
“We will not leave; he should leave,” in reference to Mubarak. The chant captured the 
importance of safeguarding Tahrir and the sit-in as a significant part of their strategy.  
The authorities deployed various means to try to evacuate (or prevent protesters from 
entering) the square. As noted above, there was the successful push on the eve of January 25, 
2001, when the police fired live ammunition and also a massive amount of tear gas. Due to the 
small number of protesters (a few thousand), they were forced to leave. The second major battle 
for the square began on January 28, 2011. This lasted all day and took place in different locations, 
including a very famous battle between central security forces and protesters on Qasr El-Nile 
Bridge. This ended with a victory for the protesters and after this point, protesters did not leave 
the square until February 11, 2011 when Mubarak was ousted. On the afternoon of January 30, 
2011, F-16 planes flew very low above protesters in an effort to scare them. But many protesters 
insisted on staying, and continued their chant of “We will not leave; he should leave!” From 
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January 30 to February 2, the Egyptian military deployed in the area, and pro-Mubarak 
supporters and thugs nearby prevented medical supplies and food from entering the square. Then, 
on February 2, there was the “camel battle,” but still protesters succeeded in protecting the sit-in 
and the square. This incident and the military’s failure to safeguard protesters and the square 
forced activists to form their own security system and checkpoints to protect their sit-in. As a 
result, the situation was relatively calmer from February 4 to February 11, 2011.  I will move 
now to the first feature of the sit-in in Tahrir, which about the question of organization and 
spontaneity in Tahrir. 
	  
Figure 9  Protestors chanting and talking in Tahrir, in the background varieties of tents. (Picture 
taken by the author on February 8, 2011). 
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I. Tahrir as Site of Organization and Spontaneity 
How exactly did protestors in Tahrir Square manage to organize the sit-in? Is it even 
possible to speak of “organizing” a camp that has millions at one time? Answering such 
questions is incredibly difficult in the case of Tahrir for there were so many different actors and 
dynamics at play. Though references to “complexity” can come off as overly pat, it is hard to 
over-emphasize this feature of Tahrir. I refer here and throughout this chapter to Tahrir, the 
specific space and place of the sit-in, but Tahrir can also be seen as an event, a point of 
convergence of multiple processes, and a heavily-laden symbol. Understanding what was going 
on there requires looking in many different directions at once. There were people who worked to 
shape the sit-in from within the square, and others who worked to shape it from without. There 
were experienced protestors and activists who could draw on past memories of mobilization in 
Tahrir and elsewhere, and there were those who were politicized for the first time and who 
decided spontaneously to participate in the sit-in and to help keep it going in various ways. In an 
effort to highlight the intersection of these various dynamics, I focus here on two issues: first, I 
look closely at the first day in Tahrir, January 25, 2011, asking how it was that the idea of a sit-in 
was established; and second, I show how organized and spontaneous actions were densely 
interwoven during this early period, leading both to the extraordinary scale of mobilization and 
the impression that no one person or group was in charge.  
January 25: The First Meeting in the Square 
Several of my informants told me about a meeting that took place in Tahrir Square on the 
evening of January 25, 2011. There were many conflicts about the number of protesters who 
were present in the square at the time; estimates vary between 5,000 and 20,000 protestors.  At 
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around 8 pm or so, some known activists called for a meeting to discuss what to do next. As I 
was told this story by different people, each of them focused on different elements. Indeed, some 
were even skeptical about calling it a “meeting.” But for my purposes here, I will refer to it as 
the “tree meeting,” as it later came to be called, in reference to a tree in Tahrir Square near the 
KFC store and the entrance to Talaat Harb Square.81   
Most of my informants agreed that, at its peak, there were about 200 people present for 
the meeting. But they also emphasized that the term “meeting” was misleading insofar as it 
suggested any kind of agreed upon agenda, set structure, formal speakers, or even start or stop 
time. Rather, the gathering was a relatively spontaneous one. Some people called for it and some 
people came. Not everyone stayed the whole time, people joined and left over the course of an 
hour. As my informants explained, this kind of fluid participation is normal given the culture of 
coalitions that existed among political factions in Egypt in the decade before the revolution.  The 
main purpose of the meeting was just for these various groups and individuals to exchange 
information, particularly pertaining to when and where the police were planning to focus their 
energies next. Participants also talked generally about what to do next, but only two clear goals 
were agreed upon: 1) to stay in the square—in short, to stage a sit-in, and 2) to release a 
statement of the protestors’ demands (see Figure 10). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Tahrir Square and Talaat Harb Square are connected. 
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Figure 10  First statement issued by protestors in Tahrir Square, distributed on the evening of 
January 25, 2011.1 The statement was distributed as a hard copy in Tahrir and it was scanned and 
distributed in social media among activists during and after the revolution. 
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 The story of how the statement was drafted is, itself, telling. The first draft was prepared 
by an experienced activist, Dr. Abdel Galeel Mustafa, the coordinator of the pro-democracy 
movement Kefayya (Enough), and included many demands, such as ending emergency law and  
firing the Minister of the Interior, Habib el-Adly. According to many of my informants, most of 
the people present—particularly the youth—disagreed with the statement at first. They felt that 
the statement should include as its first demand that Mubarak should step down (Raheel 
Mubarak,  ﻞﯿﻴﺣرﺭ to leave in Arabic). This opinion eventually prevailed and when the statement 
was released later, its first demand was for Mubarak to leave. My informants stressed that this 
interaction encapsulated some of the tensions and dynamics between older and younger 
protestors that would shape the weeks to come.   
Amre Ghrabiya, a leading blogger in Egypt, described the meeting in a tongue-in-cheek 
fashion, caricaturing the various “types” of people and stances represented there that day. 
Ghrabiya  thought that the meeting is best descriptions of what happened later and symbolizing 
all the stances of the Egyptian activist elites from the revolution and what happened in the year 
after: 
This person…was enthusiastically discussing things, while not being practical at all, have  
no plan, simple words such as: “I am willing to die here in Tahrir.” And then there is this  
person….whom you feel in every single word he is saying that he is willing to negotiate  
with the regime. And also a third person, who is making a huge effort to end the meeting  
with a very practical and even detailed plan. And this person who really does not care  
about the meeting or any discussion and left the meeting to stand with others who are in  
the square, ready to battle with the police and defend the square. 
 
Wael Tawfeeq, a leftist activist, recalled this about the meeting:  
That night in the square on January 25, 2011, I had the same similar feeling to what I  
had in the sit-in of March 2003 in Tahrir. Yes, few thousands were around. But I also  
looked around to see familiar faces. I talked to known activists such as Kamal Khalil and  
Kamal Abu Eita [two known pro-democracy activists; the first is a radical Marxist and  
the second is a Nasserite/Arab nationalist]. There were also many others, from Tagamou’  
Party, the Egyptian communist party, Karama Party, many liberals, and revolutionary  
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socialists as well as revolutionary left. We knew we had to meet. Someone called for the  
meeting. And we ended with the statement and, some rushed to collect blankets and tents,  
and organize collecting food. We were ready for the sit-in. But only after few hours, the  
police attacked. 
 
Khaled Abdel Hameed, one of the founders of the Youth Coalition of the Revolution, corrected 
one point of confusion, noting that in fact there was not one single meeting, but more like a 
series of meetings:    
The meeting took place three times, at 7:00, 9:00, and 12:00 PM, before the 
 square was evacuated by force. At 7:00 in the first meeting, the following forces 
 were there: Youth for Justice and Freedom [a leftist coalition of youth, and not to 
 be confused with the Freedom and Justice party, the political arm of the Muslim 
 Brotherhood that was formed later after the revolution],  some youth from the  
Muslim Brotherhood, youth from the Democratic Front Party, youth from 
ElBaradei Campaign, from the 6 April Movement, and some members from the 
Revolutionary Socialists. In the meeting we talked about what to do next. It was 
surprising that many people showed up in the protests that day. And we suggested 
that we will meet in two hours to assess the situation and see how many people in 
the square. At 9:00 we meet another time. And we decided that the next step is to 
call for collecting donations and food and blankets and equipments for forming 
sit-in in Tahrir. In the second meeting some political figures attended too such as  
Ibrahim Esssa [journalist and critic of Mubarak], Kamal Abu Eita [Nasserite and  
labor organizer], and Kamal Khalil [radical Socialist].  In the end of the meeting, 
 we issued a statement in which we called for firing the minister of interior, and all 
 the cabinet, and all those who are responsible for torture in the police in Egypt. At 
 12:00 we met one more time, but after a few minutes…the police started to attack 
 the square and we end up leaving. 
	  
These narratives are important for they reveal several things. First, that though protestors met to 
exchange information and agree upon some minimal goals, there were no efforts to develop a 
plan as such for the revolution. Organizing efforts took the form, rather, of meetings that were 
scheduled in advance, but only minimally and loosely so. Participants were well aware of their 
differences, but saw these as neither an immediate stumbling block nor something that 
necessarily had to be resolved before moving forward. As activists told me later, awareness of 
this meant that nobody dared to claim in retrospect that they were in control of the events that 
came later. There was no guarantee of any sort about how things were going to unfold. Short of 
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agreeing to simply stay in the square until Mubarak was gone, there was no grand plan. And yet 
people did meet and there was from the start a collective sense of the need to coordinate and 
support one another. People were talking not only about political statements, but  also about 
blankets and food and equipment. Still, the question remains: why didn’t the square simply 
descend into chaos as security forces stepped up their attacks and, despite this, more and more 
people flocked to Tahrir? Here, I turn to the complex interplay of organization and spontaneity 
that characterized those first days in the square.  
Spontaneous organizations and organized spontaneity 
From my own observations during the revolution, and my discussions with many activists 
and protesters who were present at the time, there was no central organization for anything. 
Rather, there were multiple, simultaneous organizing efforts that took place before and during 
the key 18-day period. In terms of organization formation, there were two kinds of organizations. 
First, there were organizations that existed before the revolution; this includes mostly organized 
political parties, activist coalitions, and other interest-based groups. The best examples of these 
are Kefayya, the National Association for Change, and the Muslim Brotherhood.82 Another 
interesting set of groups, however, that existed before the revolution were the “ultras,” or 
organized groups of football fans that were able to draw upon their experience of fighting with 
police in violent clashes related to football games. These groups played an important role in 
protecting the square, particularly during the first week of the revolution.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 The National Association for Change is another group that was evolved from Kefayya. Kefayya did not 
disappear from politics until the revolution and its aftermath. But the National Association for change was 
a broader coalition that did not include only leftists (Nasserists and Marxists as the case in Kefayya), but 
it included many liberals and also Islamists. I discuss both Kefayya and the National Association for 
Change in chapter 4. 
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Second, there were the organizations that were formed during the revolution, primarily in 
order to do specific things, like taking care of the wounded, providing art and entertainment, or 
ensuring ongoing mobilization for the revolution. The most important of these organizations was 
the Youth Coalition for the Revolution (YCR). The YCR announced itself as an entity on 
January 30, 2011, only five days of the start of the protest, but it was, in fact, several months in 
the making. Members of several youth organizations had been working together to plan large-
scale protests in the few weeks leading up to the revolution, and it was these groups that made 
the initial call for protests on January 25. The coalition included six youth groups: Justice and 
Freedom (leftist), the 6th of April group (liberally oriented), ElBaradie supporters (liberally 
oriented), youth of the Muslim Brotherhood, and youth of the Democratic Front Party (liberally 
oriented). Later, the YCR launched a Facebook page and its press releases were circulated 
widely, but from the beginning in Tahrir, the tents and the corner claimed by the coalition 
quickly became an important center for spreading news.  Another group that formed in Tahrir 
was called the “January 25, 2011 movement,” though it did not gain the same attention as the 
YCR. The former was based on individual membership and was more radical, refusing  
membership to liberal and/or Islamist members. The Youth Coalition of the Revolution, on the 
other hand, gained more attention and was more effective because it was a coalition of strong, 
effective, already existing groups.  
Other specialized groups that formed during those first days in Tahrir included:  
Physicians for Tahrir, the main group responsible for managing and working in the field 
hospitals for the wounded; Artists for the Revolution, tasked with boosting morale and filling the 
square with different types of creative art made especially for the revolution; and Journalists for 
the Revolution, who organized displays of pictures and newsstands and wall magazines in Tahrir. 
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Scriptwriters, filmmakers and workers in Egypt’s cinema production as well made their own 
statements and had some sort of organization in Tahrir. Grouped loosely according to the 
coalitions to which they belonged, protestors throughout the square created their own “corners” 
to display their work, offer assistance, and talk to members of the public who came to talk to 
activists or just to learn about what was going on.  In addition to these groups, there were also 
various committees that were formed spontaneously to deal with practical issues such as health 
(general medical care), food (food and survival committee), hygiene (waste management and 
garbage disposal), and security (security/check-points committee) as the sit-in grew in size. 
Ahmed Douma, a leading activist and a founding member of the YCR told me, “The square was 
like a complete republic: we had ministries of health, food, and defense.” To deal with morale, 
there was more of a fluid network of activists who circulated through the crowd, especially at 
night, singing to boost people’s spirits or even creating false alarms to ensure people were 
remaining alert. Other protesters spontaneously took it upon themselves to clean the square 
regularly or they encouraged others to help clean the square and collect the garbage in one or two 
locations.   
In other words, organization emerged organically in Tahrir Square, building upon 
existing networks and practices, but also coming together in new and unique ways. Some people 
came to the square as part of groups, but once there, they interacted within the space as part of a 
larger whole. People volunteered to do things all the time, with little, if any, concern for who was 
“in charge.” Norhan Tharwat, a leftist activist who works as an IT support person for a human 
rights NGO, described the scene:  
When it comes to food, water and cleaning the square, people volunteered to do jobs with  
others in coordination, or simply just stood up to do things without being asked. For  
example, many activists decided to clean the square. Some mocked them and described  
them as the green youth of the square. But they were persistent. Perhaps it was a middle 
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class thing, but many of them were wearing gloves, and have many trash bags, sweepers  
and shovels. Most people had to do specific jobs or knew what to do. It was like a state of  
multiple or parallel initiatives.   
 
The general feeling among the crowds was that what was happening was too large for any one 
group to control. Khaled Abdel Hameed, one of the founders of the YCR, quoted above, 
emphasized that what was going on in Tahrir was way bigger than the YCR or any other 
organized group.  Perhaps the most telling phrase was one uttered by many protesters and 
activists during this period: “Tahrir has no owner.” And as others said to me, “Tahrir only 
belongs to the revolution.”  
 In short, there were many types of organizing efforts in Tahrir, but paradoxical though it 
may seem, these efforts were decentralized and combined with spontaneous actions. It is 
important to contrast this with the common depiction in media analyses that talk about the 
Egyptian revolution as a leaderless movement (The Christian Science Monitor 2011; Hais and 
Winograd 2011; Slaughter 2011; Tugal 2013). The revolution may not have had a single leader 
in the traditional sense, yet the tendency in these analyses is to equate this absence with a 
corresponding absence of organization. Similarly, other important analyses of the Egyptian 
revolution have focused on the prominence of spontaneity in mobilization and on the streets 
during the revolution (Bamyeh 2011). Yet, as the discussion above has sought to demonstrate, 
simply describing people’s actions as spontaneous fails to capture the ways in which people drew 
on pre-existing patterns of behavior and already established networks built around skill-sets and 
interests, but also adapted their actions creatively as new circumstances arose. There were, in 
fact, multiple forms of organization on the ground, including groups that existed before the 
revolution and groups that emerged organically to respond to needs within the square as they 
developed. Indeed, I would tend to argue along similar lines as John Chalcraft (2012) who has 
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suggested that there actually so many different “leaders” and organizers on the ground that the 
media simply didn’t know how to characterize what it was seeing.83 Ultimately, what was going 
on in Tahrir involved a complex interplay of organization and spontaneity and the two dynamics 
must be examined together.  
 
II. Tahrir as Site of Survival and Mobilization 
Again, we arrive at the (only seemingly) simple observation that in Tahrir, many things  
were going on at the same time. As one activist told me in an interview, “Every inch in Tahrir 
witnessed a story, or even many stories, nobody can claim or is capable of collecting all these 
stories.” Though we may never be able to collect all of the stories, we can at least examine Tahrir 
from multiple angles. In this section, I focus on the dual attention given to two immediately 
pressing goals: survival and mobilization.  On the one hand, protestors within the square were 
faced with the very real, logistical problem of how to ensure the basic survival of so many people 
in a space not designed to accommodate such day-to-day habitation. On the other hand, 
protestors also needed to ensure that those within the square and those who might join in the 
future remained mobilized, committed to the cause of holding Tahrir and insisting that their 
demands be met. Both goals were imperative and each served to counterbalance the other. If 
either one fell apart, the whole endeavor would have unraveled. Protestors thus needed to 
maintain a persistent double vision, attentive to both short-term practicalities and long-term 
visions for Egypt’s future. In short, neither the physicality nor the politics of Tahrir could be 
ignored.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Chalcraft proposes that revolution actually may be described as “leaderful” as opposed to leaderless.  
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 The problem of survival was crucial.  At issue was not only how to survive under the 
constant threat and regular reality of violence, but also how to address only seemingly banal 
needs like food, water, and bathrooms for tens of thousands, even up to a million people, with 
limited resources. For a one-day rally, this is a manageable problem, but a sit-in lasting over two 
weeks was something with which no one in Tahrir had previous experience. As with so much 
else that took place in the square, these issues were also managed on a dynamic, ad hoc basis, 
combining elements of organization and spontaneity. 
The simple provision of blankets, tents, and food was a contentious issue from the very 
beginning. On the very first night, January 25, 2011, after the “tree meeting” described above, 
many activists brought tents and blankets and food to Tahrir. Their efforts did not last long, 
however, as the police attacked at midnight and evacuated the square by force. In the days that 
followed, things began to assume a familiar pattern: people would bring supplies to the square, 
while police tried to keep these things out—whether by arresting people bearing such items 
before they could even reach Tahrir, or by periodically using force to disperse those who were 
set up in the square. Over time, despite police efforts—or arguably even because of them, the 
numbers of protestors kept growing and the sit-in kept expanding. An informal network 
connected protestors within the square and a more fluid group of people both inside and outside 
of the square who moved back and forth, simply bringing what they could, when they could.  
Water provides an interesting example. There were many ways to get drinking water, and 
these varied in terms of class and preferences. Some people drank only mineral water and were 
careful to always bring water with them. Visitors and protestors also brought boxes of mineral 
water to share with others, either distributing the bottles themselves or giving them to one of the 
survival committees to distribute later. Other people just drank tap water, and many protesters 
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volunteered to collect water bottles, wash them, and refill them at nearby taps. The many cafes 
and restaurants around the square could have served as resources, but most were closed after 
warning from the police not to open. Ever adaptive, protesters turned instead to nearby churches 
and mosques. Both Omar Makram Mosque and the Qasr El-Doubara Church served as places 
people could go to for water, in addition to serving as sites for two of the major field hospitals. 
Other small mosques were used as similar resources, and in one case, a simple zawyia (corner in 
Arabic) on the other side of the Egyptian Museum used for prayer found itself pulling double 
duty when a long hose was connected from there to Tahrir Square.  
When it came to sanitation, bathrooms, and provisions for basic hygiene, there was no 
single system and, like so much else, strategies shifted over time and among the protestors.  For 
example, there was no central plan to collect garbage, after a few days some people just 
volunteered to collect it, gathering it all in one or two corners. Bathrooms were another big 
problem. There are no public restrooms in the square, and most of the stores and cafes in the area 
were instructed/threatened by the police not to open at all, as part of the plan to put the protest 
under siege. A small number of stores violated the police order and stayed open, and protestors 
could also use the bathrooms in the church and mosques mentioned before. For everyone in the 
square, simply attending to this basic need could become a time- and energy-consuming 
proposition. Protestors walked distances that varied from a few hundred feet to one mile or more 
to find bathroom. Some informants told me they would get up at 4:00 or 5:00 AM or even earlier 
to stand in the line to be able to wash in the Omar Makram Mosque. Others simply went home to 
take showers, then returned to Tahrir. It is important to remember here that there was always this 
mix of people in the square—those who were there for the full 18 days, not leaving at all; those 
who stayed for a few days at a time; and those who came and left on daily basis. Pictures 
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circulated later, in which activists carried signs reading: “To Mubarak, you should leave because 
I want to take a shower.” Some activists jokingly told me: “I was a hero to survive being dirty, 
with no shower for 15 days in the square.” By the second week, some protestors had begun to 
build public restrooms in the square. 
As for sleep, this was not an issue for the daily visitors, but for members of the core sit-in 
that held the square, it was a nightly concern. From the beginning, people brought tents and 
blankets and again, there were variations in terms of class and availability. Some protesters, for 
example, slept in camping tents and sleeping bags, while others improvised simple tents using 
sticks and big pieces of cloth. It rained twice during the 18 days of the sit-in—once during the 
“camel battle” and then again on the Friday, February 11, when Mubarak left. Some protesters 
simply slept on a top of a blanket in the open air. And some female protesters told me they slept 
at the headquarters of the leftist political party Tagamo, about half a mile or so from the square. 
I detail these practical matters in order to emphasize that survival was not a simple thing.  
The sit-in in Tahrir was a mode of collective action, yes, but it was also a social and physical 
space in which revolutionaries needed to attend to basic human needs in order to survive. All too 
often, social movement theories (and perhaps also revolution theories) give scant attention to 
such issues in their analyses. Social movement theorists ask how social movements endure, 
referring to the challenges associating with maintaining or reviving mobilization, or the issue of 
continuity between two movements (Rupp and Taylor 1990’; Taylor 1989). But such questions 
are really concerned with broader issues of movement organization and structure, not the 
mundane tasks of providing food, water, and places for people to sleep and go to the bathroom. 
And yet, for an action as large as that staged in Tahrir Square, such issues were mobilization 
issues. They spoke not only to people’s basic physical needs, but also to ensuring that people 
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would remain in the square, either sleeping there or returning on a daily basis, despite discomfort 
and despite the constant threat of violence.  
There were four features of the actions in Tahrir that addressed these issues of survival 
and, simultaneously, contributed to keeping the movement alive over the 18 days. The first is the 
existence of a culture of survival aid that existed before the sit-in, having been strengthened in 
the decade before the revolution in particular. Some of my ethnographic notes from the years 
before 2011 are telling here. In 2003, I was the director of a research unit at the Hisham Mubarak 
Law Center (HMLC),84 an NGO that offers legal aid to victims of human rights abuses in Egypt. 
In addition to legal assistance, however, the offices also provided space for meetings of antiwar 
and pro-democracy activists, who otherwise had no place to meet. The office was messy—not 
just full of legal files, but also crowded with blankets, food cans, and medicine. Sometimes you 
couldn’t even walk in without tripping over blankets and packets of medicine.  The NGO offices 
had basically become one of the most well-known, if not the main center in Egypt to collect 
donations and medical aid for political prisoners in Egypt. When Mubarak was detained a few 
months after the January revolution, activists mocked his detention, saying, “Perhaps we should 
contact the HMLC to offer him legal aid, and also send him food in jail.”85  In short, there 
developed among activists and organizations a culture of assisting one another with practical 
issues related to basic survival. This culture was already in place when the sit-in began and thus, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 The name does not have any connection to Mubarak’s family. It was named after a human rights 
attorney, who died young, after generating lots of initiatives in human rights, especially in the field of 
legal aid for human rights victims.  
85 Two days before my arrival to Tahrir Square on February 4, 2011, the HMLC was stormed by the 
military and state security intelligence, as well as a group of Mubarak supporters. They arrested the 
executive director of HMLC and two other researchers who work for Amnesty International. The 
authorities confiscated many things in the office, including blankets, medicine, food, as well as computers 
and other office equipment.   
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as a result of this history of organization, protestors were able to draw on these already existing 
networks and spontaneously develop new ones.  
This connects with the second feature that facilitated both survival and mobilization: the 
emergence of parallel patterns of organization to deal with practical issues. On the one hand, 
there were older activists with past sit-in and protest experience, who quickly began to deal with 
logistical  issues systematically in the square. On the other hand, there were also newly 
politicized participants, often younger, who simply volunteered to do things like collect garbage 
or bring food and water randomly, sometimes on a daily basis, sometimes just one time. In other 
words, there was no single pattern of assistance; people helped out according to their own prior 
experience and preferences. On February 11, for example, I and a friend decided to bring lots of 
sandwiches and water to the sit-in, along with bottles of water that we planned to go around and 
distribute. When we got to the square, we were told to leave everything at one of the central 
places for distributing food. It would be difficult to characterize these actions as purely 
spontaneous or organized; rather, they were a mixture of both and involved multiple parties 
working in tandem, but without a pre-existing plan.  
Such exchanges were also facilitated by the third feature that developed in Tahrir—or 
rather, between those inside and outside the square. Here I refer to the emergence of multi-sited 
networks of volunteers. Much attention has been given, understandably, to people who were in 
Tahrir Square, but equally important were the many people who sent assistance from outside the 
square. I talked to many informants who told me about families and people who couldn’t 
participate directly in the revolution for various reasons—some of them upper class people or 
even people with ties with the ruling regime, but who were also sympathetic with the 
revolution—who organized campaigns to collect donations of money and/or food  to send to the 
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square. The sit-in represented, in many ways then, only the most visible part of an iceberg, kept 
afloat by unseen people and resources beyond the square.  
The fourth feature of the sit-in that highlights the intertwined organizing for survival and 
mobilization is the division of labor that not only emerged among protestors themselves, but also 
manifested in how resources themselves were used. As noted above, there were pre-existing 
organizations and political and/or interest-based groups in the square, but also random volunteers 
who simply started to assist with things. Regardless of who initiated the action, a division of 
labor always developed. Some people took care of food and tents, while others took care of 
political negotiations, meetings and mobilization. Big organizations such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood, for example, played an important role in collecting food and blankets, and also in 
manning the checkpoint system established at entrances to the square. For its part, the Youth 
Coalition of the Revolution helped with food and tents, but also played an important role by 
giving speeches and maintaining mobilization.  
One of the most telling and symbolic images here is that of the large stages installed in 
the square. The first stage was erected on February 3 by the YCR86; the next day, the Muslim 
Brotherhood installed another (see Figure 11).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 It is also interesting to note that the YCR’s stage was mainly financed by Mamdouh Hamza, a civil 
engineer and businessman critical of Mubarak. Some businessmen, especially those who suffered from the 
monopoly of Gamal Mubrak’s networks, did participate in the revolution and contributed donations to 
assist organization in Tahrir. This is discussed further in the following chapter.  
 
	  124	  
	  
	  
Figure 11  One of the two main stages in Tahrir. By February 11, 2011, there were 6 stages in 
Tahrir. Picture taken by the author on February 8, 2011. 
	  
By February 11, at least four more stages were installed, complete with huge speakers. 
These stages were crucial in spreading messages and delivering speeches. They served as an 
important means of communicating in the immense square. What I did not know at the time, but 
was told later by Seham Shawadda, the main person who worked with the Youth Coalition of the 
Revolution in collecting and organizing food, was that the stages also provided crucial space 
under which food could be protected from the elements and stored. This is a profoundly telling 
image, for it captures the way that survival and mobilization efforts reinforced one another. A 
stage serves as both a platform from which to politicize a crowd of people and a place to keep 
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food safe and away from the eyes of police who might otherwise have targeted such resources. It 
speaks, in other words, to the multiple ways in which a movement needs to be nourished to stay 
alive.  
III. All Roads (and Repertoires) Lead to Tahrir 
If we use the language of repertoires, one question we need to address is how and why 
the Tahrir Square sit-in emerged as the central repertoire of contention vis-à-vis other modes of 
action such as erecting barricades, street rallies, and/or attacking centers of power, for example? 
Again, my argument here is somewhat paradoxical. I affirm that the sit-in was, indeed, the 
central repertoire, but I also argue that this very centrality was possible due to the way in which 
this particular repertoire interacted with and was supported by others. In other words, it is not so 
much a question of one repertoire triumphing over others in some sort of zero-sum competition; 
rather, repertoires comprised a multi-dimensional, multi-sited palette from which protestors 
could draw. But as the title of this sub-section puts it, all roads and repertoires really did lead—
both literally and figuratively—to the sit-in in Tahrir.  
Looking back at my field notes, I could offer various descriptions of Tahrir Square during 
the revolution: 1) a huge sit-in that occupied one of the main squares in Egypt’s capital, Cairo; 2) 
the target and end-point of multiple rallies originating in various places both within and beyond 
Cairo; 3) the center of organized attempts to attack key sites of power, such as various 
government buildings, political party headquarters, and the Egyptian Parliament. In this section, I 
discuss, in turn, barricades, rallies, and targeted attacks of key buildings as the repertoires that 
worked together and converged to constitute the Tahrir Square sit-in as the central mode of 
action.  
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Barricades 
I will start with the barricades. Barricades are barriers, objects, or structures that are 
erected across a street to stop traffic and prevent or delay the movement of opposing forces. 
Barricades have long been known and used by protestors in various kinds of protests, urban 
warfare, and revolutions. Many scholars have written about the emergence and use of barricades 
during the French revolution (Bos 2005; Harsin 2002; Traugott 1995a, 2010). Recently, 
sociologist Christian Scholl (2013) wrote about the use of barricades during protests at the G8 
summit in Genoa in 2001 and argued for a spatial analysis that conceives barricades as 
symbolizing the struggle over social control and space between hegemonic powers and protestors 
for social justice. The point here is that this old tactic of protest is relevant to our contemporary 
world. Like Scholl, I argue that barricades are not only roadblocks, but in times of revolution or 
mass protest, they are also much more than that. They are about having the authority to control 
or separate two zones, and in so doing, define who belongs in each space and what those spaces 
mean.  
Barricades appeared in the Egyptian revolution in many streets in urban centers as well as 
in Tahrir. To my knowledge, only few scholars have given much attention to the question of 
barricades in the Egyptian revolution, the most notable exception being El-Ghobashy (2011a). 
Barricades first appeared the afternoon of January 28, 2011. On that day, there were fierce battles 
between the police and protestors in many places in Egypt, especially in main streets and squares 
in most urban centers in cities like Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, Mahala, Mansoura, Islamilia, and 
Portsaid, among others. Two main patterns for barricades soon developed. The first was 
barricades established by neighborhood watch groups, formed spontaneously in the streets of 
major urban centers in Egypt. These neighborhood watches were formed under the name of 
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popular committees. They were simply groups of neighborhood residents who stayed up at night 
to protect the streets from robbers and prisoners who escaped from the jails when many of the 
prisons were left unattended by the police on January 28 (Steinvorth and Windfuhr 2011). I 
participated in one of these committees in the neighborhood where my extended family was 
living, after being in Tahrir during the day. The other type of barricade was established in battle 
zones—the most important of which was in Tahrir Square. The barricades continued in Tahrir as 
a form of protection of the square after February 4, 2011, when the battles with the police and 
pro-regime militia/thugs generally stopped.  
The barricades in Tahrir became more important than those in other locations, or at least 
were given more attention in the media, for at least two reasons. The first is that the fiercest and 
most strategically significant battles with police took place in the roads loading up to Tahrir, 
especially close to the main entrances to the square. Media and activists alike focused primarily 
on efforts to control Qasr El-Nile Bridge, but my informants told me about other battles, such as 
in Abdel-Mone’m Riad Square, a small square leading to Tahrir, also in Al-Qasr Al-Aeiny, and 
also in Ramses Street.  My aim here is not to document all these different conflicts, but to note 
that notwithstanding this existence of conflict across multiple sites, it was control of Tahrir that 
garnered the most attention from both onlookers and participants, partly because of the numbers 
involved, but also partly given the history of Tahrir as discussed in the previous chapter.  
At first, there were no real barricades; only impromptu barriers constructed using any 
available materials on hand. But then, on January 28, 2011, protestors ended up setting fire to 
and burning two armored military vehicles that were suspected of bringing weapons for the 
police.87 These burned vehicles were then re-purposed as makeshift barricades. As plainclothes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Informants explained to me later that they based these suspicions on the fact that police would fire on 
protestors any time one of these vehicles entered the square.  
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police attacks continued and combined with those of pro-Mubarak supporters, protestors started 
to take more seriously this question of how to protect the square and restrict access to it. In 
addition to erecting more barricades, they also developed a system of checkpoints to try to ensure 
that those entering the square were there to support the revolution. These checkpoints were 
known as the protestors’ gates and they depended entirely on volunteers.  Pro-Mubarak 
supporters and thugs continued to attack the square until February 5, but protestors developed a 
low-tech tool to sound the alarm when there were intruders by sitting traffic lights and banging 
on them to alert others.  
The barricades eventually enclosing Tahrir soon came to serve as symbols, too, of the 
division between revolutionary and non-revolutionary space. Over and over again during the 
revolution, I heard protestors in Tahrir say things like, “When you enter Tahrir you are in the 
revolution,” or “You are now in the most important liberated zone in Egypt,” or simply 
“Welcome to the revolution.” Indeed, some of my informants noted that, despite the dangers, 
they  “never felt safer” than when they were in Tahrir. They would explain that outside of Tahrir, 
they were anxious and worried about the future of the revolution and the future of the country, 
but once they entered Tahrir, all their fears and worries went away. Barricades, then, served as an 
important repertoire that worked to affirm the centrality of the sit-in by demarcating the square, 
both literally and figuratively, as something that protestors controlled.88 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 I am not all suggesting here that what was going on in Tahrir was more important compared to many 
repertoires of protest or actions taking place else where, especially the formation of these popular 
committees or the escalation of labor strikes took places in the last couple days before ousting Mubarak 
on February 11, 2011. As many radical activists suggested to me, and as I will discuss later in Chapter 5, 
these other forms of protest had more potential for radicalizing the events of the revolution. According to 
them, both labor strikes and popular committees, if more politicized and if events lasted for more time, 
could have lead to different outcomes, at least this could have lead to more “revolutionaries” participation 
in the transitional governments and or limit the military’s control of the transitional process at the time. 
The focus of my discussion here is that Tahrir was constructed by the regime and activists as more 
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Rallies  
As discussed in the previous chapter, large mass protest rallies in Egypt essentially 
disappeared from 1977 until 2000.89 After that, they reappeared briefly as people mobilized 
around the Second Palestinian Intifada and then the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2000 and 2003 
respectively. Rallies then disappeared again until January 25, 2011—at which point, they 
reappeared in various places in Egypt. But particularly after January 28, the point of every rally 
was to end, ultimately, in Tahrir.   
During the 18 days of the revolution, there were four so-called “million person rallies.” 
These were on the following days:  February 1, 4, 8, and 11. My first day in Tahrir was during 
the second of those rallies (Feb 4). Activists of the Youth Coalition of the Revolution invented 
attractive names, for mobilization purposes, for these rallies. The first one on February 1 did not 
have a name as such—activists figured the very idea of “million person rally” would be enough 
to get the world’s attention and scare the regime. But the second million person rally was 
described, along with the day on which it took place, as the “Friday of Israr, or determination; 
the Friday after, which ended with Mubarak’s ousting, was described as “the decisiveness or the 
great marching,” in reference to the plan to march, if necessary, to the presidential palace and 
force Mubarak out. These are the ones during the so-called 18 days of the revolution.  After 
ousting Mubarak protestors also came to the square and in the first Friday after the revolution, 
Friday, February 18 they gathered in Tahrir and called this day the “Friday of victory.”90  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
important to other locations/actions. I discuss the relation between Tahrir and some important modes of 
actions took place outside it, especially popular committees and labor strikes in details in chapter 5. 
89 The exception in this long period is a big riot of the soldiers of police central security forces in Egypt in 
1986. But this was limited to some areas in Giza, where the camps of the solders camp is located, and also 
was not a mass riot, in the sense I am discussing here.  
90 From the time of the revolution until the end of June 2012, Egypt has witnessed 40 million person 
rallies. The name became less accurate, but the media and activists continued to use the name to describe 
the big rallies. Some of these rallies did not reach half a million, or even they were limited to several tens 
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The places from which rallies started were determined by activists, mainly the Youth 
Coalition of the Revolution, and this information was disseminated via traditional and social 
media, particularly the “We Are All Khaled Said” site. The starting points were often mosques or 
other smaller squares both in Cairo and in other cities, and rallies were often scheduled for 
Fridays. The idea of choosing mosques and Fridays is  an old idea that capitalizes on the fact that 
Friday prayers guarantee a big gathering of already present people. But once the revolution got 
going, activists were also able to choose other days during the week, in order to maintain 
mobilization and keep pressure on the regime. When and how the calls for million-person rallies 
were issued seemed to be an open question and many activists did not have an answer to this. 
But two of the founders of the Youth Coalition of the Revolution told me “the name [“million 
person rally”] and the idea was simply a bold move from the coalition. We called for it, after 
seeing the critical mass that participated on the ‘Friday of rage’ on January 28.” 
In general, such large rallies were an important way of getting international attention and 
they also increased mobilization of protestors and put pressure on the regime locally. The 
important thing here is that the rallies targeted Tahrir. The routes of the rallies announced by 
activists were crafted to end in Tahrir. In other words, while rallies and the sit-in in Tahrir were 
two separate and distinct repertoires, they were linked. Rallies served their own functions, but by 
having them all end in Tahrir, activists reinforced the notion that Tahrir was the culmination—
literally and symbolically—of the revolution. At the end of each rally, one of the concrete goals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of thousands. There were always debates in the media and also some attempts to make scientific 
measurements to know whether or not Tahrir Square can fit one million person at a time.  But it is 
important that most of the rallies in Tahrir, in the so-called one million person rallies, specially during the 
revolution, protestors were not only present in the square itself only, but in all or most neighboring streets 
as well. Sometimes, protestors occupied a space of one mile, half a mile  or quarter a mile in these 
neighboring streets to Tahrir. See these articles about the list and the names of these rallies (Abdel 
Kareem et al. 2012; M. Moustafa 2011). And also see these articles for the debate concerning how many 
people could actually fit in Tahrir Square (R. Alexander 2013; Jensen 2011; Shachtman 2011). 
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was to produce yet another picture of Tahrir, filled with a million people, for international 
circulation.91 But it is also important to note here that not all protestors in Tahrir participated in 
the rallies. Some protestors just went directly to Tahrir, as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
without traveling there via a mass rally. As I was told by some protestors, “The rule when you do 
not want to or cannot participate in the rally, you can go directly to Tahrir.”  It is impossible to 
tell how many participated in the rallies compared to those who went to Tahrir directly, but from 
my observations, and from talking to many protestors, the number of people who participated in 
the rallies dramatically exceeds those who went directly to Tahrir. But the general idea is that 
Tahrir was always the target.  
Attacking Centers of Power  
During the so-called 18 days of the revolution, there were several attempts to attack 
centers of power. By centers of power, I refer to government buildings, including not only those 
of the executive and or the judiciary and the police, but also the ruling party offices. These 
attempts varied over time in terms of their method of attack, their outcome, and their 
implications. Generally, however, the attacks did not aim to occupy the buildings, but rather to 
storm them, with an eye to emptying and then burning them.  The other aim of these efforts, of 
course, was the symbolic victory of protestors, and sometimes even the simple act of revenge 
after long years of repression by the buildings’ inhabitants. The most notable and visible 
examples of these sorts of attacks were the burning of the headquarters of the ruling party (the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 It is important to note here that most media coverage, Egyptian and international, at the time of the 
revolution was right to associated the rallies with Tahrir. But at the same time, the coverage sometimes 
did not separate the two things, the rallies/the march and the sit-in, in a way that leads to confusion. 
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National Democratic Party or NDP) near Tahrir, the burning of many police stations, and the 
burning of the court complex in Galaa Street, also close to Tahrir (see Figure 12). 
On Sunday, January 30, protestors tried to storm the Ministry of Interior building near 
Tahrir; they did so from various directions, but primarily from Mohamed Mahmoud Street and 
also Rihan Street, both of which are connected to Tahrir. But police personnel and snipers were 
concentrated in this area, many on the rooftops of buildings, and as an outcome many protestors 
were killed and/or wounded. After this, protestors did not make any further attempts to attack the 
Ministry of Interior. But, for many, the Tahrir sit-in itself symbolized a form of attack on the 
centers of power, for, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Tahrir holds the greatest  
concentration of government buildings in all of Cairo and, hence, Egypt. As the Tahrir sit-in 
expanded, many protestors decided to establish smaller sit-ins in front of Cabinet and the 
Egyptian Parliament, both of which are in parallel streets and about 50–100 feet from the edge of 
Tahrir in Qasr Al-Ainy Street. Protestors did not try to occupy the buildings in these instances; 
rather, their presence was seen as important enough. For even though these were smaller than the 
Tahrir sit-in, there were still somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 participants, as estimated by 
many of my informants, and the protestors successfully blocked access to both buildings and 
occupied the street in front of them.92  
It is also important to differentiate between attacks on buildings in or near Tahrir, and 
those that took place elsewhere in Egypt. The latter were more likely to be random, spontaneous 
acts of violence and revenge directed at the symbols  of power, particularly in the case of local 
police stations. In contrast, with the exception of the burning the NDP building, similarly 
targeted attacks in Tahrir were rare conducted simply for revenge, but also as a form of pre-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Even though I was in Tahrir every day at the time in this period, I did not see this sit-in by the 
parliament building. Hence, I am relying on the estimate by my informants.  
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emptive self-defense for those engaged in the sit-in in the square, as in the case of the attempt to 
attack the Ministry of Interior. Other efforts to target building, such as the occupation of the 
Parliament and Cabinet, were done to put pressure on the regime and to physically expand the 
reach of the Tahrir sit-in outward. In other words, these attempts near Tahrir can be seen as part 
of the sit-in, an extension of it in many ways. There were logistical reasons for this also, given 
that the square was where the field hospitals and most other resources were located. Sometimes 
protestors tried to save lives of others who were seriously injured and tried to take them to 
hospitals, but the most immediate form of help was always to send protestors to Tahrir first. Also, 
as many informants told me, even when protestors were not injured, but were simply tired and 
needed food or drink, they would come to Tahrir right away. So, again, whether participating in a 
rally, targeting a government building, or even just looking for a place to rest, all roads and 
repertoires led to the sit-in in Tahrir.  
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Figure 12  The Headquarters of the National Democratic Party (NDP) on the afternoon of 
January 28, 2011, after protestors burned it down. Picture taken by Hossam El-Hamalawy and 
used here with his permission. 
 
IV. The Virtual Making of Tahrir 
Many analysts have emphasized the significance of social media in the Egyptian 
revolution. And to be sure, the impact of social media warrants attention as both a relatively new 
and a potentially powerful social phenomenon. Yet, too often, analysts have exaggerated the role 
of social media networks such as Facebook and Twitter, at the risk of reducing the complex 
dynamics of the revolution to a form of technological determinism. These analyses have 
oversimplified the complicated role of social media and failed to explore their connection to 
various forms of off-line activism, and to broader and historically longer political dynamics. 
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Even within the eighteen days of the revolution itself, the role of social media shifted over time, 
becoming minimal at some moments and generating paradoxical effects at others. The more 
accurate and productive question, therefore, is not whether the Egyptian revolution was a “social 
media revolution,” but in what ways social media facilitated, impeded, and/or influenced the 
revolution.  
In this section, I distinguish between the online and offline dimensions of the revolution, 
and chart how the connections between the two shifted over time with various effects.  
Specifically, I examine how online-offline interaction drew attention to the Tahrir Square sit-in, 
practically assisted those who were gathered there, and eventually constructed Tahrir as an icon 
of the revolution. I call this the virtual making of Tahrir. This was a unique process whereby the 
sit-in was connected both to the larger Egyptian population and to an international audience, 
making Tahrir the sit-in of and for Egypt’s revolution. I argue, however, that the relationship 
between the space of Tahrir and the forms of cyber-activism before and during the revolution 
was more multi-layered and dynamic than has been previously acknowledged. First, while cyber-
activism was significant in both the initial mobilization that lead to the occupation of Tahrir 
Square and the subsequent iconization of the sit-in there, the physical square itself must also be 
remembered as a major site of bloggers’ and activists’ organizing efforts and campaigns during 
the revolution. It is this reciprocal dynamic between online and offline dimensions of activism 
that I seek to emphasize here.  In doing so, I argue against technological determinism and affirm 
the insistence of many of my informants that, for all their virtual dimensions, revolutions are, 
ultimately, fought out on the ground.  
Second, the role of social media in the revolution was not static over time; rather, it took 
different forms and shifted through various phases. I divide my analysis of the interaction 
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between online and offline activism into four phases: 1) From June 2010 to January 27 2011; 2) 
January 28 to February 1, 2011; and 3) February 2 to February 11, 2011. As discussed in Chapter 
2, social media contributed in various ways to expand and transform political public space in 
Egypt in the years leading up to 2011. Here, I focus more specifically on the revolution itself, 
noting how social media facilitated mobilization at key moments, provoked various government 
responses, and sometimes produced paradoxical effects. 
Social Media and Initial Mobilization for the Revolution 
 The period during which social media arguably played the most decisive role in the 
Egyptian revolution was in the few months leading up to the revolution. The most important and 
obvious example is the role played by the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page, introduced in 
the previous chapter. The page was central in what I describe as the initial mobilization for the 
revolution. Between June 2010 and January 2011, the page brought widespread attention to the 
issue of police brutality, in general, and the case of Khaled Said, specifically. Activists used the 
page to organize various demonstrations related to the case. Over this seven-month period, the 
page attracted more and more visitors and built up credibility—in large part by avoiding 
association with any one political party. By the time of the revolution, the page had almost half a 
million members. 93 And in the weeks immediately preceding the revolution, the page became 
the primary virtual meeting place for discussions and publicizing events—including, most 
crucially, the protests in Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011.   
As activists discussed various details regarding where, when, and how to stage protests, 
the We are All Khaled Said page provided an important site through which participants 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 At the time of this writing, the page has 3.5 million members (or “likes” for the page). The page also 
released statistics showing the number of visitors since its formation: one billion and 300 thousand by the 
end of March 2011.  
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themselves developed patterns of online-offline communication and instituted collective forms of 
discussion and decision making. Members of the page proposed ideas about places and slogans 
and shared practical strategies. The administrators simply facilitated the discussion and 
highlighted conclusions reached through some form of consensus. Some of my informants, 
especially the founders of what later became the Youth Coalition for the Revolution described to 
me how, in the weeks leading up to the revolution, they regularly interacted with the 
administrators  of the page, even though the identities of the latter were still unknown at the time. 
YCR members sent the WAAKS page administrators numerous e-mails and Facebook messages, 
discussing various ideas for the prospective protest. This mediated relationship between 
participants who eventually gathered in mass numbers at the same place at the same time make it 
very difficult to assert a rigid dichotomy between the virtual and the real. They also indicate that 
social media was providing participants with an opportunity to practice and produce new forms 
of dialogue and interaction. And for all that my informants insisted that the revolution absolutely 
could not be contained or enacted online, neither would it have been possible without the forms 
of planning and mobilization made possible there.  
The Social Media Blackout: January 28 – February 1, 2011 
Egyptian authorities shut down the Internet and all cell phone communication in Egypt at 
midnight, January 28, 2011. For almost one week, Egypt was returned to a pre-digital age. The 
measure was described by the US-based Internet-analysis firm Renesys as “an action 
unprecedented in Internet history” that rendered “every Egyptian site inaccessible, from any part 
of the world” (Toor 2011). And yet, despite this drastic action, the revolution continued. The 
significance of this pairing cannot be overemphasized, particularly in light of the analyses 
mentioned at the beginning of this paper that would attempt to reduce the revolution to a form of 
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technological determinism. Too often, enthusiastic, yet overly simplistic claims about the role of 
social media in the Egyptian revolution ignore the question of how the protests continued and 
even intensified after the Internet shutdown. The answer to this is three-fold. First, protestors 
returned to using pre-digital methods of communication, from landlines to satellite phones and, 
perhaps most importantly, word of mouth. Second, they developed “backdoor” social media 
strategies whereby they would speak to friends and family outside of Egypt who would post to 
social media on their behalf. Thirdly and most importantly for the purposes of this chapter, there 
was a paradoxical effect of the social media and communications ban—namely, the blackout 
served to anger and mobilize a greater number of people, but at the same time, it spatially 
compressed their energies, by necessity, on a smaller space, specifically, Tahrir.   
January 28, 2011, also described as the “Friday of Rage,” was a decisive day in the 
events of the revolution: Mubarak’s brutal Central Security Forces police suffered a major defeat 
in their street battles with protesters in many neighborhoods in urban centers—the most famous 
of which were in downtown Cairo near Tahrir, and relatively more restrained army troops were 
deployed in the streets (Cole 2011a). These two things: the defeat of the police and the 
deployment of the army signaled an important victory for the revolution—a victory that 
depended, in large part, upon the large turnout of protestors on the streets that day. The irony, of 
course, is that this was right in the middle of the Internet and communications blackout in Egypt. 
But even more ironic is the following possibility: that the absence of social media actually 
helped to increase the numbers of protesters who participated that day. I interviewed many 
activists about their participation in the revolution, particularly focusing on specific days such as 
January 25 and January 28. Even more interesting, however, were my interviews with everyday 
citizens who didn’t identify as activists prior to the revolution, but who ended up in the streets 
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participating in it nonetheless. These informants told me: we and many of the other people we 
know just went to the streets to check things out; we wanted to see with our own eyes what was 
going on, given the lack of news and communications.   
Some background context is helpful here: according to a 2011 United Nations Children 
Fund (UNICEF) report, the number per 100 people in the Egyptian population who had cell 
phones was 101, and number per 100 who were Internet users was 36 (UNICEF 2013). If we 
exclude elders and children, every Egyptian has more than one cell phone. Many households 
have more cell phone lines than family members.  People do this for a variety of reasons, from 
marking class status, to securing privacy between family and work and in society in general, to 
maneuvering between all these spheres. But as a result, many Egyptians were even more angry 
about the shutting down of all cell phone communications than they were about the Internet 
blackout. Eliminating cell phone conversations—both voice and text—meant, for many, 
essentially stopping life for millions of people in Egypt—many of whom might not otherwise 
have been mobilized to participate in the revolution. As one informant told me: “This was the 
decision that made critical mass participate in the revolution.”  
Thus, by the morning of February 2, 2011, when Internet and cell phone communications 
were restored in Egypt, the plan had already backfired. Far from ensuring the world would see 
images of only pro-Mubarak supporters, the return of the Internet at this time enabled protestors 
to show the world the exact opposite of what Mubarak’s regime wanted to portray: its brutality 
and authoritarianism. Images of protesters being beaten in Tahrir, and attacks with camels and 
live ammunition were circulated worldwide. While the shutdown had contributed to stir up 
international sympathy for the protestors in Tahrir, this ill-timed (from the regime’s perspective) 
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return of the Internet and its rapidly circulating images, Tweets, and videos contributed to make 
Tahrir the icon of the Egyptian revolution.   
By “iconization,” I mean the process by which the circulated images of and messages 
regarding Tahrir Square transformed Tahrir into the most potent symbol and representative sign 
of the revolution. This happened through multiple channels. The first was the immediate 
coverage of events through social media. Egyptian bloggers and activists, and also regular 
citizens who became politicized through the protests, used their cell phones and smart phones to 
take pictures and send/post messages about Tahrir. The second channel was the creation of the 
Twitter topic or “hashtag” #Tahrir (other famous hashtags of the revolution being Egypt, Jan25, 
revolution, and Mubarak). Using this hashtag, sympathetic activists from around the world 
started to share and spread words and images from Tahrir. The phrase “Tweets from Tahrir” 
became widespread in the days immediately preceding the ousting of Mubarak on February 11.94  
 In short, social media interacted with offline events and actions to constitute the sit-in in 
Tahrir as the central icon of the revolution. And to the extent that this “making” of Tahrir was 
effected in part through virtual channels, the process highlights the immediate modularity of the  
repertoires that converged at Tahrir. The sit-in itself may not have been replicated per se 
elsewhere in Egypt, particularly not at the same scale or with the same level of success, yet 
through social media and iconization of Tahrir, I suggest that we might find in this example new 
ways of thinking about repertoires and their transferability/transposability, as highlighted so 
famously by Sidney Tarrow (1993).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Notably, it was only a few months after the revolution that books began to appear with the words 
“Twitter” “Tahrir” in the title; the most important of which was Tweets from Tahrir, edited by Alex 
Nunns and Nadia Idle (Idle and Nunns 2011). The book also has a website that features important tweets 
from Tahrir during the revolution (“Tweets”). And also see some pieces written about this period (Nunns 
2011). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter was devoted to investigate how the sit-in in Tahrir became the central 
repertoire in the Egyptian revolution, and how all repertoires took place in Tahrir became the 
central  mode of action in the revolution. Empirically, the discussion in this chapter shows that 
the discussion about spontaneity in the Egyptian revolution and Tahrir is exaggerated. As I show 
in the chapter, actions in Tahrir entailed a mix of organization and spontaneity. Theoretically,  
Tahrir sit-in represents a challenge to the scholarship in repertoires in three different ways.  The 
first of these is the problem of scale. As I showed in this chapter,  while Tahrir sit-in was bound 
by space of Tahrir, the sit-in was transformed into the center of all main protest actions in the 
revolutions. In other words, seemingly the sit-in repertoire was bound by space, but it was 
connected to different places, and also wider impact that goes beyond Tahrir. My study to the sit-
in in Tahrir expose the limitations of conventional theories of repertoire which do not deal with 
how repertoire may have scale up and down. The second way is the  problem of repertoire’s 
connections to other repertories. Most of the literature in collective action repertoires does not 
deal with this issue. This literature tends to analyze repertoires as separate from one another. A 
close reading to some of the foundational literature about repertoires sheds light about how 
historical contexts mattered (such as the French revolution and barricades), but also that we need 
to study them in relations to one another.  As shown in this chapter, Tahrir was not only a sit-in, 
but was in a sort of organized and messy connections with other repertoires such as rallies, 
building barricades and also attacking government buildings. Third, this chapter is also an 
invitation to expand and problematize the question of modularity as developed by Sidney Tarrow. 
Tarrow’s modularity simply means the transferability and or the transposability of modes of 
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collective action. Even though Tahrir sit-in was not transferred to other parts in Egypt (there is 
only one failed attempt only in Alexandria as I showed in the introduction), but the fact that 
Tahrir was iconized and virtually constructed, while it was happening in the same time, as a 
global phenomena (which latter inspired occupy movement) makes one wonder, can we speak of 
“immediate modularity?” As the chapter shows, social media contributed to process of 
iconization of Tahrir, and globalizing its image at the time of the protest during the revolution.   
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CHAPTER 4 
The Tahrir Effect, Part I: 
A Reformist Revolution and the Embodiment of  
Revolutionary Legitimacy 
 
 
Introduction 
From February 4, 2011, I was in Tahrir Square every day until the ousting of Mubarak on 
February 11, 2011. Things were changing on a daily basis in Tahrir, including the relation of the 
protestors themselves to the square. As protestors began to feel increasingly comfortable in the 
space and confident in themselves, they began to integrate more of the square and its 
surroundings as part of the sit-in. Soon, people were climbing buildings and traffic lights not 
only to hang banners, but also to provide a form of security that would sound an alert when 
intruders (mostly armed thugs aligned with Mubarak and the ruling party) attempted to enter the 
square. The grounds filled up with tents, posters, communication centers, and impromptu field 
hospitals, while barricades were erected at the square’s borders. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, as the sit-in progressed, it expanded beyond the square itself as checkpoints and gates 
were established in neighboring streets. Protestors also tried to encroach or occupy government 
buildings and centers of power; some attempts were successful and others not. It was in this 
context that I witnessed an important incident. On February 6, I saw protestors on top of one of 
the tallest buildings in Tahrir. The building is at the corner of Tahrir, in the entrance of Talaat 
Harb Square. On the side of the building, protesters began to unfurl a banner as tall as the 
building itself; as they did so, hundreds of thousands in the square cheered. On the banner were 
written a list of demands (see Figure 13):  
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 Our Demands:  
1. Ousting Mubarak 
2. Dissolving the illegitimate Parliament and Upper House (Shoura Council) 
3. Ending Emergency Status immediately 
4. Forming a transitional national unity government 
5. Election of a Parliament to enact constitutional amendments, based on which a 
presidential election will take place 
6. Immediate trials for all officials who were responsible for killing martyrs 
(protestors ) of the revolution. 
7. Immediate trials for all corrupt officials and those who stole the nation’s wealth. 
 
The Youth of Egypt in the sit-in (in Tahrir) 
The banner and the story of both its origins and its impact highlight questions about the role of 
Tahrir’s sit-in in the larger revolution.  Here we have Tahrir protestors presenting what seem to 
be the demands of the revolution at large. Indeed, the banner and the revolution’s demands 
became virtually synonymous in popular discourse over time.  I cannot point to any process by 
which these demands were drafted, voted upon, and granted consensus—and yet, it is precisely 
this apparent absence of process that makes the banner’s unquestioned acceptance so remarkable. 
What made so many protestors in Tahrir and beyond accept these as the demands of the 
revolution? The question is all the more pressing because, as I will argue in this chapter, these 
demands effectively delimited the revolution as a politically reformist one—a strategy that, as I 
will argue in the following chapter, simultaneously marginalized other possibilities. The 
widespread acceptance of the banner as representing the demands of the revolution also 
cemented the understanding of the Tahrir sit-in as the site of the revolution and the symbol of its 
legitimacy. Tahrir Square and the banner hung within it became essentially the face and the voice 
of the revolution, respectively. How did this happen?  
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 This chapter seeks to explore these questions: Why did so many protestors accept the 
reformist demands of the banner as those of the revolution as a whole? And how and why did 
Tahrir become the embodiment of revolutionary legitimacy? As I explore these questions, my 
argument is twofold. First, the event known as the Egyptian Revolution witnessed a specific 
historical conjuncture where three types of coalitions peaked at the same time: political 
coalitions, cross-class alliances, and youth coalitions.  The specific composition and 
development of each of these led to a minimalist consensus regarding political reform that 
identified ousting of Mubarak as the foremost goal. Second, I argue that during the 18 days of 
the Tahrir sit-in/revolution, the relationship between the protestors in Tahrir and the regime itself 
entailed a form of mutual recognition and opposition at the same time that constituted Tahrir as 
the embodiment of revolutionary legitimacy. From the regime’s perspective, focusing on Tahrir 
was a way to isolate the square and contain nationwide protest, whereas for protestors in Tahrir, 
continuing to occupy the largest liberated zone in the country took on enormous symbolic power 
and generated its own form of mobilization. Though the motivations of the two “sides” varied, 
by each focusing on the other, the protestors of Tahrir and Mubarak’s regime co-constituted one 
another as the main parties to the revolution. The chapter is thus divided into two main sections; 
each is devoted to the discussion of these two arguments, respectively. But first, let us return to 
story of the banner and further elaborate the problem of a reformist revolution.  
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Figure 13  The banner hung in Tahrir Square, displaying the demands of the Tahrir protestors. 
The picture was circulated widely in social media. Picture Adel Wassily, used here with his 
permission. 
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A Banner For All and the Problem of the Reformist Revolution 
When the banner was hung in Tahrir Square, I cheered along with everyone else. It was 
truly an exciting moment. Several large banners had been hung in the previous  days and, indeed, 
continued to be hung all the way up to February 11. But the banner pictured in Figure 13 was the 
biggest and it was the one everyone embraced as outlining the revolution’s demands. At first, I 
made no effort to find out who exactly was behind it, and I was not alone in this (in hindsight) 
curious indifference—it would be difficult to overstate the extent to which no one seemed to 
know or care. When I finally began to ask people about it, they all simply said, “We do not know 
who hung it. It has our demands, it belongs to Tahrir and the revolution.” I remained in Egypt 
until April 16, 2011, and during that whole time, I could not find an answer to the question: who 
hung the banner. I took to social media, asking connections on Facebook and Twitter, but still no 
response. In my second fieldtrip, in the summer of 2012, I made an extra effort to ask all my 
informants and friends—many of them leading bloggers, activists, and/or founders of the Youth 
Coalition of the Revolution. Most of them really did not know, but they gave me clues about 
who to ask: Pierre Sioufi, the person whose apartment was on the top floor of the building from 
which the banner was hung, and whose home many bloggers and activists, as well as 
international and local journalists, used to take wide-angle pictures of Tahrir.95  Others told me: 
you have to ask Kefayya activists and/or the National Association For Change (there is an 
overlap between the two organizations). After a long time, one of the older activists from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Sioufi is an artist.  He also became one of the informants for this dissertation. There were several media 
reports about Sioufi; the fact that his apartment hosted many activists and international media led some 
reporters and analysts to describe his home as the headquarters of the uprising, or to describe him 
personally as the “guru” or the “watchdog” of the revolution. See, for example: http://www.spiegel. 
de/international/world/egypt-s-man-in-the-moon-the-watchdog-of-tahrir-square-fears-for-the-revolution-
a-759025.html (last accessed May 28, 2014); and http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/opinion/18iht-
edcohen18.html?_r=0 (last accessed May 28, 2014); and http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/ 
magazine/06YouRHere-t.html (last accessed May 28, 2014).  
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National Association for Change  (NAFC) finally told me it was their organization that hung the 
banner—but by that point, the issue was practically moot. For his part, Pierre Sioufi had only this 
to say when I asked him about the banner’s origins:   
I really do not know. There were a few youth from Tahrir, and [they] came to ask  
me to hang it from the top of the building.  At the time, I was receiving many  
police harassments. Police told me to prevent journalists and foreign nationals 
from taking pictures from my apartment of the square. After these harassments, I  
did stop allowing journalists. But I made an extra effort to know who is being  
filming or taking pictures from my balcony. In the end of the day, I did not  
prevent anybody who seemed to belong or be sympathetic with the revolution. I  
saw the banner and I did not say no.   
 
When I asked him why he allowed people to do things related to the revolution from his  balcony 
despite the attacks and police harassment, he simply said: “Tahrir protected me.”   He explained:  
At the time, everybody knew that the apartment, which overlooks the square,  
belongs to many friends and journalists, and people belong to the revolution.  
Nobody can attack the apartment, since there are millions there. If anything  
happened to me at the time, or if they attacked the apartment, it will be Tahrir  
who will fight back. 
 
In the end, it was likely the very anonymity of the banner that fuelled its acceptance and power. 
With no one specific author or owner, the banner—and its demands—belonged to everyone and 
could thus be accepted as those of the revolution.  Whether it was the National Association for 
Change or not matters little at this point, for it was during the revolution that the banner was 
powerful, and that power was understood to belong to those who cheered as it was hung: the 
protestors of Tahrir.    
If the power of the banner rested not in its known authorship, then, let us turn to consider 
its content. What was it about this set of demands that made them so widely acceptable to what 
was (as I will elaborate shortly) a diverse group of protestors?  Had these demands sprung out of 
nowhere or did they have, in fact, a long process of genesis? In order to explore how the 
demands listed on the banner established (for better or worse) the agenda of the Egyptian 
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Revolution, I should clarify first what I mean by a “reformist revolution.”  It should be 
acknowledged that the very premise of describing the banner’s demands as “reformist” implies 
the existence of a continuum, along which other kinds of demands might have been articulated. I 
use the term reformist revolution here to describe the case of a mass uprising in a revolutionary 
situation, which focuses its demands around political reform—as opposed to, for example, more 
widespread social or economic reform. I draw here on the insights of Goldstone (2009), who 
usefully reminds us that political revolutions may be of different types,96 and Tilly (2001: 194–
95), who notes that the heavy focus of revolution scholarship on successful social revolutions has 
prevented scholars from giving enough attention to other types of revolutions, which share 
characteristics with these, but do not qualify as complete social revolutions (2001: 94–95).   
The term reformist revolution, as I use it, overlaps with another term, refolution, which 
warrants some discussion here. Originally coined by British historian Timothy Garton Ash,97 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 In his 2009 essay, Goldstone argued for a new typology of revolutions: color revolution and 
radicalizing revolution. The first is the model after the democratic revolution that took place in Eastern 
Europe. According to him, “color revolutions tend to occur in societies with substantial urban and 
commercial sectors, organized labor and moderate social and economic inequality (2009: 31). In this type, 
defected elites, and also the decent industrialized economies as well as state institutions that do not resist 
the reform. And the second type is radicalizing revolution. This occurs in countries where there is a great 
economic inequality, and where there are “leaders seek to position themselves as leaders of radical class-
based or ideology based movements that target entire groups of elites or the population for attack (2009: 
31). Radicalizing revolutions are also do thrive in civil or international wars, which can create a context 
for “extreme  politics for the redistributive or ideological restructuring of society” (2009: 31). 
97 British historian, Timothy Garton Ash coined the term refolution in two essays about the revolutions in 
Hungary and Poland, published in The New York Review of Books in 1989. See http://www.nybooks. 
com/articles/archives/1989/jun/15/revolution-the-springtime-of-two-nations/ (last accessed May 28, 2014) 
and  http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1989/aug/17/revolution-in-hungary-and-poland/ (last 
accessed May 28, 2014). In the former piece, Ash states: “But what is happening just now is a singular 
mixture of both reform and revolution: a ‘revorm,’ if you will, or perhaps a ‘refolution.’ There is, in both 
places, a strong and essential element of voluntary, deliberate reform led by an enlightened minority (but 
only a minority) in the still ruling Communist parties, and, in the Polish case, at the top of the military and 
the police. Their advance consists of an unprecedented retreat: undertaking to share power, and even—
mirabile dictu—talk of giving it up altogether if they lose an election.”  
 
 
	  150	  
	  
refolution has been taken up and variously defined by a number of different authors. Goldstone 
emphasizes that it is a type of democratic revolution  in which changes are limited to electoral 
reforms (2009, 19), while Goodwin (2001, 260) defines refolution as negotiated reform and 
specifically suggests that refolutions result from collaboration between reformist movements and 
factions of the old communist parties (both Goldstone and Goodwin specifically discuss the 
concept in relation to the eastern European revolutions of 1989). Bayat (2013), on the other hand, 
discusses the concept specifically in the context of the Arab uprisings of 2011 and describes 
them as “revolutions that aim to push for reforms in, and through, the institutions of the existing 
regimes” (53). He describes the Egyptian revolt as embodying the paradoxical “discrepancy 
between a revolutionary desire for the ‘new’ and a reformist trajectory that…lead to harbouring 
the ‘old’”(Bayat 2013: 52).  
Not surprisingly, I find Bayat’s take on refolution the most applicable to the Egyptian 
context, but I use the seemingly paradoxical term “reformist revolution,” rather than “refolution,” 
in order to foreground more explicitly this disjuncture between the aspirations and outcomes of 
the Egyptian uprising. By retaining both terms, “reform” and “revolution,” I seek to 
acknowledge protestors’ demands for both, or more accurately, their hope that the latter could be 
attained through the former. Protestors called for political reform, but they described (and, in 
many case, continue to describe) the events of 2011 as a revolution, and this terminology is still 
meaningful, even if strict definitions of the term “revolution” would suggest otherwise. As I will 
discuss further in Chapter 5, I also retain the label of revolution as a way of recognizing the more 
radical potential that, I argue, the uprisings did indeed have, even if this potential has not (yet) 
been realized.   
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It is telling to compare the demands outlined on the banner and generally accepted as the 
demands of the revolution, and the more general slogans of the revolution that circulated 
throughout Tahrir and beyond. The banner’s simplest and most powerful demand is its first: 
Ousting Mubarak. This radical demand is then followed by a series of reformist measures that, 
far from dismantling and rebuilding Egypt’s political system anew, seek rather to make the 
existing system work properly. Consider, in contrast, two of the main slogans of the revolution: 
“The People Want the Downfall of the Regime,” and “Bread, Freedom, Human Dignity, and 
Social Justice.”  Interestingly, the first slogan was also displayed prominently on a banner in the 
square, but its deceptively simple statement likely prevented it from being seen as outlining an 
entire agenda. In actuality, however, it goes beyond the demand to oust Mubarak, calling instead 
for the downfall of the entire regime. 98  The second slogan goes even further, articulating the 
specific components of an imagined future, but the very breadth of its terms are not only more 
radical than the demands of the banner, but also harder to operationalize.   
I asked many activists after the 18 days what they thought about this seeming disjuncture 
between the specific demands of the square (reformist) and the general slogans of the revolution 
(revolutionary). I received different answers. Some noted that the slogans emerged organically in 
the streets and took on a life of their own; nobody could have tried to stop or question them. It’s 
also worth noting that “The People Want the Downfall of the Regime” was a slogan that 
appeared first in Tunisia and had traveled from there to Egypt.99 But mostly people pointed out 
that it was the banner’s first goal—ousting Mubarak—that became the focus of everyone’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 There was a debate among activists about the meaning of the regime.. and many said, the Egyptian 
wanted to change the regime in the narrow sense, i.e., the government including ousting Mubarak and the 
ruling party, but not this does not mean to dismantle the state, in the Leninian fashion. I was personally 
one of the people who disagreed with this (not that my voice was heard or particularly important), but this 
was part of the debate. 
99 See Gana (2013) about the appearance of the slogan first in Tunisia. 
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attention and energy, precisely because it had previously seemed so impossible.  And here, it is 
crucial to recognize the extent to which Mubarak and the regime had come to be seen as one and 
the same—so much so that the gap between the demands of the banner and the slogans didn’t 
actually seem that significant in the minds of many protestors.  
As I will elaborate in other sections and in the next chapter in particular, ousting Mubarak 
was not the only demand voiced by protestors in Tahrir and beyond; and hindsight makes it all 
too easy and tempting to look back and critique the fact that Mubarak’s ouster became such a 
primary, even exclusive, focus. But we need to scrutinize protestors’ ambitions and actions in 
their specific political and historical context, and it would be difficult to overstate the extent to 
which the figure of Mubarak (and by extension, his family) loomed over this landscape. Over 
and over again, informants described to me how unthinkable the prospect of usurping Mubarak 
had become after thirty years of increasingly authoritarian rule.  Statements to the effect of “I 
could never have imagined ousting Mubarak this way” were repeated infinitely by  Egyptians in 
the streets at the time. Sharif Abdel Kadous, a journalist and reporter for Democracy Now, stated 
in his 2012 documentary, In Tahrir Square: 18 Days of Egypt’s Unfinished Revolution, “If you 
would have told me a few weeks ago, that we will oust Mubarak by a mass rebellion, I would 
have thought you are crazy.” 100 Indeed, the idea existed among not only ordinary people and 
activists within Egypt, but also domestic and international media that Mubarak was a kind of 
present-day pharaoh who, like the rulers of old, would not relinquish power until he was dead.101  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 http://www.democracynow.org/2012/1/25/in_tahrir_square_hbo_doc_on (last accessed May 28, 2014).  
101 See, for example: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/11/hosni-mubarak-resigns-analysis 
(last accessed May 28, 2014); and http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67687/dina-shehata/the-fall-of-
the-pharaoh (last accessed May 28, 20140).  
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 Egypt at the start of 2011 was, in many ways, what Goldstone (2011a) terms a 
“sultanistic regime.” 102 Such a regime revolves around the person of the leader or dictator, who 
uses a system of rewards and punishments to “keep populations depoliticized and 
marginalized…control elections and political parties and sometimes…pay subsidies for 
populations” (Goldstone 2011a: 9). A regime is sultanistic when “a national leader expands his 
personal power at the expense of formal institutions” (Goldstone 2011a: 9). Examples from 
history include Suharto in Indonesia, Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, Reza Shah Pahlavi in 
Iran, the Samosa dynasty in Nicaragua, the Duvalier dynasty in Haiti, and Porfirio Diaz in 
Mexico. According to Goldstone, such regimes are particularly prone to revolution given their 
fragility, especially in times of economic and political crisis. He explains: 
Sultans must strike a careful balance between self-enrichment and rewarding  
the elite: if the ruler rewards himself and neglects the elite, a key incentive  
for the elite to support the regime is removed. But as sultans come to feel  
more entrenched and indispensable, their corruption frequently becomes  
more brazen and concentrated along a small inner circle. As the sultan monopolizes 
 foreign aid   and investments or gets too close to unpopular foreign governments,  
he may alienate elite and popular groups even further. (Goldstone 2011a: 10) 
 
While the relation between ruler and elites is, indeed, a central consideration in such regimes, it 
is also important to look at this idea from the perspective of protestors. Mubarak’s personalist 
form of rule had existed for decades prior to the 2011 revolution, but became increasingly 
crystallized in the ten years directly preceding 2011, particularly with the strong indications 
about plans to transfer power to Mubarak’s son, Gamal.103 My ethnography and interviews 
repeatedly suggest that this idea of Mubarak’s personal rule had a significant impact on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Goldstone here is building on the work of H. E. Chehabi and Juan Linz (1998), who coined the 
concept “sultanistic regime” and elaborate on it in the context of revolutions.  
103 In addition, from 2004 to 2006, prominent intellectual and former judge Tareq El-Beshry wrote a 
series of articles in the opposition paper al-Araby that described the state as “personalistic.” The articles 
were widely debated and discussed among activists in Egypt. The articles were published later in a book, 
see http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/8166575 (last accessed May 28, 2014).  
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political psychology of many protestors and, indeed, many Egyptians in general.  For almost 
everyone in Egypt, getting rid of Mubarak was getting rid of the regime. The result was a sort of 
a tunnel vision that limited the political imagination of many protestors. Perhaps nothing 
captures this more succinctly than one of the most common slogans featured on signs and in 
chants throughout Egypt: “Leave.” But though the subject of this slogan was obvious to 
everyone, its limitations as a revolutionary agenda took longer to apprehend. As Bayat notes, the 
speed with which some of the dictators fell across the region “gave the impression that the 
revolutions had come to an end, achieved their goals, without a substantial shift in the power 
structure” (2013, 54). My point in this chapter, I wish to emphasize, is not to point out the short-
sightedness of protestors’ demands, but rather to emphasize how and why they called for such a 
reformist revolution.  Having established how pervasive and powerful the figure of Mubarak was, 
I turn now to tracing how Egyptians nonetheless constructed a vision of revolution.   
 
I. Three Roads to Consensus: The Making of a Reformist Revolution 
 
To properly answer the question of how Tahrir came to stand in as the political voice of 
the majority of Egyptians, it is useful to step back and ask who exactly participated in the 
Egyptian revolution?  To my knowledge there has been no rigorous analysis of the demography 
of the participants in the revolution.  Various studies have, however, focused on particular 
groups of participants and/or coalitions across groups (Amar 2013a; Goldstone 2011b; Holmes 
2012; Shehata 2012). It is important, however, to avoid conflating the various levels at which 
one can examine coalition politics in Egypt. In this section, I examine each of the following: a) 
political coalitions, b) cross-class coalitions, and c) youth coalitions.  I seek to show how and 
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why the various groups that formed these types of coalitions all arrived at the same outcome (a 
shared consensus regarding the reformist, Mubarak-focused demands of the revolution) via 
distinctive, but overlapping, processes. All three types of coalition building have distinct 
histories and temporalities. Political coalitions were a decade in the making, whereas cross-class 
coalitions intensified in the years from 2005 to 2010, with 2011 representing a “final straw” 
moment when economic elites became alienated from Mubarak as well. As for the youth 
coalitions, many of these emerged first as part of larger, umbrella political coalitions such as 
Kefayya, but went on to become more independent, especially from 2008 (the birth of the April 6 
movement) onward. The peak of youth organizing can be seen with the birth of the Youth 
Coalition of the Revolution (YCR) during the revolution itself.  
Despite their significance, coalitions are understudied in social movements scholarship 
(Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005: 342; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010: xii). Granted, 
studying coalitions is difficult for a number of reasons. There are methodological challenges 
when, for example, coalitions involve the work of both individuals and organizations, in terms of 
the components of the coalitions. Also, in terms of the demands and the substance of the 
coalitions, it is difficult to establish clear criteria about what degree of cooperation constitutes a 
coalition. Indeed, coalitions themselves are often unclear regarding their strategic goals and/or 
the nature (long-term vs. temporary) nature of their partnership. Finally, it is even more difficult 
to study coalitions in authoritarian contexts, where there is no transparency and it is difficult to 
access information about the groups involved in coalitions (see Beamish and Luebbers 2009; 
Diani and Bison 2004; Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010).  
For the sake of my analysis, I define a coalition as a temporary agreement between some 
social and/or political movement organizations/parties/forces to work together to achieve one 
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goal. A coalition does not entail the dissolution of the respective groups and their reconstitution 
as a single new groups; rather, each party to the coalition may continue to work autonomously 
under its own banner at the same time that it is involved in a common project that involves some 
degree of coordination and collaboration. The dynamic is similar to what Trotsky (1938) called 
the strategy of the united front, in which the communist party established a common platform 
with reformist parties temporarily in order to work together.104  
 Scholarship examining coalitions during the time of revolutions tends to focus on cross-
class coalitions in particular. A cross-class coalition refers to the presence of an organization or a 
spontaneous collective action in which many classes participate, despite the class divide. Such 
coalitions are usually temporary and their work is limited to a specific goal. Cross-class alliances 
are significant in a variety of political contexts and situations, 105  but it is their role in revolutions 
that has garnered the most scholarly attention (see, for example, Everingham 1996; Nepstad 
2011; Thompson 2004).  John Foran points out that “multiclass alliances, often motivated by 
diffuse ideals such as nationalism, populism, or religion rather than particularistic ones such as 
socialism, have made most of the revolutions in world history, and all of the third world” (2005: 
15). And as Goldstone (2011b: 457) notes, the formation of a cross-class alliance can have 
multiple benefits:  
If a protest draws support mainly from just one class or group (peasants, 
workers, students, urban shopkeepers, professionals), the state can  
confront that group as a disruptive force, and seek to unify elites from  
other sectors against that threat. However, if protestors represent many 
different groups, it is much harder for the state to find allies against them.  
Moreover, while a state can claim to be preserving a society by acting  
against isolated disruptive elements, it is far from difficult to maintain  
legitimacy when acting against a broad cross-class coalition. Elites are  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Available at: http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1922/02/uf.htm (last accessed May 29, 2014).  
105 See, for example, Busemeyer (2011), who also notes that there are different types of cross-class 
coalitions; he differentiates between a conservative cross-class coalition and a segmentalist class coalition. 
Available at: http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp11-13.pdf (last accessed May 28, 2014).  
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more likely to desert the state, creating crippling divisions, if protesters 
represent a broad spectrum of society. In addition, a broad cross-class  
coalition facilitates further mobilization by creating ‘mega-networks’  
linking prior, tightly linked within-group networks to each other. The  
impact of public media in favor of the protestors is also greater if media  
representation shows protestors as representative of the whole society,  
rather than as one particular group seeking partisan advantages for itself. 
       
It is important to note here that while coalitions are, indeed, often crucial in revolutions, this does 
not mean that they are adequate conditions to make a revolution. As Goldstone rightly reminds 
us, the revolutionary conjuncture requires many things—above all, a state crisis, a major 
defection of elite from the regime, and mass mobilization (in addition to formation of an 
alternative or competing opposition/coalition against the state) (2009: 19). Revolutions “do not 
arise simply from mounting discontent over poverty, inequality, or other changes. Rather, 
revolution is a complex process that emerges from the social order becoming frayed in many 
areas at once” (Goldstone 2014: 15). The existence of polarization and coalition building, argues 
Goldstone, is one common element in revolutions (Goldstone 2009: 20). 
What coalitions do offer is the seemingly paradoxical benefit of unity in diversity.  To the 
extent that they bring diverse groups together around a common goal, they widen their potential 
base of appeal, while focusing their collective energies. But if diversity and appeal increase 
together, so too does the difficulty of arriving at a consensus regarding goals and strategies. I 
turn now to tracing the “path” to consensus for each of the three types of coalitions significant to 
the Egyptian context, noting along the way what was gained—and lost—in the process.  The 
focus of this chapter is on the process and benefits of coalition building; the following chapter 
will focus more exclusively on who and what was marginalized as a result.  
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Road 1: Political Coalitions 
 
On January 2014, Mohamed Fadel, professor of law and an expert on Egypt, wrote an op-
ed for the Al-Jazeera  website, asking whether Egypt’s revolutionary coalition—what he called 
the “Tahrir coalition”—could be resurrected? 106 Fadel acknowledged how difficult it would be 
to reconstitute the coalition of diverse groups that came together to oust Mubarak, particularly 
given the divisions among factions that seemed only to deepen after the ousting of elected 
president Mohamed Morsi in 2013. What Fadel reiterated, however, was this idea that coalitions 
were crucial in ousting Mubarak, and that the only hope for moving forward lay in reconstituting 
such alliances. In order to understand how the political coalitions of Tahrir arrived at a set of 
revolutionary demands focused primarily on democratic reform and the ousting of Mubarak, we 
need to study the history of political coalitions in Egypt, particularly in the decade before the 
revolution. A quick analysis of political protests in Egypt since 2000 shows a diverse range of 
demands and grievances, not all of which were necessarily and/or explicitly about democracy.  
There is a general consensus among several analysts, shared by many of my informants, that 
there were three connected waves of protest in Egypt since 2000 that paved the road to the 
revolution. 107 The first wave from 2000 to 2003 began with protests in solidarity with 
Palestinians during the Second Intifada and then continued with protests in 2003 against the war 
on Iraq. Activists describe this as the anti-imperialist and anti-Israeli wave. As emphasized by 
several of my informants, this wave then lead to the second: when protesters in the first wave 
were severely beaten by police in the streets and then faced a general increase in repression, they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/01/can-egypt-revolutionary-coaliti-
201412510437753102.html 
107 See, for example:  http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/02/egypt-revolution-
mubarak-wall-of-fear (last accessed May 29, 2014); and http://www.masress.com/elakhbar/32264 (last 
accessed May 29, 2014).  
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realized that the question of democracy was the priority in Egypt.  The second wave can thus be 
described as the pro-democracy wave, which started at the end of 2004, with the formation of the 
Egyptian Movement for Change, Kefayya (Enough), and lasted until the revolution in 2011. This 
wave witnessed many ups and downs throughout this time, but opposition movements continued 
to focus on democracy as the key to solving Egypt’s problems. The clearest expression of the 
second wave’s focus came with Mohamed ElBaradie’s National Association for Change 
movement, discussed further below.108  
The third wave can be described as the economic and social justice wave. This wave of 
protest and mobilization was unprecedented in Egypt’s recent history. Lasting from 2006 until 
the revolution, this wave included  workers’ strikes and sit-ins that took place across Egypt and 
focused on economic demands—in particular, a guaranteed minimum wage of 1200 EGP for the 
working class. Though this wave’s focus was primarily economic, its momentum and support 
helped to re-energize the pro-democracy wave when it began to wane from 2008 to 2010 (Beinin 
and El-Hamalawy 2007; Blaydes 2010).109 Also, in Mahala in April 2008, a failed strike attempt 
by Al-Mahala Al-Kobra Misr Spinning and Weaving workers was met with violent police 
repression, setting off riots throughout the city.  El-Hamalawy (2011d) suggests these riots 
served as a rehearsal for the revolution in 2011, since protesters included not only workers but 
also members of the general public, and ended with protesters tearing down a billboard of 
Mubarak’s image—a hugely symbolic gesture that had an energizing impact on opposition 
groups throughout the country.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/05/10/ElBaradei-backers-call-for-change/UPI-
21291273506745/ (last accessed May 29, 2014); and http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052748703757504575193960660230840 (last accessed May 29, 2014).  
109 Also see the New York Times editorial from May 6, 2007; available at: http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/05/06/opinion/06sun2.html?_r=0 (last accessed May 29, 2014).  
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 Drawing on a variety of primary and secondary sources, as well as my own observations 
and interviews, I have compiled a list of 33 different political coalitions and/or temporary 
campaigns that involved the collaboration of various groups and individuals from 2000 to 2011 
(see Appendix 3). The point of the list is simply to highlight the breadth and significance of 
coalition building during this period. Some coalitions were extremely short-lived and narrow in 
focus, while others were more general and continue in some form today. Some involved the 
coordination of pre-existing organizations, while others were open to individual members as well. 
But what all share in common are demands for democracy and either explicit calls for political 
and electoral reform or a general call for increased freedom of organizing.110    
 I identify two key instances and organizations in this history of coalition-building that 
illustrate not only peak moments of mobilization, but also the process by which demands became 
increasingly focused on the removal of Mubarak and the institution of political reforms.  The 
first is the formation of Kefayya in 2004 and the second is the formation of the National   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 I also added two coalitions, The Popular Committee for the Solidarity with the Egyptian Intifada and 
Campaign Against the War on Iraq, whose platforms did not explicitly include calls for democratic 
reform, but which were against the Mubarak’s regime’s involvement in the war on Iraq or the complicity 
on attacks on Palestinian rights. I included them because they were crucial in dealing with the regime 
repression on streets and were also instrumental in giving birth to other groups that did make democracy 
the center of their organizing. I have also included the Anti-Globalization Egyptian Group (AGEG), 
which was formed in 2011, as its efforts included grassroots organizing and distributing leaflets and 
protests in neighborhoods. I did not include important movements such as the April 6 movements and 
also the Youth for Justice and Freedom, because these did not entail coalitions of different groups per se. 
The first was mostly liberal democratic and the second was mostly socialist oriented and also democratic.  
I also had some difficulty classifying the many groups that emerged after 2005, and which were inspired 
by Kefayya. These groups were named after Kefayya (the Egyptian Movement for Change, Enough) but 
specifically organized in terms of particular interests or professions. Examples include Labor for Change, 
Engineers for Change, and Lawyers for Change. These groups were described as Kefayya’s siblings by 
leading activists in Kefayya. Although they are worked with Kefayya and coordinated with its members, 
and some of these groups’ founding members were also members of Kefayya, I considered these as 
separate groups, because their aim was to mobilize on the ground, while Kefayya aimed to mobilize 
nationally for democracy. 
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Table 3  Comparing the Platforms of Political Coalitions in 2004, 2010, and 2011. 
Kefayya 
Platform/Demands 
2004 
The NAFC  
Platform/Demands111  
2010 
Tahrir Banner  
Platform/Demands  
2011 
1) The constitution (of 
1971) should be amended to 
allow a multi-candidate 
presidential election, and 
that presidency should be 
limited to two terms for one 
person, and that the 
presidential power should 
be reduced to guarantee 
some sort of separation of 
powers;  
 
2) End emergency status 
and all despotic laws in 
Egypt as well as release all 
political prisoners and 
prisoners of conscious; and 
 
3) Amend election laws in 
Egypt to allow full 
supervision of the judiciary 
over all stages of the 
electoral process. 112 
1) End emergency status; 
 
2) Grant the Egyptian 
judiciary full supervision of 
all the stages of electoral 
process;  
 
3) Grant national and 
international NGOS with 
the right to monitor election 
process; 
 
4) Ensure equal opportunity 
in the media to all 
candidates in elections, 
especially in the 
presidential election;  
 
5) Ensure that Egyptians 
abroad have the right to 
vote in Egyptian embassies 
and consulates abroad;  
 
6) Ensure that the right to 
run in presidential  election 
is not restricted with tough 
stipulations, according to 
Egypt commitments with 
ICPR, also restrict 
presidents to two terms;  
 
7) Ensure voters vote only 
with their national ID.113 
1) Ousting Mubarak; 
 
2) Dissolving the forged 
based Parliament and Upper 
House (Shoura Council); 
 
3) Ending emergency status 
immediately; 
 
4) Forming transitional 
national unity government; 
 
5) Election of a Parliament 
to enact constitutional 
amendments, based on 
which a presidential 
election will take place; 
 
6) Immediate trials for all 
officials responsible for 
killing martyrs (protestors) 
of the revolution;  
 
7) Immediate trials for all 
corrupt officials and those 
who stole the nation’s 
wealth. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 As outlined specifically in the 2010 “We Will Change” campaign. 
112 I was one of the signers of the statement in my first year of immigration to the U.S.See statement at: 
http://www.m.ahewar.org/s.asp?aid=24022&r=0&cid=0&u=%C7%E1%CD%E3%E1%C9+%C7%E1%D
4%DA%C8%ED%C9+%E3%E4+%C3%CC%E1+%C7%E1%CA%DB%ED%ED%D1&i=0&q= (last 
accessed May 29, 2014).  
113 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/35381 (last accessed June 1, 2014).  
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Association for Change (NAFC) in 2010.  A quick comparison of the respective platforms of 
Kefayya in 2004, the National Association for Change in 2010, and the Tahrir banner in 2011 
reveals significant similarities (see Table 3). The platforms are almost identical, with the 2011 
addition of ousting Mubarak and an increased focus on immediate punitive measures for those 
associated with the Mubarak regime. All three, however, reveal the focus on political and 
electoral reform.   
a) Kefayya  
The founding statement of Kefayya had a major impact on the political map in Egypt. On 
September 9, 2004, a group of organizations (both political parties, and political groups as well 
as civil society organizations) and individuals issued a historic statement against Mubarak’s 
plans to run for a fifth term in 2005. The statement  announced the launching of a campaign 
under the name, the Popular Campaign for Change, as well as a slogan: “No to the Extension of 
Power [for Mubarak Sr.] and No to Succession [for Mubarak Jr.].”  The statement was headed 
with this slogan, as well as the demand that the presidential election should be a multicandidate 
election. At the time, Egypt’s constitution of 1971 was still in force, with an amendment that 
allowed the president to run for unlimited periods, and for the election to be based on only one 
candidate nominated by the parliament. By September 23, 2004, the statement had 26 signatures 
of organizations and 489 of individuals. The statement was historic because most political parties 
at the time were co-opted by Mubarak and the security state apparatus. The statement, which was 
openly critical of Mubarak’s false democracy and his foreign policy, took great courage. The 
signers of the statement vowed that Mubarak’s fourth term would be his last, and included three 
general demands, as listed in the table above. The seemingly simple list of demands was, itself, 
the culmination of years of experience dealing with forged elections.  
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This statement gave birth to the Egyptian Movement for Change, or Kefayya, which in 
English means Enough. The new coalition put the demands and the slogan of the previous 
statement in institutional form by bringing together organizations and individuals in Egypt to 
mobilize around electoral reform and a pro-democracy platform in general.  Importantly, the 
very rise of Kefayya built upon movements and coalitions that preceded it (Howeidy 2005a, 
2005b),114 and thus its platform represented a process of both refinement and compromise over 
time. Kefayya made a strong impact in Egypt’s political culture for many reasons. First, Kefayya 
took the opposition to the street, and constituted a clear signal that the formal opposition 
(political parties which were co-opted by Mubarak) was a failure in Egypt. Kefayya’s message 
was that no reform would come to Egypt without pressure and protest; the existing political 
system was broken. Second, Kefayya offered a wide platform which was not rigid and included a 
wide range of new opposition based on a consensus. Though dominated mainly by Nasserites 
and socialists (both organizations and parties), Kefayya focused broadly on democracy and just 
the traditional working class focus of the Left.  Also, crucially, although the Muslim 
Brotherhood was not part of Kefayya, individual members of the MB were.  Third, Kefayya was 
mostly dominated by middle class professionals. The wide platform and the lack of democracy in 
Egypt at the time made Kefayya a great space for many professions and their syndicates to join. 
This generated a series of off-shoot Kefayya organizations such as Lawyers for Change, Artists 
for Change, etc.—what Abdel Haleem Qadndeel, prominent Nasserist and founder of Kefayya 
and others, call Kefayya and its sisters (Essmat 2010; Qandeel 2007).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 For more on Kefayya, see also Clarke (2011), Onodera (2009), Oweidat et al. (2008) and Shorbagy 
(2007a; 2007b). See also: http://www.aucegypt.edu/research/conf/eureca/Documents/BahaaEzzelArab.pdf 
(last accessed June 1, 2014) and in the Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles 
/A35379-2005Mar14.html (last accessed June 1, 2014).  
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When I interviewed Yehaia Fekry, a leftist organizer and founding member of many of 
the coalitions listed in Appendix 3, in March 2014,115 he noted that the biggest problem in 
coalition building was “mostly about who will join in,” rather than “the political ceiling of the 
coalition” per se.  In other words, priority was given to building the numbers of people in any 
given coalition, rather than maintaining a rigid conception of the coalition’s goals.  It was this 
quantitative strategy, I argue, that led to the adoption of a relatively “watered down” reformist 
agenda that would appeal to the widest number of people and groups possible. Again, my point is 
not to critique this strategy with the unfair advantage of hindsight, but to note its emergence as a 
response to the very authoritarianism of Mubarak’s regime. Protestors were pushed to form 
coalitions due to the repressive nature of the regime, and this meant compromises. Compromises, 
in turn,  meant a relatively stable, generic agenda that focused on political reform. 
Fekry noted that one of the biggest recurrent questions was whether and how to include 
the Muslim Brotherhood:  
The Nasserists were against the MB joining Kefayya and also the MB was  
not interested and preferred to form their own dominated coalition. Even  
among the coalitions to coordinate between socialists parties, there was  
always a battle between the groups about whether or not to include the old  
leftist party (known for its close relation with the regime), the Tagamou party. 
  
The MB was an outlier, in a sense, in that it preferred to work on its own or, if it did form 
coalitions, it tended to dominate them given its sheer numbers.116  Appendix 3 shows that there 
were many coalitions created for the same purposes. This was often due to disagreements 
regarding who to include. For example, there were two different attempts to unionize socialists 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Phone interview, March 30, 2014.  
116 Because the MB has been an underground organization it is difficult to know its members’ numbers 
exactly before the revolution. Estimates that the group had no less than 2 or 3 hundred thousands at the 
time.  Compare this for example with another group, the revolutionary socialists, also an underground 
organization. This has only few hundred memebrs at the time.  Some reports shows that the MB has no 
less than half a million member after the revolution, in 2013. See Kingesly (2013) 
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during 2005 and 2006; likewise, there were two or three other groups that had the same aims as 
Kefayya—one initiated by Marxists, and another by the MB—but it was Kefayya which 
succeeded because it managed to unite all the opposition under a single umbrella, with the 
exception of the MB—though, as noted above, individual MB members did join. The MB-led 
coalition was the National Campaign for Change, which it formed with the Revolutionary 
Socialists—a new Trotskyist group that justified its partnership with the MB with the slogan 
“With the Islamists? –Sometimes. With the state? –Never!” (Abdelrahman 2009). The short-
lived National Campaign for Change was also formed in 2004 and had the same goals as 
Kefayya, yet it failed precisely because it was seen as dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, 
whose members outnumbered the Revolutionary Socialists. The relative fates of Kefayya and the 
National Campaign for Change reveal how crucial it was for coalitions to ensure they were seen 
as expansive, rather than exclusive, in membership and, conversely, how this pushed coalitions 
towards the one goal on which everyone could agree: political reform.  
b) The National Association for Change (NAFC)  
The NAFC was formed after Mohamed El-Baradei, the Egyptian diplomat and former 
director of the International Atomic Energy (IAEA) arrived in Egypt in February 2010 and 
announced that he would join the Movement for Change in Egypt.117 When ElBaradei arrived, he 
was welcomed by youth groups as well as figures of the opposition. Within a week, he hosted a 
big meeting in his home, attended by the leaders of Kefayya, other major figures of political 
opposition, and also leading members in the MB. As Yehia Fekry put it, “Almost all Egyptian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 For more about the NAFC, see the following: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/ 
archive/2010/05/can-mohamed-elbaradei-lead-change-in-egypt/56613/ (last accessed May 29, 2014) and 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/09/22/national-association-for-change/h4l7?reloadFlag=1 (last 
accessed June 1, 2014).  
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important political figures, who represent all the opposition were in that meeting.” In addition to 
convincing ElBaradei to run in the presidential election, the meeting founded the NAFC. With its 
inclusion of the Muslim Brother, the NAFC was the biggest political coalition in the decade 
before the revolution, representing, in many ways, the culmination of all the previous coalitions. 
It released a founding statement, Together We Will Make Change, listing seven demands (see 
Table 3 above), and clearly establishing its focus on political reform:  
 Egypt is suffering from very serious problems. Despite Egypt’s resources,  
 and capacities, which should enable Egypt to be placed in a distinct position  
 in the advanced modern world, all aspects of life in Egypt became seriously  
 deteriorating. The best approach to combat this deterioration is political  
 reform.118 
 
Within seven months, the NAFC had collected 1 million signatures in support of the statement—
a major achievement, as in previous years, people were too scared to sign petitions in the context 
of a police state.  
The NAFC was important for many reasons. First, it was the largest organized effort of the 
opposition in Egypt before the revolution. Though the MB’s membership was tenuous, with MB 
members specifically opposing ElBaradei’s candidacy for president, the inclusion of the MB 
made the NAFC the largest and most significant opposition entity to confront Mubarak in his 
thirty-year rule.119  Second, despite the stagnation of politics and the pervasive levels of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/35381 (last accessed June 1, 2014). 
119 It is difficult to summarize the relationship between the MB and its role in the NAFC in a few 
sentences. Due to its size, the MB has always preferred to act independently. Within the NAFC, the MB’s 
role was delicate. On  the one hand, the MB supported the NAFC, but on the other hand, they did not 
support ElBaradei for president. For example, though the MB signed the “We Will Change” statement 
and devoted some members to collect signatures for it, a key MB spokesperson noted that “collecting 
signatures does not mean that the MB is supporting or will be in coalition with ElBaradei. We are 
collecting signatures, but we did not decide officially that we are part of the NAFC.” For more on the 
MB’s membership within the NAFC, see, for example: http://www1.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID 
=238703&SecID=65&IssueID=54#.U3Tq4_0RB4M (last accessed June 1, 2014) and 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/702 (last accessed June 1, 2014).  
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depression and discouragement among political opposition in the period from 2006–2010,120 the 
NAFC gave renewed energy to the opposition and was seen as a major threat to the regime. In 
parliamentary elections in November 2010, the NAFC sponsored a bold idea at the time—the 
formation of an alternative parliament. This parliament actually met a couple times before the 
revolution and included some of the former MPs ousted in the forged elections. One of my 
informants was a member in that parliament. The idea of a counter parliament was a big threat to 
the legitimacy of the regime at the time.  Third, the NAFC’s petition whipped up a great deal of 
enthusiasm and momentum in the streets. Many youth joined the campaign for ElBaradie’s 
election and worked in organized groups to collect petition signatures. Youth groups were also 
very active in the spontaneous street protests described in Chapter 2. Finally, when the protests 
in Tahrir began in January 2011, the first formal statement appeared on the night of January 25, 
2011 and was written by Abdel Galil Mosstafa, the then secretary general of the NAFC. And as I 
noted above, I later learned from Taqadoum Al-Khateeb, an active member of the NAFC, that it 
was NAFC activists that made and hung the famous banner that hung from the tallest building in 
Tahrir. No one realized this at the time, but it was arguably the NAFC’s reformist language and 
aspirations demands that made the banner’s demands so easily and unquestioningly accepted.   
Road 2: Cross-Class Coalitions   
 
Unlike the case of political coalitions in the decade before the revolution, there was no 
evidence that would have led one to expect the kind of wide cross-class coalition that developed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Widespread depression resulted as opposition groups saw themselves as failing to stop the 
constitutional amendments of 2005. Between 2006 and 2011, there was no strong political resistance on 
the pro-democracy front. The only major forms of mobilization were labor strikes from 2006–2008, and 
also the April 6, 2008 attempted strike and national civil disobedience in Mahala, mentioned above and 
discussed further below. 
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in and around Tahrir in 2011. Though the opposition had long been trying to highlight the 
inequities of Mubarak’s political economy—namely, the impoverishment of the majority of 
Egyptians and the collapse of the middle class—the regime itself proclaimed satisfaction with 
the numbers it presented (or fabricated) regarding the economy. This narrative of success was 
supported by the “complementary” reports of international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which declared that Egypt’s economy 
was performing well.121 The unprecedented participation of people from all class backgrounds in 
the revolution, however, reveals the reality of widespread dissatisfaction and disillusionment 
across Egypt’s class structure. In this section, I explore the factors that brought the different 
classes to Tahrir and shaped their participation therein. 122  I also note how cross-class coalitions, 
like wide political coalitions, diluted the aims of the revolution and focused attention on goals to 
which the members of all classes could agree.  
The diverse class participation in the revolution of 2011 has been noted by a number of 
commentators. Prominent Egyptian blogger Hossam El-Hamalawy (2011b) writes:  
All classes in Egypt took part in the uprising. Mubarak managed to alienate  
all social classes in society. In Tahrir Square, you found sons and daughters  
of the Egyptian elite, together with the workers, middle-class citizens and  
the urban poor. But remember that it's only when the mass strikes started 
on Wednesday that the regime started crumbling and the army had to force  
Mubarak to resign because the system was about to collapse.123 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 See for example a report by the IMF about Egypt, just few months before the revolution, in which the 
reports suggests that Egypt’s economic performance is better than expected (IMF 2010). 
122 I am using the term class here in very descriptive sense that relies on how people define themselves. 
There are, of course, various typologies of class in sociology, based on Marxian, Weberian, or 
Durkheimian theoretical foundations (see, for example, Wright 1978, 1979a, 1979b; Erikson and 
Goldthorpe 1992; Hauser and Featherman 1977; Weeden and Grusky 2005; and Sorenson 2000). My aim 
here is limited to analyzing the idea of cross-class alliances in the revolution, rather than performing a 
rigorous class analysis of the protestors per se.  
123 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/feb/14/egypt-protests-democracy-generals (last 
accessed June 1, 2014).  
	  169	  
	  
As El-Hamalway suggests, however, the mobilization of the working classes provided what we 
might consider the crucial foundation of the revolution.  The Egyptian working class was crucial 
in the revolution in two ways. The first is the role of working class strikes in the years from 
2006–2008 and also the series of sit-ins in downtown Cairo and in front of the Egyptian cabinets 
and the parliament in the few years prior to 2011. And the second way is the role of key labor 
strikes that took place in the couple days before the ousting of Mubarak. These strikes, which are 
not highlighted enough in analyses about Egypt, played a crucial role in paralyzing the economy 
at an important junction and costing the government major economic loses. On January 9, 2011, 
for example, public transportation workers announced that they were organizing a strike in 
solidarity with the revolution’s demands. They released a statement calling for an end to 
Emergency Law, a national minimum wage of $1200 EGP, and the drafting a new constitution—
echoing the same demands hung on the banner in Tahrir Square.124 When I interviewed Tareq 
Al-Behreery, a leader of the independent union of public transportation workers, he told me 
about the significance of these late January strikes.   
Within Tahrir, the presence of working class and labor organizations was easy to see. I saw a 
banner by the newly founded Independent Trade Unions of the Tax Collectors (see Figure 14) 
for example in Tahrir. As I have discussed in chapter 4, and as political economists in Egypt 
suggest (such as the late Samer Soliman 2012a) Egypt under Mubarak has moved from a rentier 
state to a predatory state, or a tax state. In the last decade under Mubarak, the Egyptian 
government has been increasingly dependent on taxes revenues, in addition to international aid, 
while the government continuously suffering budget deficiency. The real state tax collectors are 
state employees, as discussed earlier in chapter 4. Their union has about 55,000 members. Not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 http://www.arabawy.org/2011/02/09/jan25-public-transportation-workers-call-for-overthrowing-
mubarak/(last accessed June 1, 2014).  
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only because they are state employees, but also because this is one of the strongest trade unions 
in contemporary Egypt, their presence in Tahrir marked an important marker in the revolution. 
This showed that a critical sector in the state bureaucracy is against the regime; giving so much 
power to Tahrir specifically and the revolution at large. 
In Tahrir, I also  saw many the banners of workers from many different locations outside 
Cairo who came to join the sit-in. Some of the key organizers of labor from outside Cairo were 
present in Tahrir too, such as Wael Habib and Kamal al-Fayoumi, two of the key workers who 
planned the labor strike in Mahala in April 2008. I interviewed both of them in the summer of 
2012.  In my interview with Habib in November 2012, he stated: 
I did join protests in Mahala in days 25, 26 and 27 of January, but after then I did  
go to Cairo. I was in Tahrir sit-in all the time until ousting Mubarak. And I did  
only leave Tahrir every day for couple hours and when needed to go to the  
bathroom. In Tahrir, I was with many people, workers and others from Mahala.  
And I also saw workers from Suez, from Islamiiya.125 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Interview, November 15, 2012.  
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Figure 14  Banner in Tahrir belonging to The Union of Tax Collectors.  The banner reads: “The 
Union of Tax Collectors endorses the demands of the January 25, 2011 revolution.” Picture by 
the author, taken on February 7, 2011. 
 
Despite their presence in Tahrir, however, workers did not mobilize visibly as workers and join 
the protests until February 8 and 9, in the last couple days before ousting Mubarak. Habib noted 
that, at first, workers felt that simply participating in the street protests was the best way to 
contribute, but when they saw the numbers of people in Tahrir, they were encouraged eventually 
to attempt to organize strikes. Hossam El-Hamalawy (2011c) also explains this period, stating: 
From day 1 of our uprising, the working class has been taking part in the 
 protests. Who do you think were the protesters in Mahalla, Suez and Kafrel-
 Dawwar for example? However, the workers were taking part as  
 “demonstrators” and not necessarily as “workers”– meaning, they were not 
 moving independently. The govt [sic] had brought the economy to  halt, not the 
 protesters by its curfew, shutting down of banks and business. It was a capitalist 
 strike, aiming at terrorizing the Egyptian people. Only when the govt [sic] tried to 
 bring the country back to “normal” on Sunday that workers returned to their 
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 factories, discussed the current situation, and started to organize en masse, 
 moving as a block.126 
Mustafa Bassioni, a labor organizer and journalist, also told me that one reason the workers 
delayed striking during the 18 days was the implementation of a curfew by the military. With the 
curfew, as well as the closing of banks and government buildings, a strike—particularly one 
involving government workers—would have been ineffective anyway. Then, when businesses 
opened again on February 6, it took them two days at least to organize, and thus the strikes 
started on February 8, 2011.  
To the extent that working class participants in Tahrir were present, but less immediately 
and visibly involved in leadership roles, middle class participants more than compensated.  In my 
two rounds of interviews in 2011 and 2012, I interviewed a total of 106 people who were present 
in Tahrir Square during the 18 days of the revolution. 127  Of those 106, only 23 clearly identified 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 http://www.arabawy.org/2011/02/12/permanent-revolution (last accessed June 1, 2014).  There are no 
documented statistics about labor strikes during the time of the revolution, but labor organizers I spoke to 
estimated that there were at least 1500 industrial actions in February 2011 alone (also mentioned in El-
Hamalawy at: http://www.newsocialist.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=551:the-
egyptian-revolution-continues-an-interview-with-hossam-el-hamalawy-&catid=51:analysis&Itemid=98 
(last accessed June 1, 2014). Despite joining late in the revolution, workers had high hopes and protested 
as an organized group not only in the last few days in the revolution, but also after the ousting of Mubarak. 
Indeed, as a result of their actions, one of SCAF’s first actions was to issue a law banning strikes. El-
Hamalawy (2011d) discusses the increased stakes for working class participants:  
When Mubarak was toppled on the 11th of February and the middle class and most of the 
 youth groups were more than happy to suspend the Tahrir sit-in and there were calls for  
everybody to go back to work amidst all of this nationalist propaganda – you know, 'let's 
build a new Egypt' and 'put 110 percent of your effort into work' – the working class did  
not go. A journalist like myself, I can afford not showing up to work for 18 days, but then 
go back to my editorial position where I will get several thousand Egyptian pounds a  
month. But a public transport worker cannot basically suspend his strike and go back  
home to his kids and tell them, “I'm still getting paid 189 Egyptian pounds after fifteen  
years of service; let's wait for another six months while the ruling military junta gives us  
a civilian cabinet so as to solve all our problems. 
See interview with el-Hamalawy (2011d) in http://www.newsocialist.org/index.php?option=com_content 
&view=article&id=551:the-egyptian-revolution-continues-an-interview-with-hossam-el-hamalawy-
&catid=51:analysis&Itemid=98 (last accessed June 1, 2014).  
127 90 of the 106 said they were present in Tahrir Square in various ways, such as going to the square 
regularly without necessarily being part of the daily sit-in and sleeping in Tahrir.   
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themselves as working class, while the rest identified themselves as middle class.128 I fully 
acknowledge that my sample may not be representative; indeed, it is likely impossible to 
construct in hindsight a clear picture of the exact class composition of the protestors in Tahrir.  
Nonetheless, based on my own observations and conversations, I would still argue that while 
there was a range of  classes in Tahrir, the most dominant class was the middle class. Many of 
my informants were working professionals—IT persons in universities, employees in NGOs, 
engineers, or publishers. Middle class protestors such as journalists and doctors and lawyers set 
up  stages and banners and established professional association tables in the various corners of 
Tahrir. And as many of them acknowledged, participating in a constant action for 18 days 
requires the freedom to either miss work or simply leave your job—a luxury that only the middle 
class can afford. The prominence of middle class protest leaders was, in many ways, 
unsurprising, given the fact that Kefayya and many other core opposition groups and coalitions 
of the last decade were comprised primarily of middle class participants, particularly in 
leadership positions.  
 Middle class participants went to Tahrir not out of some sense of altruistic solidarity with 
workers and the poor, however, but because they too were weary of the economic disparities and 
lack of opportunities under the Mubarak regime (Kandil 2012).  The application of structural 
adjustments programs since the mid-1990s and then Gamal Mubarak’s excessive neo-liberal 
reforms seriously affected both the lower and middle classes. The protection of the welfare state 
under Nasser had steadily given way under Nasser and then Mubarak to an increasingly 
repressive police state, the crony capitalism of which offered few opportunities for those outside 
of a ruling inner circle. As Juan Cole (2011b) put it:   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Some informants further specified a rank within the middle class—i.e., lower middle class—while 
others did not; interviews were based on snowball sampling that built upon my initial contacts.  
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 The failure of the regime to connect with the rapidly growing new urban  
 working and middle classes, and its inability to provide jobs to the masses  
 of college graduates it was creating, set the stage for last week’s events.   
          
Likewise, Francis Fukuyama (2013), connects this narrowing of economic opportunities to the 
emergence of a politically reformist revolution:  
The authoritarian governments of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni  
Mubarak were classic crony-capitalist regimes, in which economic  
opportunities depended heavily on political connections. Neither country,  
in any event, had grown fast enough economically to provide jobs for  
ever-larger cohorts of young people. The result was political revolution.129 
 
Fukuyama and others have gone so far as to describe the Egyptian revolution as a middle-class 
revolution.  Talking to people in Tahrir Square, I got the sense that, for the working classes, this 
politicization of the middle classes was welcome, if somewhat bittersweet. Some working class 
leaders recalled a sense of betrayal by the middle classes, whose political actions in previous 
years had not extended to supporting strikes in places like Mahala. But those same working class 
leaders noted that in Tahrir, it was enough for workers to come and be part of the story without 
necessarily being visible; if middle class protestors played a leadership role in Tahrir, it was fine 
because, ultimately, it was the revolution that mattered. 130 As Wael Habib, the leading labor 
organizer from Mahala, put it:  
I think that workers role and all political oppositions are not against one  
another. But at the same time, we have some sense of bitterness against  
the political oppositions since 2008, specially because in a sense they  
betrayed us. After announcing the strike, they told people it is better to  
stay home and hang banners in your balconies.etc.  In April 2008, there 
was a civil war in Mahala and most of the opposition seems not to care.  
But today we join here in Tahrir, and we forget about that past. We only  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Francis Fukuyama, “The Middle-Class Revolution,” The Wall Street Journal, 28 June, 2013; available 
at: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323873904578571472700348086 (last 
accessed June 1, 2014).  
130 Though, for an argument that the middle class has not yet done enough, see http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/egypt-missing-middle-class-politics.html# (last accessed June 1, 
2014).  
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care about the revolution. 
  
 Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Tahrir sit-in, however, was the extent to which 
it received the support of the upper classes—in particular, many key Egyptian businessmen. Why 
did so many upper class Egyptians participate in the revolution and why were they were so angry 
at Mubarak’s regime? Here, it is useful to situate the question of the cross-class coalition in the 
larger picture of Egyptian political economy under Mubarak. Late political economist Samer 
Soliman (2012a) identified three main features of the political economy of the Mubarak regime: 
1) the state moving from a semi-rentier state to a predatory tax state (where taxation increases 
constantly without true representation); 2) the decline of the regime’s public purchasing power; 
and 3) the “bourgeoisification” of the ruling party. The third feature is especially relevant to the 
question of upper class Egyptians in relation to the revolution. Soliman was discussing a major 
shift in the practices of the Egyptian state, especially after the rise of Gamal Mubarak to politics. 
Historically, Hosni Mubarak, who came from the army and inherited a bureaucratic economy 
from Sadat, acted as an arbiter between the military and the upper classes. As Gamal Mubarak 
became increasingly involved in politics, however, this formula changed. The ruling party and its 
relation to “business” began to change; in short, the inner circle of the regime narrowed ever 
more tightly around a small group of businessmen close to Gamal Mubarak. Soliman states: 
The bourgeoisification of the ruling party reflected Egypt’s changing  
political economy from bureaucratic to neo-liberal authoritarianism. The  
shift was meant to strengthen the party by supporting it with the financial 
and human resources in the hands of businessman. Instead, this  
metamorphosis of the party and its leadership had a destabilizing effect in  
the political sphere. It created resentment among other social groups,  
especially when the businessman joining and leading the party were  
accused of monopolistic and corrupt practices. (2012a: 58) 
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Not only the military, but also wider segments of Egypt’s upper classes were threatened 
by this shift towards Gamal Mubarak’s inner circle.131 Soon, only small segments at each 
level of Egypt’s class structure stood to benefit from their connections to the Mubarak 
family network. Soliman describes the situation:  
The neo-liberal “reforms” Gamal Mubarak made had a strong impact on  
Mubarak’s support on the higher circles of state bureaucracy. And also did  
not have enough support outside the state. Groups that supported Gamal  
were very narrow strata from the upper class, and also narrow strata from  
upper middle class, those who directly benefited from the economic  
policies of Gamal Mubarak, and saw Gamal’s role as an opportunity to  
modernize or innovate July state/regime smoothly. And lastly very narrow  
strata from the poor, those who benefited from charity and the “crumbs”  
given to them by Gamal and his mother’s NGOs.132 
 
 Of course, how exactly the upper classes participated in and supported the sit-in in Tahrir 
varied was quite different from the participation of the lower and middle classes.  Some business 
tycoons, for example, offered their own private TV channels to cover protests, thus violating the 
government ban and censorship on Tahrir; Naguib Sawiris, CEO of the telecommunications 
companies Wind Telecom and Orascom Telecom Holding, was one such example. Two 
businessmen, Tawfeeq Kamel Diab, and Ibrahim El Moallem own the two main independent 
newspapers, which were exceptionally covering protests, and tried to offer perspective from the 
ground. These two papers are Al-Masry Alyoum and El-Shorouk, respectively.  El Moallem also 
has some important business partners in Egypt. Despite the threats the newspapers received, they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 The military’s relation to Gamal Mubarak and how this motivated the military to sacrifice Hosni 
Mubarak during the revolution goes beyond the scope of this discussion. But, briefly, it is important to 
mention that many people have pointed to evidence that Gamal Mubarak and his circle were attempting to 
encroach  on military lands and business in Egypt.  Also the rise of Gamal Mubarak angered the generals, 
as his planned succession to power disrupted the long-standing tradition of all previous presidents coming 
from the military in Egypt, from Nasser to Mubarak Sr.  See, for example, Ahram Online,  “Tantawi Was 
at Odds with Gamal Mubarak: Wikileaks,” May 7, 2011; available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/ 
NewsContent/1/64/11559/Egypt/Politics-/Tantawi-was-atodds-with-Gamal-Mubarak-Wikileaks.aspx (last 
accessed June 1, 2014).  
132 http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=08042012&id=827835fd-2fd1-4658-a064-
e4811851dcf3 (last accessed June 1, 2014).  
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continued to cover protests and go to Tahrir. During my fieldwork in Tahrir, I heard many stories 
from journalist friends about the threats that the workers in these two papers received from pro-
Mubarak thugs, but yet they continued to do their work.  
Some businessmen, such as Mamdouh Hamza, an engineer and industrialist, and founder 
of Hamza Associates, a major engineering company in Egypt, also helped to finance protests in 
Tahrir by offering assistance with logistics.133 As several representatives from the Youth 
Coalition of the Revolution (YCR) told me, Hamza provided some of the finances to build a 
stage in Tahrir. One of my informants also mentioned to me that the some of the activists of the 
National Association for Change rented an apartment overlooking Tahrir Square and used it for 
meetings. He spoke critically of the idea that a group holding meetings above the square had an 
important impact on the dynamics within the square, but regardless his critique, this idea that 
certain businessmen connected to the movement assisted in financing things did exist during the 
sit-in and was expressed by a number of participants.  
Businessmen from the Muslim Brotherhood and its networks also supported the sit-in. 
Seham Shawadda, the key organizer of the survival committee of the YCR, told me that she 
asked MB contacts to provide her with money and donations for the square. In addition, the MB 
had their own survival committees, and also provided tents and blankets to many of their poor 
members who came from the countryside to Tahrir. I personally saw much of this kind of 
assistance, and many of my informants said that the MB and the Salafies brought many of their 
members from the countryside. Indeed, on my first day of arrival to Tahrir on February 4, 2011, I 
helped two old men who appeared to be Salafies or from the MB to carry in huge piles of 
blankets and tents.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/3181/mamdouh-hamza (last accessed June 1, 2014).  
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  In general, as discussed earlier, political coalitions in Egypt were a decade in the making, 
but the widespread participation of different classes in the revolution was sparked by more recent 
changes in politics and the economy that occurred mainly after 2005. The inevitable outcome of 
such cross-class coalition, however, was that the only  consensus capable of uniting everyone 
was an agenda that focused on political, as opposed to economic, reform. Though members of 
each class had their own ideas about  what the uprising should be all about, political reform was 
the one idea that all could rally behind.  
 
Road 3: Youth Coalitions  
Most of my informants were youth. 87 out of my 106 informants were under the age of 
forty.134 The YCR was very crucial in the mobilization for the revolution and in presenting the 
most solid, concrete coalition during the uprising in Tahrir. One could say that while the NAFC 
was the most important political coalition prior to the revolution, it was the YCR that played the 
most effective role during the uprising itself.  In order to understanding the role of youth in the 
revolution, however, it is crucial to locate them in their political and economic context 
(Korotayev and Zinkina 2011).   
 Scholars have noted that Egypt has a “youth bulge” (LaGraffe 2012; Shahine 2011; 
Shehata 2011). Defined as those between the ages of 18 and 29, youth in Egypt comprise about 
24.3 % of the population, according to a report by Egypt’s Central Agency for Public 
Mobilization and Statistics published in 2012.135 And according to a Carnegie Middle East 
Center report, two thirds of the Egyptian population is under 30 (Achy 2010). Before the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 The age breakdown was as follows: 52 out of 106 were between 20–30; 35 were between 30–40; ten 
were between 40–50; 6 were between 50–60; and 1 informant was above 60.  
135 The report is published in Egypt Independent (August 12, 2012). Available at: 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/youth-are-quarter-egypt-s-population-and-half-them-are-poor 
(last accessed June 9, 2014) 
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revolution, a number of studies revealed the extent to which Egyptian youth were excluded from 
politics and also lacking opportunities (Assaad 2008; Assaad and Barsoum 2007; Assaad and 
Roudi-Fahimi 2007; Hassan and Sassanpour 2008).  According to survey conducted in 2009 by 
the Egyptian Population Council, nine out of ten jobless in Egypt are under age 30, and it is 
estimated that 51.3% of those aged 18–29 in Egypt live in poverty. And though most Egyptian 
youth are educated, only 1% are members of political parties, revealing the extent of 
disillusionment with the formal political system (Achy 2010).136  Highlighting this combination 
of education and unemployment, sociologist Asef Bayat (2011) calls for studying the new 
uprisings in the Middle East with a focus on what he calls the “poor middle class.” This group 
acts with the high aspirations and expectations of the middle class, but they are constantly 
frustrated by economic hardship. Many of my informants under 30 cited this lack of 
opportunities and their perception of politics as corrupted as major reasons why they decided to 
participate in the revolution.   
In terms of their patterns of mobilization, this young generation was also heavily 
influenced by the coalition politics of the early 2000s. Perhaps one of the most influential 
coalitions was Kefayya, which led to the offshoot organization, Youth for Change. And just as 
Kefayya served as an umbrella organization for various offshoots, so too did Youth for Change 
generate a number of other groups. By the time the Youth Coalition of the Revolution was 
created in 2011, it included six youth groups: the April 6th Movement, the Youth for ElBaradei, 
the Youth of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Youth of the Democratic Front Party, and the Justice 
and Freedom Movement, the latter of which included Marxists, Islamists, Arab nationalists and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 See also http://www.popcouncil.org/uploads/pdfs/2010PGY_SYPEPrelimReport.pdf (last accessed 
June 1, 2014).  
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Nasserists.137 Many of my youth informants told me that they were members of at least one of 
these groups. They and the founders of the YCR emphasized to me the impact the history of 
youth organizing and coalition building had leading up to the revolution. 
The following excerpt is from my November 9, 2012, interview with Mohamed El-
Qasass, one of the founders of the YCR and a key member in the Youth of the MB. el-Qasass 
was one of the activists who later violated MB orders to leave Tahrir and not join the revolution 
on that first day of January 25, 2011. As a consequence, the MB fired him after the revolution. I 
cite El-Qasass at length as his narrative reveals the subtle way in which the growing 
authoritarianism of the Mubarak regime itself pushed youth to gravitate towards a more 
coalition-based form of politics, focused more on building numbers and strength than adhering to 
any rigid ideology or agenda:  
  I am now 38. And I work in a small media company that I own. I was an active 
member in the MB in college. I was in college in the 1990s. My father is a scholar 
in Al-Azhar. I studied in Dar El-Oloum College, one of the main centers Islamic 
studies in Egypt. . . .  
  
 The 1990s were unique in college activism for many reasons. The first is that it 
was obvious that Mubarak’s regime is very authoritarian. And it is getting worse. 
Also we were very strong as Islamic students activists in camps (Cairo 
University). The regime was very hostile to us and students activism. Yes, the 
Islamists were the strongest group in campus. But we realized that coordinating 
with other groups will make the students movement stronger.  
 
 I have known many of my friends and colleagues who formed the YCR with me 
in this period in campus such as Khaled Abdel Hameed, the socialist, and 
Mohamed Abdel Haleem, the Nasserist, from my generation. I continued working 
with the MB after graduation. And I was active in the MB student office. And I 
did know newer generations such as Zyaed Al-Eleemy, the socialist, and also 
Islam Lotfy, who is also an MB and founder of the YCR and also this party (the 
Egyptian Current). And I can give you many other names such as Kharyi al-Sayed, 
Mosysfa Shawky, and Mohamed Abbas—all are Islamists and colleagues in our 
party. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 This preceded and should not be confused with the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which was banned in 2013 after the military coup.  
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 The years from 2004 to 2008 were very crucial in making of our generation and 
the experience of working together. In the context of Kefayya, some of us, the 
young MB, were became very interested in joining the movement and working 
with others. Also, we participated in something called the International Cairo 
Conference Against the War and Zionism. This was coordinated by the MB, 
socialists, and Nasserists in that time. This started out of the efforts against the 
war on Iraq and then continued for few years in Cairo. In this conference, I was 
one of the organizers of panels on student activism, and also anti-discrimination 
panels. In 2006, I participated with others in the protest in solidarity with the 
prosecuted judges. 
 
When I asked him why he did not follow the instructions of the MB, he responded: 
I cannot attribute this to one factor. Some of us were not really so  
committed to the rigidity of the orders and instruction of our senior folks  
in the MB. I was arrested many times. And I was in the military trial  
against the MB in the 1990s. And I did not like some aspects of this  
disciplining way perhaps.  And probably these experiences of working  
with others affected me.  I have always valued the experience we shared  
with others, and perhaps also this context of participating in the streets that  
made our experience unique, as an MB and also as working with others.   
Then the April 2008 strike occurred followed by the movement that took  
its name. In other words, these years created a unique generation, those  
who are graduated earlier and politics absorbed them. 
 
Many other members of the YCR told me similar things. It seems that by the time the 
YCR was organized in Tahrir, it brought together a generation of youth uniquely 
predisposed to build consensus across more traditional political lines.  Having witnessed 
the growth of authoritarianism under Mubarak, and paired with their own lack of 
economic opportunities, El-Qassass and others seemed to understand that only by 
working together could youth ensure their voices would be heard. As a result, the YCR 
was the most visible organized coalition in Tahrir and the revolution. And it was a 
coalition that truly represented a consensus—a consensus built on the common ground of 
political reform. The very fact that the YCR contained youth ranging from Marxists to 
liberals to Islamists made it impossible to go beyond political reform as their main 
agenda. Once focused on this goal, though, the YCR held fast—they remained the only 
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organized voice during the 18 days of the revolution that insisted upon ousting Mubarak 
before engaging in any negotiations (unlike, by contrast, the MB, which engaged in 
negotiations with the regime before Mubarak was out).    
In this section, I have examined the three roads that led to a consensus around political 
reform as the main goal of the revolution: the specific history of political coalitions in Egypt, the 
creation of an impromptu cross-class alliance, and also the crystallization of youth coalitional 
experiences in the YCR. This explains how the revolution was confined to a specific list of 
demands that represented, in many ways, a compromise on the part of all the groups involved. In 
reality, of course, these three roads overlapped with one another in various ways, and are only 
separated here for analytical purposes. I have discussed them separately so as to avoid conflating 
the different dynamics at work, but the point is that there were many factors that shaped what 
came to be seen as the demands of the revolution—demands spelled out on a banner that hung 
over Tahrir Square and were embraced precisely because they seemed to belong to no one and 
everyone at the same time.  In the next section, I turn to examining how and  why Tahrir itself 
came to be seen as the symbol and site of the revolution’s legitimacy.  
 
 
 
II. Tahrir as the Embodiment of Revolutionary Legitimacy 
Soon after the ousting of Mubarak on February 11, 2011, and for many months 
afterward—including both before and after the  first parliamentary elections held after the 
revolution, from November 28, 2011 to January 11, 2012—talk continued to circulate within 
political circles about something called revolutionary legitimacy. Khaled Abdel Hameed, one of 
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the founders of the Youth Coalition of the Revolution, told me that the first time the slogan, “The 
Legitimacy is for the Square” appeared was during the 18 days of the revolution, specifically on 
February 1, 2011, in opposition to the idea of negotiating with the regime.  It was coined in 
conjunction with another slogan, “No Negotiation Until Mubarak Leaves.” But even once 
Mubarak was gone, “The Legitimacy is for the Square” revealed itself to be more than just a 
slogan; it was an idea with profound political purchase both in Tahrir Square and beyond. After 
the parliamentary elections, heated discussions talked about a presumed conflict between 
“electoral legitimacy” and “revolutionary legitimacy.” The former, the regime (now controlled 
by SCAF and the MB) argued, came to the fore with the election of the new parliament, whereas 
the latter, according to many activists and protestors, continued to reside with the revolution, as 
embodied in the space of Tahrir. 138  For this second group, a form of revolutionary legitimacy 
emerged during those 18 days in Tahrir that was grounded in, yet not limited to the actual square; 
nor, they argued, did that legitimacy dissipate when the protests subsided and SCAF took 
power.139 And it was this legitimacy, they argued, that should still be acknowledged and used as 
a guide in the transition period. Politicians, academics, and protestors debated the issue and 
many continued to explicitly connect this idea of revolutionary legitimacy to the symbol and 
space of Tahrir (Adly 2012; Bamyeh 2012; Helal 2012).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 For the argument that legitimacy now rested with Parliament, see “Parliament, not Tahrir, now the 
legitimate authority, says Brotherhood leader,” Ahram Online, 24 January 2012; available at:  
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/32579/Egypt/Politics-/Parliament,-not-Tahrir,-now-the-
legitimate-authori.aspx (last accessed June 1, 2014); also the comments of Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and 
intellectual leader of the MB and also the chairman of the International Union for Muslim scholars, 
available at: http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=15022012&id=36209e08-1dde-4588-
95a6-1d99b50677eb (last accessed June 1, 2014). Not surprisingly, most of the voices arguing that  
parliament was now the legitimate authority were either from SCAF or pro-SCAF or from the MB or pro 
Islamists, now that the parliament was dominated by the MB.  
139 See http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/218046 (last accessed June 1, 2014); 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/213762 (last accessed June 1, 2014);  http://www1.youm7. 
com/News.asp?NewsID=651945#.UzGWKv0RB4M (last accessed June 1, 2014); and also  
http://www.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&article=664516&issueno=12137 (last accessed June 1, 
2014).  
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Legitimacy is a relational concept; it refers to how and why citizens are willing to obey 
the commands of a ruler. Sociologists know, of course, the famous three sources of legitimacy 
defined by Max Weber: tradition, charisma, and legality (Weber 1984). In “modern” 
constitutional democracies, the most relevant of these is the form of political legitimacy that is 
based on legality, which means that a government’s actions should always be made according to 
just laws.  In times of revolution, the authority and legitimacy of the government is called into 
question. The existing regime will always try retain and uphold the “old” form of legitimacy, 
whether based in tradition, charisma, or the law, but the revolution—or so it hopes—always 
brings with it a new form legitimacy,  based on the revolution’s ideals (Applewhite 1978; 
Edelstein 2002; Greene 1974; Holbig and Gilley 2010). This is described as revolutionary 
legitimacy. 
In order to understand how the protests in Tahrir Square came to assert a new form of 
legitimacy that challenged that of the existing regime, it is necessary to grasp the extent to which 
the legitimacy of the Mubarak regime was already in crisis.  When exactly the Mubarak regime 
lost its legitimacy and/or what kind of legitimacy it had by January 2011 has been much debated 
among academics and scholars in Egypt and beyond (Cole 2011b; Heikal 2002; Younis 2012). 
But most commentators agree that compared to those he succeeded, Mubarak’s legitimacy was 
always in question.  Nasser’s legitimacy was rooted in revolution—a revolution that ended 
colonial rule, established a welfare state, ended the monarchy, and formed a republic. Sadat’s 
legitimacy was based in war—the liberation of the Sinai from Israel and then the establishment 
of the post-war peace. Mubarak’s rule, on the other hand, with its inauspicious start following the 
assassination of Sadat, lacked any solid basis of legitimacy. Though constantly seeking to 
maintain the appearance of a legalistic state, Mubarak’s regime quickly revealed itself to be one 
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buttressed by the massive build-up of state security apparatus, the continuation of emergency law, 
the escalation of police brutality, and rigged elections. There is a consensus at least that the 
regime had become increasingly authoritarian by 2011, and that although there were “elections,” 
there was no democracy in Egypt (Blaydes 2006, 2010; Brownlee 2002; El-Ghobashy 2006). In a 
famous lecture delivered at the American University in Cairo in 2002, prominent writer 
Mohamed Hassanin Heikal, emphasized “it is not enough that you are in power to be a legitimate 
leader” (Heikal 2002).140 Indeed, several critics suggested that the regime had become so 
powerful that it had essentially swallowed the state, or as political economist Samer Soliman put 
it, Egypt had become that paradox of a “strong regime and weak state” (2011). The rise of the 
police state under Mubarak actually constituted a hollowing out of the state, in terms of a state 
apparatus with any level of autonomy from the ruler, and this only intensified the legitimacy 
crisis of the regime. Sherif Younis (2012: 97), an Egyptian historian and critic, explains:  
The already repressive state of July [in reference to Nasser’s state] is  
transformed into a crude free market state. This means combination of  
both neo-liberal and repressive state at once. The regime simply became  
lacking any legitimacy. Why is that? The regime is made of mere  
networks of corrupt gang, or cronies, their main job becomes loyal to this  
regime. Despite this loyalty, the regime, also can get rid of any of these  
elements or eliminate them at any time, since there is no real  
constitutionally controlling  rules. The state in its core is nothing but  
police machine that protects corruption. When the regime simply thinks  
that they can do it all with police machine, then it lacks any legitimacy. 
 
The last parliamentary elections under Mubarak, only a few months before the revolution, and 
widely understood to have fraudulent, were arguably the “last straw” in the regime’s 
legitimacy.141 But while Mubarak’s legitimacy was already in crisis, it was by no means clear at 
the start of 2011 who or what could step in to assert a new form of legitimacy that would be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 The full Arabic text of the lecture is published in this link: http://www.mafhoum.com/press4/ 
118P56.htm (last accessed June 9, 2014) 
141 Some scholars argue that we need to think more seriously about cases of stolen elections, and consider 
them as part of the revolutionary process, namely, as triggers; see Thompson and Kuntz (2005).  
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accepted by the Egyptian people. The question is thus: how and why did the protests and sit-in 
staged in Tahrir become the center of revolutionary politics and, ultimately, the embodiment of 
revolutionary legitimacy?   
The answer, I suggest, is partly thanks to the regime itself.  During the 18 days of the 
revolution, the Mubarak regime used multiple strategies, all aimed at Tahrir; these  varied from 
using force, to trying to isolate and demonize the protests, to negotiation.  The use of force has 
been well documented and culminated in the now infamous Battle of the Camel Battle on 
February 2, 2011, which left 11 people dead and over 600 injured.142 Such violence on the part of 
the state and pro-Mubarak supporters had the opposite effect of what was intended, leading some 
to identify the Battle of the Camel as the moment the tide of opinion shifted against Mubarak and 
in favor of the protestors.143  
The second strategy involved using official media and state propaganda to isolate the 
protests, and construct those in Tahrir as enemies of the state, un-representative of what was felt 
by the rest of the nation. Despite the fact that protests took place in many locations in Egypt 
(something I explore further in the following chapter), the regime continually tried to portray the 
uprising as taking place only in Tahrir, in order to justify the idea of speedy repression targeting 
the single place that was supposedly witnessing trouble.  On February 2, 2011, the new prime 
minister hired by Mubarak at the time ordered that government work go back to normal, after 
only a few days being closed. Some of my informants told me this was part of the plan to isolate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 See also a report of the fact-finding mission mandated by the Egyptian government after the revolution, 
in which the report that at least 846 were killed during the revolution and the injured were about 6467. 
This includes the dead and the injured in the revolution in general including the camel battle. 
The report (in Arabic) is available in this link: http://www.ffnc-eg.org/assets/ffnc-eg_final.pdf (last 
accessed June 9, 2014) 
143 See, for example about how crucial this battle in turning the public against Mubarak at the time: 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/33470.aspx (last accessed June 1, 2014) and 
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/02/03/the-battle-of-the-camel-the-final-straw-for-mubaraks-
regime/ (last accessed June 1, 2014).  
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the square, to get normal citizens to go back to normal, while, hopefully, the protestors would get 
exhausted and leave the square.  
Meanwhile, the official media targeted Tahrir, labeled protestors as infiltrators or 
troublemakers, and disseminated images purportedly showing violent instigators and groups of 
irresponsible, destructive kids. 144 Many conservative prominent actors and actresses, politicians, 
and state intellectuals were interviewed extensively on state TV to praise Mubarak’s reform 
and/or demonize Tahrir. Over and over again, the protestors were referred to, in a reductive and 
pejorative manner, as “the kids of Tahrir.” 145 Yet the ironic effect of the excessive propaganda 
against Tahrir, in the context of the revolutionary crisis at the time, was to construct and 
inadvertently acknowledge Tahrir as the counterpart of the state in the conflict. The political 
climate had become acutely polarized, such that society was essentially divided into three main 
camps: pro-Mubarak/regime, pro-Tahrir/revolution, and a third party, known at the time in Egypt 
as “the couch party”—in reference to the significant part of the population who were reluctant to 
participate in the revolution, and overwhelmed with anxiety and worries about the stability of the 
country. As several activists pointed out to me, the obsession of the official media with Tahrir 
was ironic and contradictory: if the Mubarak regime was as  strong and stable as it asserted, why 
so much concern over a bunch of kids? The regime’s response to Tahrir belied its own discourse 
that Tahrir was an isolated, aberrant uprising and inadvertently contributed to constructing the 
square as the symbol of the revolution, the “other side” with which the regime had to contend.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 See J. Alexander (2011) who created a cultural coding analysis about how the media constructed 
Tahrir and how Tahrir was seen compared to the regime. It is useful to contrast the media’s perspective 
on Tahrir with how protestors in Tahrir saw the state and the media coverage on the other hand. But this 
goes beyond my research.  
145 See, for example: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zacNVc9nGjU (last accessed June 1, 2014);  
http://www.masress.com/search?q=لﻝﺎﯿﻴﻌﻟاﺍ+عﻉﻮﺘﺑ+ﺮﯾﻳﺮﺤﺘﻟاﺍ (last accessed June 1, 2014); and  
http://www.masrawy.com/Ketabat/ArticlesDetails.aspx?AID=87727 (last accessed June 1, 2014).  
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 On February 4, 2011, I witnessed an incident that illustrated this unintended interpellation 
of Tahrir’s legitimacy by the state when a high-ranking military general came to the square, and 
talked on one of the main stages. Protestors did not know who he was, but the initial rumor was 
that he was Sami Anan, the military chief of staff at the time. The general talked to the protestors 
through the speakers, saying: the regime heard you, and your demands are respected, and it is 
now the time for you to leave the square.146 Protestors refused to listen and chanted back, “We 
will not leave, he [Mubarak] should leave.” We learned later from the media that the speaker was 
General Hassan Al-Rouiny, the Head of the Central Command in Egypt. Sending such a high-
ranking individual sent the protestors in Tahrir an unintended message of recognition and 
acknowledgment. Even asking the protestors to leave the square seemed to validate the idea that 
Tahrir was the revolution—if only it would empty out, the uprising would be over.  Al-Rouiny 
was not the only representative of the regime to speak in the square, other messengers were sent, 
asking the protestors to accept Mubarak’s offer to make reforms and continue his presidential 
term.147, 148 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 For footage of this incident, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lem36h5kSZE (last accessed 
June 1, 2014).  
147 Other messengers were Amre Moussa, former Secretary General of the Arab League, and also Ahmed 
Kamal Abu Al-Magd, a former minister from Nasser’s time. Abu-Almgd with some other intellectuals 
and elite formed what is called the “committee of the wise,” which sought to play a role as arbiter 
between the regime and the protestors. The committee was not effective. 
148 One can argue that the regime’s grand strategy was to end the Tahrir protests as soon as possible and 
to absorb their now contained legitimacy via negotiated electoral reform. Scholar Amr Adly (2012) states, 
for example: 
Days after the breakout of the 25 January revolt and before the ouster of Hosni Mubarak, 
his chief spy, Omar Suleiman, proposed a long and detailed legalistic plan to solve 
Egypt’s political impasse. Suleiman was planning to buy time until Mubarak’s official 
term expired in six months. The proposal included the introduction of constitutional 
amendments and the dissolution of Parliament by enabling the Court of Cassation to 
invalidate the fraudulent membership of the MPs. The idea behind Suleiman’s proposal 
was simple: deny any form of revolutionary legitimacy and subject any political demands 
to legalistic and procedural measures set by the regime itself. In other words, it was a 
practical move to contain the upheaval of the revolution. Fortunately enough, the people 
in Tahrir Square were adamant on killing Suleiman’s plan, especially after the Battle of 
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 This third strategy of negotiating for reform was attempted first with political parties and 
some important groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.  Mubarak authorized his VP at the time, 
who was just hired by Mubarak, Omar Soliman, to lead negotiation with opposition groups.149 
The protestors in Tahrir were not properly invited to these talks.150 The talks started and only a 
few youth figures were invited, most of whom later wrote testimonies that they were 
marginalized at the meetings.151  
It is telling also to consider the three speeches Mubarak gave during the 18 days in 
response to the protests: on the evening of January 28, on the evening of February 1, and on the 
evening of February 10, 2011. While he addressed his remarks to the nation in the first two 
speeches, without a single mention of the word “Tahrir,” Mubarak’s third speech invoked Tahrir 
in the first sentence: “In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful, dear citizens, I 
am addressing the youth of Egypt today in Tahrir Square and across the country.” 152 But this 
belated attempt to appeal to the protestors was too late; Mubarak’s third speech was the last time 
he would address the country as the president. 
 The idea of Tahrir as the center of revolutionary legitimacy grew also among the public 
within and beyond Cairo. In many areas in Egypt in general and in Cairo specifically, people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the Camel. Mubarak had to consequently step down in a move that effectively annulled 
the 1971 Constitution. 
149 For Soliman’s talks with opposition, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dp4oWUKkGYQ (last 
accessed June 1, 2014); and for a statement by Soliman about his mandate from Mubarak to talk with the 
opposition, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WrnkbdGVuZQ (last accessed June 1, 2014).  
150 For Soliman’s talks with youth, see: http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=349281#.å 
UzXYRv0RB4M (last accessed June 1, 2014).  
151 Of course the fact that the regime targeted Tahrir and its youth, in attempt to isolate them, and then 
inviting some of the youth to the talks with Mubarak’s VP, Omar Soliman, needs an explanation. My 
guess is that this was simple tactical move to make divisions among the youth. The goal is to show the 
negotiators as good citizens, and those who refuse negotiations as insisting on troublemaking. Ironically 
the youth who met with Soliman were marginalized in his meeting with the political opposition. And they 
had a small very short meeting with him afterword. See Abdel Rahman Youssef’s account of the meeting 
and the marginalization (Youssef 2011: 142–48). 
152 For Mubarak’s last speech, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NbIBXNKMUhs (last accessed 
June 1, 2014).   
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could not walk around without being asked whether or not they were going to Tahrir. At the time 
of the revolution, so-called popular security committees were created in many neighborhoods in 
Cairo and most urban centers in Egypt. The relationship between these committees and Tahrir is 
complex and I discuss this further in the following chapter.  Suffice it to say here that these 
committees established a form of self-rule or, at the very least, security for a number of 
neighborhoods, where the police were lacking, albeit with some coordination with the military. 
Importantly, not all of the committees were necessarily pro-revolution. In such cases, the 
committees created difficulties for many protestors, especially in light of the curfew that went 
into effect on January 28, 2011. For people coming from or going to Tahrir, they would 
inevitably be stopped by one of these committees and asked many questions. One of the most 
common questions was whether or not they were coming from Tahrir. Yet again, the result was a 
form of recognition, performed at checkpoints and on corners throughout Egypt, that  Tahrir was 
the center of action. 
Importantly, Tahrir was not only a sit-in and a symbol, but also a very real and 
strategically effective center of mobilization, given its proximity to all of the major political 
power centers of Egypt.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, the area of Tahrir houses  no less than ten 
ministries, as well as the cabinet and the parliament. There was a constant sense of struggle 
between the regime and the protestors in Tahrir about occupying this space.  For many protestors, 
their successful occupation of Tahrir both symbolized and literally demonstrated their ability to 
shut down the government. Writer Assem El-Qersh conveyed this idea when he wrote: “Who 
occupies Tahrir Square grasps the nation’s neck and controls the rhythm of life. The ruling 
regime cannot afford but to maintain this control. If the regime lost this control, this will be this 
regime’s end” (2012: 123–24). Protestors used this idea to mobilize further, building up a 
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discourse that constructed Tahrir as the revolution and the future of Egypt. This idea was 
common and reflected in banners in Tahrir—just one example: on February 11, 2011, a protestor, 
who was also a lawyer, carried a sign that read: 
This is the Tahrir state, it is based on justice, dignity, liberty and respecting  
diversity. Outside this square is Mubarak’s state, which is based on corruption,  
despotism and humiliation.153 
 
In sum, there was a form of mutual recognition between the regime and Tahrir protestors. 
The regime sought to end the protests by isolating Tahrir, by negotiating with protestors to buy 
time, and by simply trying to crush them with force. But for protestors, the idea that Tahrir was 
the center of the revolution provided a means and an opportunity for further mobilization. To put 
it simply, the regime, the media, neighborhood committees, and the media all contributed to 
create a dichotomy between the regime on the one hand and the revolution on the other; the first 
was reduced to Mubarak and the latter was reduced to Tahrir.  
Perhaps no greater affirmation of Tahrir’s ongoing embodiment of revolutionary 
legitimacy even after the 18 days of the revolution can be found than in the actions of political 
authorities since the ousting of Mubarak. After February 11, SCAF kept Mubarak’s cabinet for a 
few weeks. Protests continued opposing this, and protestors called for a new cabinet, arguing that 
this was the least that SCAF could do to signal real change in Egypt. On March 3, 2011, SCAF 
authorized Essam Sharaf to form and chair a new cabinet. Sharaf is a professor of engineering 
and was a minister under Mubarak, but was viewed favorably as he had joined the protests in 
Tahrir during the 18 days, as part of the faculty rallies that marched to Tahrir on several 
occasions. After calls from some protestors that the new prime minster should take his oath in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Related in Saad (2012: 53). 
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Tahrir, Sharaf went to Tahrir the next day, March 4, and joined protestors who were still 
protesting SCAF rule and calling for real change. Sharaf did not take the oath of office in Tahrir, 
but he did give a speech and told protestors that the legitimacy of his new job was derived from 
the protestors of the revolution and from Tahrir.154 Similarly, when Mohamed Morsi was elected 
President in 2012, on June 29, the day before he officially took office, he went to Tahrir. Morsi 
joined the protestors who were celebrating the first civilian elected president in Egypt, gave a 
speech, and in a hugely significant gesture, he took the oath of office in front of the protestors in 
Tahrir.155 A few months before this, on the first anniversary of the revolution, protestors 
themselves also invoked the memory and ongoing legacy of Tahrir when they mobilized in the 
streets against military rule and widely distributed a leaflet simply titled “The Revolution First 
and Legitimacy for Tahrir.”156   
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I tried to answer two questions. The first is how and why a consensus was 
formed that established (and limited) the demands of the Egyptian revolution to political reform. 
And the second is how and why Tahrir came to embody the voice and legitimacy of the 
revolution. I began by discussing the concept of a reformist revolution and relating it to the 
concept of a “refolution.” I argued that while it is useful to develop  classifications of the 
different types of democratic revolutions, it is also important to understand how a specific type 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2011/03/110303_egyptpm.shtml (last accessed June 1, 
2014).  For Sharaf’s speech in Tahrir, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFH8X_-TxtY (last 
accessed June 1, 2014).  
155 For the text of Morsi’s speech, see: http://marsadpress.net/?p=4860 (last accessed June 1, 2014); and 
for video of the speech, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RWPVCUtpNWw (last accessed June 1, 
2014). Morsi took the oath again later at the Supreme Court.  
156 See this leaflet at: http://www.tahrirdocuments.org/2011/12/the-revolution-first-and-legitimacy-for-
tahrir/ (last accessed June 1, 2014).  
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of revolution is constructed and accepted by the protestors themselves. Also, it is important to 
understand the kind of impact a regime type (whether we call it “personalistic” or “sultanistic” or     
something else) has on the political imagination of protestors. I have suggested in this chapter 
that in Egypt, the very concentration and authoritarianism of Mubarak’s regime created a form 
tunnel vision on the part of otherwise diverse opposition groups, such that coalitions became 
focused on simply getting rid of Mubarak and establishing a set of demands to which the largest 
number of people and groups could agree. Finally, I examined how Tahrir became both seen as 
both the symbol and the site of the revolution’s legitimacy.  In the same way that the objectives 
of the revolution were reduced over time to a relatively generic platform of political reform, so 
too did the revolution itself become reduced, imaginatively and practically, to the symbol and 
space of Tahrir.  As I have sought to highlight in this chapter, critical assessments of this 
development in hindsight must take into account the context at the time, and recognize that this 
focus gave the very idea of Tahrir enormous mobilizing power.  Nonetheless, as I will discuss in 
the following chapter, this concentration of energy within and around Tahrir also had a downside.   
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Figure 15  Two signs hung by protestors during the revolution on the door of the Egyptian 
Parliament. The first sign reads: “This building is closed until the regime would fall. January 25, 
revolutionary youth.” The other sign reads: “Yesterday, it was Tahrir [read being closed or being 
liberated], today is the Parliament, and tomorrow is…….” [in reference to the idea that the 
occupation of Tahrir is expanding its power and the mobilization continues]. The sign was hung 
on February 5, 2011. (Picture by Ara-Bi Website, http://ara.bi/photos/6762/ﻖﻠﻐﻣ-ﻰﺘﺣ-طﻁﺎﻘﺳإﺇ-مﻡﺎﻈﻨﻟاﺍ/) 
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Chapter 5 
 
The Tahrir Effect, Part II: 
On the Margin of the Revolution, On the Margin of Tahrir 
 
 
I am not planning to watch any movie, whose title is “The Square,” without  
specifying that it is talking about Tahrir. I personally started to become  
pessimistic since that moment when some of us have started to drop the word  
“Tahrir” and talk only about the square, as if it is self-identifying. Since that  
moment the main questions [of the revolution] have changed and became: How’s  
the square? And what is the message of the square today? And is the legitimacy 
 from the square or the parliament? And “Oh….the Square.”157 I would argue that 
 this pedophiliaic relation with the “square” was the natural starter to our crisis  
today. I do not want to watch anything that would deepen such “sexual disorder.”  
In truth, I do not miss Tahrir Square, and I do not want to remember it, and I do 
 not want to see anything that reminds me of Tahrir!! 
 
On January 22, 2014, Egyptian activist and scholar Amr Abdel Rahman wrote the above 
as his Facebook status.158 He was commenting on the Tahrir-focused Egyptian Revolution 
documentary The Square (2013), directed by Jehane Noujaim, which was receiving much 
attention and acclaim at the time, but which remained controversial among Egyptian activists and 
bloggers.  Specifically, Abdel Rahman was expressing a certain level of fatigue and frustration 
regarding the attention accorded to Tahrir and the discursive tendency to reduce the events of 
2011 to Tahrir. This idea that the revolution had somehow become limited to Tahrir Square and 
that this had contributed to what some saw as the revolution’s failure was, in fact, a relatively 
new discourse.  During the 18 days of the uprising itself, and also in the immediate aftermath, 
one would have been hard pressed to hear any negative remarks about Tahrir among activists. 
Tahrir was constituted at the time as a remarkably utopian space, a site of intense emotions, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 “Oh the square… “is the title of a famous song made after the January revolution by Aida Al-Ayoubi; 
available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hp6nx7wJRZk (last accessed June 6, 2014).  
158 Quoted here with his permission. 
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optimism, and a sense of profound solidarity. In the months that followed, however, as the post-
Mubarak transition stalled and began to veer in disturbing directions, people began to talk about 
another “side” of Tahrir. In my first round of fieldwork in 2011, which included my own 
ethnographic observations and numerous interviews,  the general attitude was one of admiration 
for and positive feelings regarding Tahrir, with little to no criticism. But by the time I conducted 
my second round of fieldwork and interviews in the summer of 2012, I noticed that many 
informants had begun to speak critically about Tahrir and its effect. The partially longitudinal 
aspect of my research design enabled me to note this variation, which I might otherwise have 
missed or seen at only one stage or another. Ultimately, this complicated and evolving set of 
understandings and expectations regarding Tahrir became the major inspiration for this 
dissertation.  While Abdel Rahman in the quote above was referring to the larger problem of 
Tahrir and its relation not only to the revolution, but also to its aftermath in the years that 
followed, his words serve as a warning to investigate the full extent of the Tahrir effect—its 
positive and negative dimensions—during the time of the revolution itself. The latter is the focus 
of this chapter. 
As noted in the introduction of this dissertation, the main goal of this project is to 
investigate the paradoxical role of Tahrir Square in the Egyptian revolution. By paradoxical role, 
I am referring to the way in which, on the one hand, Tahrir Square came to represent the central 
voice of the revolution—a fact that amplified this voice, garnered it unprecedented domestic and 
international attention, and assisted in mobilization—but also how, on the other hand, this 
centralization of the revolution in one place and in one set of demands simultaneously 
marginalized other voices and other, sometimes more radical, forms of mobilization. In Chapter 
3, I analyzed how Tahrir sit-in became the central mode of action of the revolution. And in 
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Chapter 4, I investigated how Tahrir became the main voice of the revolution, and an 
embodiment of revolutionary legitimacy. In this chapter, I analyze the other side of the 
paradoxical impact of Tahrir on the revolution, specifically how some possibilities outside Tahrir 
were obscured and/or truncated in ways that left their true potential unknown, and how some 
voices within Tahrir itself were marginalized. The discussion in this chapter focuses specifically 
on the 18 days of the revolution, though I do discuss some examples from events that happened 
afterwards for elaboration, when needed.    
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I discuss two main modes 
of action that took place outside Tahrir Square that presented promising revolutionary 
possibilities, but which were not fully elaborated as a result of the centralization of attention and 
energy around Tahrir. These two modes of action are the popular committees, which were 
formed to protect neighborhoods in urban centers throughout the country, and working class 
strikes that took place in the three days before the ousting of Mubarak.  In the second section, I 
investigate those voices and issues that were present, yet variously de-prioritized or silenced 
within Tahrir. Finally, I end the chapter with some theoretical reflections on how to understand 
this phenomenon of marginalization, or what I describe as the making of a revolutionary 
boundary. Unlike previous chapters, I focus first on simply presenting the data—an intervention 
in itself, insofar as empirical analyses of the revolution have replicated the narrow focus on 
Tahrir; then, at the end of the chapter, I elaborate a framework for thinking about marginalization 
and social movements more generally. A spatial analysis, I argue, provides both methodological 
and theoretical tools for understanding how social movements and revolutions are constituted as 
such, as well as who and what are left out of this process.   
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I. The Road Untraveled: Possibilities Beyond Tahrir 
 
 
Before talking about possibilities outside Tahrir Square, it is useful to briefly describe 
what was going on in Egypt outside of Tahrir and outside of Cairo in January and February 2011.  
It is very difficult to describe things accurately during this period, because so much was 
changing from one day to the next, in terms of mobilization and in terms of the regime crisis. To 
recap in general: Mass protests arose on January 25, 2011, with people mobilizing around a 
number of issues, but the main goal was calling for democracy. Prior to January 25, protestors 
did not explicitly call for a regime change, but rather, protested mainly against corruption and 
police brutality. With Mubarak’s refusal to offer concessions and then the deployment of 
violence against protestors, demands shifted to the downfall of the regime and continued until 
Mubarak’s ousting on February 11, 2011. Below, I provide a more detailed version of this 
narrative that focuses on mobilization and protests; in it, I highlight important temporal markers, 
as well as note significant spatial dynamics and things going on outside of Tahrir.  
1) On January 25, 2011, mass rallies took place in most major urban centers—not 
only in Cairo near Tahrir Square, but also in Alexandria, Canal Suez cities, and 
Nile Delta cities. 
 
 2) On January 26 and 27, 2011, scattered rallies took place in Cairo, especially in 
 the downtown area. At the same time, heated battles took place on the 26 and 27 
 January in Suez, resulting in the deaths of some protestors.  As my informants 
 affirmed, this latter event was temporally significant because it angered and,  
 consequently, energized protestors nationwide.  
 
 3) On January 28, 2011, even bigger rallies took place in most urban centers in 
 Egypt.  These rallies ended with some very important battles between protestors 
 and police, in which the latter used live ammunition and violence. These battles 
 were extremely significant as they demonstrated the protestors’ resilience and 
 ability, despite intense violence, to defeat the police. Both “sides” began to sense 
 that Mubarak could no longer simply crush protesters—in other words the regime 
 lost its significant coercive force.  
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 Mubarak thus deployed the army instead—a move seen as a “last resort.”  On the 
 ground, this meant an increase in military presence on the streets, but at the same 
 time, urban riots and looting began to spread. On the night of January 28, people 
 in various locales formed the popular committees, which I will discuss later in this 
 chapter. On that night, several riots also included attacks on government centers  
 of power. 
 
4) On February 1,  2011, the first million-person rally159 took place in Cairo and  
rallies generally increased throughout the country.  The one in Cairo soon became 
the largest and most visible, however; the Cairo rally ended in Tahrir.   
 
5) On February 2, 2011, the so-called Camel Battle took place. This was an  
attack of pro-Mubarak militia on Tahrir Square. This was an important temporal  
and spatial marker. Protestors succeeded in protecting Tahrir Square, while the  
army was forced to appear neutral. Spatially, the attack served to focus energy  
and attention on protecting the sit-in in Tahrir; symbolically, the attack increased  
both popular sympathy for the sit-in and critiques of the regime. Although  
spatially focused in Tahrir Square, the defeat of Mubarak's militia gave more 
 energy to the revolution elsewhere and sent a signal regarding the failure of  
Mubarak’s legitimacy.  
 
6) On February 4, 2011, the second million-person rally took place in Cairo. This was  
larger, stronger, and even more successful than the first.  Bigger rallies took place  
throughout the country, especially in main urban centers. What happened in the Camel 
 Battle two days earlier compelled even more ordinary people (more critical mass) to join  
the protests.  
 
7) On February 6, 2011, the government ordered state employees to go back to  
work (this had ceased after the events of January 28, 2011), in an effort to force  
things “back to normal.” Instead, working class started strikes were launched in   
many parts of Cairo and in other important urban centers. 
 
8) On February 9, 2011, the Egyptian working class expanded their strikes to  
include key strategic sectors such as the Suez Canal, railway, public  
transportation, and telecommunication workers. 
 
9) On February 10, 2011, the military began to distance itself from Mubarak in a  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 As noted in Chapter 3, in Egypt, the term “rallies” is used to describe mobile protests or marches, in 
which participants begin at one location and protest while marching towards and ending at another 
strategic and/or symbolic location.  
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statement.  
 
10) On February 10 and 11, protesters make plans to march to the presidential  
palace, and working class strikes escalated. 
 
 11) On the afternoon of February 11, 2011, Mubarak steps down and transfers  
power to the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). 
But what about life in general in Egypt during this time?  How did all of the above play out on 
the ground?  How did it shape the texture and tone of people’s everyday lives? This is also 
difficult also to capture, but I can share from my own experience in Cairo, at least after February 
4, 2011, and from my many conversations with my friends and informants. Despite media efforts 
to downplay the protests in the first two days, people were talking about the protests every day 
and everywhere. As events escalated, the protests and news about Tahrir became the center of 
attention. Much of the news coverage was hostile to the protests and people became increasingly 
anxious and worried about the future. Society became sharply politicized as media-fuelled 
rumors circulated everywhere, via conversations, cab drivers, cafes, and families, that the 
protestors were foreigners and spies simply attempting to destabilize the country. Soon, broad 
sides  emerged with those in favor of Mubarak and stability, and those in favor of revolution and 
change on either side of a broad middle that wanted to remain neutral and uninvolved. On the 
afternoon of January 28, 2011, army checkpoints were established  everywhere. People became 
concerned to protect their homes. One of the common themes of discussion was when or whether 
people could return to work or when banks would reopen, as many people were worried about 
not having cash. Another common theme of discussion was stock market news, as the 
government media blamed stock market losses on the uprisings. Reactions to this varied, to some 
extent, according to class.  Some people were sympathetic with news about poor or urban riots, 
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while others were not. Other people were hostile to the revolution and Tahrir, until violence 
escalated, at which point they started to become sympathetic with protestors.  
This is the general picture of life in Cairo, outside Tahrir Square. Drawing on both 
archival research and interviews, I have identified what I describe as four “revolutionary 
possibilities” beyond Tahrir—meaning, any organized or unorganized modes of protest or 
rebellion or action in general that spread at the time against the government or ruling elite, 
irrespective of their outcome. These are: 1) the battles in Suez between protestors,  police, and 
the ruling party militia, which took place on January 26 and 27, 2011; 2) poor and urban riots 
that took place in various places in Egypt, such as the Nile Delta, upper Egypt, and some Suez 
Canal cities; 3) the formation and operation of popular committees in Cairo and most urban 
centers from the night of January 28, 2011 onward; and 4) working class strikes that started on 
February 6 and lasted until the ousting Mubarak160 (they also continued after the revolution for a 
while). 
My focus in this section is on the last two: the neighborhood popular committees and the 
working class strikes. There are two reasons for this. The first is that these two modes of actions 
took organized forms involving large sectors of the population (Egyptians from a wide range of 
classes in urban centers in the case of popular committees, and workers in the case of strikes). 
The organization of these groups carried, I argue, potential for further radicalization. The second 
reason is that these two modes of action lasted for a while, and played an important role in 
ousting Mubarak, despite the focus on Tahrir in ousting Mubarak.  As I will discuss below, 
popular committees secured people’s neighborhoods and homes at a time when the state simply 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Some actually continued after this, as I will discuss below, but the primary focus is on the strikes and 
their effects leading up to February 11.Also in addition to the four modes of actions stated above, there 
were some scattered and small protests in southern Egypt, as I discussed earlier in the introduction. I do 
not discuss these further because they did not build sufficient momentum to develop further. 
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was not present in the streets (or to be accurate the state was partially present in the form of the 
army, which ended up distancing itself from Mubarak). And working class strikes were crucial in 
putting strong political and economic pressure on the ruling regimes, especially when the strikes 
targeted key locations and industries that bring in revenue for the state.   
 But, first, a brief note about the first two possibilities.  The first is the battles in Suez. 
Protests started in Suez on January 25, as in many other places in Egypt. And while the police 
did not use violence in most cases all over Egypt (until the end of the day in Tahrir), in Suez, 
police forces, joined by some of the ruling party militia, attacked and killed protestors, sparking 
huge riots in the city. Protestors concentrated in Arbeeen Square, demanding to receive the 
bodies of their dead, but the police prevented families from receiving the corpses of the dead, 
causing more anger. The entire city was more or less in a riot. In sum, the violence started in 
Suez and the first so-called martyrs of the revolution fell there. Riots and protests escalated over 
the next two days, and the city was not calm until the army was deployed on January 28, 2011. It 
was one of the earliest places where the army was deployed (as in some important places in 
Cairo). Though things calmed down after this, rallies continued throughout the revolution.161  
As for the cases of poor or urban riots, these took place mostly on January 28, in the 
context or alongside battles between police and protestors, when some protestors and ordinary 
citizens started to attack certain centers of the government. Similar to the burning of the ruling 
party’s headquarters in the Tahrir area, protestors and ordinary citizens burned some governorate 
offices, ruling party offices, and police stations in places outside Cairo. Some of the governorate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 For more about the battles in Suez, see: http://www.gemyhood.com/2011/04/3.html?utm_term=%23 
Genyhood&utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter (last accessed June 6, 2016) and 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WemMEqvG9u4 (last accessed June 6, 2016).  
 
 
	  203	  
	  
buildings that were burned were in Port Said, Alexandria, and Kafr Al-Skeikh in the Nile Delta; 
a few court buildings were also burned in Cairo and Alexandria. At the same time, some poor 
people and ordinary citizens attacked and looted some big department stores, most notably stores 
owned by the French multinational retailer, Carrefour. This  took place in different areas in Cairo, 
but also in Alexandria. It was in response to this kind of lack of security that popular committees 
formed, after which looting stopped and the burning of government sites also reduced after the 
deployment of the army in the streets.162  I include the incidents in Suez and the phenomenon of 
poor/urban riots as instances of mobilization and protest outside of Tahrir and which constituted, 
at the time, other directions and spaces in which the revolution could have developed—but 
which, ultimately, faded from view and/or did not develop further. Before discussing these two 
modes of action, however, it is useful first to talk about what the military’s presence on the 
ground meant for protestors. 
 Discussing the role of the military in the Egyptian Revolution goes beyond this 
dissertation. But what is important here is how military intervention affected the course of events 
on the ground. Some scholarship as well as media coverage at the time would note simply that 
the military sided with the Egyptian protestors (see for example Barany 2011). My ethnographic 
and documentary work, however, suggests that this vision is far from accurate.  I divide the 
military’s role during the 18 days of revolution into three stages. The first stage is from January 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 See the following sources and links about these incidents: regarding the protests in Alexandria, see: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5u4m-_Po2U0; and see here documented videos of the burned ruling 
party in Egypt at the time in difference places, outside Cairo: http://arabic.rt.com/news/62337-
كﻙرﺭﺎﺒﻣ_ضﺽﺮﻔﯾﻳ_ﺮﻈﺣ_لﻝﻮﺠﺘﻟاﺍ_ﻲﻓ_ﻊﯿﻴﻤﺟ_تﺕﺎﻈﻓﺎﺤﻤﻟاﺍ_ﺔﯾﻳﺮﺼﻤﻟاﺍ/; regarding the burning of police stations by both 
protestors and the police themselves, see http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/193671; regarding 
the burning of court buildings, see: http://www.masress.com/almessa/13350; regarding the burning of the 
Dekhyla court complex in Alexandria, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f41ucaYDZbk; and regarding 
the burning of a Carrefour store in Alexandria, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dgNhSQu_7O4 
(all links last accessed June 6, 2014). 
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28 to February 2, the second stage is from February 3 to February 10 and the third stage is from 
February 10 to February 11, 2011. In the first stage, the army intervened in Egyptian streets 
based on orders from Mubarak to assist the police and restore order. The army assisted the police, 
and after the withdrawal of police, the army took over the main police/coercive force in Egypt. In 
some cases, the army even assisted the police by providing them with weapons in Tahrir, 
something confirmed by many eye witnesses there. During this stage, the army forces near Tahrir 
also prevented food and tents and medical supplies from reaching the square. It would be 
inaccurate, then, to say that the army was neutral at this point; rather, it was still operating in 
accordance with and according to the orders of the regime.  
 February 2, 2011 represents a turning point. On this day, pro-Mubarak thugs and armed 
police and militia came to attack protestors in Tahrir. Army forces were present in Tahrir, but did 
not intervene to prevent the attacks on protestors. Indeed, only one officer violated orders and 
intervened to help protestors by shooting in the air to scare the militia. The incident forced 
protestors to develop their own security system to protect the square. The incident also 
highlighted for protestors the army’s complicity with the regime, but simultaneously prompted 
increased effort on the army’s part to appear neutral. It was this effort to appear neutral that, I 
argue, defines the second stage. During this period, the army was not hostile to Tahrir and 
allowed food and tents to enter the square.  
 The third stage included the last two days of the revolution (understood here as the 18 
days). The army did not make a statement until February 10, one day before the ousting of 
Mubarak.  And only then did the army acknowledge the demands of the Egyptian protestors and, 
I argue, it was thus only during this stage that we can see the army actually distancing itself from 
Mubarak.  
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 In other words, to say simply that the “military sided with protestors” is an extremely 
generous reading, if not totally inaccurate. I would counter that the military would have liked to 
control events, but could not. In the simplest terms, it had guns on its side and thus it retained the 
upper hand in terms of literally policing the situation. But far from facilitating the protestors’ 
revolutionary agenda, the military merely replaced the regime and to the extent that it shared 
power with the protestors, it did so only when it couldn’t avoid doing otherwise.   
How protestors themselves saw the role of the military at the time, however, is more 
complicated. Many saw the army presence as a good thing, symbolic of the extent to which  
Mubarak and his police force were incapable of controlling the situation. The army presence in 
the streets embodied an escalation of events in some sense. When I talked to protestors at the 
time, they told me the army was like a black box. They did not know what to expect from it, and 
they worried about what role it would assume in both the revolution and the future of Egypt. But 
at the same time, they preferred not to chant against the army so as not to antagonize it while 
events were still uncertain and unfolding. Some protestors came up with a famous slogan 
designed to neutralize the army at the time: “The people and the army are one hand” (Kitchley 
2014). Others protestors put graffiti on army tanks, writing things like “Fuck Mubarak” or “down 
with Mubarak” in order to send a message to the army that the protestors’ battle was specifically 
focused on the army’s commander in chief and his regime. A leading blogger, Wael Khalil, told 
me in an interview on April 5, 2011, that “ it is this mix of feelings/actions toward the army that 
sums it up: on the one hand we have chanted ‘the people and the army are one hand,’ and on the 
other, protestors decided to sleep under tanks and block them from encroaching on the square or 
dispersing the Tahrir sit-in.” This complex sentiment concerns primarily the protestors in Tahrir. 
But for protestors and populations outside Tahrir, at least in the popular committees which I will 
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discuss in further detail later in this chapter, people tended to cooperate with the military. The 
military for them was the main coercive force in Egypt. I will move now to the discussing the 
popular committees and labor strikes.  
 
Popular Committees 
 
In this section, I discuss the first important revolutionary possibility outside of Tahrir, 
namely the popular committees. As I will show, despite the fact that these  committees 
constituted an important form of mobilization, through which ordinary people seized the 
normally state-controlled domain of policing in the streets, they did not, ultimately, shift 
sufficient attention or energy away from the sit-in in Tahrir.  I discussed the spontaneous 
formation of these popular committees (legan shaabiyya) briefly in Chapter 4. The committees 
were formed in many neighborhoods in most urban centers in Egypt. Their general purpose was 
protection—something much needed given the security vacuum that had developed. This 
vacuum occurred due to the following reasons. Most of the police force was focused on 
attempting to crush protests; significant portions of the force were involved in major battles with 
protestors especially in Tahrir and in other major urban centers areas, with the most important of 
these battles taking place on the afternoon of January 28, 2011. These battles ended with what 
seemed to be a major defeat of police forces, due to police exhaustion and the mass numbers of 
protestors. Meanwhile, police stations and streets throughout Egypt were left unattended. There 
was evidence, too, that many prisons were left unattended (or according to the police narrative, 
stormed by people). Rumors circulated that convicts had escaped the prisons and were roaming 
the streets of many urban centers in Egypt. This major withdrawal of police, as well as the news 
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about escaped convicts, motivated people to form committees to protect themselves and their 
homes.163  
In an interview with Ahmed Ezzat, one of the organizers in Tahrir and also one who 
worked to coordinate the popular committees in Cairo and nationally, he stated: 
The security vacuum may not only or simply be a plot. But it is a fact that  
the entire police apparatus did focus on the protests that time. And on  
January 28, 2011, there was a major battle with protestors. The battle end  
up with sort of a major defeat for police in the streets in the battle with  
protestors. Police defeat end up with a major withdrawal of police force  
from most streets in Egypt. If most of the police force was centered around  
protests, and the entire police apparatus was organized around the goal of 
ending protests, and then there defeat affected the entire network and  
communication. Police force simply lost directions and were clueless  
about what to do. I do not deny the plot. I am just saying that police was  
defeated and withdraw due to the heroic actions of protestors too.164  
  
The members of popular committees armed themselves with guns, sticks, and whatever else was 
at hand, as they stood at night in their street to protect their neighborhoods. The committees 
established checkpoints everywhere and used barricades to control the entrances of streets and 
control the flow of traffic (people walking and driving cars). When deemed necessary, the 
committees arrested people and sent them to the army to be dealt with. At the time, there were 
many reported incidents of looting and also burglary. I, myself, participated in one of these 
committees in one of the neighborhoods in Al-Nozha al-Gadida (Near Cairo Airport). Ahmed 
Ezzat further explained the role and significance of these committees:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Some speculated that, in fact, the mass police withdrawal and lack of security at the jails were all part 
of a Ministry of Interior plan to combat the protests, with the goal being to scare people and make them 
end the protests and go home; see http://www.masress.com/kelmetna/10331 (last accessed June 6, 2014). 
For footage of the jails and people escaping, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bxSHvOJVzpg (last 
accessed June 6, 2014). The narrative offered by the regime and state intelligence was that infiltrators and 
members of Hamas got into Egypt and attacked the jails in order to release prisoners, especially  Islamists. 
The question how jails were opened and/or who was responsible became one of the mysteries in the 
Egyptian revolution. 
 
164 Interview, November 29, 2012.  
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After we organized ourselves in Tahrir, we realized the significance and the need 
 of protection beyond Tahrir. Then, we started to organize ourselves in Tahrir and   
asked protesters to go to neighborhoods, specially those are in touch with or have  
networks there or if they do live there, and talk to them. These were groups of 2 
 and or 3 did go to these neighborhoods. We learned that committees were made  
fast in ard alliwaa, almatariya, roud alfarag, ain chams, almarg, helwan. And  
then the idea spread to many other areas. The independent media caught the idea  
and started to circulate it widely after the media showed images of people  
protecting their areas.  This was a revolutionary moment; ideas and initiatives  
were spreading like fire. People were empowered and they were the authority.  
They stopped cars and looked at licenses. They inspected cars and look at the IDs  
of strangers, especially whom they think not from the neighborhood. And when  
random people attack the checkpoint, the committee reacted with violence, or  
another committee intervened in solidarity or then they arrested the people and  
gave them to military, which was dispersed at the time. 
 
On February 1, 2012, Al-Ahram newspaper published testimonies from people who 
participated in these popular committees in 2011.165 For example, one person, whose name is 
Mohamed Emam, stated: 
These were great days. In the committee, I have learned responsibility. I  
felt like I am responsible on my entire district (Abbasyya). I have made  
many friends in the committees. My father owns a Taxi. We used to drive  
the taxi and go around from one committee to another and to exchange  
information and supervise things in the neighborhood. Yes we have  
arrested many thugs. We had the power to arrest anyone, and we were  
capable of arresting poorest or the richest person (al-ghafeeer wa-al  
wazeer, literally the door man and the minister). 
 
When I was on one of these committees, I have heard many stories of committees in other, 
nearby communities actually arresting police personnel.  At the time, police personnel were 
hiding and not wearing their uniforms in the streets. There was no proper documentation of these 
cases, but there are a few cases where members of committees were filmed stopping, inspecting, 
and/or arresting police.166  In many locales, the committees were extremely organized, not only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Available at: http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=796179&eid=1187 (last accessed June 6, 
2014).  
166 See, for example, the following videos posted on YouTube: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFcgEz8dQds (last accessed June 6, 2014); 
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establishing networks of communication, but also dividing the city into numbered districts.  Of 
course, there were also cases in which the committee members abused power, or used it to enact 
revenge on the police. Ahmed Ezzat conceded, “Yes, this happened and it was impossible to 
control things in this chaotic situation.”  
 Perhaps the greatest evidence of the committees’ significance and revolutionary potential 
is the fact that after Mubarak’s ouster, both “revolutionaries” and state officials rushed to try to 
work with the committees—whether to further radicalize them, in the case of the former, or to 
co-opt them, in the case of the latter. After ousting Mubarak, and to overcome the lack of proper 
connectivity between these committees, socialist activists and revolutionary youth tried to form a 
national network for these committees. They held a national gathering in Tahrir where many 
people from within and outside of Cairo gathered and re-formed the committees under the name 
“The Popular Committees to Defend the Revolution.”167 Ahmed Ezzat, my informant, was one of 
the key activists who worked on this effort.  
 The state and the police tried to use a double strategy after ousting Mubarak. On the one 
hand, they tried to push some of these committees (or committees comprised of state informants) 
to use more aggressive measures and abuse their power, in an effort to increase people’s fear of 
such committees and turn the public against them. On the other hand, they disseminated a 
discourse that referred repeatedly to the committees as militias and criminals (a strategy offset by 
media coverage during the revolution that was actually quite positive, portraying the committees 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d8yL9eyCQgY (last accessed June 6, 2014); and 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEoxxtd2TJE (last accessed June 6, 2014).  
167 See the web page of the national popular committee at: http://leganthawrya.blogspot.com (last 
accessed June 6, 2014);  also, see this discussion of the emergence and role of popular committees, 
available at: https://revolutionaryfrontlines.wordpress.com/2011/07/04/egypt-a-report-on-the-emergence-
and-role-of-popular-committees/ (last accessed June 6, 2014).  
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as great protectors of Egypt, not unlike the much vaunted army).168  Some funding agencies saw 
the committees as an opportunity to build a culture of civic engagement in Egypt and tried to 
find ways to fund them, though some activists worried that such funding might lead to the 
committees co-optation and corruption.169  
 The popular committees thus constitute one of the most important forms of mobilization 
during the revolution with significant potential for further politicization and radicalization. This 
was for two main reasons. First, they were fundamentally democratic in nature, formed 
spontaneously without hierarchy. They were like small communities or congresses that gathered 
to talk about politics every day, especially at night. I remember participating in many such 
discussions, devoted to topics such as the news update of the day, how we saw the revolution, 
and what Egypt would be like with or without Mubarak. Second, these committees exercised a 
form of collective authority. I am not speculating here; rather, I am analyzing a case of actual 
power practiced on the ground. As an outcome of the lack of security in Egyptian streets, the 
committees claimed power. They had the authority to stop “strange” people in the streets and in 
neighborhoods. They also targeted and arrested police officers and personnel—many of whom 
were in hiding, embarrassed by what was seen by many as the police’s great betrayal of the 
Egyptian people (when they left most areas unattended without protection). And in terms of their 
own operations, the committees developed a coordinated form of power that increasingly 
resembled and took responsibility for the operations of the state itself. Members of the 
committees volunteered to organize traffic in Egypt. They developed a system of checkpoints, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 See here a police general referring to the members of such committees as criminals and militia: 
http://www.alwaqe.com/news-action-show-id-11390.htm (last accessed June 6, 2014).  
169 For a particularly good discussion of the committees and the transformation of some into NGOs, see 
this report by El-Meehy (2012) in the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP): 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer265/egypts-popular-committees (last accessed June 6, 2014).  
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passwords, and walkie talkies. In many ways, one could say that state power was divided at the 
time between the army (which was dispersed in the streets) and these popular neighborhood 
committees. 
If we agree that policing in general (and especially during a time of unrest) is a crucial 
component of state authority and one of the most important issues related to state power, then 
these committees represented a major opportunity for the revolution—an opportunity that could 
have led to a much more decentralized form of revolutionary power outside of Tahrir. It is 
important to note here, however, that not all the committees were necessarily pro-revolution. 
Indeed, I argue that one of the main factors limited the  further development and radicalization of 
these committees was their ambivalent relationship with the revolution (and with Tahrir). In the 
committee in which I participated, the members did not think of themselves as part of the 
revolution. They told me: we are here just to protect our homes. But Ahmed Ezzat and many 
other informants told me that some of the committees were more radical than others. Overall, the 
common denominator that united the committees was not any particular political stance, but 
anger towards the police.  This ambiguity regarding the committees’ positions vis-à-vis the 
revolution meant that encounters between committees and protestors were often tense. I heard 
testimonies from many friends at the time and protestors in Tahrir about being stopped by these 
committees.  They all said it was a difficult experience to be stopped at the checkpoints of the 
committees, for one never knew whether the committee was sympathetic with the revolution or 
not. This was an intense experience, especially in light of the political polarization and the 
dissemination of negative propaganda against the protests in Tahrir. At the checkpoints, people 
were asked “Are you coming from or headed to Tahrir?”  Protestors and friends told me, we had 
to look the committee and make our judgment and figure out what would be the safe answer. In 
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sum, popular committees were so important that they constituted an alternative to state power in 
the streets, and/or could be seen as sharing power with the military.  But even though many 
committees became more sympathetic towards the revolution as events escalated and attacks 
against Tahrir continued, those involved simply didn’t see themselves as part of, let alone 
representatives of, the revolution.  They kept their distance from the revolution and this a limit 
on their role in the events.  
Here, it is important to consider how these committees related to Trotsky’s concept of 
dual power. Dual power refers to a situation in which revolutionaries establish institutions that 
perform the same functions as the government. In The History of the Russian Revolution ([1932] 
2013), Trotsky discussed this concept in reference to the period when the Provisional 
Government was in power, while the Soviets, the assemblies created by the Bolsheviks started to 
do some works of the government, at least started to claim representation of all working classes 
in Russia during the revolution, which comprised the major bulks of revolutionaries (Trotsky 
[1932] 2013: 259–69). Trotsky was clear that dual power does not mean that the two competing 
powers are equal at the time, or represent a formal equilibrium. He stated: 
This double sovereignty does not presuppose—generally speaking,  
indeed, it excludes—the possibility of a division of the power into two  
equal halves, or indeed any formal equilibrium of forces whatever. It is not  
constitutional, but a revolutionary fact. It implies that a destruction of the  
social equilibrium has already split the state superstructure. It arises where  
the hostile classes are already each relying upon essentially incompatible  
governmental organizations—the one-outlived, the other at every step in  
the sphere of government. The amount of power which falls to each of  
these struggling classes in such a situation, is determined by the  
correlation of forces in the course of the struggle.  (Trotsky [1932] 2013: 261) 
 
One could certainly argue that the popular committees in Egypt represented a form of dual power 
in Trotsky’s sense, given that they were like true parliaments in the streets and also had arrest 
powers. To be most accurate, they shared power with the military in the streets. The question 
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here is how to reconcile this with the fact that it was Tahrir and the sit-in there that was seen as 
the embodiment of revolutionary legitimacy—and that the committees had, at best, an 
ambivalent relationship with Tahrir. The point is not to try to determine whether Tahrir or the 
popular committees had greater power; rather, the point is to consider the nature of the power of 
each and its potential impact on the revolution at the time. The popular committees were 
grassroots organizing efforts that actually claimed state power (and perhaps created an 
alternative state, in the form of organizing efforts and constituting a form of grassroots 
democracy). But Tahrir represented the voice of the revolution and, as such, specifically 
challenged the authority of the regime. To put it simply, while the committees claimed and 
practiced power on the ground, their participants did not articulate themselves as claiming this 
power or in any way representing the revolution.170  The protestors in Tahrir, on the other hand, 
effectively practiced power on the ground in a much smaller area (the Tahrir sit-in), but 
articulated their role and power as representative of the entire revolution. Ultimately, the 
ambivalent relationship between the two modes of action prevented further coordination that 
may have led to greater radicalization and power for both.171  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 I am using here the term articulation in a general sense, that protestors talked explicitly about being the 
power of Tahrir and the central representatives of the revolution. For more on the concept of articulation 
in cultural studies, see Slack (1996). This also overlaps with another important question regarding 
whether this articulation presented a social narrative about power and liberation. There is some indication 
of this, as discussed in chapter 2, when protestors simply said that Tahrir is liberation and they lived 
liberation. But social narrative is a complex body of representation and a discussion of this goes beyond 
my research here; see Steinmetz (1992).  
171 As for how to reconcile the idea of dual power with the idea of revolutionary legitimacy, this perhaps 
goes beyond this research. I would note that the two concepts  have some similarities. Both are relational: 
revolutionary legitimacy implicitly suggests an old legitimacy, which is not revolutionary and may be in 
crisis. The same goes with dual power, which assumes that there are two power contenders in the time of 
revolution. At the risk of simplification, and despite this similarity, it seems to me that the main 
difference between the two is that the idea of dual power is temporally limited to a specific moment in the 
revolutionary situation, during which two competing claims over power and/or the state are present. The 
idea of revolutionary legitimacy, in contrast, may last for a while, even during the transition in a post-
revolutionary situation. Importantly, much confusion can probably be traced to the fact that Trotsky 
himself did not actually use the word power as such, because the term he used did not have an equivalent 
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Working Class Strikes  
When analysts address the role of the Egyptian working class in the revolution, the 
discussion mostly focuses on the role of labor strikes in the years leading up to the revolution—
primarily from 2006 onward—and the constant labor sit-ins in Cairo and near Tahrir, as well as 
the Mahala uprising in 2008. And to be sure, these events and actions are important. As put by 
Haitham Mohamadeen, a socialist lawyer and labor organizer: “To argue that the Egyptian 
revolution has nothing to do with workers is obsolete. Let us just remember Mahala strikes in 
2007 and the failed strike of 2008 that turned into an entire city riot. The latter was a true 
rehearsal for the revolution.”172 But the role of labor during in the 18 days of the revolution itself 
is understudied. Labor was far from absent during these days. As I will argue in this section, the 
working class joined the protests and their role was significant in ending Mubarak’s rule. First, 
however, it is useful to review some basic information about the Egyptian working class. 
An organized Egyptian working developed in the nineteenth century. In 1899, Egypt 
witnessed the first strike by tobacco workers. Afterwards, labor played a prominent role in 
protests against British occupation in 1919 (El-Merghany 2009).173 According to unionist and 
labor analyst Elhamy El-Merghany, Egypt had 21.7 million workers in 2007. Divided by the type 
of ownership of the sector, 48% of those workers were in the private sector, 46% worked in the 
government, and 2 % and 1% worked in investment and cooperative sectors, respectively. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in English. As noted by Max Eastman, translator of The History of Russian Revolution, “dual power is the 
phrase settled upon in communist literature as the English rendering of dvevlastie.  The term is 
untranslatable both because of its form—twin-powerdom—and because the stem, vlast means sovereignty 
as well as power. Vlast is also used as an equivalent of government, and in the plural corresponds to our 
phrase the authorities. In view of this, I have employed some other terms besides dual power: double 
sovereignty, two-power regime, etc.” (Trotsky 2013, Translator’s Note, p. 259). 
172 Interview, December 18, 2012.  
173 http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=176711 (last accessed June 6, 2014).  
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government has about 5.4 million workers, 2.7 million of which are in urban centers and 2.6 
million of which are in rural Egypt. 69% of those are males and 31% are females. And divided 
by the activity of the sector,  32% of workers in Egypt work in the agriculture and fishing sectors, 
13% are in the mining sector, 11% are  in small businesses, 10% are in construction and 
education, 7% are in communication and transportations, 5% are in service sector,  3% in health 
and social work, and 2 % are in hotels and restaurants (El-Merghany 2009). Only about a quarter 
of this labor force is organized in unions. Most of the organized workers have been part of a one-
union-per-sector policy, which was applied since Nasser’s time in 1959. The result was a very 
hierarchical union system, on the top of which sits what is known as Egypt’s Trade Union 
Federation (ETUF). This body became essentially a front under Mubarak, with most of the 
leaders being part of the Mubarak’s ruling party. Only in December 2007, did Egypt see the birth 
of its first independent trade union not part of the ETUF, following an eleven-day strike in 
December 2007 by tax collectors.174 In the strike, fifty-five thousand workers participated and 
the strike led to a 90% drop in tax collection. The Independent Union of Tax collectors has 29 
offices in Egypt, and has more than 3000 members.175 The union gave birth later to a new 
movement for independent unions after the revolution. The Mahala uprising in 2008 and the tax 
collectors union in 2007 were two major turning points in labor history before the revolution. 
While industrial labor still composes the significant chunk of striking labor against neo-liberal 
policies in Egypt in the years before the revolution, Egypt witnessed an increase in the 
participation and role of state employees, best exemplified by the tax collectors.  And while most 
analyses focus on the years 2006 to 2008 as a peak for worker’s protest in Egypt, the truth is that 
these protests did not stop at all. According to a report by two organizations in Egypt (The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174  See http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=83054 (last accessed June 6, 2014).  
175 http://www.ctuws.com/labour_movements/?item=394 (last accessed June 6, 2014).  
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Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights, and the Awlad Al-Ard Center for Human 
Rights), the year 2010 was a crucial one for labor protests, with workers’ actions serving as a 
“prelude to the revolution.”  That year alone witnessed, for example, 209 labor sit-ins, 135 
strikes, 80 demonstrations, 83 stand-ins, 23 unplanned rallies, 52 workers committing suicide 
protesting economic hardships, over 6,000 workers injured in labor sites, and about over 40,000 
workers compelled to resign from their jobs.176 
Looking at the role of the Egyptian working class during the 18 days of the revolution, 
one can divide it into two main stages. In the first phase, from January 25, 2011 to February 5 
(though there is some debates about this end-point), many workers participated in the in the 
revolution as protestors, but not as an organized force per se. In the second stage, workers joined 
the revolution as an organized force, with many critical sectors staging action in support of the 
revolution. Mustafa Bassiouni, a socialist activist and labor organizer, explained to me why 
workers’ participation was not as visible during the early days of the revolution:  
Labor action did not stop throughout the 18 days. It just was not visible  
until the final days before ousting Mubarak. Workers came to Tahrir and  
participated in rallies. They could not do action for two reasons. The first 
reason is that many jobs were closed for security purposes, especially  
government employees, where Mubarak regime ordered closing of  
government buildings and they paid workers. They assumed that this  
would impact negatively protests, as to reduce workers interaction with  
protests, and also reduce their chances of participation. Government works  
are significant number of work force in Egypt. Then there was no  
government works simply. In that context, when there is no work,  
workers simply cannot go to work and then strike (in a work that is  
already closed). This does not make sense. And the second reason was the  
curfew, which was imposed by the military since January 28, 2011. The  
curfew made movements is limited only to limited hours in the day. This  
limited their ability to organize in these days, until February 6th when jobs  
and banks were opened again. During that time, workers just participated in 
 rallies and in Tahrir.177  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 See the website of the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights: http://ecesr.org/?p=2967 (last 
accessed June 6, 2014).  
177 Phone interview, February 28, 2014.  
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Haytham Mohamadeen, another labor organizer, also spoke about this relationship between 
workers and the events in Tahrir:  
If you remember, the leaders of the official union participated in camel  
battle on February 2, 2011. But and the numbers were funny, it was only  
the thugs and corrupt unionists. But the workers boycotted this, as they do  
not feel to belong to the official union. When the government’s decided to  
open government works on February 4, 2011 their  plan was to bring [so  
they think] the society back to normal life. And they intended to isolate Tahrir.  
The prime minister at the time, Ahmed Sahifq, said we do not mind the  
Tahrir folks, and we can make Tahrir even a Hyde Park. Workers first  
participated in the rallies. But after opening works, while worker seem not  
to take actions, this was not true. There was a low-key moment for the first  
few days before they decided on strikes . This included workers releasing 
 statements about the revolution or raising their demands linking them to the 
 revolution. In addition to this, some political forces released statements asking  
the labor to intervene in joining and supporting the revolution.178  
 
On February 4, 2011, the EFITU issued a statement calling upon Egyptian workers in the nation 
to strike. Two days later, workers were ordered back to their work. As suggested by Hossam al-
Hamalawy, “the real action started really on Sunday February 6, 2011, this was when all works 
are back (government and banks, in addition to the private sector which in theory did not stop). 
This when workers were able to meet and talk and started to organize.”179 After this, the second 
phase began, in which workers in many important sectors mobilized to join the revolution as an 
organized force.  
On February 6, public transportation workers in Cairo announced their strike. They 
issued a statement in which the first demand was supporting the revolution’s demand to oust 
Mubarak, and the rest of the demands were to increase the minimum wage to $1200 EGP a 
month and to reform the Cairo Transport Authority to end corruption. Workers in the Suez Canal 
Authority, and Egypt’s Railway Authority followed with their own calls for strikes. The railway 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Interview, December 18, 2012.  
179 http://archive.today/wAtI#selection-223.0-226.0 (last accessed June 6, 2014). 
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authority had strikes in Bani Suef, Sharabiya’s workshops (in Cairo), lines in Alexandria. Tanta 
also witnessed strikes in cement factories and chemical manufacturing plants. Hossam el-
Hamalawy (known also as 3arabawy on Twitter) posted in his Twitter account on February 9, 
2011, that there were four military production companies on strike that day. Despite the focus on 
Tahrir, some local and international media wrote briefly about strikes that took place especially 
on February 9 and 10, the last two days before Mubarak’s ousting.180 On the day Mubarak as 
forced to step down, there were at least 60 strikes in Egypt, most of them in critical and strategic 
places (Beinin 2012: 7).  
Did the mobilization of the working class represent an alternate revolutionary path in 
2011, at least as important as Tahrir? My aim here is not to speculate in the abstract, but to 
discuss the actual modes of action taking place at the time. I suggest that working class 
mobilization constituted another revolutionary center of gravity, so to speak, which had links to 
Tahrir, but was also distinct from it.  This form of mobilization had long roots and, contrary to 
analyses that downplay strikes during the revolution, working class action did not stop and 
continued, in fact, until April of 2011.181 As discussed above, the working class organized a 
number of strikes in significant sectors in the last few days before Mubarak’s ouster—strikes that 
put substantial pressure on the regime and, arguably, were crucial in leading to the ouster. 
According to Khaled Ali, a prominent labor lawyer, the average number of labor strikes was 
between 30 and 60 strikes per day from the period of February 12 (the day after Mubarak 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 See, for example: http://www.thenation.com/article/158680/egypts-workers-rise# (last accessed June 6, 
2014); http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/feb/10/trade-unions-egypt-tunisia (last accessed 
June 6, 2014); and http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/02/09/egypt-strike-strike-strike/# (last accessed 
June 6, 2014).  
181 See http://www.npr.org/2011/02/14/133741350/egyptian-labor-unrest-grows-after-uprising (last 
accessed June 6, 2014).  
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stepped down) to February 16, 2011.182 On February 16, Suez Canal workers went on strike. 
After only partial strike from some of its workers few days earlier, this time they joined with a 
full board strike. 183 Fatma Ramadan, a unionist and organizer, wrote on the day after Mubarak’s 
ousting about a series of strikes  in different places in Egypt, including one company, Grain Mills 
Company of East Delta, which has branches in Ismailiyya, Suez, Port Said, and Mansoura. Also 
worker strikes took place at the Sugar Factory in Mansoura and also by Egypt’s Post Office 
Workers.  The workers of the Petro Trade Company, which belongs to the Ministry of Oil, also 
continued a sit-in in front of the ministry.184 
Of course, numbers alone do not demonstrate the significance of these protests for  the 
revolution. In fact, reports after this period show that workers strikes and protests in Egypt have 
increased from year to year before and after the revolution. According to a report by the 
International Development Center, the total number of workers’ strikes and protests were 2,210 
in 2010; 2,532 in 2012; and 2,782 in 2013.185 But what was different about the strikes during the 
revolution and in the immediate aftermath was the following: 1) Workers strikes, especially in 
the final days of the revolution, rose almost to the level of a national strike in Egypt, and given 
their focus in critical, strategic sectors, were crucial in leading to Mubarak’s ouster; 2) the strikes 
during the uprising were also more political, specifying demands such as ousting Mubarak in 
addition to their demands about minimum wage, etc.; and 3) the revolutionary momentum was 
high and many protestors were talking about the need for working class to intervene in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Interview of Khaled Ali by Amy Goodman of  Democracy Now, available at: 
http://www.democracynow.org/2011/2/18/egyptian_uprising_fueled_by_striking_workers (last accessed 
June 6, 2014).  
183 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/middleeast/18egypt.html (last accessed June 6, 2014). 
184 http://tadamonmasr.wordpress.com/2011/02/12/strikes/ (last accessed June 6, 2014) 
185 http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=1044586&#.U4IKXNz90ds (last accessed June 6, 2014).  
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revolution.186 
Some of the demands of the striking workers were very radical and called for confiscations 
of public sector factories, which were sold in the privatization programs, and forming workers 
committees to supervise these factors in addition to ousting Mubarak. For example, the Iron and 
Steel Workers in Helwan released a statement on February 9, 2011 in which they called for: 
1. Immediate resignation of the president and all men and symbols of the regime. 
2. Confiscation of funds and property of all symbols of previous regime and 
everyone proved corrupt. 
3. Iron and steel workers who have given martyrs and militants call upon all 
workers of Egypt to revolt from the regime’s and ruling party workers’ 
federation, to dismantle it and announce their independent union now and 
to plan for their general assembly to freely establish their own independent 
union without prior permission or consent of the regime which has fallen 
and lost all legitimacy. 
4. Confiscation of public sector companies that have been sold or closed 
down or privatized as well as the public sector which belongs to the 
people and its nationalization in the name of the people and formation of a 
new management by workers and technicians. 
5. Formation of a workers’ monitoring committee in all workplaces 
monitoring production, prices, distribution and wages. 
6. Call for a general assembly of all sectors and political trends of the people 
to develop a new constitution and elect real popular committees without 
waiting for the consent or negation with the regime.187 
 
On February 14, 2011, only three days after ousting Mubarak, the SCAF responded to the 
escalation of labor strikes by issuing a statement denouncing strikes and labeling them as chaotic, 
“illegitimate works that aim to damage the nation…disrupt citizens’ life…and disturb the 
economy and the wheel of production.”188 Strikes did not stop and on March 24, 2011, the SCAF 
issued a decree to ban strikes in Egypt. The SCAF and the government media, still under SCAF’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Some scholars have argued that this period can be seen as a mass strike in Rosa Luxemburg’s sense, 
see, for example Zemni, De Smet, and Bogaert (2013). 
187 This was according to the Socialist Renewal Current Group in Egypt and it is cited in 
http://www.counterpunch.org/2011/02/25/conflicts-of-economic-interests-in-egypt/ (last accessed June 6, 
2012). 
188http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?ArtID=44125#.U4EPH9z90ds (last 
accessed June 6, 2014). 
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control, launched a campaign against strikes and protests in Egypt, describing them “sectional 
demands” (Mataleb Faaawyeea).189 Many of the Egyptian elite joined the campaign, though 
some did defend the workers.190 Pro-government writers and, ironically, the MB and some 
liberals who were part of the revolution joined the SCAF and denounced the protests, arguing 
that national interests should be a priority more than the sectional demands. In some of the 
protests I witnessed against the law to ban strikes, workers raised the slogan, “It is social justice 
not sectional demands.”191The SCAF and the transitional government used force to apply this 
law, and in one instance, they used armored vehicles to attack workers at the Shebeen El-Koum 
Textile Factory on April 7, 2011.192  
 The second reason that I argue that workers’ action constituted an important center of 
gravity outside of Tahrir is the speed with which workers organized. Before the revolution, there 
was only the ETUF, and there was an attempt to form a new independent federation for 
independent unions. The former was government-controlled, and the latter, the Egyptian 
Federation for Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) was the one initiated by the tax collectors and 
newly formed unions on January 30, 2011. Before the revolution, there were only three 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 The word faaawyeea has a negative connotation, it reads like selfish demands. 
190 See http://www.ahram.org.eg/Archive/672/2011/9/30/4/104347.aspx (last accessed June 6, 2014) and 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/716/ﻞﻗ-قﻕﻮﻘﺣ-ﺔﯿﻴﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟاﺍ-ﻻوﻭ-ﻞﻘﺗ-ﺐﻟﺎﻄﻣ-ﺔﯾﻳﻮﺌﻓ_say-social-ri (last accessed 
June 6, 2014).  
191 http://www.masress.com/misrelgdida/53332 (last accessed June 6, 2014).  
192 It goes beyond the aim of this chapter to talk in detail about the question of labor strikes in the period 
after the ousting Mubarak; I have discussed it above only to show the continuation of the protests from 
the time of the revolution and to argue the strikes constituted a mobilizing center of gravity both within 
and outside of Tahrir. It is worth noting, however, that for a long time after the revolution, people 
continued to debate whether the revolution was only a political one or whether it had the potential to 
become a social revolution. Recall that one of the revolutionary slogans was: “Bread, liberty, human 
dignity and social justice.” What the latter was understood to mean varied from one political faction to 
another. As discussed in the previous chapter, a consensus developed that political reform and the ousting 
of Mubarak were the minimal agenda, but beyond this, protestors had many different ideas about what 
would constitute social justice. Many liberals and Islamists (and the military at the time) seemed to agree 
that social justice had to be delayed until democracy was established; but many socialists and working 
class organizers and activists disagreed.  
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independent trade unions, but by October 2012, this number reached 507. In the first few months 
after the uprising, Egypt saw the formation of new trade unions every day. Some of my 
informants, lawyers and others assisting workers to form these unions, such as Haytham 
Mohamadeen, told me that in the months between February to April 2011, “I was assisting trade 
unions to form a new union almost every day.” The EFITU officially announced its formation on 
March 2, 2011.193 In addition to the EFITU, is the Egyptian Democratic Labour Congress 
(EDLC) was formed on April 2013.194 There were many meetings and press conferences for 
workers, some of which I attended. The following table shows the distribution of trade unions in 
Egypt by October 2012, in relation to the Egyptian labor force. 
Table 4  Labor Union Federations in Egypt in relation to labor force 
 Number of 
affiliated 
Unions 
Number of 
workers (in 
millions) 
% of labor force (23.346) million; 
working with or without salaries195 
ETUF 23 3.8 16.2 
EFITU 261 2.4 10.2 
EDLC 246 n.a. n.a. 
Source: N. Abdalla (2012). 
 
This level of organization would not have happened without the revolutionary context that 
developed in 2011; as my informant, Mohamadeen put it, this “massive organization was like a 
fervor.”  This center of gravity was spatially outside of, and loosely connected to, Tahrir, yet did 
not develop to significantly challenge Tahrir as the dominant force of the revolution. Why is that? 
The first reason is that workers themselves were ambivalent about where the center of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/6901/Egypt/Politics-/Workers-lay-down-demands-at-
new-trade-union-confer.aspx (last accessed June 6, 2014).  
194 http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/70102/Egypt/Politics-/Egyptian-Democratic-Labour-
Congress-officially-lau.aspx (last accessed June 6, 2014).  
195 Workers without salary here refers to the case of family members who work in family owned business 
and where there is no way to document them. Some of those yet may join unions. 
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revolution was. They knew that their strikes were important and part of the revolution but, at the 
same time, they did not see their efforts as separate from Tahrir. Two of the main organizers of 
the public transportations workers, Tareq El-Beheery and Fatouh Ahmed, affirmed this view in 
their interview with me. Both said: “Our strike was complementing Tahrir.”196  Second, workers 
were not as adept as the youth in Tahrir at using social media. They organized separately, on 
their own to support the revolution, but they did not have independent media tools compared to 
the youth of Tahrir. As a result, their strikes received less media attention. Though my 
informants, as well as analysts such as Joel Beinin (2011) have suggested that this social media 
gap has lessened since the revolution, the point is that it existed at the time and shaped the 
relative impact of the Tahrir sit-in and the workers’ strikes. Kareem El-Beheery, one of the 
leaders of the strike in Mahala in 2007, who now works as an independent journalist, confirmed 
to me that this was the case in an interview.197 
	  
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Interview, December 19, 2012.  
197 Interview, November 12, 2012.  
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Figure 16  Suez Canal Workers protest in front of the company’s headquarters, February 9, 2011. 
AP Picture. Source NPR: http://www.npr.org/2011/02/09/133615261/egypt-protesters-fear-
revenge-if-mubarak-remains (last accessed June 6, 2014). 
 
I will move now to the second section of this chapter, which examines the marginalization of 
voices within Tahrir. 
 
II. The Marginalization of Voices Within Tahrir 
 
A high degree of unity of the opposition exists, at least temporarily, in most revolutions. 
Scholar of revolutions John Foran states: “Multiclass alliances, often motivated by diffuse ideals 
such as nationalism, populism, or religion rather than particularistic ones such as socialism, have 
made most of the revolutions in world history, and all of the third world” (2005: 15). In some 
sense, unity of the opposition is a must during a revolutionary situation, and can guarantee the 
success of the revolutionary process. This unity is not permanent, however, and often dissipates 
soon after the revolution. As Goldstone notes, “Even where revolutionaries have united solidly 
against the old regime, following its collapse their internal conflicts eventually cause problems. 
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After enjoying a brief euphoria over the fall of the old regime, the revolutionary opposition 
becomes rapidly disunited” (2003: 3).  
How did unity of the opposition play out in Tahrir? It is hard to overemphasize the extent 
to which many experienced Tahrir as sort of utopian alternative community during the 18 days of 
the revolution, despite the attacks on the square and the difficulty of basic survival. One writer, 
for example, stated: 
During the 18 glorious days of the revolution, there was no divide between  
men and women, between Muslims and non-Muslims, between rich and  
poor and between the educated and the illiterate: all were undertaking the  
same responsibilities and acting freely by disregarding the  
conventional gender relations that have been entrenched in our minds by a  
vicious media, unethical education and an inconsistent political discourse.  
The former regime sometimes used religion and sometimes used culture to 
justify the strict gender division that put women aside and that prevailed  
for decades.198 
 
Though this sort of utopian description of Tahrir was not uncommon, particularly among those 
who were actually present in the square, my own observations and interviews suggest the 
existence of subtle, yet significant forms of division just below the surface of this self-
consciously united image. In this section, I discuss four dimensions along which divisions 
existed, but were submerged, so to speak, in Tahrir during the 18 days. In each of these cases, the 
possibility existed to discuss and potentially address such divisions openly, but instead, voices 
raising these issues were marginalized in order to emphasize unity. Indeed, as I will suggest, this 
emphasis on unity in Tahrir seemed to have a performative quality. These four 
dimensions/divisions are: 1) class, 2) gender, 3) the question of Islam, and 4) the revolutionary 
agenda.   
Class 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1035/op222.htm (last accessed June 6, 2014) 
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The emphasis on class unity in Tahrir, during the 18 days, was a common theme in my 
interviews, like many other forms of unity (religious, politics, and gender as well). As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, Egyptians of all classes were present in Tahrir. I heard many stories 
about upper class people sending food or aid to Tahrir. In one YouTube video, for example, an 
upper class woman is shown bringing food to the square and distributing it to protestors. 
199Others remarked on cross-class unity in their testimonies about Tahrir; as one writer put it:  
One person was saying this was very humbling when I saw doctors, 
engineers and professors working with you and serving the rest, this was  
an incredible solidarity atmosphere that I have never seen in my life.   
        (Saad 2012: 43) 
 
As such, Tahrir represented for some a kind of commune, where many classes participated and 
lived together for one goal. Nonetheless, as noted in the previous chapter, it was the middle 
classes that were the most visible, at least when Tahrir was presented in the media. I noticed this 
during my own time in Tahrir, and it was a sentiment I heard expressed by multiple informants. 
As one interviewee, Tamer Wageih, stated: “The media obsession with the middle-class kids 
with iPhones simply meant that know body knew stories of poor people and workers participated 
in the revolution.”200 Wageih and others informants emphasized that the role of marginalized 
groups in the revolution and in Tahrir was left out of mainstream media coverage. My research 
shows, for example, that street children played an important role in Tahrir Square, particularly in 
the battles between protestors and the police. Street kids were crucial given their mobility and 
their knowledge of materials available in the streets. Several of my informants told me stories 
about the role of street kids in battles in Ramses Street and in Qasr Al-Ainy Street on January 28, 
2011. Many street kids came to the sit-in and lived there during the 18 days. One informant told 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EE57XlM49AA (last accessed June 6, 2014); in the 
video, the woman is interviewed and speaks explicitly about her class position and support for the 
protestors.  
200 Interview, October 12, 2012.  
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me that the street kids were very excited to fight alongside the protestors; according to him, 
“They told me they finally got a chance to revenge from police violence and the abuse they 
receive all the time.” He also said, “ I have tried to give them money and help. And many of 
them refused, and they told me: we are here to fight with you, we are not beggars.”201 
Despite the solidarity and unity atmosphere in Tahrir, it seems that the dominance of 
middle-class voices sometimes led to another group being targeted within Tahrir.202 This group is 
street vendors. The presence of street vendors in Tahrir is a complicated story. This is mainly 
because, after the revolution, some protestors said that the police had been using the vendors to 
spy on protestors. But during the 18 days, their presence—at least at first—was just normal and 
accepted; they were part of the culture of Tahrir. But as media attacks tried to portray Tahrir as 
not a place of protest, but a market filled with kids doing drugs and other illegal activities, some 
protestors began to think that it would be better to force the street venders in the square to leave. 
I discussed this issue with many protestors at the time, and they were divided. Some agreed that 
it would be better to let the vendor stay, since “Tahrir belongs to all,” but others said “No, it 
would be better if Tahrir is without street vendors” (see Figure 17). 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 It seems that this role of street kids in battles between police and protestors has continued beyond the 
revolution, as they also played an important role in what are known as the Mohamed Mahmoud battles in 
Egypt in November 2011; see: http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/8638/dispatch-from-mohamed-
mahmoud-street_egyptian-revo (last accessed June 6, 2014); also see: http://articles.latimes.com/2011/ 
nov/27/world/la-fg-egypt-homeless-boy-20111128(last accessed June 6, 2014).  
202 This idea of solidarity was prevalent in most of my interviews, with informants emphasizing that this 
was one of the crucial values present in Tahrir at the time.  I do not discuss this in detail here, but 
regarding the importance of solidarity in social movements, see Kimeldorf (2005) and Kennedy (2011).   
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Figure 17  A street vendor in Tahrir. The vendor was selling tissues, but he was also very 
creative, making up chants such as “Mubarak: leave, you traitor, you made us survive by selling 
tissues.” Picture taken by the author, February 8, three days before Mubarak was ousted.  
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The situation of street venders was a delicate one and for a while, revolutionary youth 
simply avoided taking a stance. Eventually, however, the view developed that it would be better 
if street vendors were all concentrated in one area. The nearby Qasr El-Nile Bridge was 
suggested as one possibility. In one video, 203 a youth can be seen talking over a speaker, saying:  
The street vendors issue is becoming out of control, and we ask them to go  
now, and we ask people to show restrain, and please do not talk bad to  
them, but please, we ask the vendors now to move to Qasr El-Nile Bridge.  
   
While agreeing that Tahrir was a place for unity, some of my informants were critical of this 
decision, and suggested that the upper class participants were just romanticizing Tahrir.  Ahmed 
Samir, an Islamist journalist and ex- member of the Muslim Brotherhood stated:   
The diversity of Tahrir as a social space came from different factors. But I  
would say that one of the main factors is the dominance of the discourse of 
the upper middle classes who participated in the revolution. Those people  
have a specific self and class-centered perspective about social networking 
and social interactions. They have nothing to do but to talk about  
consumer culture and themselves, unlike people in poorer neighborhoods  
who have different perspective about social interactions, where they  
experience more communalities and they share life in a sense. The upper  
class people were more impressed with Tahrir’s shared community. It was  
the community where you can talk with strangers as if they are close  
friends and you trust. In other words, they became obsessed with Tahrir  
because they miss this intimacy.204  
 
 Of particular relevance to the question of classes in Tahrir and the dominance of some 
voices over others, especially in the media, was the usage of the phrase “our image in the 
world.”205 This phrase appeared a lot in the media, and was also frequently invoked by protestors, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rozs33CAYrU (start at 1:00) (last accessed June 6, 2014).  
204 Interview October 11, 2012.  
205 This idea of “our image in the world” reveals how significant performance was in Tahrir. In this sense, 
I agree with Jeffery Alexander (2011) who described the Egyptian revolution as performative. There was, 
indeed, a war of meanings between protestors and the regime. Also, as many scholars and analysts have 
rightly pointed out, actual performances were important, with art, poetry, music, and changing all playing 
roles in Tahrir (see, for example, Colla 2011; El-Khatib 2013; Lindsay 2012; Pahwa and Winegar 2012; 
Saad 2012; Makar 2011). Here, however, I am focusing on the performance of unity itself, a collective 
performance that had a particular class twist. 
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arguing that the image they presented to the world was important. Some informants saw this as a 
reflection of the dominance of a middle-class mindset, while others simply saw it as a necessary 
focus on strategic unity in order to gain support. Members of the former group blamed middle-
class participants for obscuring a more complex reality with their concern over image. In one 
instance, for example, one of my interviewees criticized middle-class kids who returned after 
Mubarak’s ousting to clean and paint the square.  In his view: “They reduced the power of 
celebrating ousting the dictator to some painting action.”206 Others supported the emphasis on 
unity and emphasized the idea that the whole world was watching; another interviewee, Laila 
Soueif, stated:  
Part of the construction of the Tahrir as a legend is this idea of “our image  
in the world.” My nephew has this fascinating phrase. He said: Tahrir was  
a show. And I agree with him. Everybody in Tahrir was making an effort  
to be part of the show. We knew we are sending a message to all Egypt, all  
those who are not yet with the revolution. And also we were sending a  
message to the world, that we are doing something right. We are telling  
all, we know what is right, and we can do it, we are doing all the right  
things here.207 
 
It seems to me that these two points of views were not actually contradictory; the performance of 
unity was, indeed, largely middle-class driven, but it was also a strategy designed to portray a 
positive image of the revolution. The larger picture here was unity, not just class unity, with an 
emphasis on portraying Tahrir as a great community. In the same interview, Soueif added: 
Part of the show also was the emphasis on showing the peacefulness of the 
uprising. And protestors also wanted to emphasize unity and show off unity to the 
world. Look at for example, the emphasis on taking pictures of different people. 
To show for example the non-veiled, next to the neqabi (almost totally covered) 
women. The point here in the show was to send a message to all that we are 
united and nobody can separate us.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 For footage of the clean-up, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zwxfMY7MXTI (last accessed 
June 6, 2014) and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c74BoOY7Y-Y (last accessed June 6, 2016); for 
further discussion of the clean-up and its symbolic significance, also see Winegar (2011). 
207 Interview, November 20, 2012.  
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Gender  
 
When it came to gender, the events in Tahrir entailed both a continuation of existing 
patriarchal structures as well as the emergence of new possibilities for challenging patriarchy. I 
will focus here on two aspects of patriarchy: the gendered division of labor within social 
movements and the problem of sexual harassment in the streets. The ongoing problem was that 
Egyptian social movements, like most social movements internationally, are structured by a 
gendered division of labor—a division of labor that did not disappear during the 18 days of the 
revolution. At the same time, the events in Tahrir opened up new possibilities for Egyptians to 
overcome the problem of sexual harassment. Thus, Tahrir did indeed represent a new Egypt, an 
Egypt without injustice, even when it came to gender violence. Yet, when it came to the 
structures of political participation, patriarchy was strongly kept in place.  
 
Sexual Harassment 
From activists’ rhetoric to social media and the news, a shared analysis emerged: Tahrir 
square represented an alternative, non-hierarchical Egypt and the lack of sexual harassment 
exemplified this. In nearly every interview I conducted, interviewees talked about the positive 
transformations that took place during the first eighteen days in Tahrir with references to the lack 
of sexual harassment. This transformation in social norms was exceptionally powerful and the 
lack of sexual harassment in Tahrir became a marker that distinguished the boundaries of two 
worlds, one “inside” and one “outside” Tahrir.  The following quotes illustrate the magnitude of 
this social transformation for Egyptian people and explain just how other-worldly or utopian 
Tahrir Square became during the 18 days for those who experienced it. Fatma Khafagy, a 
women’s rights activist in Egypt, writes this about this period:  
Despite the millions in Tahrir Square, women of all ages were treated with 
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respect, and there was not a single case of sexual harassment reported. Some 
young women slept side by side at night in Tahrir Square, and women prayed 
side by side with men during Friday prayers. Men and women kissed one another 
when victory was achieved. Before the revolution, no one could have thought 
that these things could happen. We spent much of our time as feminists counting 
cases of sexual harassment and trying to explain them. Other people kept 
themselves busy answering questions such as should women pray beside or 
behind men. Now, the revolution has put such petty discussions aside, and 
Egypt's young people have acted freely to throw away in 18 days what we have 
speculated about and analyzed for decades. 208 
 
Similarly, Norhan Tharwat, one of my interviewees, stated:  
  
 In Tahrir, gender stereotypes were challenged. For example, most of my  
 male friends, some of the most solid activists, I saw them crying many  
 times. The experience in Tahrir had a transformative power.209 
 
Tharwat and other female protestors told me about this pattern: the areas surrounding Tahrir, 
specially in Abdeen and Bab El-louq/Talaat Harb Street and Maarouf were full of hostility 
towards the revolutionaries. This happened mostly in the first week, particularly in Abdeen area 
and Maarouf. Many women found it difficult to go to Tahrir from these areas. They were 
sexually harassed on their way to Tahrir, which only served to emphasize the sense of difference 
once inside Tahrir, where they felt safe.  
Despite the overwhelming agreement regarding the lack of sexual harassment in Tahrir 
during the 18 days, some informants told me, “We heard a few stories about some incidents that 
happened, but people did not want to talk about it.” In the same vein, some women bloggers 
admitted that it was possible that such harassment didn’t so much stop, as it was now frowned 
upon and/or prevented. As one blogger put it:  
In Tahrir, I did not hear or seen complaints about sexual harassments, or people 
pushing each other and complaining about how crowded it is. I think, I saw those 
who were coming to sexually harass girls, but the situation was controlling that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1035/op222.htm#1 (last accessed June 6, 2014).  
209 Interview, November 19, 2012.  
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nobody is able to do this. 210 
 
Protestors also emphasized how important the square experience was in terms of lack of sexual 
harassments, not only because of the big shift between what was inside and outside the square, 
but also in comparison to what happened after, when harassment returned to normal levels or 
even worsened. Only one month after ousting Mubarak, when women, men, and feminist groups 
rallied in Tahrir to celebrate International Women’s Day on March 8, 2011, they were severely 
harassed by police, as well as thugs and Salafi groups.211  
In sum, the activists I interviewed interpreted the lack of sexual harassment as an 
example of not only a new sense of social equality that developed within Tahrir, but also  as an 
example of a new form of governance based on the principle of community accountability. What 
stopped potential perpetrators of harassment is that they knew they would be stopped and held 
accountable by collective groups of people in Tahrir. While these accountability structures were 
not explicitly or strategically established, they emerged organically, out of the power of the 
collective commitment to the larger cause of creating a better Egypt. I will move now to the 
question of the gendered division of labor in Tahrir. 
 
Gendered division of labor 
 
A great deal of feminist scholarship has established that the gender structures within 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 http://anegyptiangirlsdiary.blogspot.com/2011/12/blog-post.html (last accessed June 6, 2014).  The 
most (in)famous exception to this narrative, of course, was the assault of American news correspondent, 
Lara Logan, of CBS News, who was assaulted in Tahrir on the night of February 11, 2011. Some 
informants emphasized that this happened only once things in the square became chaotic, and when the 
square was no longer controlled by protestors. Others said that it was pro-Mubarak thugs who did this. 
Regardless of how exactly they interpreted the incident, all my informants insisted that it was an 
exception. See: http://abcnews.go.com/Health/MindMoodNews/cbs-reporter-lara-logan-opens-tahrir-
square-assault/story?id=13492964 (last accessed June 6, 2014); and http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2011/feb/16/egyptian-activists-condemn-brutal-attack (last accessed June 6, 2014).  
211 http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/03/08/egypts-women-march-in-cairo-will-they-be-
heard.html (last accessed June 6, 2014).  
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contemporary social movements tend to mirror the gender structures of the larger society 
(Robnett 1996, 1997, 2002). Although every movement is distinct, a common pattern within 
social movements in contemporary nation-states around the world is to position male activists 
within masculinized positions such as decision makers, public speakers, and fighters on the front 
lines and to position women within feminized positions such as grassroots labor (such as caring 
for the communities—including cooking, distributing food, and providing emotional support) or 
administrative labor (such as mailing, typing, or accounting). A similar gendered division of 
labor existed within most of Egypt’s social movements before the revolution and a wide range 
of Egyptian feminist organizations have been challenging these structures for decades (Al-Ali 
2000).212  
A gendered division of labor also structured the labor involved in keeping the sit-in alive 
in Tahrir during the 18 days. Yet, this hierarchical structure received virtually no attention or 
recognition within the rhetoric of activists committed to the vision of a new Egypt without 
oppression and injustice. Even activists who celebrated the lack of sexual harassment tended to 
remain silent on the gendered division of labor in Tahrir and almost anyone who was actively 
involved in keeping the sit-in alive was complicit in maintaining this gendered hierarchy in one 
way or another. Here are some few examples from my research. 
I interviewed many women who ended up being responsible for or volunteered to collect 
and make food for protestors. I asked them the same question: why did women have to make or 
collect the food, why couldn’t men do it? One female informant responded:   
To be honest with you, I do not care. I never cared about politics. And I did not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Regarding gender in general in the Middle East, see Gocek and Balaghi (1994) and  
Moghadam (2003), and on gender and revolutions, see Moghadam (1997). And on gender in Egypt see 
the articles at Nazra for Feminist Studies, available at: http://nazra.org/en/terms/gender-­‐perspective 
(accessed July 22, 2014).  
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want to participate at all. I also blame my sister for participating in politics and 
bring trouble to herself and the family. As you can see, I am an old lady. But I am 
a mom. This is what got me to this. First, I heard stories about the insults and the 
attacks on protestors. And I was angry. Then I was just helping my boss, who is a 
known leftist woman, helping the movement. I did not want to go to the square at 
all in the beginning. But when I saw the young kids being injured I felt 
responsible as a mom. My daughter is 15. And one day she insisted in going to the 
square. I refused. But when there were calmer days in Tahrir we went together. I 
could not help but to work on this.213  
 
Another female informant who helped to collect food also stated: 
 
They asked me to do this because I am experienced, not because I am a woman. I 
have used to do this as a journalist. I used to collect donations for protestors and 
specially workers in sit-ins in the last few years. They told me I am good at it. I 
was reluctant in the beginning, because I wanted to participate and be free. But 
many comrades and friends said, no you are very good and we trust you to do 
this.214 
 
This story of middle-aged female participants in the revolution being worried about their kids 
and starting to cook was a common story to me during these days.  
 The second example is from the Youth Coalition of the Revolution. The YCR was a 
coalition of six youth organizations, with a political office comprised of 16 members—of whom, 
only one was a woman. One female informant who was a member in the YCR told me:   
The founders of the YCR needed a woman, and they also needed a Coptic person. 
She was both a woman and Coptic. She was the only person who did not represent 
a group and she was friend with some of the founders of YCR. She is my friend 
and I admire her. And she was an amazing addition to the YCR. But when they 
thought about this addition, they thought that they will bring a nice person, friends 
with them may help in the voting, but she ended up really independent and a great 
bad ass if you might. I just want to be frank with you.215 
 
A few of my informants were female members in the YCR, and I personally witnessed their 
essential role in assisting and preparing everything around the YCR stage in Tahrir. But they 
never spoke. They told me they were too shy to do so. As a result, most of the speakers on this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Interview, November 5, 2012.  
214 Interview, November 21, 2012.  
215 Interview, November 26, 2012.  
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stage, as one all the other stages too, were men.  
 The third example is about the dominance of the idea that only men were in the front 
lines during the battle with the police and Mubarak’s thugs, while women helped only by 
breaking rocks for the men to throw, and taking care of the wounded. I learned later from some 
of my women comrades and female informants that this was not completely true. Many women 
activists, who identified as feminists, were critical of some forms of hierarchy in Tahrir and tried 
to challenge it all along. Nermeen Khafagy stated: 
I was in the front line, near Abdel Monem Riadd, where the attacks came during 
the camel battle.  I was doing everything, breaking rocks, and giving them to 
protestors to throw them, giving water to protestors and also throwing rocks 
myself. It is not completely true that the MB only or the Ultras youth protected 
the square. We are all did. And many of our friends, men and women, were in the 
front lines.216  
 
She told me many stories about participating in different battles during that time. Women also 
participated in checkpoints around the square.  Despite these exceptions, a dominant narrative 
circulated among activists and in my interviews that on the front lines, women did nothing more 
than help break the rocks that men would use to fight the police, or that protection was only 
men’s job.  
 
The Question of Islam 
Based on my research, I argue that at least one form of strategic unity did exist in 
Tahrir—specifically, between secularists and Islamists.  Activists took great care to emphasize 
that Tahrir was a place that unified secular as well as religious people. Indeed, one of the most 
common themes that activists and the media stressed was the unity between Christians and 
Muslims. But as an outcome of this unity, any voices that were seen as being divisive were 
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marginalized. While many leftists and seculars made an effort to demonstrate that they did not 
fear Islamists, Islamists, for their part, also tried to silence members who raised religious slogans 
in Tahrir. 
It goes beyond my research to explain why the question of Islamists occupied most of the 
space in the discussion and emphasis about unity, though one can briefly not some possible 
reasons. One is that the state propaganda machine focused on the idea that the Muslim 
Brotherhood was using Tahrir and manipulating the revolution for its own advantages. In this 
way, state media attempted to scare protestors and the public by raising the specter of an Islamist 
state.  If the revolution succeeded, it was suggested, Islamists would hijack it and turn Egypt into 
a theocratic state. In one instance, for example, the headline of the major newspaper al-Akhbar, 
on February 3, 2011, warned Egyptian youth (see also Figure 18): 
To the patriotic faithful Egyptian youth, who have legitimate demands, be worried. 
There are documented evidences that there is a foreign conspiracy against Egypt. 
The MB, works with Hamas and Iran to occupy the TV building, burn all 
government buildings and burn all police stations.  
 
As my informants told me, the regime kept insisting on a dichotomy: either us or the Islamists, as 
if there was no other opposition or alternative. Western media, for its part, was all too happy to 
play into this worry about Islamic rule.217 As a result, one of the protestors’ most common 
slogans attempted to counter this idea by emphasizing that “Muslims and Christians are one  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 See examples of reports in major western news sources, during the first week of the revolution, all of 
which focusedon the fear from Islamic rule in Egypt. These include the New York Times, CNN, Fox News, 
Der Spiegel and Slate.See: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/03/opinion/03atranhtml?_r=0 (last accessed 
June 10, 2014); http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/01/31/egypt.muslim.brotherhood/(last 
accessed June 10, 2014);  http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/02/08/leading-egyptian-businessman-
fears-muslim-brotherhood/ (last accessed June 10, 2014); http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/ 
concerns-­‐about-the-muslim brotherhood-israel-fears-regime-change-in-egypt-a-742186.html (last accessed 
June 10, 2014); and http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/ 
2011/02/should_we_fear_the_muslim_brotherhood.html (last accessed June 10, 2014). 
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Hand.”218 Yet, regime pressure and the western media’s Islamophobia created the constant need 
to show off this dimension of unity. The problem with this emphasis on strategic unity, however, 
was that it forced people to delay discussing some important issues (thus leaving them 
unresolved), and it silenced any voices that could be perceived as divisive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The slogan describing Egypt as a “civil state” was particularly telling. Protestors in Tahrir 
kept saying that the future state needed to be a civil state; they explicitly avoided the term 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 For footage of protestors chanting this in Tahrir, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lkrlz7iFi7Y 
(last accessed June 6, 2014).  
Figure 18  Headlines of the Pro-Government Al-Akhbar Newspaper on February 3, 2011, 
talking about a regional plot by Islamists in the region to target Egyptian state. Source: 
http://www.umh1.com/2013/04/blog-post_1284.html (last accessed June 10, 2014) 
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“secular.” At first, this was not clear to me; only later did I realize that this was a strategic 
semantic choice that sought to avoid any divisive issues. As I talked to protestors, it became clear 
to me that they were using the term “civil” to indicate that they were including Islamists in the 
future state. From their perspective, the civil state was not going to be anti-religion; rather, it was 
to be a state that would acknowledge the role of religion, and not necessarily be a radical secular 
state. Thus, as many told me, “we saw this at the time, as one way to unify all secular and 
Islamists in Tahrir.”219  
The following excerpt is from the 2012 novel 7 Days in Tahrir by Egyptian novelist 
Hisham El-Keshen. In the novel, the author combines many real scenes that happened in Tahrir 
with fiction. The excerpt is of a conversation between Egyptian protestor, Sherine, and her 
American friend, Carol, who happened to come to the square during the sit-in. The focus of the 
conversation is the fear of Islamist rule: 
[In the midst of action and the overwhelming scene in Tahrir] Carol used the 
opportunity and surprised Sherine with a question. 
Carol: Are not you scared or worried that the MB may rule you? 
Sherine: You have also been always worried about being ruled by blacks and 
Jews, and even Christian fundamentals? 
Carol: But we do have a stable democratic system where things are under the 
control and the supervision of the people. 
Sherine: And we are here in Tahrir to call for a similar system. 
Carol: But in our society most of the people are educated and many of them are 
enjoying better life conditions or high levels of political awareness. This helps 
them to decide. 
Sherine: When your country started its democracy, you did not have the same 
literacy rates. And your nation perhaps was founded with some criminals in a new 
land. Look at India; they do have high illiteracy rates but they do have an 
exemplar democracy. Why you think we do not deserve or not capable of what 
you are enjoying? 
Carol: But the MB will make Egypt another Iran? 
Sherine: And they perhaps make us another Indonesia or Turkey. These are 
partner countries to you too. Carol, Egypt is not Iran and I assure you, it will not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 See scholar Hussein Agrama (2011), who argues that the Egyptian Revolution is best described as an 
“asecular revolution,” specifically because of this stance that attempted to maintain a fine balance 
between religion and secularism in Egypt. 
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be Iran. (El-Keshen 2012: 137) 
 
Regardless of the generalizations about the US and Egypt here, this conversation and the theme 
of the worry of Islamist rule were very common during this period in Egypt. Protestors worked 
hard to emphasize unity and that they were not worried about MB rule. Sometimes, friends and 
activists who were interviewed by international media in Tahrir asked me to translate for them. 
The question of whether they were concerned about Islamist rule was typical in many of these 
interviews. And the attitude of most of the activists was to emphasize that they were not worried; 
democracy, they insisted, would take care of everyone.    
Perhaps nothing captures the imperative to silence any discussion of potential political 
issues than the actual stages erected in Tahrir.  It is difficult to summarize the important 
symbolic and practical role of the stages here, but it was commonly understood that the stages 
represented a significant space of unity. One of the coordinators of the YCR stage, activist 
Haytham Gabr, explained to a reporter from Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper the following: 
There was only one main rule in the stage of the YCR, no to any religious or 
sectarian slogans; no to calling or voicing out specific political party or a group 
over others. The main aim of the radio (the stage, as it was described as the 
revolution radio) revolution was simply unifying the slogans. Also we had other 
objectives such as telling the protestors the news, or recent updates, and in some 
cases to announce cases about the lost ones in the square. We did not ban anybody 
from talking; the only credibility for speakers at the time was that if they belong 
to the one cause of the revolution.220 
 
While secular activists in Tahrir spent time defending the revolution against the attacks of 
the regime labeling it as a MB plot and against western media’s constant emphasis on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/113337 (last accessed June 6, 2014). Another theme that 
was emphasized in the media and among protestors was the unity of Christians and Muslims together in 
Tahrir; see, for example: http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2011/02/07/muslim-christian-unity-at-tahrir-
square/ (last accessed June 6, 2014).  
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Islamists, many of the MB activists themselves silenced members who tried to raise religion 
slogans. Scholar Khalil Al-Anani describes this period and states: “Islamists deliberately kept a 
low profile during the uprising to avoid regime repression and to diffuse western fears of their 
powerful representation” (2013: 31). This was exactly the sentiment I heard from many 
protestors. Islamist groups joined the protests on January 28, 2011; when they did so, some of 
their supporters started to raise religious slogans, declaring that Egypt should be an Islamist state, 
but other protestors—liberals and secularists, but also senior members of the MB—suppressed 
those Islamist protestors who raised religious slogans. This phenomenon was captured also in a 
2011 PBS Frontline documentary about Tahrir, in which reporter Charles Sennott visited Tahrir 
during the sit-in, accompanied by an activist from the MB named Mohamed Abbas. When they 
entered Tahrir, an Islamist protestor came up to Sennott and raised a pocket Quran in his face. 
Abbas took the protestor to the side and admonished him; when Sennott asked Abbas why he did 
this, Abbas responded: “We do not want to show this in the media. We want to show only unity 
here. Most protestors here raise Egyptian flags and emphasize unity.” 221  
I conducted my second round of fieldwork in the summer of 2012. By that time, the MB 
had formed the new government and the president was a member of the MB. One of my 
informants was Dr. Laila Soueif (one of the founders of Kefayya and a long-standing democracy 
activist in Egypt).222 She told me she understood why many of the youth of the revolution 
became angry at the MB (at the time of the interview on November 20, 2012), when the MB 
failed to be more inclusive. The youth, she explained, felt the MB had betrayed their prior stance 
of unity and defending one another.  She states: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 The documentary, Revolution in Cairo, can be viewed at: http://video.pbs.org/video/1810338755/  
(last accessed June 6, 2014). The incident I describe occurs at 36:00. 
222 For more about Dr. Soueif, see: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/03/ 
201131512328730636.html (last accessed June 6, 2014).  
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[Because protestors were insisting and making an effort for unity and  
showing unity in Tahrir] this is why I totally understand how the youth of  
the revolution became angry now with the MB. They are like saying to the  
MB: you are saying you played an important role in protecting the square  
during the revolution. But we also did protect you; we stood in Tahrir and 
told all Egyptians and the world, it is not of your damn business about the  
question of Islamists. We are not scared of them. We will build our Egypt  
together. But now this youth felt betrayed by the MB, when they worked  
closely with SCAF against reform and the revolution during the so-called  
transition period. 
 
It was precisely because the question of Islamist rule had been so deliberately suppressed during 
the 18 days of the revolution that its reemergence during the transition period struck many who 
had participated in Tahrir as such a betrayal. But as Goldstone and others have noted, the “brief 
euphoria” following revolution was, perhaps, destined to be short-lived, particularly as so many 
deeper issues were forcibly marginalized in the name of unity.   
 
   
The Revolutionary Agenda 
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed how the ousting of Mubarak and electoral political 
reform emerged as the main revolutionary demands. This is not to suggest, however, that 
alternative voices arguing for wider and/or more radical reforms were not present in Tahrir. Nor 
does it mean that there were not people arguing that, in fact, longer term goals should be 
discussed and a post-Mubarak plan developed. As hindsight has made clear, one of the most 
problematic aspects of the Egyptian revolution was the role of the military and the lack of a clear 
plan of transition.  Yet, my research reveals that during the 18 days, there were, indeed, efforts to 
consider these longer term questions. My interviews and archival research find that there was 
much discussion within Tahrir Square of alternative plans, but these discussions remained 
relatively diffused and/or, in some cases, actively suppressed.  
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Alternative plans here are defined as proposals about the future and how to organize the 
transfer and reorganization of power after Mubarak. Though diverse, what all such plans shared 
in common was a concern regarding what role the military would play in the transitional 
government. In my field notes for February 7, 2011, I wrote: “I have heard different stories about 
power arrangements and the future, but everybody is worried about Mubarak first, and that they 
are worried the most about the military’s stance in the events.” In my November 20, 2012 
interview with Dr. Laila Soueif, she talked about the idea that protestors missed an opportunity 
to have more say in the transition:  
I cannot talk about the potential or strong plans at the time. But there was this  
critical moment in February 9th. It was this time after the army sent a message to  
the protestors that we will not be attacking. But they did not show any clues, or  
perhaps did not decide yet about resuming power from Mubarak. There were  
perhaps diffused alternatives in the square and in Egypt. But these were not clear 
 and strong. I would say that if the political forces were strong enough, during this  
revolutionary momentum and while the attention is there, and told the army we 
 decided about temporary revolutionary government, the army would have been  
forced to accept.  
 
I asked Dr. Soueif whether she really believed the army would have accepted this, and she 
responded:  
I think yes.  They would have accepted this (to give power to a transitional  
revolutionary government or leadership). At the time, they did not have a  
choice, the people in the streets and the power of the revolution was on.  
But of course, after they give the power to this leadership, they would  
maneuver and go around and try to control things. My point is that the  
alternative was not strongly formulated and there. To be precise there were  
alternatives, and we discussed it, and I will give you examples, political  
forces and protestors did not push hard on the question of alternatives. 
There was one of the proposals about forming a presidential council,  
which includes a representative from the MB, ElBaradie and a  
representative from the army. And there was another one; I worked for it  
with others about a presidential council to include two judges and one  
representative from the military. We sent these proposals to the army and  
we worked hard for it. But the time was passed and the events were  
running fast. Then Mubarak did transfer power to SCAF, people were  
celebrating in the streets. And the opportunity was gone. 
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During the revolution, two entities created for the purpose of mediating between the 
regime and protestors and ostensibly representing the voice of revolution issued various 
statements and launched initiatives. One was called the Committee of the Wise, and was 
comprised of 22 intellectuals, former diplomats, and elites. The other entity had 26 members, 
was called the Council of the Trustees of the Revolution, and was founded by members of the  
MB.223 Both entities were viewed with suspicion, however, by many in the square.  Some 
protestors worried that the groups had plans to hijack the revolution and impose their own 
solutions, while others simply felt that the entities’ demands would not be radical enough and 
that they would be compromised by negotiating with the regime. In the first statement of the 
Committee of the Wise, for example, they praised the national patriotic role of the army, and also 
stated that they trusted the Vice President at the time, Omar Suleiman, the former Chief Spy in 
Egypt, who was hired as VP on January 28 by Mubarak.224 In response, many activists in the 
square developed the slogan: “No negotiation until Mubarak leaves” (la tafawed ella baad al-
raheel). The committees were seen as insisting on negotiation, something many radical 
protestors felt would be fatal to the revolution. They also developed the slogan “ No to Mubarak 
and No to Suleiman.” But interestingly, while the slogan “No negotiation until Mubarak leaves” 
was very radical at the time, it’s important to note that it ruled out only negotiation with  
Mubarak and his VP, not negotiation altogether.  Indeed, the slogan’s use of the word “until” 
indicated that protestors were open to negotiation; the problem was just that it was unclear who 
they were open to negotiating with, and what exactly that negotiation would look like. The 
implicit assumption was that the other party to the negotiations would be the military. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 See: http://gate.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/13/55/40657/رﺭﺎﺒﺧﻷاﺍ/ﻊﻤﺘﺠﻣ-ﻲﻧﺪﻣ/ﺲﻠﺠﻣ-ءﺎﻨﻣأﺃ-ةﺓرﺭﻮﺛ-ﺮﯾﻳﺎﻨﯾﻳ-ﻢﻀﯾﻳ-لﻝﻼﺑ-
ﺎﯾﻳﺮﻛزﺯوﻭ-ﻞﻌﺷﻷاﺍوﻭ-ﺪﻌﺳوﻭ.aspx (last accessed June 6, 2014); and: http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx 
?Serial=425804&eid=2166 (last accessed June 6, 2014).  
224 http://www.masress.com/shorouk/385610 (last accessed June 6, 2014). 
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But the point here is that proposals about the future did indeed circulate throughout 
Tahrir.  During my time in the square, I saw many leaflets discussing various ideas being 
distributed all the time in the square. Some activists, for example, distributed a leaflet on 
February 2, 2011, in which they asked the military to state a clear stance, indicating whether it 
sided with Mubarak or the revolution.225 But while most proposals for alternatives remained 
diffuse and not strong enough, my research also shows that many protestors who tried to discuss 
plans about the future were silenced. Ahmed Gharbiyya, one of the founders of the blogging 
movement in Egypt, was one of my informants. When I interviewed him on March 10, 2011, he 
told me the following story:  
In one of those days, I think it was the February 8th or February 9th, it was  
clear to many that Mubarak will be leaving any way. I found it is strange  
that we are not talking about the period in post-Mubarak. I wrote  
something in a small banner about plans for the future. I do not recall the  
exact plan. But it has ideas about forming a presidential council from  
independent forces, and also has judges who are known for their work on  
democracy, and the council to be chaired by the Chief Justice of the  
Supreme Court, or something. I thought it is weird to leave all things to  
the military, to be honest. But when I got to Tahrir with the banner, many  
protestors, who seem to be from political forces, came to me and asked me  
not to carry this around. They got angry and said we not talking about any  
other thing now but ousting Mubarak. This is the priority. 
 
Others told me of similar stories happening in Tahrir at the time. The gist of the stories was 
always the same: protestors were silenced when they talked about ideas regarding the  future and 
how to distribute power in a post-Mubarak Egypt. And the rationale given was also the same: 
that these were divisive voices. Some protestors were told frankly “any voices that are not 
focusing ousting Mubarak first are divisive.” Still, despite the strength of the consensus that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 Abdel Rahman Youssef, an Egyptian poet, told me the story. He is also an activist who worked closely 
with the ElBaradei campaign in the revolution, with Kefayya, and within pro-democracy circles in Egypt 
in general. He also relates the story in his book (Youssef 2011). He said that on the night of February 1, 
he and other activists met and decided to write a statement. In the statement, they called upon the military 
to take a clear stance, about whether to side with Mubarak or the revolution. They wrote the statement 
together, printed it, and early the next morning, they distributed it in Tahrir (Youssef 2011:91) 
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focused only on the ousting of Mubarak, Gharbiyya dared to carry a sign that read: “Downfall, 
Not Reform” (see Figure 19), challenging the conflation of Mubarak with the entire regime, and 
suggesting that simply reforming the post-Mubarak regime would not be enough.  
My memories of this period are that events were going very fast and everything was very 
overwhelming. The sentiments of those around me were similar. Some plans were circulating 
and being discussed but, at the same time, other plans were being silenced. There was so much 
emphasis on the ideas of unity and consensus that people’s concerns about future conflict just got 
pushed to the side. People simply didn’t want to create (or acknowledge) divisions by talking 
about the question of power in the future. The mood was so optimistic that raising the issue of 
potential conflicts genuinely did seem to many to be divisive. 
It was in this context that the decision, eventually, to leave Tahrir Square became hugely 
symbolic. After Mubarak was ousted on February 11, many people wanted to remain in the 
square for awhile. The army allowed protestors to remain for two days to celebrate, but on 
February 13, military, security forces, and also some ordinary citizens began to evacuate the 
square by force.226 The square was cleared, but not without some reluctance on the part of 
protestors.  For many activists, a sense of regret and nostalgia has only increased since then, with 
many repeating the statement: “Our biggest mistake was to leave Tahrir Square after ousting 
Mubarak.”227 I asked Dr. Laila Soueif for her thoughts about this decision and she stated:  
Yes the army used force in evacuating the square on February 13. But let us be 
frank. The Egyptian people wanted us to leave the square on February 11, the 
time when Mubarak did transfer power to SCAF. People went to the streets, 
celebrated. Their message was like: yes, it is successful revolution, we celebrated, 
ok, you should go home and no further protest is needed. Yes, they were happy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 Contradictory stories circulated about the role of the MB in this evacuation—some said they were 
involved, others said they were not. 
227 The sentence is also stated by one of the main characters in the documentary, The Square, mentioned 
at the beginning of this chapter.   
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that the dictator is gone. This is one thing. But also many people just wanted to go 
back to business and normal life. They may be trusting the army or not. The point 
is that to go back to normal life. This is about the sentiments of ordinary people. 
But as for the revolutionary youth, and who were skeptics about the role of the 
army, they could not do any better. Also some of them really wanted to try the 
army. Their logic was like this; if the people wanted the army and there is no 
alternative, ok, let them try the army. The idea was about testing the army in 
reality. For example, it took few months until many people realized that the army 
is standing against Mubarak’s trial. It was people’s protests, which lead the army 
to accept this. 
 
	  
Figure 19  Activist and blogger Ahmed Gharbiyya carrying a sign in Tahrir that reads: 
“Downfall, Not Reform.” The picture was taken in Tahrir on February 1st 2011, during the first 
one-million-person rally. (Photograph shared by Gharbiyya with permission). 
 
 
I will move now to the last section of this chapter, in which I reflect on how to make sense of 
these processes of marginalization, which took place both within and outside of Tahrir Square, 
and which shaped the revolutionary possibilities that were explored, as well as those that weren’t.  
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III. The Making of a Revolutionary Boundary 
 
 To recall, in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively, I discussed how the Tahrir Square sit-in came 
to be the central mode of action of the revolution, and also Tahrir came to represent the central 
voice and source of legitimacy for the revolution. Of course, the very idea of Tahrir becoming 
the center of the revolution means that there existed other revolutionary possibilities—alternately 
beyond or even within Tahrir—that were not central; voices, modes of action, and forms of 
political imagination that, unlike Tahrir, did not come to be understood as the revolution, and 
remained instead in the margins of the revolution. How can we make sense of this? Literature 
regarding social movements and revolutions has dealt with the question of marginalization 
primarily in the sense of recognizing that social movements and revolutions, themselves, are 
usually collective actions on the part of groups that are already marginalized (Ballard et al. 2005; 
Bandy and Smith 2005; Bayat 1997; Hall 1995; Piven and Cloward 1979). But the question of 
how processes of marginalization shape the constitutive internal and external boundaries of 
movements and revolutions themselves remains understudied.  But with a deeper look we may 
see answers in this literature to the following questions: Why are some voices are heard more 
than others during a revolution? And how do certain voices become dominant or hegemonic in a 
revolution or social movement?  
There are four answers from the literature to these questions. The first answer can be 
found in the framing perspective. According to this perspective,  one can argue that protestors in 
Tahrir seemed to agree in general that focusing on electoral reform was the an effective 
(hegemonic or master) frame that had the best chance of gaining the support of the widest 
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segments of participants in the revolt and the population.228  A second answer, which is very 
close to the framing perspective, comes from the application of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony 
to social movements and revolutions. Frames themselves develop through the constant conflict 
between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses of power (Carroll and Ratner 1994; 
Steinberg 1998). Using Gramsci, for example, sociologist of law, Alan Hunt, distinguished 
between “‘single issue’ movements and those whose goals would constitute a wider set of social 
changes than their immediate objectives” (1990: 319). The first type of movement is one that 
revolves around a single, master issue, but includes a larger people, than dividing the issues into 
separate issues, which may create more conflict and disagreements in the movement. Other 
scholars have also discussed the question of movement unity in the context of a diverse field 
(Levitsky 2007).  One can argue that the Egyptian Revolution became defined as a single issue 
movement, one in which protestors decided to unify the movement by focusing only on political 
reform and ousting Mubarak. But as an outcome of this, other issues not seen as immediate and 
urgent, were suppressed.  
A third answer comes from what can be described as the “critical opportunity structure 
approach.” In his classic piece, “States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social 
Movements” (1996), Sidney Tarrow advocates a thicker understanding to the political 
opportunity structure approach with a special focus on the state.  By looking at deeper structural 
factors, Tarrow argues, we can think about how specific movements opportunities vary. He states: 
“Mobilization into social movements varies as opportunities for collective action open and close, 
allies appear and disappear, political alignments shift, and elites divide and cohere” (Tarrow 
1996: 54). In this approach, Tarrow defines political opportunity structures as  “ consistent—but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 On hegemonic frames, see Benford and Snow (2000); on master frames, see Carroll and Ratner 
(1996b).  
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not necessarily formal, permanent, or national—signals to social or political actors which either 
encourage or discourage them to use internal resources to form social movements (1996: 54). 
According to Tarrow, political opportunities have three components: the “opening up of political 
access,” “stability or instability of alignments,” especially between government and opposition in 
our context,  and the presence or absence of “influential allies” (1996: 54–55). According to this 
perspective, one can argue that being in Tahrir was the main visible window or political access 
for the revolution’s voice. And that because the legitimacy of the regime was already in question 
thanks to the plans for Gamal Mubarak’s succession and the rigged elections in 2010, there was 
an important opportunity for temporary alignment, through which most, if not all, opposition 
groups were united against Mubarak. This included the very important and influential ally of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which though initially hesitant to join the protests, did join as events 
escalated on the ground. But protestors in Tahrir knew that this alignment and opportunity of 
taking the square was only temporary.  And knowing this, protestors pushed for consensus and 
marginalized non-consensus voices, namely, any voices that could disrupt the unity—however 
brief—that was possible in Tahrir. And as expert on the Middle East, Jillian Schwedler (2004) 
once argued, we ought to think of coalition building and political opportunities in the same 
framework. 
 A fourth answer comes from the applying the idea of cross-class solidarity during 
revolution, as elaborated by Goldstone (2011b) and discussed in the previous chapter. As 
explained by Goldstone, the very nature of the alliance between populations from different 
classes, which are in opposition in normal circumstances, requires a compromise. And the very 
nature of such a compromise, by definition, requires the suppression of many issues normally 
advocated by the different groups taking part in this alliance.  Here, one example for elaboration 
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is important. As discussed in the previous chapter, there was a degree of consensus in Tahrir that 
the revolution was about democratic change. But suggesting that the revolution was reformist 
and that Tahrir and its banner were constructed around this demand does not mean that 
everybody in Tahrir and the revolution agreed with this particular compromise. On the contrary, 
different people had different perspectives about the revolution and its potential. Indeed, after the 
revolution, it became clear that for the MB, revolution entailed only a narrow vision of electoral 
democracy; for the army (the institution that was presumably “guarding” the square and the 
revolution), the revolution was only about ending the plan for Mubarak’s son’s succession; for 
many people in the middle class, the revolution was primarily  about ending cronyism; and for 
the upper classes, the revolution was about mainly ousting Mubarak and restoring the conditions 
that would favor their businesses.  For other groups, it became increasingly clear that the agenda 
for revolution had not been wide enough: for many liberals and for many liberal-leftists, the 
revolution should have included not only about democracy but also a social democratic state; and 
for communists, the revolution should have been a more radical, social revolution. The point, 
however, is that had a consensus not developed around the idea of a reformist revolution—one 
focused on electoral reform, or even more minimally, simply the ousting of Mubarak—then the 
cross-class alliance so remarked upon in Tahrir would not have been possible. As I discussed in 
the previous section, there were, indeed, voices that tried to broaden the discussion, but these 
voices were suppressed in the interest of maintaining unity.  
These four perspectives are useful, especially insofar as they highlight the necessary, yet 
inherently problematic nature of compromise. To a certain extent, compromise inevitably entails 
silencing and marginalization. Yet, the above perspectives are also limited in two ways.  First, 
they mainly shed light on only one kind of marginalization—marginalization within a movement 
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and/or revolution. And as my discussion has demonstrated, there were, in fact, two forms of 
marginalization: the silencing of voices and issues within the revolution, but also the unrealized 
revolutionary possibilities outside of Tahrir that, for various reasons, never gained momentum, 
were incomplete, or simply did not develop further. The second limitation in applying these 
perspectives is that they fail to capture the complexity of Tahrir’s relation to the revolution.  For, 
as much as one can point to Tahrir and these processes of both internal and external 
marginalization , the truth is that Tahrir was also a powerful force of mobilization—and it is this 
simultaneous dynamic of giving voice and silencing that I want to highlight and theorize.   
I propose another explanation derived from the theorization of space in contentious 
politics, which is very relevant to this research. I also invoke an observation from the work of 
Pierre Bourdieu that relates to the question of revolutionary possibilities existed outside Tahrir. I 
synthesize these to present the idea of a “revolutionary boundary,” but before I elaborate this 
concept, I will explain briefly its theoretical basis. 
As elaborated earlier in Chapter 2, the literature on space in contentious politics calls for 
thinking of space as serving as more than just the built-in environment or a simple container of 
activism (Martin and Miller 2003; Sewell 2001; Tilly 2000). Spatial analysis in a revolution or a 
movement is not limited to how the environment enables or disables protests. We also ought to 
think of how claim making is, itself, spatial, and also how a movement is bounded by a specific 
network and idea about specific place(s). Of particular relevance here is Tilly’s idea about spatial 
claim making in contentious politics (Tilly 2000: 137). In his discussion about the relationship 
between claim making and space, Tilly argued for two types of contention: contained and 
transgressive. The latter is the case when claim making involves new actors and employs 
innovative means of collective action (2000:138).  Tilly argues the distinction is important 
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“because transgressive contention more often disrupts spatial routines in its setting, and more 
often involves deliberate occupation, reorganization, or dramatization of public space” (Tilly 
2000:138). As my research above shows, however, Tahrir was an instance of both contained and 
transgressive contention.229 Tahrir was contained in the sense that the central mode of action of 
the revolution (the sit-in) and also the main claims of the revolution were literally located in and 
symbolically represented by a relatively contained space in the center of Cairo. But Tahrir also 
represented a transgressive contentious case, insofar as it was constructed as the center of action 
and mobilization for a nationwide revolution. In sum, Tahrir became the center of the revolution, 
and this fact involved both mobilization opportunities and also limitation.  
Next, let me turn to Bourdieu’s observation. In a discussion elaborating his theorization 
of the state as a field, Bourdieu (1999: 57) states the following: 
…there is no more potent tool for rupture than the reconstruction of genesis: by 
bringing back into view the conflicts and confrontations of the early beginnings 
and therefore all the discarded possibles, it retrieves the possibility that things 
could have been (and still could be) otherwise. And, through such a practical 
utopia, it questions the “possible” which, among all others, was actualized. 
 
Here, Bourdieu talks about possibilities not as mere speculation, but as moments and 
opportunities that had genuine potential based in historical reality. Hence, the value in tracing the 
specific historical processes that led to one social institution arising as opposed to others—in this 
case, the particular formation of the state. I find Bourdieu’s comments useful because Tahrir’s 
effect on its outside was not only one of spatial marginalization, but also a culmination of 
historical conditions that favored Tahrir and not the possibilities that existed beyond its borders. 
As I discussed at the start of the chapter, the popular committees and labor strikes were not airy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 See also Kevin O’Brien (2003) for a discussion of how movements sometimes challenge the idea of 
either contained or transgressive contention. 
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possibilities or pipe dreams; they were actual mobilizations that had important effects and had 
the potential to shift the revolution beyond its narrow revolutionary boundary.  
What do I mean by a revolutionary boundary? I am proposing the term to refer to the 
creation of a dual-sided boundary that simultaneously marks mobilizations and actions within 
this limit as part of the revolution, and denotes others forms of mobilizations and actions outside 
the boundary as not part of the revolution, or at least less relevant to it. As I have tried to 
demonstrate, Tahrir itself and its demands constituted the boundary of the Egyptian Revolution. 
In relation to those events and activities that were beyond or outside of Tahrir, this boundary 
worked through ambivalence, the failure to resolve the relationship between the various spaces.  
And in relation to those voices and issues that were silenced or suppressed within Tahrir, the 
boundary operated through the idea of unity.  Any voices deemed harmful to this unity were 
constituted as outside the revolutionary boundary.  
It is important to say few things about this idea. First, this boundary was not created only 
in 2011. Rather, a diverse yet specific set of historical conditions constituted Tahrir as the center 
of the revolution and deemed mobilization efforts outside the square as in the margins. These 
conditions included the media obsession with Tahrir, the regime’s attempts to limit mobilization 
to Tahrir and its own paradoxical endorsement of Tahrir as its central counterpart, the historical 
significance of the place itself that made it a target of protest, the reliance on a sit-in as the 
central mode of action, and the history of coalition building in and around Tahrir. Together, these 
conditions created a conjuncture of processes that made Tahrir the most powerful center of 
gravity of the Egyptian Revolution, the pivot point around which a revolutionary boundary was 
established.   
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 So, there were multiple historical factors that led to the revolution becoming defined as 
and reduced to Tahrir. But what about the agency of protestors in Tahrir? Did they intend to 
marginalize voices within Tahrir and overlook opportunities outside? This is my second point. If 
we agree that there were diverse factors that led to this outcome, then things like the ambivalence 
of protestors and the nature of compromise within Tahrir are just one factor among many. The 
making of the revolutionary boundary cannot be attributed to any particular group or decision; 
instead, the process by which the revolutionary boundary was constructed was, in fact, replete 
with contingency—there were multiple moments at which a different conjuncture of events and 
actors might have shifted the boundary. But changing one factor alone does not guarantee a 
different outcome.  Thus, whether or not protestors in Tahrir intended to marginalize actors and 
events outside the square is not the right question. Indeed, I suggest that to the extent that 
protestors in Tahrir marginalized voices inside Tahrir, and gave insufficient attention to 
possibilities outside Tahrir, they did so primarily “un-intentionally.” My point is not to say that 
they weren’t aware of their own actions, complete with their various pros and cons; but rather, to 
say the making of a revolutionary boundary is a complex and contingent process that no one 
person or groups of persons controls.  I wish to make two points here. The first is to emphasize 
how overwhelming the situation was for most protestors. Not only did they have to contend with 
issues of basic survival and continued mobilization, but as many of my friends and informants 
told me, most people simply didn’t know what to do. The YCR itself was deciding on things on 
daily basis. Wael Khalil, a leading blogger and activist stated, for example: 
What I can describe as our “revolutionary psyche” shifted not only from one day 
to another, but also within the same day. The typical daily curve was as follows: 
in the morning, concern that not enough people would show up; by noon, 
confidence upon seeing mass numbers turning up, then later, as people start to 
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leave the square, anxiety and eagerness to know what is really happening outside 
the square. 230 
 
Likewise, Laila Soueif stated: 
Things were fluid and in flux all the time, from the first moment. On the night of 
January 25 for example, if Mubarak make some reforms, things may have been 
different. But instead they attacked protestors. The more they attacked the more 
things escalated. People on January 28 were angrier and more determined and 
away bigger numbers than January 25th. The more the regime is resisting reform 
and also attacking the more the people raise higher demands. This is a 
revolutionary moment where intensity and unpredictability was ruling the 
situation.231 
 
As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, the Tahrir sit-in was not really established until 
January 28. Even on this day, the protestors were scattered throughout the square, still navigating 
the situation with the army presence (see Figure 20). On the night of January 28, protestors 
decided to form the sit-in. At this point, they had no system of security per se; it was not until 
February 3, following the attacks of pro-Mubarak thugs, that protestors decided to develop a 
more advanced security system—and it was only at this point that the sit-in was really formed.    
Laila Soueif and several informants told me different stories about people from both 
southern Egypt and also from the Nile Delta cities coming to Tahrir and joining the sit-in with 
their own tents. I myself saw many tents bearing the signs of different cities in Egypt (see Figure 
21).  Also many poor villagers who belong to the MB and Salafies came and joined Tahrir. 
These protestors were supported financially by the networks of the MB and Salafies. The 
presence of population from outside Cairo gave more representation power to Tahrir, but also 
contributed to negatively  affecting mobilization outside Cairo.  
  And to share a personal example, I consider myself equipped with some decent 
organizing skills.  I gained a great deal of experience working in different spheres in Egypt under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 Interview, April 10, 2011.  
231 Interview, November 20, 2012. 
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Mubarak from 1995 to 2004. And yet, when activists running the YCR stage asked me at least 
twice to speak, I felt overwhelmed and intimidated by the tens of thousands of people in front of 
the stage and I refused. In my field notes, I find over and over again some variation of the 
following comment from protestors: “We were just walking around and looking at the faces, 
enjoying the moment, but also directionless.” Yes, protestors were talking about Tahrir as “the 
safest place in Egypt” and as a utopia, but they also experienced it as a disorienting, 
overwhelming space in which they simply didn’t know what to do from day to day, often 
focusing instead on the mundane realities of survival. Activist Ahmed Ezzat told me : 
When Tahrir protestors started the sit-in on January 28, 2011 at night, they did not 
have any other choice. At the time, there was the Mubarak regime and his security 
apparatus (seemed to be defeated at the time) on one side, and protestors have this 
[liberated] square on the other. If we have left the square, we would have being 
killed. The protestors will receive a worse repression than what they have 
received. We saw it very well in the days from January 25 to January 28 (until 
late afternoon), where Mubarak and his security apparatus did nothing but to 
arrest leading activists and kill protestors. At the time, we could not think of any 
big strategies, just save ourselves and save the uprising. If we could die outside 
the square any way, why not die here, for the sake of the uprising?232 
 
Here, Ezzat was talking especially about the first night when protestors had to decide whether to 
continue the sit-in, but this survival mode continued for some time.  The only central plan was to 
keep the revolution going until the demands (political reform and ousting Mubarak—and over 
time, maybe even just the latter) were met.  
It should be noted that some of my informants who can be classified  as experienced 
organizers did work with others to try to bridge the gap between Tahrir on the one hand and the 
popular committees and the working class on the other. They told me that at the time, especially 
in the early part of the 18 days, it was understood that the greatest danger was that Tahrir would 
be isolated from the rest of society. One of those organizers is Wael Tawfeeq. He told me the 
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story of forming an impromptu movement/organization in Tahrir, which they called the 25th of 
January youth movement. The first meeting was spontaneous, but one of the first tasks discussed 
was the need to reach out to neighborhoods, and especially the popular committees.  In my 
interview with Tawfeeq on November 21, 2012, he stated: 
The meeting was on the night of January 30, 2011. And this was the second 
meeting for the group that met in the square, after our first meeting which was 
spontaneous in Tahrir in the same day during the day. We had the meeting in the 
Press Syndicate in Ramsis St. We did not meet in Tahrir just because we wanted a 
more quiet place. No less than 500 persons attended the meeting. And the meeting 
was in the floor of the syndicate as we were not allowed to meet in one of the 
rooms. Our main discussion was how to reach out to people outside Tahrir. Then 
we decided to talk about division of labor and we divided  the (new) movement 
into groups, and which group is to work on one issue. These were four groups: 
provinces, labor, media and legal issues. If you notice, three of the committees 
were about reaching out outside Tahrir.   
 
Tawfeeq told me that the first thing the group did was issue a statement that was distributed in 
neighborhoods and in working class areas both within and outside Cairo. The statement talked 
about bridging the gap between Tahrir and the neighborhoods; as Tawfeeq described it:  
The main focus of the statement was to explain to the public what is Tahrir all 
about. Who are the people in Tahrir, and what are their demands, and we tried to 
tell the public, either the labor or the people in neighborhoods that Tahrir’s 
demands are also their own demands. We distributed the statement in 7 areas, in 
Cairo and outside Cairo. These are: Helwan, Shoubra, 6th October City, and Sadat 
City, Mahala, Alexandria, Kafr al-Dawar. Most of these are labor concentrated 
areas. We distributed 60 thousand copies, and this was a big number for us, at the 
time.  Labor entered the revolution strongly with strikes in the last few days of the 
revolt. I cannot say that this is because of our statement of course. But I would say 
that our statement was important in mobilizing labor. 
 
 Ahmed Ezzat, another experienced organizer in Tahrir, worked with others to form the 
so-called the Egyptian Committees to Defend the Revolutions a couple months after the ousting 
of Mubarak. These committees were based on networking the popular committees which were 
established during the 18 days to continue to defend neighborhoods. He told me how many 
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activists in Tahrir worked to spread the idea of popular committees and reach out to what were 
formed from these committees during the 18 days. He stated: 
Tahrir was liberated by protestors but still under attack. Protestors came up with 
the idea of protecting themselves and establishing check-points and security 
committees. And some said we have to inform our neighborhoods and networks 
about the idea. The idea then started to spread. We simply were hoping to 
spreading the [logic of the revolution in the] square to these neighborhoods, not 
only the popular committees idea. But in the beginning, we started to receive 
news about attacks on neighborhoods, or people are frightened by the lack of 
security. Then there were many groups and open discussions in the square about 
the need to spread the idea of popular committees to neighborhoods.  I cannot 
confirm that it we in Tahrir are the only reason to spread the idea outside. But we 
wanted to reach out, one to make sure that people are safe, and also to spread the 
revolution. 
 
The idea of “spreading” the square or making all Egyptian squares parallel to the main square 
(Tahrir) existed among many activists, but as noted above, activists themselves were ambivalent 
about the relationship between the square and its outside. One slogan that was common at the 
time is very telling. The slogan goes “Do not come to Tahrir empty handed.” On the surface, this 
was just a message circulated among activists and told to daily visitors to Tahrir that they should 
bring food, water, blankets, medicine, and other supplies with them, or even better yet, other 
friends, family, or neighbors with them the next day. It was a great thing to support the square. 
But as another activist pointed out to me, the imperative to support Tahrir raised the question: 
“How do you want to spread the revolution everywhere and at the same time focus mainly on 
Tahrir to make it stronger?” 
In sum, Tahrir’s effect on the Egyptian Revolution was a complicated, often paradoxical 
one. As one informant, Norhan Tharwat, put it:  
This specific charm of the square comes from many things. Yes, we lived together 
there. We had lost ones there. But the media was insisting that the revolution is 
only in Tahrir. It is like we were admitting this and we acting accordingly. There 
was a construction of a myth about Tahrir, and we all contributed to it, not only 
the media. I would not say there is a conspiracy, but the insistence of the regime 
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and international media that the revolution is only on Tahrir created this myth. It 
was unfortunate that we were not very critical of that at the time.233 
 
At the same time, it was difficult to be critical of this effect precisely because it was so powerful; 
as Dr. Laila Soueif stated: 
Tahrir [read protestors in Tahrir] was aware that the millions come during the day 
and leave. The power of Tahrir was not from the few hundred thousands or so 
sleeping at night, in the last few days. It was from the millions coming every day, 
and from the sometimes 10 million persons or even more in all over Egypt. Tahrir 
was not authoritative to the rest of Egypt. Tahrir was kind of bragging about this 
power. Tahrir was telling the regime, we are those millions. We are true 
representation of the nation. And our message is the people’s message.234 
 
	  
Figure 20  Tahrir was like a battle zone on the afternoon of January 28, 2011. The sit-in was 
formed only on the night of January 28, 2011. Picture taken by Hossam El-Hamalway and used 
here with his permission. 
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Figure 21  A sign on a tent in Tahrir. The sign reads: “This is the camp of the peasants of Faqous 
Ash Sharqiyah.” Faqous is a town in Ash Sharqiyah province in the Nile, Delta Egypt. Picture by 
the author, taken on February 9, two days before ousting Mubarak. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has three empirical and two theoretical implications. The first empirical 
implication is the importance of studying the working class action in Egypt, not separately but in 
relation to other dynamics that took place in Egypt, especially during the time of the revolution. 
Most research about the role of the working class during or after the revolution has not given 
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enough attention to the question of Tahrir’s relation to working class strikes. The second related 
empirical implication is that while most research continues to focus on Tahrir, it is important to 
provide a larger spatial map of the various modes of action that took place in Egypt during the 18 
days of the revolution. It is worth noting also that the important role of popular committees 
during the revolution is still understudied.235 The research in this chapter is a contribution to the 
discussion about the nature and the role of these committees.  The third empirical implication is 
the value of ethnographic analysis that can shed light on how the question of the unity in Tahrir 
played out and was experienced and negotiated on the ground. As the discussion in this chapter 
shows, that unity had some fragility, but it is important not to look back with the full benefit of 
hindsight and pronounce what should have been done differently. Was the coalition between 
liberal and Islamist groups a tense and temporary one? It’s easy enough to offer that diagnosis 
now, knowing what we do about the failed transition to democracy and the polarization that has 
developed around the MB, but it’s important also to recognize the spirit of compromise and 
solidarity that led protestors at the time to form that coalition and defend it so fiercely.   
As for theoretical implications, there are two.  First, this chapter serves perhaps as an 
invitation to study coalitions in social movements and revolutions (and the larger question of 
oppositions under authoritarianism) more rigorously. As noted above, Goldstone reminds us that 
revolutionary unity is often short-lived, disintegrating shortly after “a brief  euphoria over the fall 
of the old regime” (2003: 3). Goldstone also suggests that when  revolutionary coalitions fracture 
after the revolution, the fracture can take various forms: “constructive opposition, paralysis, or 
polarization” (2011b: 461). Close ethnographic and historical analysis of coalitions and the 
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Committees: From Moments of Madness to NGO Dilemmas,” Middle East Research and Information 
Project, 42 (Winter), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer265/egypts-popular-committees (last accessed June 6, 
2016).  
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process of their making may well shed light on where, when, and why they might fracture after a 
revolution. As for the second theoretical implication, this chapter is also an invitation to expand 
our analyses of cases in which movements are simultaneously contained and transgressive at the 
same time. Last, though my proposal about the idea of revolutionary boundary is case specific, I 
also think it has some theoretical implications beyond the argument against the rigid dichotomy 
of contained and transgressive contentions. Not only the concept is an invitation to broaden our 
spatial analysis to revolutions, but also the idea is an invitation to historically and rigorously 
study cases of suppressed and incomplete or failed revolution at large. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation, I examine Tahrir Square as both a political space and a lens for 
understanding the successes and failures of the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. I argue that Tahrir 
Square and the mobilization around it played a significant role in the Egyptian Revolution, but 
that this role was paradoxical. I describe this as the “Tahrir Effect.” 
This effect refers to the way in which, on the one hand, the emergence of Tahrir as the 
central voice and site of the revolution served to amplify the event, draw attention to it, and assist 
in mobilization; but on the other hand, this centralization of mobilization in one form and in one 
place also distracted from other kinds of organizing, silenced other voices and issues, and limited 
further radicalization of the revolution in ways that might have demanded more than political 
reform and a post-Mubarak transition managed by the military.  
 In the introduction, I established the paradox that the dissertation sought to address, and 
presented a theoretical framework that combines insights from theories of space and contentious 
politics. Then, I outlined my data and methodology. I described the two phases of historical and 
ethnographic research I conducted in Egypt between 2011 and 2013, and provided a discussion 
of how this data was then organized and analyzed. I also discussed my specific positionality vis-
à-vis this research, given my own status as a human rights researcher and activist in Egypt.  
In Chapter Two, I investigated why it was that protestors went to Tahrir Square in the 
first place. Drawing on the accounts of participants, my own observations, and the long history 
of protests in Egypt, I emphasized the meanings and dynamics that precede the mobilization to a 
revolution, and that challenge dominant frameworks in social movement scholarship that 
underplay the role and significance of space and time. I began by explaining the necessary 
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backdrop to any study of political contention in Egypt: the authoritarian regime of Hosni 
Mubarak. I argued that public political space was a crucial site of struggle between the 
undemocratic regime and those who opposed it. I highlighted, in particular, the significance of 
social media and its expansion of political public space, and the rise of “street” politics in the 
years directly preceding 2011. In the second part of the chapter, I focused specifically on the 
spatial and political history of Tahrir Square. I argued that we not only need to widen our 
understanding of the role of space in mobilization politics, but we also need to give greater 
attention to spaces’ historical significance. I connected mobilization for the Egyptian Revolution 
to almost a hundred years of protest history in and around Tahrir Square, and I examined the 
various ways in which this history was present in the memories of many protestors in 2011, 
actively shaping both their actions and the meanings they assigned to events as they unfolded.  
In Chapter Three, I explored how and why the sit-in in Tahrir Square emerged as the 
main mode of action of the revolution. And I asked, how, despite an almost continuous state of 
siege and attacks by security forces and regime supporters, at least in the first week of protests, 
the protests in Tahrir were not only able to literally survive, but also continue to mobilize and 
expand? I highlighted specific features of the repertoires of contention that constituted the 
Egyptian revolution, how and why they came together at Tahrir, and how they interacted with 
one another. Specifically, I examined how the actions and events that unfolded in and around 
Tahrir were: 1) characterized by a complex interplay of organization and spontaneity; 2) 
centrally concerned with issues of both basic survival and political mobilization; 3) constituted 
through multiple repertoires of contention, in which the sit-in was central, but also supplemented 
in various ways by other actions such as barricades, rallies, and targeted attacks on government 
buildings; and 4) given added symbolic and practical efficacy through social media and what I 
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referred to as the virtual making of Tahrir. My arguments here were constructed, in large part, in 
response to problematic characterizations of the Egyptian revolution that would paint it, 
alternately, as purely spontaneous, entirely reducible to a social media phenomenon, confined 
completely to the sit-in at Tahrir, and/or remarkable only as a political accomplishment and not 
also (and just as importantly) as a stunning practical achievement. Theoretically, I reflected on 
how the analyses in this chapter build upon, but also refine Tilly’s concept of repertoires of 
contention. Specifically, I suggested that the events in Tahrir point to new ways of thinking 
about the scale of repertoires, how repertoires interact with one another, and the ways in which 
repertoires become modular. 
In Chapter Four, I explored a twofold question: why were the various demands of the 
revolution ultimately limited to a call for democratic reforms, focused almost exclusively on 
elections, and how did Tahrir Square—and only Tahrir Square—become privileged as the 
legitimate voice of the revolution? To address the issue of the revolution’s demands, I look at the 
history of the various coalitions that came together in Tahrir: a) political coalitions, b) cross-class 
coalitions, and c) youth coalitions.  I showed how and why, despite their differences, the various 
groups that formed these types of coalitions eventually settled on a shared agenda that focused 
on the ousting of Mubarak and an essentially reformist revolution. Next, I argued that during the 
18 days of the Tahrir sit-in/revolution, the relationship between the protestors in Tahrir and the 
regime itself entailed a form of mutual recognition and opposition at the same time that 
constituted Tahrir as the embodiment of revolutionary legitimacy. From the regime’s perspective, 
focusing on Tahrir was a way to isolate the square and contain nationwide protest, whereas for 
protestors in Tahrir, continuing to occupy the largest liberated zone in the country took on 
enormous symbolic power and generated its own form of mobilization.  
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Chapter Five was devoted to a close study of the various modes of actions that took place 
outside Tahrir, but which were negatively affected by the centralization of Tahrir in the 
revolution, as well as the voices and issues that were marginalized within Tahrir.  My arguments 
in this chapter built upon Tilly’s theorization of space in contentious politics, specifically his 
discussion of spatiality of claim making as well as notions of contained and transgressive 
contention. I also took inspiration from a specific observation by Pierre Bourdieu that directs our 
attention to the revolutionary possibilities that were not realized—the various paths not taken in 
the Egyptian Revolution, so to speak. I synthesized these insights from Bourdieu and Tilly to 
argue that Tahrir was constructed both physically and symbolically as the “revolutionary 
boundary” of the revolution, thus limiting both the revolutionary possibilities beyond the square, 
as well as which actions and agendas were given priority within it.  
The rest of this conclusion is divided into two parts. In the first, I discuss political 
developments in Egypt since the ousting of Mubarak, with a special focus on issues related to 
mobilization and spatiality and Tahrir. In the second, I review first the empirical, then the 
theoretical implications of this research. talk briefly about some empirical implication of this 
research followed by discussing few theoretical implications of this research. I will start now 
with the developments in Egypt after ousting Mubarak.236 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 I originally planned to devote one section of this conclusion to discussing the spatiality of the Arab 
Spring in general and to relate this to the spatiality of events in Egypt specifically.  Unfortunately, I have 
not yet been able to develop this discussion to my satisfaction given time constraints, though this remains 
a priority as I look toward converting this project into a book manuscript.  Briefly, and at the risk of some 
simplification, I will make just a few observations here. There were certainly some similarities/and or 
connections between Egypt and space and contention in the rest of the so-called Arab Spring. The first of 
these is the export of the idea of occupying a major public square from Egypt to other cases. This 
happened most notably in Yemen and in Bahrain. In Yemen, protestors staged sit-ins in both Change 
Square in Sanaa and Liberation Square in Taaz. In Bahrain, protestors occupied the Pearl Roundabout, 
and the uprising was even named after it. The regime then demolished it on March 18, 2011. Sit-in as a 
main mode of action of the uprisings was not common then, it only existed in Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain. 
The second similarity is the dominance of the idea of marches after Friday prayers, when protestors 
capitalized on the convenience  of mobilizing the crowds that gather immediately following prayers. In 
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I. Political Developments Since the Ousting of Mubarak 
So much has happened in Egypt since the ousting Mubarak on February 11, 2011that it 
would impossible to summarize it adequately here. In the previous chapters, I have mentioned 
some scattered examples related to mobilization and Tahrir. Here, I provide only a broad 
overview of developments, then a general discussion about spatiality and mobilization and the 
revolution at large. The simple story about events in Egypt from 2011 to the time of this writing 
(end of June 2014) could go something like this.  Egyptians took to the streets in huge public 
protests on January 25, 2011. After 18 days of protest that included a major sit-in in Cairo’s 
famous Tahrir Square, Egyptians successfully ousted Mubarak from office. The Supreme 
Council of Armed Forces, the leadership body of the Egyptian military, succeeded Mubarak in 
ruling Egypt. This situation lasted for almost a year and a half, then in June 2012, Egyptians 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
terms of differences, I saw two things. First, I would argue that the relationship between social media and 
places of contention varied from place to place in the Arab Spring—there was no one pattern, rather this 
relationship was place-specific. In the case of Tahrir, social media helped to amplify the event and fed 
into the iconization of Tahrir, but this was not the case in later uprisings in the region. The second main 
difference between Egypt and other cases in the Arab Spring is that it seems that the question of 
regionalism was very important in many of these cases, but not in Egypt. Regionalism refers here to 
major splits and/or economic and social, cultural, or political differences between different regions, and 
how this factor affected the trajectory of the uprisings. Regionalism appeared to be a particularly 
important factor in Yemen and Libya especially. All of these issues warrant further discussion, which I 
hope to include in future writing about this research.  
For an interesting, recent take on the relation between urban public squares and revolution, see Matt Ford, 
“A Dictator’s Guide to Urban Design,” The Atlantic, February 21, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
international/archive/2014/02/a-dictators-guide-to-urban-design/283953/ (accessed July 3, 2014). For a 
discussion of the importance of the Avenue Habib Bourguiba in the Tunisian revolution, see Kareem 
Fahim, “Tunis Journal: Revolution and its Aftermath Play Out on an Avenue that Defines a City,” New 
York Times, March 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/world/africa/tunis-journal-a-front-row-
seat-for-an-uprising.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed July 3, 2014). For video footage of Liberation 
Square during the uprising in Bengazi, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K3j67Q3Je2c (accessed 
July 3, 2014), and for discussion see Leela Jacinto, “Benghazi’s Tahrir Square: Times Square Style Meets 
Revolutionary Zeal,” France24.com, April 25, 2011, http://www.france24.com/en/20110425-libya-
benghazi-tahrir-square-times-reporters-notebook-leela-jacinto/ (accessed July 3, 2014). Regarding the 
symbolic destruction of the Pearl roundabout in Bahrain, see Martin Chulov, “Bahrain Destroys Pearl 
Roundabout,” The Guardian, March 18, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/18/bahrain-
destroys-pearl-roundabout (accessed July 3, 2014). And finally, and most importantly, see the works of 
Nasser Rabbat (2011, 2012) on the spatiality of the Arab Spring. 
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democratically elected a new president, Mohamed Morsi. Morsi, the leader of the Muslim 
Brotherhood-backed Freedom and Justice Party,237 took office on June 30, 2012. But by the end 
of June 2013, Egyptians took to the streets once again to oust the new president. The Egyptian 
military intervened and removed the president from office on July 3, 2013. In June 2014, the 
minster of defense, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was elected as a new president. In many ways, one could 
say that since ousting Mubarak, Egypt has been caught in an endless state of “transition”—a 
transition supposedly leading to democracy, but in which true democracy has yet to be realized 
and, indeed, in which democracy has arguably been even further eroded. 
The process of writing a new constitution, for example, was fraught with problems and 
undermined by a lack of societal consensus, including in particular the marginalization of most 
liberal and leftist groups. The process was controlled by the MB and political Islamists on the 
one hand, and by SCAF on the other. After the ousting of Morsi in 2013, the process of writing 
yet another new constitution was almost entirely controlled by the military. This new constitution 
also excluded the MB from the writing process, as they were being targeted and prosecuted by 
the new leadership in Egypt. In general, the entire transition (now two transitions) was 
dominated by two powerful entities in Egypt: SCAF and the MB, while youth groups, or what 
can be described as the coalition that emerged in Tahrir, did not participate as such, or at the very 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237The difference between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party may confuse many 
observers of Egypt. In theory, the reason for this is that the Muslim Brotherhood existed historically as a 
group that preaches for Islamic morals and education. However, the group became politicized over time. 
It existed illegally under Mubarak but continued to survive and grow. After the revolution, the leaders of 
the Muslim Brotherhood established the Freedom and Justice Party in order to run for elections and 
participate in official politics. Not all members of the Muslim Brotherhood are members of the party and, 
indeed, the relationship between the two remains ambivalent. Several of my interviewees who were 
former Muslim Brotherhood members told me that the Muslim Brotherhood will continue separately from 
the Freedom and Justice Party. These same interviewees admitted that it would be difficult to separate the 
two. The interviews took place before the ousting of Morsi in the summer of 2012. After Morsi was 
ousted, the military-led government continued to target the Muslim Brotherhood, prosecuting its members 
and issuing court orders to ban the party and the organization.  
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least, the democratic vision of Tahrir was never reflected in either the constitution or the new 
governments.  
Consider also what some view as one of the major achievements of the revolution beyond 
ousting Mubarak—namely, the post-revolution opportunity to form new political parties. Under 
Mubarak, forming new political parties was very difficult and involved an onerous legal and 
political process of submitting a request to an administrative commission that was, in turn, 
controlled by state security and the ruling party.  After the revolution this process changed and 
the commission was replaced by a judicial one. But this openness also meant opening the door to 
several parties, including “religion-based parties,” a move many activists saw as deliberately 
fueling sectarianism and going against the democratic nature of the revolution.238 The revolution 
also opened the door for the formation of new independent trade unions and ended the control of 
the dominance of the state and the security-controlled trade union federation. But the irony is that 
while these developments took place, despotic laws, especially those governing rights to 
assembly and strikes, remained unchanged. In other words, Egyptians may have gained the right 
to organize legally, after decades of severe restrictions, but their rights to practice politics in the 
broader sense were still controlled and repressed.  Not only that, but new despotic laws were 
enacted. None of the administrations since the ousting of Mubarak have fully guaranteed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 There remain many debates regarding religion-based parties in Egypt and how to define them. The 
simple definition is that these are parties that explicitly invoke religion in their program. The grey areas of 
this definition were exploited by the MB and Islamist parties during the first transitional period (under 
SCAF and, indeed, with the blessing of SCAF, according to many activists). This fact created divisions 
within the Tahrir coalition, with some groups feeling betrayed by the MB in the immediate post-Mubarak 
period. But in the new constitution under the military, religious parties are banned: political parties may 
not be formed based on "religion, race, gender or geography.” Nonetheless, the military regime has been 
cooperating with some salafies in order to avoid appearing anti-religion and in order to further its own 
goals in the context of the war against the MB. Thus the main salafi group has a party, the Nour Party, 
which cooperated with the military to oust Morsi and continues to cooperate with the military today.  
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freedom of expression and right to assembly. Indeed, a new draconian law that limits (indeed, 
practically bans) protest has just been enacted by the current military regime.239 
 This is the general picture, put simply. But looking beyond the surface, Egypt witnessed 
many important debates at each stage and under each different form of rule: under SCAF, then 
SCAF/MB/Morsi, and then back again to military rule. Briefly, I argue there are three main 
debates. The first concerns the very meaning of democracy, with some arguing that democracy is 
more than just a ballot box, while others emphasize that even flawed elections are better than no 
democracy at all.  Activists have been strongly critical of the narrow, procedural definition of 
democracy that both SCAF and the MB have relied upon during their respective periods of rule, 
and deployed to suppress politics by other means. Both SCAF and the MB resisted reforms by 
insisting that democracy was already in place thanks to the holding of elections. One can’t help 
but note, of course, the irony that Tahrir’s consensus was centered around the model of 
representative democracy, and after the revolution of 2011, it was precisely this narrow model of 
democracy that came back to haunt activists, so to speak, now redeployed as an argument 
against more substantive forms of democracy, including broader forms of social and economic 
justice.   
Over the last three and a half years, some activists have pointed out that Egypt has now 
witnessed so many elections and referendum that people have become was exhausted with 
formal politics and procedural democracy. They declare the absence of “real” democracy, which 
they argue means respecting public opinion and allowing freedom of expression and the right to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 Also, as discussed earlier, one cannot underestimate the victory of ousting Mubarak by popular 
rebellion. Juan Cole (2014) reminds us that the Arab Spring still had several key accomplishments. The 
most important of which are ending the idea of president-for-life, and also ending the idea of “family 
cartels as the leadership of the Arab republics.” See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/juan-cole/arab-
spring_b_5542452.html?utm_hp_ref=yahoo&ir=Yahoo (accessed July 3, 2014).  
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assembly. On the other hand, both the MB and SCAF and many conservative voices have argued 
that elections are a crucial step recognized as the main mechanism of representative democracy 
throughout the world. These debates over the meaning of democracy are not merely semantic, 
they have had serious implications. For example, MB supporters and those who voted for Morsi 
now say that democracy has been betrayed in Egypt. They date the failure of the revolution to the 
moment that Morsi, the democratically elected president, was ousted in July 2013. Others argue 
that this is a simplistic reading that overestimates the democratic character of the transition from 
the very beginning; they note that the transition at all stages has been controlled by some 
combination of the SCAF, the MB, and the military and security  apparatuses. In other words, 
democracy has been failing throughout the entire transitional process.240 
The second debate is linked to the above, and centers around whether the events of July 3, 
2013—when the military ousted Mohamed Morsi—constitute a coup or a revolution .241 The 
question is significant because there was both mass mobilization against Morsi and a military 
coup. Some other complications relate to evidence revealed later, which showed that the deep 
state/intelligence apparatus of the military and the security were in touch with some of the 
leaders of the youth movement (Tamaroud, or rebel campaign)that played an important role in 
the protests against Morsi. The story is not that simple because to argue that millions took to the 
street against Morsi because they were all complicit in a military plot and security plan is 
illogical. Many Egyptian activists at the time avoided this discussion and/or argued that this was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 See also a debate among experts of Egypt about the coup in relation to democracy in Egypt, discussed 
in Mohammad Fadel, “What Killed Egyptian Democracy?,” Boston Review, January 21, 2014, 
http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/mohammad-fadel-what-killed-egyptian-democracy (accessed July 3, 
2014).  
241 Ironically, the new military-backed constitution in Egypt, put in force in January 2014, acknowledges 
the “25th, January 2011 revolution and also the “June 30th, 2013 revolution.” The irony is that while the 
constitution acknowledges these events, the current regime is restoring the old regime and targeting 
everything related to these “revolutions” and protests. For the text of the constitution, see 
http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/Dustor-en001.pdf (accessed July 3, 2014).  
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simplistic framing of the discussion. To say it was a coup means admitting that Morsi was 
democratically-elected and ignoring the mass protests against Morsi; to say it was a revolution 
means you have to deny the election of Morsi as democratic and ignore the military intervention.  
If there is one main lesson I have learned from writing this dissertation, however, it is the 
significance of time and its ability to destabilize meaning. It was time that led activists to 
eventually become more critical of Tahrir, as I explained in Chapter Five. And likewise, as I 
have been writing this dissertation, activists in Egypt have started to become more critical of the 
events that led to the ousting of Morsi. At the time, events were a mixed bag of protest and 
military intervention, fuelling confusion and a lack of certainty regarding how to classify what 
happened. But in hindsight, things have become clearer. It is a fact is that the military seized 
upon the opportunity presented by people’s protests against  Morsi. The security apparatus and 
the media also contributed to fueling anger with Morsi, and, indeed, Morsi himself and his 
administration exacerbated the problem by continuing to exclude all the secular parties from the 
constitutional writing process.  Events since show that the military has now regained total control 
of Egypt, making the events of June/July 2013 almost certainly a coup.242 On June 30, 2014, the 
first anniversary of the June 30, 2013 protests, Big Pharaoh, an Egyptian blogger, wrote on his 
Twitter account, “June 30 was definitely not a revolution and it was not just a coup. June 30 + 
July 3 = popularly backed coup.”243 Similarly, Amr Khalifa, a journalist and political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242As I mentioned in the introduction, my positionality continued affecting this research and while writing 
this dissertation. On June 29, 2013, one day before the protests, I published an article (in Arabic) in the 
Socialist Papers, a magazine in Cairo, published by the Revolutionary Socialists Group. In this article, I 
warned the revolutionaries that they should not be fooled by the military twice. See http://revsoc.me/ 
politics/l-tldg-lthwr-mn-jhr-mrtyn-ljysh-wlthwr-fy-msr/ (accessed July 3, 2014).  
243 What Big Pharaoh is referring to here is that there is a difference between June 30, 2013 and July 3, 
2013. Interpreting what happened on these dates is also a reason for debates in Egypt. June 30, 2013 was 
the day when there was mass protests against Morsi in Egypt. And July 3, 2013 is the day when the 
military announced ousting Morsi. Some activists in Egypt said we agree and endorse protests against 
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commentator, Tweeted on the same day: “On Jun 30 2013 I termed what occurred as a 
Revolutionary Coup . I was wrong. It was a coup but [only] few of us had the right glasses.”244 
The third debate, and the one most relevant to this dissertation, concerns the outcome and 
meaning of the “original” revolution itself, not only in light of the troubled three years and half, 
but also in light of the point we are at now. In the current context,  the new military regime is not 
only restoring the pre-Mubarak order, but also punishing the society and the youth for the 
revolution with excessive repression. A major part of the debate in Egypt now is whether the 
January revolution was a failure or not? In many ways, this debate has been ongoing since 
Mubarak was ousted on February 11, 2011. From that moment on, both SCAF and the MB, as 
well as significant parts of the ruling elites and intellectuals, emphasized that the revolution had 
already “succeeded” in ousting Mubarak and thus urged all the radical voices in Tahrir and 
elsewhere to stop protesting, and to practice democracy only through formal channels. But many 
protestors  resisted this narrative, argued that nothing had really changed, and raised the slogan 
“ the revolution continues”—meaning that the revolution will continue until its broader demands 
of “bread, liberty, and economic justice” have been realized.  
Mainstream scholarship regarding Egypt has not been that dissimilar to this conservative and 
ruling elite narrative in Egypt, but a few scholars have echoed the arguments of activists. Gilbert 
Achcar (2013), for example, argues that what is happening in Egypt (and the Arab Spring at 
large) must be seen as a long-term revolutionary process. Achcar points to two things to support 
this argument. The first is the continued spreadability or contagion of the events; he speculates 
that it is highly likely that many countries in the region will continue to see uprisings in the 
months and years ahead. The second is that only “profound socioeconomic transformations” —
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Morsi, but we were not necessarily pro coup. Big Pharaoh here is suggesting that combining what 
happened on June 30 and July 3 means a “popularly backed coup.” 
244 Both of them are quoted here with permission.  
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the real reasons behind the uprisings— not just mere superficial political reforms will satisfy the 
populations (Achcar 2013: 4). Earlier, I used the term “reformist revolution” to describe the 
consensus in Tahrir. We might also recall Asef Bayat’s description that this was a “refolution.” 
In the last three and a half years, some activists have suggested that the Egyptian Revolution of 
2011 was an “incomplete political revolution” or a “failed social revolution.” It is telling that the 
same activists, who have been saying over and over, “the revolution continues,” are now 
beginning to mock the slogan, saying instead “the revolution will not continue on its own.” In 
other words, they have started to judge the event by its outcome, suggesting that the January 
revolution failed (at least for the time being). 
These different views above, either academic or activists, reflect differences in the 
theoretical angle one uses to look at the revolution. If we look at the larger historical trajectory of 
events, we can see that events are still unfolding; whereas, if we look at immediate outcomes, 
one could certainly argue that the revolution has, indeed, failed. Even this bold claim can be 
questioned though, insofar as one can argue that the revolution succeeded in its narrow goal of  
ousting Mubarak. In this dissertation, I argue against the idea that the revolution has a clear 
beginning and end, and I have sought to focus on the revolution as a process. Having said that, I 
do not reject an outcome-based analysis altogether.  It is accurate to say that those who protested 
in January 2011 have witnessed major setbacks, if not a “decisive victory” of the old regime over 
the revolution. And this situation may last for a while, but not forever.  I agree here with H. A. 
Hellyer who suggested recently that the Egyptian revolution is not over, despite the fact that the 
military reestablished its control in 2013.245 Of course, to have another revolution in Egypt (or to 
continue what began with the January revolution in the same way) is unlikely; revolutionary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 See H. A. Hellyer, “A Year After Morsi, Egypt’s Revolution is Not Over,” The Guardian, June 30, 
2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/01/a-year-after-morsi-egypt-revolution 
(accessed July 3, 2014).  
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conjunctures do not repeat themselves in the same way in history, at least in a short period of 
time. I also agree with Gilbert Achcar’s insightful point that while a revolutionary conjuncture is 
overdetermined, revolutionary success is not. As he puts it:  
Overdetermination should not…be understood as overdetermination of the 
revolution’s success — that is, of the overthrow of the political powers that be 
and the shattering of …“the legal and political superstructure.” Only the 
revolutionary explosion is overdetermined. It is overdetermined in the sense that 
the exacerbation of the structural blockage holding back the development of 
productive forces, in combination with local, regional, and international 
conjunctural factors that contribute to heightening tensions, inevitably culminates 
in a popular revolt leading to a grave political crisis. If this popular uprising is to 
set a process of revolutionary change in motion, the rebellious masses must be 
capable of organizing to that end and acting effectively to achieve it. In other 
words, the transformation of a rebellious uprising into a revolution necessitates a 
subjective capacity. This subjective capacity cannot, for its part be 
“overdetermined.” (2013: 115–16) 
 
Let us look now at how issues of spatiality and protests have been shaped by these 
developments since the ousting of Mubarak. One can simply suggest that the overall relation 
between regime and repertoires of protest continued. Specifically, I would argue that in the case 
of street politics, every administration in Egypt since the revolution has continued to use 
violence to varying degrees and has been intolerant to some degree to street protests. Based on 
my observation and discussions with activists, I have come to discern the following pattern: the 
violence will be high if the number of protestors is low.  This does not mean the absence of 
police violence against protests when the number of protesters is high. But state violence will be 
lacking or minimal when the number of protestors is very high, such as the case when it exceeds 
a few hundred thousand. The logic here is that it is difficult to target a big number and this may 
increase the outrage against the regime. In sum, all administrations have used violence, but the 
violence reached its maximum with the regime that followed Morsi.  Ironically, the state under 
Mubarak did not use live ammunition against protestors before the revolution. But during and 
	  277	  
	  
after the revolution, shooting at protestors with live ammunition has continued, reaching a 
terrible climax in August 2013, when the state evacuated and open fire on  pro-Morsi and MB 
supporters staging a sit-in at Rabaa Al-Adawia. 
From the side of protestors, the regime attacks did not lead to them to stop protesting in 
the streets. As noted in Chapter Three, common repertoires in the last three years and half have 
included street rallies (the so-called “million person rallies”), sit-ins in Tahrir and in other key 
places, as well as labor strikes and “stand-ins” in downtown Cairo and in other urban centers. 
But while these are common protest repertoires, in no way am I suggesting that things have 
simply remained the same way (or have the same degree of tolerance or violence by the 
consecutive administrations in Egypt). On the contrary, as suggested earlier these were always 
produced in a context of a battle between the regime and protestors. Things got worse to the 
extent that shooting at protestors –with live ammunition-- became very normalized under the 
new military regime in Egypt, and also protests is almost banned in Egypt now, as I will explain 
below.  
Specifically, I suggest that there were three main features in the context of spatiality and 
protests in Egypt in the last three and a half years and half.246 The first feature is the presence of 
a battle about Tahrir. And this was not only between the regime and protesters but also amongst 
the different factions, which were once united during the revolution. Because of the symbolic 
power of Tahrir, something that existed historically before the revolution and then was 
intensified by the revolution, different groups started to rally in Tahrir in the aftermath of the 
revolution.  But while doing so, groups had many disputes about which groups are entitled to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 There is a fourth feature that I am not discussing here. Which is the continuation of street rallies, 
known as the one million person rallies. I am not discussing this here because there was nothing new 
about them. I discussed this earlier in Chapter 3. These rallies continued until ousting Morsi. The name 
continued, while in many cases, there was no real millions in these rallies.  
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claim that space and, in so doing, represent themselves as embodying the spirit of Tahrir and the 
revolution. Protests started right away after ousting Mubarak, under SCAF, when Tahrir 
protestors started to realize that SCAF was resisting reform. Protestors continued to rally to 
Tahrir and attempted many times to stage sit-ins there. In the first year after ousting Mubarak 
especially, secular and leftists groups and parties on the one hand, the Islamists on the other did 
diverge. One reason for this divergence was presumably the close relation that appeared between 
the MB and the Islamists on the one hand and the SCAF on the other. During that time, secular 
and leftists groups and the youth continued to rally to Tahrir and also to stage sit-ins, inspired by 
the famous one that took place during the revolution. In some cases, these sit-ins were left 
unattacked by the state. But in most cases, the SCAF and the security attacked. Also, during its 
own negotiation and coordination with SCAF at the time, the MB also preferred to organize its 
own rallies in Tahrir. MB in general preferred not to organize sit-ins with few exceptions.247  
 The regime continued to attack Tahrir and blame protestors for the lack of stability, 
using various excuses, but in most cases simply reusing narratives familiar from the revolution: 
the protestors are just a bunch of infiltrators and thugs. Also the regime started to used live 
ammunition. Protestors on the other hand, blamed the MB for what seemed to be a deal with 
SCAF. This does not mean that the MB stopped protesting. But in general, it did so only with 
Islamic forces, not in coordination with other secular and liberal forces. On July 29, 2011 for 
example, all Islamic forces, MB, Salafies and a wide range of Islamic groups, including what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 This is mainly about the period under SCAF. At the time, some leftist youth activists started to mock 
the MB and the Islamists style of protesting at the time. At the time, the MB and Islamists never staged a 
sit-in as such, aiming instead to organize a rally and some speeches in Tahrir and then to leave in the end 
of the day. So some activists started to mock the MB, and said that the MB slogan for the period is “a 
revolution until the afternoon.” The slogan is a modified version of another famous slogan, protestors 
chanted in the revolution, which goes “ revolution until victory.”But while the MB was in power, Islamic 
groups did stage sit-ins. Some were outside the Supreme Court, and sometimes outside media centers in 
Egypt. And the main case was the sit-in in Rabaa Al-Adawia, after ousting Morsi, which ended with a 
massacre by the military and police against the protestors. 
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activists and journalists identified as jihadist groups,  rallied together in Tahrir.248 The crowd 
chanted Islamic slogans including chants that Egypt should be an Islamic state.  Some activists 
said that the Islamists were showing off their power in their negotiation with the regime. The 
larger picture here was not only that the unity of Tahrir was gone, but also that the disunity of the 
Tahrir coalition was reflected symbolically in the battles over who could speak for Tahrir.249  For 
most of time since  2011, Tahrir has been reserved primarily for pro-democracy protestors, but 
after the military regime took over in 2013, protests in Tahrir were practically banned, except in 
the case of supporters of General Sisi and the new regime.  On the third anniversary of the 
revolution, pro-democracy activists were arrested in Tahrir and now faced trial. Meanwhile, 
when Sisi took office, his supporters celebrated in Tahrir. 
  The second development in the area of spatiality and protest is the emergence of what I 
describe as competing squares of protests. I mentioned this briefly in the introduction. This refers 
to the case when different groups occupy or rally in different squares at the same time. This has 
happened in during the revolution itself, when pro-democracy protestors occupied Tahrir, while 
pro-Mubarak and then pro-SCAF supporters rallied near Moustafa Mahmoud Mosque in 
Mohandesseen (also used sometimes but briefly for rallies by pro-democracy activists) and also 
other squares such as Abbassyya and also Nasr City’s El Manasa/The Unknown Soldier 
Memorial. But throughout that time, Tahrir always maintained its privilege as the main symbol 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 The main reason for this is that observers and activists saw Al-Qaeda’s famous black flags in the 
crowd. Activists in Egypt described the day as the Friday of Kandahar, named after the second largest city 
in Afghanistan, in reference to the idea that the MB is now in coalition with Islamic extremists. Some 
activists wrote about that day, and said: “ We knew the revolution has been stolen that day.” See a 
collection of YouTube videos about that day at  https://m.youtube.com/playlist?list= 
PLnJKbEpCMbiG3iKGTvfeIQ2sy1aEQQjza (accessed July 3, 2014).  
249 I mentioned this earlier in the introduction. Egyptian historian Khaled Fahmy also described this 
period in an article titled “To Whom the Square Belonged,” see http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/ 
view.aspx?cdate=23092012&id=e9eeb0ef-0b77-4c9f-a04a-2d09d18d8f48 (accessed June 30, 2014).  
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of the revolution and as the biggest square, hence why there is so much fighting over who 
occupies Tahrir now. This increased competition over public space also reflects the increasing 
polarization of the situation in Egypt. The phenomenon of competing squares reached its peak of 
bloody  upheaval after the ousting of Morsi. While supporters of the coup were gathering in 
Tahrir for different days, in the aftermath of July 2013, MB supporters and Islamists occupied 
two squares to protest the oust of Morsi. These were in front of Cairo University (Nahda Square) 
and in front of Rabaa Al-Adawiya Mosque (Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square in Nasr City, Cairo). 
They succeeded in occupying these squares for almost a month and a half. But  On August 14, 
2013, Egyptian security forces and military raided the two camps and evacuated them by force. 
The authorities used excessive violence and many were killed. Different human rights groups 
estimate that no less than 1,000 people were killed in these raids. Human Rights Watch described 
this as the “most serious mass unlawful killing in modern Egypt.”250 
 The third main feature of spatiality and protest since the revolution is the intensification 
of the battle over the streets between the regime and protesters. This confrontation reached a new 
level when the government put severe conditions on protests in 2013. On November 24, the new 
government issued a law to supposedly regulate the right to protest, but which, in reality, 
essentially aimed to limit or even ban protests altogether. Human rights groups described it as 
draconian law.251 And it seems that this was truly the case, as many activists have been targeted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/19/egypt-security-forces-used-excessive-lethal-force (accessed July 
3, 2014).  
251 Throughout this dissertation, I have not discussed the question of the legality of protest in Egypt. The 
main reason for this is that legality has been historically manipulated by the regime and was never 
respected anyway. In other words, historically, activists and rights groups used to submit requests to the 
police to organize protests, and these requests are never honored. And this goes not only to what the 
regime saw as illegal groups, but also with the actual existing political parties. Even in the times of 
elections, rallies are controlled by the police and not allowed. What was allowed during election times 
were only confined gatherings. Also, earlier in this dissertation, and in Chapter 2, I discussed the colonial 
legacy of choosing Tahrir as a center of protest since 1919. This was due to the fact that the British 
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since the law was put in place. Some have been sentenced to 7 years or 15 years, just for 
protesting without permit. Alaa Abdel Fatah, one of the icons of the revolution and one of the 
founders of the blogging movement, has been sentenced to 15 years in jail, just for supposedly 
protesting without  a permit. Also Ahmed Maher, one of the founders of the April 6 movement 
has also been sentenced to 7 years in jail, for the same reason.252 Developments such as these are 
very important because, as discussed earlier, many activists in Egypt and especially after the 
revolution found that formal politics were too narrow and corrupt to effect any real change. In 
short, many activists thought that formal politics were still controlled by the old regime.  Scholar 
Mona El-Ghobashy rightly suggested that in Egypt in the aftermath of the revolution, only street 
politics had a strong enough voice to make real change.253 This is exactly what was affirmed by 
many activists. Many of them have confirmed to me “ the only and the main gain from the 
revolution was that we gained our right to protest in the street.” This law is ending this. This 
feature reflects the larger issue I described earlier about the fact of many activists in Egypt still 
distrust formal politics, and see it, especially after their experience under authoritarianism, as 
simply one more way for regimes to manipulate politics and delay real change.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
barracks were concentrated in the Tahrir area, in what is now known as Qasr Elnile Bridge. There is 
another colonial legacy of protest control in Egypt, and this is the Illegal Assembly Law of 1914, Law 10 
of 1914. This law was enacted by the colonial administration in Egypt in 1914 and remains in effect to 
this today. But it seems that the new regime thought that this “repressive” law was not enough, hence 
their enactment of an even more repressive law against protests. See http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/ 
10/30/egypt-draft-law-would-effectively-ban-protests (accessed July 3, 2014).  
252 See coverage of these arrests and sentences at: https://www.ifex.org/egypt/2014/06/27/23_anti_ 
protestlaw_activists_detained/; http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/26/world/middleeast/egypt-law-street-
protests.html?_r=0; http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/06/30/ngo-shocked-continued-detention-anti-
protest-law-demonstrators/; and http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/53e7b196-551f-11e3-86bc-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz36LP7st5I (all accessed July 3, 2014).  
253 Mona El-Ghobashy, “Politics by Other Means,” Boston Review, November 1, 2011, 
http://www.bostonreview.net/mona-el-ghobashy-egypt-revolution-tahrir-square (accessed July 3, 2014).  
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II. Empirical and Theoretical Implications 
 
 This research has three empirical implications and six theoretical implications, as well as 
one conclusion with both theoretical and empirical significance. I will begin with the empirical 
implications. The first of these is the potentiality of future political coalitions in Egypt. As this 
research shows, there has long been tensions regarding the inclusion of the MB and Islamists in 
political coalitions in Egypt, dating from well before the revolution. These tensions were not 
only on the side of leftist and secular groups, but on the “side” of the MB side as well. And as we 
have seen since 2013, these tensions have only gotten worse in the aftermath of the ousting of 
Morsi. Thus, even though it is difficult to predict or be certain with respect to a big state/society 
like Egypt, given the history of coalition building in Egypt as well as the events in the aftermath 
of ousting Morsi, there appears to be little chance for coalitions between Islamic forces and 
secular/liberal forces in Egypt in the near future. 
 The second empirical implication that this research highlights concerns the various 
protest repertoires took place outside of Tahrir.  The emergence of the sit-in as the central mode 
of action reflects the centrality of Tahrir and the class consensus that existed there. As I will 
discuss below, this raises theoretical questions regarding whether or not some repertoires are 
shaped by the dominance of populations of specific classes. But on the empirical level, it is fair 
to say that any mass actions in Egypt in the future may suffer the same outcome and limitation of 
what happened during the revolution if they remain centralized in downtown Cairo and/or 
become dominated by the pattern of a “peaceful  limited gathering of some population,” without 
any intention of escalation against the state. Yes, my research shows that Tahrir protestors 
planned to escalate and attack centers of power, and some of this happened on the day before 
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ousting Mubarak with plans to marsh to the presidential palace.  But in general, the protest was 
peaceful and did not entail major escalation or plans to seize power, something crucial in 
revolutions. In other words, the main lesson that activists may learn in Egypt is that protestors 
should think outside the Tahrir model of organizing. And the  main lesson for observers about 
Egypt and analysts is to investigate carefully how repertoires reflect specific types of class 
politics.  
 The third empirical implication is the very characterization of the revolution as a process 
or as unsettled as discussed above. Even if we agree that the revolution failed (at least for now), 
and that the old regime—led by the military now explicitly, despite the superficial changes took 
place with election—is in total control of the state, this does not mean that the state is stable. 
Surely one of the main lessons from the Arab Spring is that theories regarding “robust 
authoritarianism” that have dominated analyses of the Middle East need questioning and 
revisiting (see Bellin 2012). As the research shows, things are still in flux in Egypt. The old 
regime may have won a decisive battle against the revolution, but if we look at the revolution as 
a process, and that robust repression does not work, this tells us that Egypt will not be stable for 
a while.  
 I will move now to the theoretical implications. The first of these is that a mode of action 
analysis can tell us a lot about a big event like a revolution. As I have hopefully demonstrated, 
such an analysis can inform us about many things—not only the spatial power of the revolution, 
but also its spatial limitation. We saw, for example, how the scope of protestors’ grievances and 
subsequent demands were limited by the (constructed) concentration of the revolution in one 
place—a concentration that reflected and in some ways intensified the consensus of the 
revolution’s participants.  I would argue that a mode of action analysis of the revolution tells us a 
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lot about its successes and limitations. It directs us to investigate closely when repertoires and 
revolutionary forces converge and when they diverge. It can help to provide some clues about the 
discrepancy between a “strong” revolutionary situation and a “poor” revolutionary outcome. As 
Tilly rightly suggested before, dominant frameworks in the study of revolutions suffer a major 
drawback in terms of their of lack of “systematic investigations of how revolutionary situations 
turn into revolutionary outcomes” (Tilly 2001: 195). 
The second theoretical implication is that this research is an invitation to rethink the 
meaning and application of the notion of rupture in revolutions. In the literature on revolution, 
there is a common idea that revolutions entail a major split or break from the past or at least an 
emergence of new paradigms of thinking or knowledge. Of course, this idea may be referring 
mainly to cases of “successful revolutions, ” something Tilly has already noted the scholarship 
tends to focus too narrowly upon (Tilly 2001: 194). Revolutions always entail a conjuncture of 
historical conditions that make them occur, but this conjuncture does not come out of nowhere. 
My analysis shows that the revolution was connected to the past in many ways. The revolution 
itself in Egypt did not cut the relation with the past. In one sense, the Egyptian revolution may be 
a failed revolution. But if we looked at it as a process, this research is also an invitation to 
rethink the meaning of rupture in relation to revolution.254    
The third theoretical implication of this research is its contribution to understanding the 
process of marginalization in social movements and revolutions. I proposed that marginalization 
in the case of Tahrir was effected through what I described as a “revolutionary boundary.” And 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 For a similar point as I am making here, see historian Irène Herrmann’s, “Introduction–Ruptures in 
Revolution,” La Révolution française, December 9, 2011, http://lrf.revues.org/319 (accessed July 3, 2014).  
See also Olivia Harris (2004) argument that Braudel focused on long time spans, the longue durée,  and 
history as continuity, thus giving insufficient attention to the idea of rupture or breaks in time, and that he 
avoided clear periodization. 
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this worked through two mechanisms: internally through the dominance of the idea of unity, 
where, as a price of unity, many voices got marginalized. And this also worked externally, where 
the main mechanism was the ambivalence of the relation between other revolutionary forces or 
modes of actions taking place outside what was constructed at the time as the center of action or 
the revolution. Again, this is only one case study and my proposed explanation in this research 
may not be generalizable to other cases. But this idea is worth investigating further; specifically, 
it worth examining how mechanisms of marginalization coincide with (both physical and 
symbolic) spatial marginalization. 
 The fourth theoretical implication of this research is that it highlights the need to take not 
only spatiality, but also temporality seriously in the study of mobilization and social movements. 
Much social movement literature underestimates the impact of temporality on framing or 
resource mobilization, even though the literature admits that mobilizations are processes that 
vary over time. In 2001, McAdam and Sewell, for example, suggested that the two main 
temporal logics that dominate the study of social movements are studying them as part of a 
“long-term change process” or as protest cycles (2001: 90).  One can add to these two other 
logics. The first is from the work of Sewell, which is to study movements—in this case, studying 
a revolution as a movement—as contingent events (Sewell 1996).  The second is studying 
movements in terms of their continuity and with respect to the question of abeyance (Taylor 
1989). My research shows that previous movements were connected to the new movements—in 
this case the revolution itself—in different ways. This included: 1) temporal connection through 
the spatiality of Tahrir, as an important historical protest site, 2) through repertoire, in terms of 
the idea of occupation itself, 3) through grievance, in terms of the dominance of the idea of 
political reform over a more revolutionary agenda, and 4) through the actors themselves, some of 
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whom participated in older protests where their old experience shaped their participation in the 
revolution. In other words, one can suggest that instead of studying only one movement in the 
past or in the present, it is important to study the connections between old movements and new 
movements, and to investigate rigorously the different types and logics of temporal connections 
between the two. My aim is to expand this research with the enormous data I have and to 
investigate seriously the idea of movements’ temporal successions/connections: in terms of 
logics space, repertoire, agenda, and actors.  
 The fifth theoretical implication of this research is its invitation to question the very 
meaning of regime change in revolutions. Scholars of revolutions coined the term “refolution” 
after the Orange Revolutions, where they saw change limited to negotiated or electoral reforms. 
And we learned from both the Orange revolutions of 1989 and the Arab Spring, as has been 
made very obvious here in the Egyptian case, that ousting dictators does not necessarily mean 
per se the downfall of the regime.  If we agree that the Egyptian regime was personalistic (or 
“Sultanistic” to use Goldstone’s term), then the capability of the regime to survive and fight back, 
if not also reversing the revolution, is a puzzle that needs an explanation.  The puzzle here is how 
a regime that seemed to be personalistic, a dictatorial regime that was centered around one leader, 
was capable to adapt and not only to survive, but also to fight back after the ousting of that leader. 
Of course, in the case of Egypt, this means delving further into the specific history of the military 
and its complex relation with the state, and also examining the role of significant superpowers 
like the U.S. in sustaining the regime. Egyptian revolutionaries themselves were divided and 
argued about the difference between regime change and seizing state power or change in the 
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state. In other words, the tension and relation between the regime and the state is something that 
warrants more investigation. 255 
 A sixth theoretical implication of this research is its challenge to literature in social 
movements and communication studies that creates a rigid binary between online and offline 
activism. In this research, it was showed that this binary is faulty, and maybe exaggerated. In 
many cases, activists who have been working online took their actions to the streets. And 
likewise, activists who worked primarily online nonetheless coordinated behind the scenes (due 
to security reasons) with activists working on the ground. In other words, what often appeared to 
be online activism only was, in fact, an outcome of coordination between online activists and 
offline activists.  Of course, in a major event like a revolution, the argument that the revolution 
was made or decided on-line is obsolete. But in general, this research is still an invitation to re-
think this binary. This binary may be created only for analytical and academic purposes, but it is 
important to acknowledge its limitation.   
 I will end here with  a specific conclusion from this research that has both empirical and 
also theoretical implications. This refers to the idea of political public space, and specifically 
how activists or concerned citizens navigate their actions among three spaces: formal political 
space, social media space, and the space of street politics. A close analysis of the history of 
mobilization in Egypt before the revolution reveals all three as spaces in and through which the 
broader political public space was constituted. By examining the history of mobilization in these 
three space, particularly in the decade before the revolution, I was able to identity a pattern 
whereby Egyptian activists turned to social media space and street politics when formal political 
space was virtually closed. The general logic was that street politics were used as an alternative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 The different meanings of regime change in revolution have been much discussed, particularly in 
political science.  See, for, example Bermeo (1990), Hale (2005, 2013),  and Kis (1995). 
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to and against the restrictions in formal politics. Social media in general was in the backseat to 
street politics, but it sometimes came into the front seat when street politics were blocked or 
banned. But the aim of both the spaces of social media and street politics was to expand the 
formal politics space. They were alternative and against formal politics in general, sometimes 
against it altogether, but the aim was always to expand and push the limits of formal politics, and 
pave a road to democracy in Egypt.  
 Empirically, in the context in which the current regime is essentially shutting down street 
politics, and has plans to spend enormous amount of money for surveillance of social media, 
there will be nowhere for Egyptians to practice politics other than the realm of formal politics.256 
The new regime would do well to recall that this narrowing of political space was one of the 
main triggers of the revolution against Mubarak. Regardless of how fair elections might be under 
the current military regime in Egypt in the future, given the relatively recent occurrence of a 
revolution and  the renewed context of a closed civil society featuring censorship and repression, 
these conditions will not be satisfactory to many Egyptians. At the very least, the situation does 
not bode well for a stable regime. Theoretically, then, the relationship between these three spaces 
(formal politics, social media, and street politics) within the overall political public space, with 
the specific formulations and conclusions learned from the Egyptian case before the revolution, 
is worth more investigation and application in some other authoritarian contexts.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 See Patrick Kingsley, “Egypt’s Police Seek Ability to Monitor Social Media for Signs of Dissent,” The 
Guardian, June 2, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/02/egypt-police-monitor-social-
media-dissent-facebook-twitter-protest (accessed July 3, 2014). See also reports that the plans for new 
electoral laws in Egypt seem to be privileging individual businesspersons and not political parties, where 
about 2/3 of the parliamentary seats will be reserved for individual candidates not political party 
candidates. This will mean limiting the changes of political parties, and gave more changes to old elites 
with money. see http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/06/us-egypt-election-
idUSKBN0EH16L20140606 (accessed July 3, 2014).  
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Appendix 1: Interview Questions 
 
(University of Michigan-Ann Arbor IRB  No: HUM00053086) 
Investigator: Atef Said, Doctoral Candidate, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan 
First: General Demographic Information 
1) Name:  
2) Age:  
3) Gender: 
4) Occupation: 
5) How do you see yourself in terms of class (choose one of the following: working class, 
middle class, upper middle class, capitalist class)? And tell me why you chose so? 
6) Also if you do not feel comfortable or have difficulty choosing from the above, please 
choose from the following options (you are economically: barely surviving, have a little 
extra income beyond surviving,  have a lot of money beyond surviving) 
 
Second: General Questions about activism, participation in the revolution: 
1) Did you participate in any protest before January 25, 2011 revolution? What are these? 
2) Did you consider yourself a political activist before the revolution? Why? 
3) Describe to me what you did generally in the days from January 25 to February 11, 2011? 
4) Do you have important stories that you do not mind sharing about these days? What are 
these? 
 
Third: Questions about classes in the revolution: 
1) Most analysts and media circles portray the revolution as initiated and led mainly by 
middle class Egyptian youth (those who have I-phones and activists in the social media?). 
Do you think that this portrayal is accurate? Why or why not? 
2)  Do you remember the presence of trade unions and working class protesters in Tahrir? 
Tell me more about that, if yes? 
3) Did you learn that many workers’ strikes took place in the last days of the revolution? Do 
you think these were important? Why or why not? 
4) Many activists I talked too, and also when I was in Tahrir, told me that many owners of 
small businesses and white collar workers were in Tahrir and participated in the 
revolution? How do you explain that? 
5)  If all of these stories are true, how do you explain that blue collar, white collar, and small 
business owners/middle class people participated in the revolution? 
 
Fourth: Questions about Tahrir: 
1) Did you participate in the famous sit-in in Tahrir Square from January 25 to Feb 11, 2011? 
(this section in the questions may be skipped if the subject did not participate, and  she/he 
can answer only relevant questions) 
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2) If yes, describe to me your participation in these days? 
3) In your opinion, why protesters decided to hold a sit-in in Tahrir in the first place? 
4) Describe the sit-in in terms of the organization of space? 
5) Describe the sit-in in terms of social life and day and night activities..etc? 
6) Did particular political movements and coalitions organize the sit-in? If yes, what are 
these?  
7) From your observations and experience in the sit-in, how was the diversity of opinions 
managed in the sit-in? 
8) In the media and according to many analysts, the Egyptian revolution was referred to as 
the Tahrir revolution? Why is that in your opinion? 
9) Are there any specific reasons why Tahrir Square was geographically important? 
10)  After the revolution, activists kept coming back to Tahrir, why is that? 
 
Fifth: Questions about the revolution/demands and vision about the state? 
1) In the revolution, protesters raised a general slogan: “ the people want the downfall of 
this regime.” Do you remember the first time this slogan was raised?  
2) Protesters tried to translate their general demands into another slogan: “bread, freedom 
and social justice.” What does this mean? 
3) Protesters also made a list of demands about the revolution, do you remember these 
demands? Tell me some of them? 
4) One of the key demands was to establish a democratic state, which is based on 
parliamentary democracy? Why is that? 
5) Do you think that this demand is sufficient or may be seen as the corner stone of the list 
of demands? Why, why not? 
6) Do you remember any discussions in Tahrir and or during the time of the revolution 
about the experience or the failure of parliamentary democracy in Europe, and hence, it is 
not enough to raise this demand in the Egyptian revolution? If this happened, tell us about 
these discussions? 
7) Were you and or others worried about the role of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces 
leading the transitional period in Egypt? Why? 
 
Last:  
1) In your opinion, what happened in the transitional period so far, in terms of factor that 
make you worry or make you assured about the future democracy in Egypt? 
2) Do you have any general comments you want to add about the revolution? 
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Appendix 2: Political Protests in Contemporary Egypt since 1919 
Date  Protest for/against  In or near what is now Tahrir Square?  
1. 1919 Protest against British 
Occupation.  
Protests throughout Cairo and Egypt, but 
especially in Tahrir, given the location of 
British Army barracks there. 
2. February 1936 Protest against the 
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty 
of 1936, guaranteeing 
superficial 
independence for Egypt. 
 Yes, for the same reason above. 
3. February 21, 1946 Protest calling for 
British forces to 
evacuate the Nile Valley 
completely (Egypt and 
Sudan).  
Yes; evacuated by force when police and 
British military opened Abbas bridge and 
many students protestors drowned in the 
Nile. 
4. December 14, 1947 Protest against UN 
resolution number 181 
creating a partition 
between Palestine and 
Israel.  
Yes; but even more in Cairo Opera House 
Square, also known as Ibrahim Pasha 
Square. 
5. November 14, 1951 
 
Protest against British 
occupation.  
Yes; again targeting location of barracks. 
Students and protesters marched from 
Tahrir to the King’s palace in Abdeen 
Square nearby.  
6. June 9, 1967 Sparked by Nasser 
stepping down 
following military 
defeat by Israel; 
Egyptians took to the 
streets to demand his 
return. 
Yes; crowds also gathered in front of 
Nasser’s home in Qouba. 
7. February 1968 Student demonstration 
calling for more 
freedoms and protesting 
the verdicts in the trials 
of military personnel 
charged as responsible 
for the 1967 defeat. 
Yes  
8. January 1972 Student protest of the 
lack of an equitable 
social justice system 
and democracy, and 
President Sadat’s failure 
to liberate the occupied 
Sinai peninsula.  
Yes; students occupied Tahrir for almost 
one day. 
9. January 1977 Popular protests against 
end of state subsidies 
Yes  
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for basic foodstuffs, 
Sadat’s first 
introduction of IMF 
policies in Egypt.  
September 10,  2001  Part of a series of 
protests across  
Egyptian universities 
following the second 
Palestinian Intifada 
(uprising) in 2000, in 
solidarity with 
Palestinians  
Yes; protests were blockaded by the police 
in the area in front of Mogamma. 
March 20-21, 2003  Popular protest against 
the Anglo-American 
war on Iraq  
Yes; protestors occupied Tahrir for roughly 
one day 
March 2006 Protestors staged sit-in 
in solidarity with pro-
democracy judges 
prosecuted by Mubarak 
regime  
Yes; protestors occupied Tahrir for roughly 
one day. 
July 2006  Demonstration in 
solidarity with Lebanon 
during the Israeli war 
Yes 
April 6, 2008 Demonstration in 
solidarity with Mahala 
Kobbra workers  
Yes  
January 25, 2011 Egyptian Revolution  Yes; protesters occupied Tahrir for the 18 
days of the revolution. 
 
Table compiled by the author (sources: Abdel Razeq (1985), El-Hamalawy (2001), Farag (1999), and 
Taher (2012), as well as interviews conducted with Egyptian activists). 
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Appendix 3: List of Major Political Coalitions in Egypt, 2000–2010257 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 I constructed this table based on my own experience and knowledge, and also on discussions and 
interviews with many activists, including Ayman Abdel Moati and Yehia Fekry, both of whom 
participated in many of these coalitions.  Abdel Moati, in paticular, assisted me in constructing 
the table. Four articles by Amira Howeidy about the period from 2000 to 2005 published in Al-
Ahram Weekly were also especially useful. See: http://weekly.ahram.org. 
 eg/2005/731/eg10.htm; also, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/748/eg10.htm; also, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/748/eg8.htm; and http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/748/eg9.htm (all last 
accessed June 1, 2014).  
 
Date of 
formation 
(approx.) 
Name of  
coalition 
Component 
groups/forces  
Main objectives  Status  
2000 The Egyptian 
Committee for 
Defending the 
Prisoners of 
Consciousness 
Formed by leftists  
and Islamist lawyers 
and hosted by the 
Egyptian Bar 
Association   and the 
Egyptian Press 
Syndicate.  
To defend prisoners 
of consciousness in 
Egypt 
Continues 
today,  mainly 
hosted by the 
Egyptian Press 
Syndicate.  
September 
2000 
The Popular 
Committee for 
the Solidarity 
with the 
Egyptian 
Intifada 
Formed mainly by 
activists from the 
1970s generation; 
also included 
members of these 
groups: Karama 
Party (new Nassserist 
group), Egyptian 
Communist Party, 
Tagamou leftist 
party, revolutionary 
socialists, and the 
Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB). 
To collect donations, 
food and medical aid 
for Palestinians, as 
well as to protest 
against Mubarak 
regime’s 
complicity/biased 
role in the peace 
process.  
Divisions 
developed  
between 
reformist and 
more radical 
members; 
reemerged in 
April 2002 for a 
short period, 
and again in 
2009 after the 
siege of Gaza. 
No longer exists 
in practice.   
August 
2001 
Coordinating 
Committee for 
Workers and 
Trade Union 
Rights 
Started as an 
initiative by unionists 
and human rights 
NGOs working on 
labor issues; later 
joined by many 
parties and groups 
To assist trade unions 
and workers with 
labor 
rights/organizing 
issues; provides legal 
aid and awareness 
campaigns  
Continues today 
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and other additional 
unionists later 
September 
2001;  
first 
formal  
founding  
meeting on 
June  28, 
2002 
The Anti-
Globalization 
Egyptian 
Group (AGEG) 
Leftist and socialist 
organizations, but 
also open to 
individual members.   
 
To mobilize against 
globalization and 
neo-liberal policies in 
Egypt, particularly 
those negatively 
affecting workers, 
peasants, and the 
poor in Egypt. 
Organized a public 
conference opposing 
visit of the World 
Bank president to 
Egypt on October 12, 
2003.  
Defunct 
September 
2001 
Coalition 
Against the 
War on 
Afghanistan   
Impromptu coalition 
that included 
socialists,  Nasserists, 
and other 
independent 
members  
To mobilize people 
in the streets in 
opposition to the U.S. 
war on Afghanistan   
Defunct 
December 
2002 
 
Egyptian 
Popular 
Campaign 
Against the 
War,  
Imperialism, 
and Zionism   
Founded by the 
Nasserists party, and 
also Karama party, as 
well as socialists, 
mainly the 
Revolutionary 
Socialists, as well as 
the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the 
Egyptian Communist 
Party. 
To coordinate and 
organize efforts to 
support anti-colonial 
and anti-war 
movements in the 
region. Organized an 
annual international 
conference in Cairo 
against the war for 
six years, from 2002–
2008.  
Ended in 2008. 
January 
2003 
Campaign 
Against the 
War on Iraq   
Leftists (socialists 
and Nasserists, and 
others) 
To mobilize people 
in the streets in 
opposition to the U.S. 
war on Iraq. 
Developed as part of 
an international 
campaign (and 
regular conference in 
Cairo) against war 
and imperialism.  
Faded after 
2005. 
March 9, 
2003 
Movement for 
Independence 
of Universities  
(March 9 
movement) 
Mostly individuals 
but many of them 
belong to political 
forces and parties, 
mostly liberal and 
leftists. 
To defend 
universities against 
state control, and 
expose corruption on 
campuses (sparked 
by Cairo University’s 
administration 
Continues 
today. 
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appropriating a 
building for Gamal 
Mubarak’s 
Association- Al-
Mostaqbal) 
January 4, 
2004 
Committee to 
Defend 
Pension Rights 
for the Retired 
Mostly leftist lawyers 
and unionists, but 
joined with workers 
and unions and 
groups. 
To save pensions and 
pension rights (due to 
the fact that the 
government under 
Mubarak wasted 
most pension 
money).  
Now defunct, 
but did give 
birth to a union 
of the retired 
which was 
founded after 
the revolution  
Founding 
meeting on 
March 13, 
2004 
20 March 
Movement for 
Change 
(named after 
the protest held 
the year before 
against the war 
on Iraq)  
Mostly socialists 
from different 
groups, but also open 
to individuals 
To mobilize against 
despotism, 
dictatorship,  
poverty, and 
imperialism.  
Defunct.  
September 
4, 2004 
Kefayya 
(Enough), The 
Egyptian 
Movement for 
Change  
Nasserists, Socialists 
and members in 
different political 
parties, and also 
NGOs, with 
individuals from the 
MB 
To mobilize around 
amending the 
constitution to allow 
multi-candidate 
based presidency and 
free elections, among 
other things. 
Active until the 
revolution (but 
became less 
visible after the 
formation of the 
National 
Association for 
Change in 2010, 
see below) 
September 
2004 
 
 
National 
Coalition for 
Change  
MB and 
Revolutionary 
Socialists (RS), as 
well as  members in 
the March 20 
movement 
To mobilize for 
democracy in Egypt, 
specifically, to end 
succession and make 
constitutional 
amendments. 
Organized some 
press conferences 
and protests. 
Short-lived and 
generally 
ineffective; seen 
as largely 
dominated by 
the MB 
members, who 
outnumbered 
RS members.  
2005 Leftist Union Many socialist 
organizations and 
parties in Egypt 
(mostly underground) 
such as the Egyptian 
Communist party, the 
People’s Party, and 
the Revolutionary 
Socialists.; did not 
include the  
Tagamou Party. 
To build a general 
socialist network 
(and, hopefully, a 
Socialist Party in the 
future); activities 
were limited to 
meetings and writing 
papers.   
Did not continue 
beyond 2005.  
2005 Workers for Unionists, NGOs, To apply minimum Defunct 
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Change and individuals. wage in Egypt; 
change bonuses 
regulations; enact 
laws about work 
space health 
conditions, and laws 
related to health and 
social insurance to 
workers; criminalize 
child labor; and 
change laws related 
to labor organizing 
rights to make sure 
they meet 
international 
standards.  
February 
2005 
Youth For 
Change 
Youth from different 
parties such as the 
Nasserist party, Ghad 
party, Karama party, 
Revolutionary 
Socialists, and also 
Wasat party, and 
labor party, and 
independent youth  
Started as part of 
Kefayya, but split off 
when youth wanted 
to be more flexible 
with organizing 
activities.  
Works mostly for the 
same goals of 
Kefayya but in 
campuses and streets. 
Now defunct, 
but gave birth to 
many later 
youth groups 
such as the 
April 6 
movement and 
others. 
June 2005 Journalists for 
Change 
Members in press 
syndicates from 
different parties, but 
mostly members in 
Kefayya  
To end emergency 
status in Egypt and 
release political 
prisoners; also to 
change press laws in 
Egypt to make sure 
journalists not jailed 
for their writings.  
Defunct 
June 2005 
 
Writers and 
Artists for 
Change 
Artists, writers, and 
public intellectuals, 
some independent 
and some belonging 
to parties.  
To mobilize for 
democratic change in 
Egypt and also to 
defend the rights of 
artists who died in 
Bani Suef (a theatre 
which was burned in 
2005). Organized a 
number of protests in 
downtown Cairo, 
particularly Talat 
Harb Square. 
Defunct 
2005 Engineers for 
Change 
Engineers, mostly 
members in Kefayya 
To mobilize for the 
independence of the 
Engineers Syndicates 
from the control of 
Defunct 
	  297	  
	  
the state, and also 
mobilize for 
democracy in Egypt 
June 29, 
2005 
Lawyers for 
Change 
Lawyers, especially 
members in Kefayya  
To mobilize for 
democracy and 
liberties in Egypt, 
including rights to 
organize and 
personal freedoms 
and also to end 
emergency status. 
Defunct 
July 30, 
2005 
Students for 
Change 
Students members in 
Kefayya and political 
parties  
To end Mubarak rule 
and stop succession 
in Egypt, end 
security control of 
campuses, and 
expand free 
education to all, end 
emergency status, 
and establish 
independent 
universities   
Defunct 
April 2006 Egyptians 
Against 
Religious 
Discrimination  
Founded by 200 
Egyptian 
individuals—mostly 
public intellectuals,  
writers, academics, 
and activists—many 
of whom are 
members in various 
parties, groups, and 
associations. 
To defend citizens 
and citizenship 
rights, especially 
those of minorities 
facing religious 
discrimination. 
Continues 
today. 
August 
2006 
Leftist 
Coalition  
Many socialist 
organizations and 
parties in Egypt 
(mostly underground) 
such as the Egyptian 
Communist party, the 
People’s Party and 
the Revolutionary 
socialists; did include  
Tagamou Party. 
To build a network of 
socialist groups in 
Egypt to work 
together around 
issues of poverty and 
social justice; 
activities were 
limited to meetings 
and writing papers.  
Did not 
continue. 
December 
28, 2006 
Front to 
Defend 
Peasants 
(Peasants Strife 
Campaign) 
Political parties and 
NGOs and leaders of 
farmers movements 
To support struggle 
of peasants in Egypt, 
end peasants debt in 
Egypt, and combat 
the negative 
implication of law 
number 96 for year 
1992 (The purpose of 
Defunct 
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this law was to undo 
the policy of land 
appropriations and 
rent laws for poor 
peasants set since 
Nasser in 1952, 
which means more 
privatization of 
agriculture, seen as 
more bias for land 
lords and old  
feudalists in Egypt) 
2007 Doctors 
without Rights 
Individual doctors 
and activists, 
especially in the 
doctors syndicates, 
and doctors who are 
members in political 
parties .  
To apply special laws 
for underpaid 
doctors, who work in 
the government, 
increase bonuses 
related the conditions 
of doctors work, and 
improve the health 
care budget in Egypt.  
Continues today 
(and gave birth 
to Doctors of 
Tahrir, an entity 
that assisted the 
injured in Tahrir 
during the 
revolution and 
in the 
transitional 
period) 
May 2008 National 
Committee to 
Defend 
Egypt’s Wealth 
Mostly individuals 
but members in 
political parties and 
other groups too 
To organize 
campaigns against 
exporting Gas to 
Israel, end and/or 
limit monopoly in 
Egypt, and also 
organize campaigns 
against the 
government wasting 
natural resources in 
Egypt.  
Unclear when it 
ended, but 
probably gave 
birth to a similar 
group after the 
revolution that 
aimed to get 
back money 
stolen by 
Mubarak 
officials.  
February 
19, 2008 
Tadamon 
(Solidarity) 
Revolutionary 
socialists, unionists, 
and some members in 
NGOs 
To support social 
movements in Egypt 
especially labor 
movements and 
economic and social 
justice based 
movements  
Did not 
continue, but 
there were some 
attempts to 
revive it in 
2009. 
September 
21, 2008 
Egyptian 
Movement for 
Democracy 
(Shorakaa-
Partners) 
Individuals, and 
NGOs 
To make 
constitutional 
amendments to 
article 76 (facilitating 
Gamal Mubarak’s 
succession), and limit 
presidential terms to 
two. 
Defunct  
May 22, Popular Revolutionary To assist workers in Ended before 
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2009 Preparatory 
Commission 
for Labor  
Socialists, unionists 
and some members in 
NGOs 
Egypt to unionize, 
launch campaign to 
enact a minimum 
wage law in Egypt, 
stop privatization, 
and end monopoly 
corporations in Egypt 
and/or nationalize 
these. 
the revolution. 
October 
2009 
Egyptian 
Campaign 
Against 
Succession   
Members from 
different political 
parties and NGOs 
To campaign against 
the succession of 
Gamal Mubarak to 
his father’s position; 
involved political, 
constitutional, media 
and legal fronts, as 
well as raising 
awareness about the 
issue. 
Ended with the 
revolution.  
December 
8, 2009 
Egyptian 
Campaign to 
Boycott  Gas 
Companies 
Open to individuals  
and political parties 
and groups  
To boycott natural 
gas company in 
Egypt (through not 
paying the monthly 
bills) to protest 
overpricing and also 
to stop exporting gas 
to Israel.  
Defunct 
January 9, 
2010 
Egyptian 
Campaign to 
Combat the 
Wall of Shame  
Individuals and 
groups from different 
parties  
To protest against the 
building of an 
underground steel 
wall between Egypt 
and Gaza, and to 
organize campaigns 
to collect donations 
for Palestinians 
Defunct 
March 2, 
2010 
The National 
Association 
For Change  
Almost all opposition 
political parties in 
Egypt, with NGOs 
and political groups 
from socialists to 
Islamic groups. Was 
the main platform for 
youth groups and 
demands in the 
revolution. Collected 
over a million 
signatures to endorse 
demands, and chaired 
by El Baradei. 
To end emergency 
status, and demand  
judicial supervision 
of election, as well as 
constitutional 
amendments. 
Continues today 
and played an 
important role in 
the revolution.  
June 2010 Democratic Mostly leftist To mobilize masses Continues today 
	  300	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Popular 
Movement for 
Change 
(Hashd) 
individuals and 
organizations, but 
coordinated mainly 
by Revolutionary 
Socialists  
for change in Egypt, 
and to build a radical 
revolutionary 
alternative in Egypt. 
but is largely 
ineffective. 
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